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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to explore Germany’s border policies in the face of a 
European-level intergovernmental regime for border-related policies: The Schengen 
Agreements (1985-1995)1. The results are twofold: The border retains an essential role for 
state authorities for security provision since European solutions were only sought to 
nationally understood security threats. Yet a new principle of internal and external borders 
emerged in which competence for border policies was moved to the European level and in 
which the interests of other states have to be taken into account as if they were the state’s 
own.
The thesis analyses the rationale of Germany for advocating such a transfer of hitherto 
essentially national competence to an intergovernmental mechanism. The motive is 
identified in a combination of national (internal) security interests and current 
interpretations of historical experiences. A socialisation of Western Germany into 
European institutions led it to seek a European-level solution.
In this context, the changes of the political landscape in 1989 had profound implications 
for the debate about borders. A changed security situation led to a focus on soft security 
matters which were connected to deep-seated uncertainties of the possible threats 
emanating from an unstable Eastern Europe. Germany’s relationship with its eastern 
neighbours had to be clarified (which included the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border), 
and it had to assure the Schengen partners of its ability to guard the eastern Schengen 
border.
The thesis concludes that Germany was one of the driving forces in the Schengen 
negotiations. From the start, Germany advocated a set of compensatory measures which 
were to counteract the identified loss of the security function of the border against 
international crime and illegal immigration. In parallel, it also implemented significant 
additional changes on the national level. The resulting Schengen system established a link 
between freedom and security which was retained in subsequent EU arrangements.
1 Beginning of negotiations to beginning of implementation
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State borders, Schengen and Germany
1. Introduction
The Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 19902 and their integration into the European 
Treaties by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 represented a fundamental change with 
regard to border policies in Europe. Negotiated and implemented in a period of major 
transitions in Europe, they were decisive steps in European integration. When the process 
of abolishing border controls started in 1984/85 as a result of a general intention to 
reinforce European integration and of a strike of lorry drivers, the consequences of such an 
enterprise had not been thought through and were considered unproblematic. The years of 
negotiations which followed made apparent the complexity of the issue:
While the modalities of border controls and law enforcement cooperation had hitherto 
been an exclusive competence of state governments, these agreements introduced 
substantial European-level solutions to perceived security problems. Not only were actual 
controls at the borders to be conducted according to a common standard; via common 
databases on people and goods sought, authorities of one state could require those of 
another state to act on their behalf. Furthermore, a principle was introduced in which one 
state of the Schengen partnership had to observe the interests of other states as if they 
were its own.
For scholars of International Relations, it is therefore an important question why states 
were willing to give up these traditional competences anchored in national sovereignty. 
Whilst it is not enough to cite security interests for such a development, it is interesting to 
ask what kind of security was to be provided through this arrangement, which threats were 
identified as primary and in which processes with what actors. It is also important to 
retrace the processes through which this European solution, that was advocated by national 
governments, became accepted as the adequate solution in the national arena.
One of the central questions of this thesis is which role Germany played in the Schengen 
negotiations and how it influenced the agenda as well as the solutions found. Germany’s 
historical experiences led it to consider its geographic position as a direct neighbour of two 
Eastern European states as problematic with regard to immigration and international crime.
2 The 1985 treaty is commonly called the ‘Schengen Agreement’, while the 1990 text is referred to as the 
‘Schengen Convention’. If both Schengen treaties are referred to, this thesis will use the expression 
‘Schengen Agreements’.
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Its European anchoring led it to seek a common European solution to this problem. 
During the negotiations, Germany’s experiences in terms of practice and techniques of 
control as well as its central role in the European integration process assured the country a 
key position.
The aim of this thesis is therefore to retrace the national German debate regarding changes 
of border controls between 1985 and 1995. At the same time, the interplay between the 
European and national level is to be investigated -  showing German influences on the 
outcome of negotiations, but also the influence of European processes on German 
arrangements of border controls.
The timeframe of investigation concentrates on the years between 1985 to 1995. This space 
encompasses the time between the signing of the first Schengen Agreement and the 
entering into force of both Agreements (in 1995). During these ten years, the fundamental 
decisions on the direction and inner logic of the treaties were taken. Although important 
developments also took place after 1995, they did not run counter to the fundamental 
directions negotiated before. Developments after the implementation show that the initial 
rationale was expanded and also found entry into the legal arrangements of the EU through 
integration of Schengen into the European treaties.
Border, frontiers, boundaries3 -  these terms are very much part of everyday language as 
well as of the daily experience of citizens: passport controls, cross-border shopping, the 
presence of asylum seekers, the changes of currency, language or dialects at the border... - 
all this illustrates the variety of effects of borders on daily lives of citizens and foreigners. It 
is also apparent that borders differ in their character for individuals. For many people, 
borders imply difference: different language, food, mentality -  ‘others’ live on the other 
side. This is not only true for state borders, but also for regional borders within states. Yet 
borders can also represent contact points in areas where the possibility of economic or 
cultural exchange over the border is more central than political and societal antagonism.
Growing up in Western Europe after the end of the Second World War sheltered many 
people from the experience of one of the harshest effects of frontiers: being denied visas or
3 The usage of these terms differs widely as Chapter 2 (part 2.1) shows in more detail. This thesis uses 
the terms in the following sense: Border and frontier are both used for political borders. Frontier is 
used more to designate international state borders and the external borders of the EU. Border refers 
to political and administrative limits on all levels. Boundary is employed as the term with the widest 
connotations, referring to a political border on any level, but also to an abstract ‘limit’.
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entry to places or being prevented to exit from their own state -  an experience very 
common in many other parts of the world. Yet people were not unfamiliar with strict 
border controls between states and the possibility of a subjection to the search of car or 
body at checkpoints. West European countries conducted border controls on goods for 
purposes of taxation, enforcement of quality or security standards and of laws of import, 
and they enacted controls of persons for purposes of public security, criminal investigation 
and immigration control. Especially the entry to East European states carried with it an 
exercise of the full control of state authorities.
Germans had an ambiguous experience of consequences of borders: one aspect was that 
crossing the border to go to Berlin or into Eastern Europe entailed detailed controls, 
rejection of certain goods in the luggage and even denial of entry. The inner-German 
border made contacts with the 17 million Germans on the other side (to whom many West 
Germans were related) very limited. Awareness of borders was high -  the vast majority of 
citizens lived within 150 km of a land border, and many lived close to the German-German 
border.
The inner-German border was one of the most fortified in the world. Personal accounts of 
people living in Berlin -  a divided city surrounded by borders -  often referred to the 
feeling of being shut in. Whereas the Western side of the inner-German border remained 
relatively unfortified, the eastern side was heavily guarded along the whole length of the 
border. The following gives an impression of the array of subsequent rows of barriers on 
the eastern side of the border.
- 15 -
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Figure 1: The border between the GDR and FRG4
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The image gives an idea of the impression the presence of such a border must have left on 
the consciousness of Germans. There were changes to the border regime, but those did 
little to alleviate the impression of overpowering control.5 Testimonies to the important 
role of the border in daily lives are numerous anthologies and other collections 
documenting ‘life with the border’ which were published before and after the fall of the 
wall.6 Thus, growing up in Germany meant that the eastern border attained an immense 
psychological importance. The disappearance of this border was charged with new hopes, 
but also new fears which became part of the German response to Schengen.
4 Source: Bundesministerium fur Innerdeutsche Beziehungen, In the Heart o f Germany, in the Twentieth
Century (Karlsruhe: Badenia Verlag, 1965).
5 By the 1980s, the mines had been removed. The metal fence had been fortified, the observation posts
multiplied, dogs were constantly on patrol and the third line fence had become equipped with 
electronic and acustic signals. Border guards had the duty to shoot if a person trying to exit without 
permit did not stop on demand.
6 Cf. for example Ernst-Michael Brandt and Roger Melis, Die unsichtbare Grenze oderLeben in zwei Welten
(Hamburg: Luchterhand, 1991), Ralph Giordano, "Hier war ja Schluss... " (Hamburg: Rasch und 
Rohring, 1996), Karl Ruppert, Beispielefiir Verflechtungen undZusammenarheitander Grenze (Hannover: 
Vincentz, 1984), Dietmar Schultke, "Keinerkommtdurch " (Berlin: Aufbau-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1999), 
Ludwig Schumann, Grenze (Magdeburg: Blaue Apfel, 1999), Klaus Herwig Stoll, Dienst an der Grenze 
(Fulda: Parzeller, 2000).
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The other aspect of West German post-war experience with borders was ease of travel 
within Europe, and increasingly within the whole Western world. Indeed, West Germans 
liked to think of themselves as ‘world champions of travel’. The following chart shows that 
in comparison to their fellow Europeans, Germans were especially eager to spend time and 
money on journeys beyond their borders. The numbers from 1980 and 1993 demonstrate 
that Germans continuously spent more on travels abroad than citizens of most other 
countries.7
Country Rank in 1993 Spending in 
million $ in 1993
Spending in 
million $ in 
1980
Rank in 1980
United States 1 40,564 10,385 2
Germany 2 37,514 20,599 1
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland
4 17,431 6,893 3
Italy 5 13,053 1,907 12
France 6 12,805 6,027 4
Netherlands 8 8,974 4,664 5
Austria 9 8,180 2,847 10
Belgium 11 6,363 3,272 8
Switzerland 12 5,803 2,357 11
Spain 14 4,706 1,229 21
Sweden 15 4,464 1,235 20
Australia 17 4,100 1,749 15
Norway 18 3,565 1,310 19
Denmark 19 3,214 1,560 17
Portugal 27 1,846 290 37
Finland 29 1,617 544 28
Ireland 32 1,256 742 26
Greece 34 1,003 190 41
7 Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Tourismus in Zahlen 1995 (Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel, 1996). 
See also more extensive chart in the appendix. Figures about Germany include the Eastern part from 
July 1990 onwards.
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It is difficult to say where this desire to cross borders and go abroad sprang and springs 
from: one might certainly cite the difficult and sometimes tense situation concerning the 
inner-German border which made Germans enjoy the opportunity to cross other borders 
in the West easily. One might also refer to the German historical experience which led to a 
great willingness to view the country’s political and citizens’ individual future in a European 
context. The negative memory of the wars as well as Germans’ longstanding historical links 
all over Europe may have led to an awareness of German connectedness to other 
European states and to a desire to forge friendly ties with former enemies. The rise of 
economic productivity and wealth from the 1950s onwards certainly also played a role in 
Germans’ willingness to spend money on holidays abroad and demonstrate one’s ability to 
afford such luxury, which had previously been reserved for the upper social classes. Thus, 
the negotiations for abolition of border controls may be said to have corresponded with an 
existing desire in Germany to facilitate journeys abroad.
The Schengen negotiations which had progressed to a final stage by 1989 were confronted 
with critical uncertainties by the changes in Germany and the centre of Europe. Before 
1989, the division of Europe had precluded many issues from the political agenda which 
had to be accepted as a given. The international security situation allowed only small space 
for manoeuvering, mostly negotiations to change ‘low politics’ circumstances of life for 
citizens. Problems such as the final recognition of the eastern German border or even the 
unification of Europe had been postponed indefinitely. Through the changes, the security 
situation changed fundamentally, replacing a clearly identifiable enemy with so-called ‘soft 
security’ threats such as immigration, terrorism and organised crime: ‘The danger to the 
stability of our system is no longer perceived as a homogeneous external ‘enemy’ which 
was identified with the communist system, but with terrorism, drugs and illegal 
immigration.’8
In Germany, unification brought with it a whole set of questions relating to German 
identity, Germanness and also the relationship with eastern neighbours. This included a re­
inforced debate regarding former German land in Poland and the discussion of ethnic 
Germans’ access to Germany. The public debate also highlighted the historical uncertainty 
of Germany regarding its identity, shape and location of borders. Thus, the role and 
management of borders became a vital issue: firstly, while the border had cut off relations
8 Monica den Boer, "The Quest for European Policing: Rhetoric and Justification in a Disorderly 
Debate," in Policing across National Boundaries, ed. Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer (1994), 
182.
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between the (West) German state and its former lands and area of influence in the East, the 
dismantling of the tightly controlled border between East and West put renewed questions 
of the relationship between Germany, its Eastern neighbours and people of German 
descent. Secondly, while the relations between the two German states had hitherto been 
subject to only painfully negotiated small changes, the reality after the Cold War demanded 
active management of border controls in order to encounter problems of uncontrolled 
migration and international crime.
Germany’s European neighbours also viewed the unification with concern. The questions 
regarding Germany’s role in Europe and its relationship with the East also had 
repercussions for the debate on border controls. One of the concerns was whether 
Germany would be willing and able to control its Eastern border. Other fears related to 
German instability and possible claims to lands in the East.
Thus, the political changes of 1985 -  1991 brought with them enormous implications for 
the discussion of borders and border controls. European integration led to the creation of a 
common market and envisaged the lifting of border controls. German unification did away 
with the border between the former two German states which had been the most fiercely 
guarded border in Europe. Germany saw itself under the obligation internally and from its 
Western partners to guarantee the control of a new Eastern border of the European Union. 
Finally, the fall of the Soviet Union and the re-establishement of the sovereignty of Central 
European states brought with it the freedom of travel for both sides and the interests of 
developing reinforced economic relations with these states. The changes in the East had 
contradictory implications: the developments opened up a ‘new world’ -  politically, 
culturally and economically -  to West European states, especially Germany. At the same 
time, the open borders towards the East became associated with unforeseen consequences 
for Europe such as the influx of immigration and crime.
Although 1989 changed the whole context of the Schengen negotiations, there were also 
considerable elements of continuity. It will be shown that a major part of the compensatory 
measures had been agreed before that time -  partly thanks to German insistence. The 
changes meant that these now became important to Germany’s neighbours to safeguard 
their security interests. While anxieties by Germany’s neighbours led to a delay of
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implementation, the debate in Germany regarding the security function of the external 
border did not change course, it only intensified.9
Western Europeans had been privileged in seeing a new development through travel 
unions which abolished border controls between countries. The earliest two such 
arrangements were the Nordic Passport Union starting in 1954 and the UK-Ireland 
Common Travel Area.10 The start on the continent was the Benelux travel union in 1960 as 
a part of the Benelux Economic Union. Between other countries, such as Germany and 
France, smaller border points could in practice be crossed without much control (especially 
at night), but the legal obligation for full border controls remained. The crossing points at 
major roads for transnational traffic were still controlled closely by the beginning of the 
1980s. Progress in European integration led to disaffection with remaining border controls 
and subsequent delays. Industrial action and perceived economic advantages led the 
German and French government to conclude a bilateral treaty envisaging the abolition of 
border controls in 1984. On the invitation of the Benelux Union, this was extended to 
become a community of five states which envisaged the abolition of border controls at the 
common borders.
The initial rationale was both economic and political: European integration led to the 
enactment of an internal market allowing goods and capital to flow freely in the area of the 
Community. Border checks on goods were to be abolished in order to facilitate trade 
across the whole of the West European territory. What was missing was agreement on the 
freedom of movement for persons, which proved more difficult to introduce due to the 
reticence of some member states, most importantly the UK. The intergovernmental 
Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990 were a solution found to compensate for 
supposed risks attached to full freedom of movement within the EU. They provided for 
compensatory measures such as increased police cooperation and reinforced controls at the 
external borders in order to make up for the loss of internal border controls. It took until 
1995 for the implementation of the agreements to create a true European space of freedom 
of movement. This initial community of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France 
and Germany with the intention to compensate for the negative consequences of the 
realisation of the Single Market, widened its scope to eventually include all EU countries
9 Organised crime had been an occupation for the German police during the whole decade. With the
opening of the iron curtain, fears regarding an influx of criminals intensified.
10 The UK-Ireland Common Travel Area was in fact not a ‘new’ development, but was a result of the 
evolution of Ireland into an autonomous state which took place in the context of the British 
‘common travel area’ for its Empire and Commonwealth.
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except the United Kingdom, Ireland.11 With the integration of the accords into the 
community acquis through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/1999), the agreements have 
become part of the integral logic of the EU and of the acquis all new applicants of the 
Union will have to implement.
Although borders, migration and internal security have been very high on the agenda in 
some of the member states of the European Union, have scholars in political science and 
international relations taken up the issue in greater numbers only recently. There are 
interesting studies, especially in the field of internal security and migration, but the majority 
of scholarship has neglected this ‘second building site of Europe.’12 Within this field, a 
specific interest in borders themselves is rare. Most studies are directed at policy areas such 
as police cooperation or the fight against organised crime which have become part of the 
tasks of the EU since 1992.
Also on a theoretical level, there has been comparatively little interest in consequences of 
border policies for the state, its sovereign authority and intergovernmental cooperation in 
an area of hitherto central national authority. A number of questions has remained largely 
unexplored. One set of questions refers to the role of borders for the modern state: what 
do states expect of their borders at the end of the 1990s, which functions are borders 
supposed to fulfil? Are there differences in such concepts between states? What influences 
the attitudes of states towards their borders after the end of the Cold War? Another field of 
interest could be the relationship between the intended role of the border and practice: 
How are border controls actually conducted? Do they fulfil the function assigned through 
politics and administration? Is the physical border of any relevance at all in Europe 
anymore? Relatively little research has been carried out regarding internal national policies 
of border controls: Which actors within states advocate the control of borders, which 
would like to reduce such checks? What is their relative importance and influence in the 
national policy making field?
11 Spain and Portugal joined in June 1991; Austria signed in April 1995 and began implementation in 
December 1997; Greece signed in November 1992 and started partial implementation at the end of 
1997, Italy signed in November 1990 and fully participated only from October 1997 onwards; 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden joined in December 1996; a cooperation agreement between the 
Schengen states and Iceland and Norway (members of the Nordic Passport Union) was signed at the 
same time.
12 Didier Bigo, ed., L 'Europe des Polices et de la Securite Interieure (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1992).
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2. States, borders and border controls
Policies dealing with migration or foreigners are not only questions of domestic politics. 
Rather, this topic touches upon questions of encountering ‘the other’, whether within or 
across one’s own borders. The increased and lasting presence of foreigners in European 
societies re-poses difficult theoretical questions of identity definition and the constitution 
of a polity. Where is the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and how is this line drawn? 
How is the relationship across this line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ managed?
Political identities in European states have developed at a time of relatively little trans- 
border exchange in terms of migration or trade. In the past decades, European countries 
experienced the opening of borders between Western European states. Exchange and 
intra-Community movement grew over time. With the end of the Cold War, also the stria 
border controls with East European states were eased. Travel to and from Eastern Europe 
became easier and an exchange of goods took place. Soon, however, the experience of 
negative consequences of relatively uncontrolled borders -  illegal migration and crime -  
were noticed. Policies had to be devised which would ensure both the freedom of 
movement as well as deflea as much as possible the negative effects of borders. On the 
level of societal questions, these developments challenged certainty about national identity 
in a number of European countries. Questions of the legitimacy of the presence of 
foreigners were discussed (asylum seekers, work migrants), but also the access to 
citizenship. What makes a person ‘French’, ‘German’ or ‘British’, were questions which had 
to be answered anew in European states.13
On the level of governance, deepening European integration and the consequences of the 
end of the Cold War brought to the surface deep-lying questions of control and ability to 
provide security and freedom. One of the questions became where this control ought to be 
exercised and who should be controlled. On a theoretical level, the past decades therefore 
raised questions of the importance of borders for the modern state. Which role does 
territoriality, do border controls have for the state and its governance?
13 Cf. Koslowski’s account of the critical role of migration in the development of political institutions 
and the problems it raises today for territorially organised institutions. Rey Koslowski, Migrants and 
Citizens. Demographic Change in the European State System (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2000).
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The development of the modern state involved territorial differentiation into like units 
(formally inscribed by the Treaty of Westphalia). Concomitantly, the modern states 
gradually evolved systems of control over individuals from those of hierarchical systems of 
fiefdom to those of state monopoly of power.14
Modern states are therefore territorial in the sense that their mode of governance refers to 
territory. The functioning of the modern state relies on a certain controllability of internal 
events which is guaranteed by borders and their control. Weber has captured this when he 
described the modern state: ’Staat ist diejenige menschliche Gemeinschaft, welche 
innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes -  dies: das „Gebiet“ gehort zum Merkmal -  das 
Monopol legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit fiir sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht.’15
Citizenship, national identity and borders have become interlinked aspects of the modern 
state. The term citizenship denotes a legal relationship between a person and a state from 
which result rights for the individuals and duties towards the state. Part of the rights of 
citizens is to be protected from ‘outsiders’, thus implying a clearly definable distinction 
between citizens and aliens. National service in the army in the event of conflict with other 
states became a constituting feature of the modern state. Citizens of the ‘traditional’ 
modern state defined themselves as living within states. Indeed, Koslowski points to the 
fact that national identity and citizenship developed in a context of emigration in Western 
Europe when the overwhelming majority of inhabitants did correspond with citizens.16 
Growing integration in Europe and of the international system means, however, that a 
rising number of citizens spends time outside their state, whether for reasons of travel, 
work or flight from their country.
Two principles govern the acquisition of citizenship: ius sanguinis (‘the right of the blood’) 
or the principle of descent, and ius soli (‘the right of the soil’) or the territorially based 
principle. Many states apply a mixture of the principles, often under the pressure of 
changed circumstances of migration. Globally speaking, none of the principles dominates: 
the Americas apply predominantly the territorially based principle, Asia and Central and
14 Cf. for example Schulze’s history of state and nation in Europe: Hagen Schulze, Staat und Nation in der 
Europaischen Geschichte, Limitierte Sonderauflage ed. (Miinchen: Beck Verlag, 1999).
15 Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in GesammeltePolitische Schriften, ed Johannes Winckelmann (Tubingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr, 1980).
Translation: The state is this human community which (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory -  this: “territory” is an indispensable part of 
the definition.
16 Cf. Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens. Demographic Change in the European State System.
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Eastern Europe use the principle of descent but refer to the iussoli to avoid statelessness. 
Parts of Africa and Europe still apply primarily the principle of descent. In Europe, most 
states practice a mixture where the principle of descent is complemented with territorially 
based rights to citizenship for second and third generation migrants. Germany, Austria and 
the Scandinavian countries used primarily the principle of descent. Germany changed its 
law of citizenship in 2000 to include a degree of territorially based conditions for 
citizenship for immigrants.17
In the modern system of governance, borders are indispensable for the maintenance of 
domestic order and the enforcement of legal provisions and taxation. Similarly, the welfare 
state depends on a certain congruence between citizenship and those entitled to benefits. 
The terms and conditions under which non-citizens can gain access to the welfare system 
are a matter of fierce debate (see for example the debate regarding social security for guest 
workers in Germany). Thus, the change of the law of citizenship in Germany can be 
interpreted as an attempt to bring into more congruence the holders of democratic rights 
and the permanent domestic residents.18
That modern states display territorial behaviour has to be seen as historically contingent, 
however. Koslowski has shown, for example, how migration poses a challenge to 
territoriality as practiced in the modern state.19 The geographer Sack has identified 
classification by area, communication and control over territory as general characteristics of 
territoriality.20 As socially constituted behaviour, territoriality depends on the reproduction 
of territory-oriented behaviour. The mode of governance of modern states, which relies on 
borders in the sense outlined above, is only one particular practice reproducing 
territoriality.
The governments of modern states see themselves increasingly confronted with 
phenomena (such as migration or transnational networks of criminals) which 
fundamentally challenge the system based on territory. This thesis looks at the reaction of 
states in the face of such a challenge. Europe is a particularly interesting example in that it
17 Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, Abstammungs- und Territorialitatsprinzip (1999 [cited July 
2002]); available from http://www2.stmi.bayem.de/infothek/staatsangeh6rigkeit/sld003.htm. These 
are only rough categories and more differentiation would be useful. However, they suffice to indicate 
the distribution and mixture of principles between countries.
18 Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern, "Das Bundesministerium des Innern. Informationen zu Aufgaben 
und Bilanz, Organisation und Geschichte," (Berlin: 2000/2001), 39.
19 Cf. Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens. Demographic Change in the European State System.
20 Cf. Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality. Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986).
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epitomises the development: the modern territorial nation state evolved in Europe under 
conditions of emigration and sparse population, while it is now faced with the question of 
how to deal with increased migration and international crime, and the rising presence of 
foreigners. At the same time, Europe is undergoing a change as a polity evolving towards 
an ‘ever closer union* amongst its peoples -  a development which has itself brought to the 
surface questions of sovereignty, citizenship and entitlement.
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3. European integration and borders
Studying border policies allows the observation of the integration of a new policy area into 
the EU. Until the Treaty of European Union in 1992, cooperation on matters of Justice 
and Home affairs, to which the Schengen Agreements were closely connected by virtue of 
their subject matter and participants, had remained outside the then EC. Given the close 
connection between developments in European integration and those in coordinated 
internal policies, provisions were sought to introduce negotiations regarding such issues 
into the framework of the Treaties. The new Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty represented 
a compromise of all the diverging views of Member States, allowing for intergovernmental 
cooperation in a separate pillar of the European Union.
Despite the fact that Justice and Home Affairs have long remained within the realm of 
intergovernmental cooperation, researching borders in the European Union touches upon 
the core questions of integration. The issue highlights a number of theoretical questions 
relating to the evolution and deepening of integration, to the tensions between national and 
European level and to the possible evolution of a European polity.
Citizenship, national identity and territoriality are interlinked aspects of the modern state. 
Efficient government relies on clarity of territory and the relevant population. Over time, 
national control over borders has been developed into a system in which states depend on 
borders to maintain their authority, their security and their ability to tax. The control of the 
national borders is part of the competences of the national government, even in states 
which have a federal system such as Germany. The national control systems, e.g. 
personified in the national border guard or the customs services, have become intricately 
linked with internal and external sovereignty.
This does not imply, however, that borders represent also a sharp division in the economic 
or social sphere. Anderson observes that the ‘international boundary no longer constitutes 
a sharp break in the cultural landscape. This is a reflection of the economic and social 
realities of contemporary Europe.’21 At times, the existence of clearly marked and 
controlled borders -  in the interest of efficient governance -  can therefore conflict with
21 Malcolm Anderson, "The Political Problems of Frontier Regions," West European Politics 5, no. 4 
(1982): 14.
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cross-border ties in the social and economic realm. The evolution of border policies in the 
European context testifies to tensions between national and Community interests.
While states were intent upon preserving national control and sovereignty, the integration 
‘project’ aimed at promoting transnational contacts and links. The internal logic of 
integration therefore also aimed at ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”22 -  as already indicated in the 
Treaty of Rome. This provision was interpreted by most Member States to imply the 
abolition of all control impeding free movement, but not the abolishing of the legal border 
itself. While the Member States of the European Community/Union were convinced of the 
benefits of further integration to every member, such plans held the threat of a loss over 
what had hitherto constituted a core area of national sovereignty. Propositions of the 
European Parliament or European Commission for the realisation of an area free of 
internal borders were therefore viewed with varying degrees of hesitation. As a result, the 
Schengen cooperation of initially five states took place outside the framework of the 
European Community and only amongst those states willing and able to abolish border 
controls.
The willingness of member states to participate in the overall European integration process 
and transfer sovereignty in the course of its development has been judged differently by 
researchers. The integration of matters of internal policy such as border controls or police 
cooperation poses renewed questions of the limits and locus of sovereignty of 
‘Europeanised’ states. Alan Milward, for example, has emphasised the central role of 
national governments in the history of European integration, arguing that the state is still 
the master of its own fate.23 Stanley Hoffmann has argued in a similar direction, pointing 
out early on the survival of the state despite the transfer of real powers to the EC. For him, 
the Community helps to preserve states rather than forcing them to disintegrate.24 Andrew 
Moravcsik instead has very much acknowledged the economic and political imperatives 
which lead to compromises of governments otherwise bent on as much autonomy as 
possible.25
22 European Communities, "Treaty Establishing the European Community," (Luxembourg: 1997 
(1957)), Art. 7a.
23 Alan S. Milward, Frances M.B. Lynch, and et al., The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory 
1945-1992 (London/New York: Routledge, 1993).
24 Cf. Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today," Journal ofCommon 
Market Studies 21, no. 1&2 (1982).
25 Cf. Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single Act," in The New European Community, ed. Robert 
Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (1991).
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This thesis will explore to what extent this argument is also true for the Schengen 
cooperation in which partial decision-making power regarding hitherto core national 
competences was transferred to intergovernmental coordination, but where ultimate 
responsibility for implementation of border controls and security provision remained with 
the states. Indeed, political debate and recruitment, accountability, citizens’ identity and 
areas of high politics remained mainly under state control.26 It will be shown that the states 
negotiating the Schengen Agreements were convinced that European-level solutions had to 
be sought to nationally perceived problems in order to preserve national authority and 
security.
Integrationalists point to the spill-over effects and dynamics of integration as reasons for 
inclusion and deeper integration of issue areas into the EU/EC. The explicit connectedness 
of Schengen to integration objectives such as free movement makes this seem a plausible 
thesis. However, an open question remains to what extent the inclusion of issues of Justice 
and Home Affairs leads also to an eventual deepening of integration. Integrationalists see 
indicators for a changing basis of a European polity for example in the rising number of 
citizens in the European community spending a part of their lives abroad, the numbers of 
exchange students abroad and the rising numbers of intra-EU travel. However, it is unclear 
whether the identification of citizens with a political unit really springs from such 
experiences and to what extent functional integration really spreads to areas of ‘high 
politics’. During the 1980s and 1990s, citizens still seemed to expect security provision 
from their national governments -  while acknowledging that some solutions may have to 
lie in European cooperation or integration.
There are thus a number of possible theoretical interpretations of the development of 
border policies in Europe. Whatever the stance of the researcher, it can be observed that 
the Treaties of Rome and all subsequent treaties led to the integration of national and 
supranational authority, the weight of ‘Brussels’ generally growing in the overall 
development despite swings back and forth of the pendulum between national and 
European solutions.27 The practical implications of the treaties - mainly the gradual 
achievement of a common market and the four freedoms of goods, capital, services and 
persons -  have led to effective changes both in the objective powers of governments to
26 Cf. William Wallace, "Europe after the Cold War: International Society or Interstate Order?," (1998).
27 Cf. Helen Wallace and William Wallace, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).
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influence policies affecting the state as well as in the subjective experience of citizens as to 
the autonomy of national decision-making. Why states were willing to give their consent to 
such changes remains an object of debate. This thesis hopes to contribute insights to this 
debate by showing that the German government saw a European agreement on internal 
and external borders as the only viable solution to security problems, while at the same 
time being desirable from the point of view of economic and political integration.
This thesis shows that the negotiating states attached different values to the retention of 
national sovereignty. For example, the willingness to transfer sovereignty in the issue of 
cross-border pursuit and observation depended on particular national traditions regarding 
sovereignty. Similarly, the extent of compensatory measures demanded at the negotiations 
varied according to national experiences. In addition to such questions of sovereignty, trust 
in the neighbours’ ability and willingness to guard the external border became indispensable 
under the Schengen system.
In the early 1980s, cooperation in matters relating to internal security and border control 
on a European level was still a relative novelty. International cooperation in a number of 
issue areas (terrorism, drugs) predated the Schengen negotiations, but for the majority of 
participants in the negotiations, experiences in European-level coordination and 
cooperation were limited. Especially the experts for border controls or visas had hitherto 
been largely concentrated on the national context. Those participants originating from 
ministries experienced in European negotiations (e.g. ministries responsible for trade or 
transport) had relatively little knowledge of this field. The result was that the first task 
during negotiations was to avoid misunderstandings and clarify the various national 
positions, their differences and congruence. Participants recall the importance of processes 
of ‘getting to know each other’ in order to assess the interests of the partner states.28 This 
meant the learning about individual legal provisions and their implications in other 
European states (i.e. the difference between the legal status various countries’ visas 
conferred), but also of the various national arrangements with regard to internal security 
and border control.
The research on border policies in Europe also allows the study of how the topic evolved 
in the process of negotiations. While in the past, external security crystallised at the 
borders, modern European states have increasingly seen borders as essential for
28 A number of interviewees have been assured that they would not be quoted directly in the text.
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safeguarding internal security. In the course of the Schengen negotiations, concerns 
regarding a possible security gap became prevalent so that discussions concentrated 
increasingly on compensatory measures. While the first Schengen Agreement was a result 
of economic and political interests of deepening integration, the Schengen Convention 
clearly represents the security dimension. The debate about border policies thus 
increasingly became one of border controls, their abolition and compensating measures. It 
was the act of control itself with which states had traditionally ensured security, thus 
reciprocating by practice territorially based sovereignty. The Schengen Agreements implied, 
however, that trust in the ability of other states to guard their borders had to replace the 
old practice -  implying a new principle of coordinated sovereignty.
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4. Case study Germany
In the process of European integration, Germany holds a central position -  it might even 
be stated that European integration was ‘about’ Germany. Thus, any steps in the 
integration process must also involve Germany. On the other hand, Germany has itself 
been very eager to push ahead with European integration, before and after unification.29 
The country has also been centrally active in the Schengen process itself. The bilateral 
treaty with France envisaging a removal of border controls was the starting point of 
Schengen. Experts in a number of German ministries, most notably in the Chancellery and 
the Ministry of the Interior, dedicated themselves to the topic from early on. Germany also 
was one of the actors which clearly supported and shaped the Schengen philosophy of 
‘freedom and security’ through compensatory measures. Many of its proposals regarding 
compensatory measures and their implementation found entry into the final agreements.30
Germany is also an interesting case due to its geographic position. It is placed to have both 
internal and external borders of the Schengen area. Consequently, it had to concern itself 
with arrangements for both border types and could establish a conceptual link between the 
two. Thus, the consequences of the abolition of internal border controls were felt strongly 
and the arrangement of reinforced external border controls seemed a useful solution -  
whose implementation was in the power of Germany itself.
Connected to this was the fact that Germany was most strongly affected (in terms of 
borders) by the end of the Cold War. The fall of the inner-German border held an 
immense psychological importance for Germans. On the one hand, it had been the border 
which divided the once united Germany on a very practical level. Many families had 
relatives in the other part of Germany. Much of the collective German historical sites had 
been cut off from West Germany (such as Weimar or Erfurt). The border also was 
considered the result and consequence of a war which had been caused by Germany. On 
the other hand, the border divided West Germany from the East. It had been the symbol 
for the Cold War and the division of Europe -  and the world. The presence of Allied 
troops in West Germany and of Soviet troops in East Germany reinforced this impression. 
Thus, the border also had become a symbol of the vulnerability of Germany in the case of
29 Banchoff posits the membership and participation in European integration as an integral part of 
Germany’s identity. Thomas Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," EuropeanJournal 
of International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999).
30 for example the Schengen Information System and the Common Handbook on Border Controls.
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a military confrontation between the superpowers. At the same time, the border had 
represented protection of Germany from Eastern invasion. Thus, the fall of the wall 
opened up questions on the individual, the collective, the psychological, the political and 
the strategic level.
When the Schengen negotiations were begun in 1985, no one foresaw an end of bipolarity 
in the near future. The fall of the wall led to a number of new hopes and fears both of 
Germany but also of its neighbours. Hopes were connected to opportunities of European 
integration and growing influence in the East. Fears referred to the unknown future of the 
Central and Eastern European area. Many of these fears were also relevant for the 
Schengen negotiations so that the case study of Germany seemed particularly insightful. 
German unification led to an entirely new border situation, not only geographically but also 
in the de facto responsibility for controls at that border. While before the eastern border had 
been guarded through the intensive measures of the German Democratic Republic and 
Czechoslovakia, now the united Germany took on securing the border to Poland and the 
Czech Republic.
German proximity to Central and Eastern Europe also allows us to study the interpretation 
of a threat from Eastern Europe. Historical experiences and deep-seated fears played a role 
here just as much as unexpectedly fast growing rates of international crime and fears of 
large waves of immigration.
This German case study also permits to study the peculiarity of the German position within 
the Schengen founding members: it had ill defined boundaries. Historically, the influence 
of Germany had extended far to the East and a concept of nationality which was 
connected to culture and language never led to a clearly fixed image of the country. In two 
major wars in the 20th century, as well as in the inter-war period, German expansionist 
policies as well as the lack of clarity of its borders in general were an active source of 
tension. From a formal point of view, the eastern border of a united Germany remained an 
open question up to 1990.
Germany also had a peculiar definition of citizenship amongst the Schengen founding 
members. France had fixed borders as part of its national myth, defining citizenship on the 
basis of birth on the national territory. Germany’s more fluid borders and interrupted 
history as a state had led to a different link between nation and state. The acquisition of 
German citizenship on the basis of descent was concomitant to the lack of a fixed national
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territory. A concept of an ethnic nation prevailed as opposed to the republican nation ideal 
in France, for example.
How Germany approached security solutions to perceived threats was strongly influenced 
by past experiences and existing norms in the country. Germany did not perceive itself as a 
country of immigration -  while administrative practice and social reality were different. 
This mismatch led to an insecurity as to the reality of future immigration, of the numbers 
to expect and ways to deal with them. At the same time, the rates of asylum seekers in 
Germany grew consistently during the 1980s and early 1990s. Changing the law of asylum 
touched the heart of the self-perception of society. The liberal law of asylum was a heritage 
of the atrocities committed in the name of Germany in the two world wars. Changing it 
was therefore only possible under the pressure of perceived unfeasibly large numbers of 
immigrants and abuse of the system.31 The link of the topic of immigration to border 
controls is therefore heavily influenced by socially-charged issues in Germany -  a link 
which can be found in most European countries. German debates are therefore also 
indicative of larger debates regarding entitlements of political or economic refugees, the 
capacity of states and societies to take in immigrants and the means to prevent unwelcome 
immigration. Despite differences in relating to foreigners, there was a common thread in 
Western European countries linking reinforced border controls to immigration.
The problem of choosing a single case study is obvious: the comparability of the results 
with other European member states remains open. While borders are by nature a topic of 
international relations, this thesis had to take into account specific national historical 
experiences and their interpretation. The experiences and interpretations differ for each 
country. On the other hand, phenomena like international crime and immigration and a 
perceived threat to societies are a common experience of all EU countries. Furthermore, 
the solution found in the Schengen Agreements demonstrates that a common rationale has 
evolved with includes a considerable common interpretation of the dangers and of how to 
deal with them.
The documents used for this case study are reports and protocols of the proceedings in the 
Schengen Executive Committee, the Central Group and working groups in which 
Germany participated and outlined its position. Furthermore, some reports of the Federal
31 This problem was also linked to the influx of considerable numbers of ethnic Germans, so-called 
‘Aussiedler’ who could come to Germany without any need for recognition as refugees. This re­
opened a debate of the questions of who is a German and who should be allowed to live in Germany.
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Ministry of Interior to the Bundestag Committee on Internal Affairs regarding the progress 
of Schengen negotiations could be used. Additionally, some reports of hearings of experts 
by this Committee were available, as well as a protocol from a journey of delegates to the 
Schengen partner states. This was complemented by a number of interviews with long­
standing members of the Committee of Internal Affairs of the Bundestag, current officials 
at the Federal Ministry of Interior charged with Schengen and German participants at the 
Schengen negotiations. A list of interviewees can be found in the appendix.
Difficulties arose with the availability of documents due to the majority of documents 
being classified as ‘confidential’. Sometimes these became available through chance, with 
the help of other researchers, or were available abroad. The confidentiality of the papers 
confirmed the impression of secrecy linked to the security field in general. Since Schengen 
was perceived by the Federal Ministries as primarily a security-relevant issue, the 
confidentiality of documents was a logical consequence. As a result, not all interview 
partners were willing to be cited by name, although the Ministry of the Interior and its civil 
servants were helpful and informative in personal contact.
An enquiry to the Bundesarchiv, where the papers of the Federal Chancellery are stored, was 
unsuccessful. These papers would have given important additional insights, because the 
Chancellery held the overall control of negotiations for Germany until 1995. These papers 
are only open to researchers after a 30-year lapse or if an official institution applies for their 
use or if the research is in the interest of public administration. A letter from the Archive 
pointed out that an official application to use the documents was likely to be unsuccessful 
and -  in the event of it being granted -  would only allow insight into few pre-selected
_    32papers.
32 Quote from the replying letter: ”Wie Sie den amtl. Merkblattern iiber die Benutzungsmodalitaten beim 
Bundesarchiv, dem Auszug aus der GGO und dem Bundesarchivgesetz entnehmen konnen, 
unterliegen amtliche Aktien der 30-jahrigen Sperrfrist fur Benutzungen. Ausnahmen von dieser 
Regelung konnen auf Antrag genehmigt werden von der fur die Aktenfiihrung zustandigen 
Dienststelle, sofern es sich um eine amtliche Benutzung handelt oder die Benutzung in amtlichem 
Interesse erfolgt. Leider vermag ich beides bei Ihrer Antragstellung nicht zu erkennen. Sollten Sie 
dennoch auf einer Antragstellung bestehen, muss ich Sie anhand der bisherigen Erfahrungen leider 
auf die geringen Aussichten auf einen positiven Bescheid aufmerksam machen. In jedem Fall wird 
sich eine Genehmigung zur vorzeitigen Akteneinsicht auf wenige ausgesuchte Akten beschranken." 
Letter from Bundesarchiv of 4.7.2001.
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5. Existing research
International Relations (ER) as a discipline has paid little direct attention to borders. Unlike 
the state, strategy or power, the discipline has tended to take the importance of borders as a 
given. As a result, it has studied the issues of border control and border crossing relatively 
little. This is all the more astonishing if we consider that the subject even of ‘classic’ 
international relations is the state within its boundaries and its relationship with others 
across such boundaries. Ruggie has voiced his bewilderment: *It is truly astonishing that the 
concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics; its 
neglect is akin to never looking at the ground that one is walking on.’33
Nevertheless, IR has implicitly considered boundaries as important: Broadly speaking, the 
Realist tradition, beginning with Hobbes, views the border between the domestic and the 
international as the dividing line between order and anarchy.34 Equally, the tradition of 
international law draws a dividing line between an internal realm of the sovereign ruler and 
an external realm of equal monarchs. For Bodin, for example, sovereignty symbolised the 
ruler’s unrestrained power over people in a defined territory. He therefore started from the 
premise that law had to be bounded by the territory of the state.35 In a reaction, one 
important project of the idealist tradition in International Relations has been to bridge the 
domestic/international divide.
What could be regarded as one of the first direct considerations relating to borders in the 
subject of IR, is the debate of the territorial state, sovereignty, and its future with the onset 
of the nuclear age in the 1950s.36 However, this debate included very little consideration of 
borders themselves and their control. The last two decades have seen a growing number of 
studies of border-related issues in International Relations. These come often from scholars 
who challenge the traditional approaches and scope of IR, including new objects of study
33 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. Essays on international Institutionalization (London:
Routledge, 1998), 197. chapter seven on ‘Territoriality at millennium’s end’.
34 See the tradition starting with Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1946).
35 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, ed. M.J. Tooley (New York: 1955), Jean Bodin, SixLivresde
laRepublique (1576).
36 Cf. John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics 9, no. 4 (1957), John H. 
Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," in International 
Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James A. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969).
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and new approaches.37 Kratochwil, for example, has discussed the concept of territorial 
sovereignty as an organising principle of international politics by studying the functions of 
boundaries in territorial and non-territorial societies.38
Theories of integration have also tended to concentrate part of their attention on the role 
of borders. Karl Deutsch, for example, included an analysis of boundaries and the 
concomitant decline of communications in his thoughts about integration of political 
communities.39 Also European studies have united IR scholars with experts from other 
disciplines in the study of border-related issues. Often, the consideration of particular issue 
areas such as asylum, migration, cross-border cooperation and border control have led to 
in-depth studies of the role and effects of borders.40 This thesis therefore profited from 
research carried out within the realm of European integration studies, often with an 
emphasis on security aspects or the development of a particular policy field.
As a background to this thesis, reference was also made to a number of other disciplines 
whose concerns are relevant to border research. Borders are multi-dimensional phenomena 
which can be studied from the perspective of a number of disciplines. Although a 
considerable body of literature on borders has emerged from various fields, no agreed 
definition of borders has emerged on which scholars could agree. A statement by the
37 Cf. For example Bertrand Badie, Lafin des territoires. Essai sur le desordre internationalet sur I 'utilitesocialedu 
respect (Paris: Fayard, 1995), Bertrand Badie andMarie-Claude Smouts, eds., L 'internationalsans territoire, 
vol. 21/22, Cultures & Conflits (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996), Beate Kohler-Koch, "Regieren in 
entgrenzten Raumen," Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft 29 (1998), John Gerard Ruggie, 
"Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International 
Organization 46, no. 1 (1993), Cynthia Weber and Thomas J. Biersteker, State Sovereignty as a Social 
Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Michael Ziirn, Regieren jenseits des 
Nationalstaates, ed. Ulrich Beck, Edition ZweiteModeme (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1998).
38 Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of 
the State System," World Politics 39, no. 1 (1986).
39 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1957).
40 Cf. for example Alberto Achermann et al., Schengen unddieFolgen. DerAbbau der Grenzkontrollen in 
Europa (Bern: Stampfli+Cie AG, C.H. Beck, Manz, 1995), Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer, 
eds., Policing across National Boundaries (New York/London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), Malcolm 
Anderson et al., eds., Policing the European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Malcolm Anderson 
and EberhardBort, eds., The Frontiers of Europe (London: Pinter, 1998), Bigo, ed., L 'Europe des Polices et 
de la Securite Interieure, Eberhard Bort, ed., Borders and Borderlands in Europe (Edinburgh: International 
Social Sciences Institute, 1998), Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, eds., Frontieres - Identites. Les 
enjeuxautour del 'immigration etdel'asile (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), Monica den Boer, Schengen's Final 
Days? The Incorporation of Schengen into the New TEU, External Borders and Information Systems (Maastricht: 
European Institute of Public Administration, 1998), Soledad Garcia, ed., European Identity and the 
Searchfor Legitimacy (London and New York: Pinter, 1993), Ole Waever et al., Identity, Migration and the 
New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993).
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geographer Prestcott bears witness to this situation. ‘Attempts to produce a set of reliable 
theories about international boundaries have failed.*41
Historians’ work into the evolution of the state in Europe was important, as well as the 
extensive work on nationalism in Europe.42 Historical research also inspired an 
appreciation of the historical contingency of the shape, the course and the role of borders. 
This has informed the methodology of this thesis, placing an emphasis on the historical 
genesis of borders for an understanding of the positions of contemporary actors.
Empirical research has traditionally been a core emphasis of border research. The 
collection of data on borders included research on the exact position of borders, the length 
of borders, the people living on or near the borders, the age of borders, the control of 
borders or the traffic across borders. These data are of central importance to state 
governments, but have also been important bases for researchers’ interpretation of the role 
and importance of borders or of particular kinds of borders.43 In parallel, the search for 
appropriate frameworks for the conception of research projects has recently moved more 
to the centre of attention.
Political science has dealt surprisingly little with the boundaries of the state so far. This is 
astonishing since the state as the traditional object of study in political science has implicitly 
always been seen as limited. Prestcott’s work of 1978 and 1987 were early pieces treating 
borders in the context of political science.44 Most influential was his attempt to give clear 
definitions to the terms border, boundary and frontier. Malcolm Anderson’s work on 
Frontiers has to count as one of the first incisive works into the role of boundaries from a 
direct political science perspective. He covers theoretical as well as practical issues in the 
relationship between borders and states, presents a history of the concept of borders, a
41 J.R.V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 8.
42 Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World (Cambridge: Blackwell,
1996), John Breuilly, "Sovereignty, Citizenship and Nationality: Reflections on the Case of Germany," 
in The Frontiers of Europe, ed. Malcolm Anderson andEberhardBort (London: Pinter, 1998), Kenneth 
Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), Schulze, Stoat und 
Nation in derEuropdischen Geschichte, Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: 
1979), Heinrich August Winkler, Derlange Wegnach Westen. Deutsche Geschichtevom "DrittenReich "hiszur 
Wiederuereinigung, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Miinchen: C.H. Beck, 2000), Heinrich August Winkler, Derlange Weg 
nach Westen. Deutsche Geschichte vomEndedes AltenReiches biszum Untergangder WeimarerRepuhlik, 2 vols., 
vol. 1 (Miinchen: C.H. Beck, 2000).
43 Cf. for example Michel Foucher, Fronts etFrontieres (Paris: Fayard, 1991).
44 J.R.V. Prescott, Boundaries and Frontiers (London: Croom Helm, 1978), Prescott, Political Frontiers and 
Boundaries. -  although the author is a geographer; his attention centres around political borders, 
border disputes and border evolution.
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discussion of mainstream political science theories and borders, and analyses the change in 
the role of borders in the current political world.
Sociology has contributed to research by a number of studies. System theory has produced 
important insights into the necessity of boundaries for social systems. Most prominent here 
is the work of theorists such as Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann and Raimondo 
Strassoldo.45 Their work on boundaries and systems, and more specifically on political 
borders, has contributed to the understanding of the functioning of borders and their role 
for the differentiation and maintenance of systems.
Classic sociology, from Emile Durkheim back through Max Weber even to Karl Marx, all 
share an -  implicitly or explicitly -  territorial definition of society.46 Ulrich Beck speaks of 
the container-theory of modern sociology, Agnew and Corbridge of the territorial trap due 
to the equalisation of society and nation-state.47 This means that in parallel to political 
science, the territorial base of sociology was not problematised for a long time. A growing 
literature within sociology is concerned with social phenomena which take place across 
national borders and boundaries; they have looked at transnational social movements, 
changing horizons of experiences of people, transnational experience of threat, a possible 
emergence of a transnational society and at the effects of such developments on 
governance.48 The impact of this body of work on the understanding of borders is 
profound, albeit indirect. At the least, the insights from studies on transnational social 
developments allow to infer that the meaning and impact of borders for individuals and 
society are undergoing significant change.
Geography has been a major field of research into borders and has undergone a marked 
evolution of approach. Geopolitics has a long tradition and developed important concepts
45 Cf. Niklas Luhmann, "Territorial Borders as System Boundaries," in Cooperation and Conflict in Border 
Areas, ed. Raimondo Strassoldo and Giovanni Delli Zotti (Milano: Franco Angeli Editore, 1982), 
Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological Review 29 (1964), 
Raimondo Strassoldo and R Gubert, "The Boundary: An Overview of Its Current Theoretical 
Status," in ConfiniERegioni. IlPotenzialeDiSvUuppoEDiPaceDellePeriferie, ed. Raimondo Strassoldo 
(Trieste: 1973).
46 Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 191. cited after Ulrich Beck, Was ist Globalisierung, Edition 
ZweiteModeme (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 52.
47 Cf. Beck, Was ist Globalisierung, 49.
48 Cf. Ulrich Beck, DieErflndungdesPolitischen. 7u einer TheorieReflexiverModernisierung (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1993), Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellscbafi. Auf dem Weg in eine andereModeme (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1986), Manuel Castells, The Network Society, vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), Stefan 
Immerfall, ed., Territoriality in the Globalizing Society. One Place or None? (Berlin: Springer, 1998), Ernst 
Ulrich von Weizsacker, ed., Grenzenlos?Jedes System braucht Grenzen - aber wiedurchldssig miissen diesesein? 
(Berlin: Birkhauser Verlag, 1997), Ziirn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates.
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relating to the state, its environment and positioning in a wider system. The concepts of 
‘heartlands’ and peripheral regions (or marches) have to be mentioned here in particular. Sir 
Halford Mackinder developed a theory of heartland and rimlands, where access to the 
strategic position and resources of Euro-Asian land were the secret to becoming the 
dominating world power.49
Political geography’s early researchers, the most well known representative of which is 
probably Friedrich Ratzel,50 have started with enquiries into the state and its necessary 
connection to the territory it occupies. A major interest was to identify the relationship 
between geographical facts and the development of societies and states. Ratzel saw the 
border as a peripheral organ of the state, thus inherently connected to the organism of the 
state.51 A pupil of Ratzel’s, Karl Haushofer, threw the discipline of geopolitics into lasting 
disrepute when he developed the concept of ‘Lebensraum’, a social Darwinist idea which 
was used by the Nazis to justify their racism and expansionism. Later scientists in the area 
of geopolitics are still having to deal with the heritage or reproach of nationalist 
assumptions despite the fact that Ratzel’s determinism has been largely abandoned. Later 
literature on the geography of borders engaged in questions of classification, definition and 
recording of border types.52 Case studies were a prime emphasis of focus.53
New and critical geopolitics has started to conceptualise the territoriality of states and the 
‘geographic processes of socialization (which) have taught us to acknowledge the state 
system within which we live -  a spatial system which is characterized by more or less 
exclusive boundaries.’54 Richard Sack’s profound study of territoriality is part of this 
development, but also works which started to ‘challenge the idea of a fixed, territorially
49 Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," GeographicalJournal XXH, no. April (1904).. 
In a similar tradition is Alfred Mahan’s study which concluded that control of the seas and particular 
passageways were central factors to become a great power. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of 
Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897). For a contribution on events after 
the end of the Cold War, deliberating a return of geopolitics see Michel Foucher, "La fin de la 
geopolitique? Reflexions geographiques sur la grammaire des puissances," PolitiqueEtrangere 62, no. 1 
(1997).
50 Cf. Friedrich Ratzel, AUgemeine Eigenschaften der Geographischen Grenzen und uber diePolitische Grenze. 
(Sonderdruck aus den Berichten der Koniglich Sachsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften. 
Philologisch-Historische Klasse 44, 1892), Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie (Miinchen: R. 
Oldenbourg, 1897).
51 Cf. Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie, 3 ed. (Miinchen und Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1923), 86.
52 E.g. R  Hartshome, "Suggestions on the Terminology of Political Boundaries," Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers 26, no. 1 (1936), S.B. Jones, Boundary-Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty 
Editors and Boundary Commissioners. (New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1945/1971).
53 for a description of the tradition of border research in political geography see David Newman and 
Anssi Paasi, "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in Political 
Geography," Progress in Human Geography 22, no. 2 (1998).
34 Ibid.: 187.
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bounded world,’55 incorporating questions of inclusion and exclusion or geographic 
representation in politics and education.56 Recently, also under the impact of the political 
and territorial changes of the 1990s, critical geography has moved to view borders as 
constructs of a discursive, political and social nature, has demanded that the spatial 
dimension be reinserted and the multidimensional character of boundaries be incorporated 
into research.57
Anthropologists have not only conducted a number of interesting case studies,58 but their 
work has also contributed important insights to border research from the methodological 
point of view through the use of extensive field work. Studies such as the one of Sahlins or 
the collected book by Wilson and Donnan have been influential for an understanding of 
identity formation at and across the border.59
55 Ibid.: 191.
56 Cf. e.g. Gerard OT uathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge, 
1996), Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996).
57 Cf. Newman and Paasi, "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in 
Political Geography," 200f. David Newman, "Into the Millennium: The Study of international 
Boundaries in an Era of Global and Technological Change," Boundary and Security Bulletin 7, no. 4 
(1999/2000): 70.
58 Frederik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organisation ofCulture Difference (Bergen: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1969), Daphne Berdahl, Where the World Ended. Re-Unification and Identity in the 
German Borderland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).; John Bornemann, "Grenzregime 
(Border Regime): The Wall and Its Aftermath," in Border Identities. Nation and State at International 
Frontiers, ed. Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998).
59 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The MakingofFrance and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989), Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, eds., Border Identities. Nation and State at 
International Frontiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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6. Positioning of thesis
This thesis aims to contribute to research in International Relations by investigating the 
role of borders for the modern state in the European Union. In a theoretical way, the 
functions of borders for the modern state will be explored. It will be shown that borders 
still retain a central security, economic and legal function for the state. Borders as signals of 
sovereignty have become less important with the vanishing of the visibility of internal 
border controls. However, the legal arrangements of agreements regarding borders prove 
that sovereignty concerns have not been lifted in negotiations. In a practical perspective, 
the thesis will retrace the evolution of the German position on border policies which is also 
present in the European agreements. With the help of document analysis, personal 
interviews and reference to media reports, it will be shown how a security-led perspective 
came to dominate the German position. This fits in with existing research on the European 
level on policy-making regarding border controls and internal security.60
It will furthermore be shown that despite an abolition of internal border controls, state 
governments are very active in ensuring the fulfilment of the security role of borders. The 
necessity of strict controls at the external borders as well as compensatory measures are 
represented as important in the national interest. The European and state border 
arrangements will therefore be identified as the reactions of active states in the face of 
transnational phenomena such as immigration or crime which are seen as a threat to the 
state’s existence.
This thesis also hopes to provide insights into the interplay of the state and European level 
in negotiating border policy. It will be outlined how European and German politics 
developed in parallel and in reference to each other. Contacts between national security
60 Cf. for example Malcolm Anderson, "Les frontieres: un debat contemporain," in Controles:Frontieres - 
Identites. Les enjeux autourdel 'immigration etdel 'asile, ed Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia T soukala, Cultures 
& Conflits (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), Anderson and Boer, eds., Policing across National Boundaries, 
Anderson et al., eds., Policing the European Union, Didier Bigo, "Frontiers and Security in the European 
Union: The Illusion of Migration Control," in The Frontiers of Europe, ed. Malcolm Anderson and 
Eberhard Bort (London and Washington: Pinter, 1998), Didier Bigo, PolicesenReseaux (Paris: Presses 
de Sciences Po, 1996), Bigo, ed., L 'Europe des Polices etdela Securite Interieure, Bort, ed., Borders and 
Borderlands in Europe, Monica den Boer, "Justice and Home Affairs: Cooperation without Integration," 
in Policy-Making in the European Union, ed. Helen Wallace and William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), den Boer, "The Quest for European Policing: Rhetoric and Justification in a 
Disorderly Debate.", Monica den Boer, "Schengen, Intergovernmental Scenario for European Police 
Cooperation, a System of European Police Cooperation," (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 
1992).
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experts as early as the 1970s had led to the emergence of a common discourse on threats. 
Although this network differed in personnel from the one in the Schengen Agreements, 
this European-level discourse found counterparts in both the national and European 
debates regarding border controls. It will be shown to what extent German experiences and 
perspectives found entry into the Schengen Agreements, while at the same time European 
agreements changed the practice within Germany. The thesis will also show that the 
structure of the policy field -  with negotiations on a European level conducted by the 
national government and security experts -  and of the national debate led to a situation 
where alternative voices were unable to influence the outcome of policy-making.
The analyses will show that the Schengen Agreements -  which were conceived originally as 
a means of deepening integration -  gradually became a field of policy-making where 
national concerns about sovereignty and security became prevalent. The rhetoric argued for 
European-level solutions but with the intention of protecting national security.
The thesis aims at contributing to knowledge about the role of Germany in European 
politics in the Schengen negotiations. The country was one of the initiators of the 
Schengen process in 1985; Germany pushed for maximum security in compensatory 
measures and for widening the agenda of compensatory measures; as a country with the 
longest border with East European countries (after 1989), the arrangements for controls at 
the external land borders it advocated will be influential for future enlargement and 
controls in the East.
Also Germany’s relation to France is explored: both countries were central figures in the 
Schengen process. Despite inherent tensions between the two countries on the issues of 
territory, sovereignty and border control, the two countries started the process of opening 
borders in 1985 which led to the Schengen Agreements, but took different roles during the 
negotiations for implementation. On the one hand, it has been observed that France 
provided the overall political leadership to bring forward the project and Germany 
contributed mainly technical knowledge. On the other hand, France often proved much 
more hesitant to adopt far-reaching proposals for compensatory measures. In crucial areas 
such as cross-border cooperation or the development of the SIS, the German government 
led and France proved a laggard.61 The reasons for this can be found in national structures:
61 Parts of the negotiations can be usefully described by referring to Heritier’s concept of leaders and 
laggards. But it has to be borne in mind that French consent and also leadership were indispensable 
for the overall outcome. Cf. Adrienne Heritier, ""Leaders” and "Laggards" in European Policy-
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The nationally-organized police and administrative system in France was very perceptive to 
possible threats to sovereignty by the Schengen agreements. In the German federal system, 
cooperation between regionally organized law enforcement authorities on all levels was 
considered routine-procedure. The difference of systems was considered a problem for 
cooperation, especially from the French perspective, where competences and structures in 
Germany were perceived as complicated.62
Making: Clean-Air Policy Changes in Britain and Germany," in Convergence or Diversity? The Pressure of 
Internationalization on Economic Governance Institutions andPolicy Outcomes, ed Frans van Waarden and B. 
Unger (Avebury: Aldershot, 1994).
62 Cf. Didier Bigo and Franziska Hagedorn, "National Report: France," in Controlling Organised Crime: 
Organisational Changes in the Law Enforcement and Prosecution Services oftheEUMember States, ed Monica 
den Boer and Patrick Doelle (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 2000).
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7. Thesis structure
A theoretical conceptualisation of the role of borders will be attempted in chapter two. It 
will first delimit and define the term borders. In a next step, borders will be presented as 
intrinsic to the idea of the modern state; in this section, a special emphasis is laid on the 
centrality of security in the role of the border.
Chapter three is dedicated to retracing the evolution of European policies on border 
controls, outlining the gradual emergence of a security-led rationale. After presenting the 
origins and rationales of cooperation on border control policies, the chapter portrays the 
circles of experts and politicians with influence on policy-making in a chronological order. 
The structure of the Schengen negotiations is presented. This is followed by an analysis of 
the evolution of the Schengen Agreements and their contents. In a short appendix, other 
conventions with relevance to border controls will be set in relation to the Schengen 
Agreements.
Chapter four presents a historical perspective on the German relationship with borders. 
After a presentation of the topography of current German borders, the discontinuity in 
German history and identity is retraced. Special attention is paid to German relations with 
the East.
Chapter five outlines the debate in Germany regarding changes of border controls. First, 
the relevant actors regarding border policies in Germany are presented. In a next step, the 
chapter sketches out the international and national context to the debate regarding border 
controls. The events of 1989 to 1992, European integration dynamics, and social 
phenomena like the rise of immigration, are presented as relevant. The arguments for the 
necessity of abolition of internal border controls and the introduction of compensatory 
measures including external border controls are shown to be two-fold: on the one hand, 
they concentrate on the role of the border as barriers and protection while at the same time 
suggesting that border controls already were inefficient before their abolition internally.
Chapter six retraces the evolution of policies regarding border controls on a national level. 
It outlines changes in the border guard service during the relevant period of time, shows a 
change in the technique of controls as well as the relationship between law enforcement
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services. An overall augmentation of control ability will be noticed both internally and at 
the external borders.
Chapter seven links the two levels of analysis by looking at the role Germany has played 
during negotiations on the European-level. An enquiry into the institutional involvement of 
Germany shows the centrality of the German role. Its delegations could rely on relative 
stability, especially with regard to top-level civil servants as delegation leaders. Germany’s 
central position providing technical competence and advocating and building up 
compensatory measures will be emphasised.
The conclusion of the thesis will emphasise that borders remain central in spite of or even 
with the help of a common European border regime. Security-provision remains an 
important task of the (post)national state and is conducted in the name of and for the state, 
but through European arrangements. The prevalence of security over other policy concerns 
is also unlikely to change even with Communitarization as provided for in the Amsterdam 
Treaty.
Germany is found to have had a decisive role in the process of negotiating Schengen. 
Together with France, it took the lead in negotiations and provided the technical 
competence for the realisation of compensatory measures. Germany’s role is seen as 
influenced both by current interpretations of historical experiences and learnings (fears of 
threats emanating from the East, the untouchability of borders) and an inability to judge 
the actual threat (through political uncertainties abroad and a policy which denied the 
discrepancy between immigration rhetoric and practice).
An emergence of two types of borders is presented as one of the consequences of 
Schengen. A concentration on security focussed only on the external borders, neglecting 
possible economic consequences, political messages and symbolism conveyed through the 
strict controls at external borders. Internal borders became political symbols for European 
integration and free movement. The external borders retained both the role of a border line 
for checks and a border zone for intensive controls. The internal borders became border 
zones to be controlled.
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When the first Schengen Agreement was concluded, the implications of suppression of 
border controls for states and governance had not been thought through. It was the result 
of a general intention to deepen European integration and of a strike action in Italy and 
France which affected most European states. It is the aim of this chapter to clarify how 
fundamental borders and their control are to the modern system of governance and thus to 
show how essential a challenge the abolition of border controls was to modern states.
The chapter demonstrates ‘the ways in which regulation of movement contributes to 
constituting the very “state-ness” of states.’63 Indeed, borders and delimited territory 
cannot be considered separately from the states they enclose. They serve as the basis for an 
inside/outside divide with relevance for all areas of governance: citizenship and identity, 
economic and fiscal governance and the state monopoly of force. Entitlement to health 
and child care, unemployment benefits and education are all connected to this divide. The 
underlying assumption in the modern state system is shown to be one of congruence 
between citizens and resident population -  a presupposition which is challenged under 
conditions of migration and easy travel. The changes of 1989 re-posed the questions 
regarding the role of borders with new urgency in the face of possible migration and crime. 
Similarly, assumptions about the stability of the system and the provision of security were 
challenged.
In addition to identifying the fundamental role of borders for modern governance, the 
chapter also alludes to a conceptual difference between France and Germany with regard to 
statehood. France has a more monolithic concept of sovereignty which made it difficult to 
envisage a sharing of sovereignty. Germany, instead, had a tradition of shared sovereignty 
through its federal structure and the cooperation between the Lander.
The chapter also points to an underlying tension between European integration and the 
necessity for state governments to retain efficient governance. The existence of a border 
allows the enforcement of state rules such as taxation and the establishment of internal 
order. The border also serves an important role as a marker and a symbol of national 
identity. The dynamic of the economic and political process of integration stood to some 
extent in opposition to such deeply set interests of governance, although it had not been 
the intention of national or European elites to challenge the state in such a way.
63 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6.
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The chapter starts by pointing out the difficulty to define borders by showing the 
dimensions of borders and the variety of usage of the term. It continues by illustrating the 
link between the state and borders by showing how interlinked borders and state are both 
in their genesis and in international law. It goes on to point to specific areas where the 
existence of borders makes possible state governance. The chapter continues with outlining 
the relationship between borders and security, one of the central tasks of governance.
The chapter thus concludes that borders and the modern state are mutually constitutive. 
Taking away borders threatens the idea of the modern state and the principle according to 
which it provides security for its citizens.
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1. Boundaries and political borders
Drawing and maintaining boundaries64 is an invariant in human activity. Boundaries 
surround human beings, indeed all living beings, at all times. Biologically speaking, 
boundary-drawing behaviour can be observed in most species. Human activity and 
development is defined by mechanisms of boundary-drawing. Humankind is divided into 
societies and societies are divided into smaller kin-groups. Developmental psychology of a 
child identifies the ability to recognise the self as different from the carer as a decisive step 
in the development of a child. Human consciousness of the self and its connectedness to 
others is therefore closely related to this mechanism of drawing a boundary.
Boundaries allow people to define, to think and to communicate. They structure reality by 
ordering information, thus making possible knowledge and understanding. To think and to 
speak implies a system of boundaries - which allows to distinguish one thing from another. 
Such distinctions allow to group ‘things’ and label them. A chair can only be named and 
communicated to be a chair because it is grouped with other objects with similar features 
and therefore distinguished from objects such as ‘table’. Only its appropriate usage across a 
social group makes it possible to sustain the meaning of such a term.
Borders, therefore, allow classification and categorisation. By the same mechanism, 
boundaries negate and exclude by being the foundation of difference. This means that the 
ability to group things in a socially accepted way also entails social power. Thus, 
governance (by governments, courts, police etc.) also refers to the ability to define by 
grouping things, thus drawing boundaries, and thereby defining the reference objects for 
policies.65
64 Part 2 of this chapter deals with the distinctions between the terms of boundaries, borders or 
frontiers. ‘Boundary’ is used with the widest meaning, whereas ‘border’ and ‘frontier’ refer to political 
borders.
65 Pointing to the transcendental nature and fundamental function of borders in society, Raffestin and 
Benveniste draw attention to the deeply rooted sacredness of boundaries in society. Emile 
Benveniste, Le VocabulairedesInstitutionsIndo-Europeennes, vol. 1 (Paris: Editions deMinuit, 1969), 
Claude Raffestin, "La frontiere comme representation: discontinuite geographique et discontinuite 
ideologique," Relations intemationales 63, no. automne (1990). The drawing of physical boundaries was 
connected to the highest power in the community, thus a representation of a spiritual ability to draw 
boundaries. The researchers use the etymologic connection between the Latin regerefines and rex to 
show this: regere fines was a religious act and means literally ‘to draw the boundary in a straight line’. It 
was the action of the high priest for the construction of a temple or a city and consisted in 
determining the sacred space. Thus, he separated the inside from the outside, the sacred from the 
profane. This trace was made by the personage invested with the highest powers, the rex. Thus 
according to Benveniste, “dans rex il faut voir moins le souverain que celui qui trace la ligne“. (transl:
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Boundaries have the function of introducing predictability and regularity into social life. By 
structuring reality, they are a mechanism reducing complexity and eliminating options. The 
rules they apply for defining in and out therefore are crucial for the functioning of a 
community. On the other hand, borders also seem to be a prerequisite for internal 
complexity: system theorists have shown that boundaries enable systems to differentiate 
internally, in separation from the environment.66
Raffestin has identified four basic so-called ‘megafunctions’ for boundaries: translation, 
regulation, differentiation and relation:67 The boundary is first of all a translation of a 
differentiation into a tangible phenomenon. It is also information, a sign and a signal. It 
regulates - by demarcation - areas of relationships in which certain political, social or 
cultural rules prevail. It differentiates by being the foundation of a difference whose 
disappearance would lead to a crisis. The boundary also has the function of relating by 
juxtaposing two areas, by defining two entities which can face each other, discover and 
confront each other.68
Political borders are a subcategory of boundaries. As such, they share a number of 
characteristics: similarly to boundaries, political, territorial borders serve to reduce 
complexity. They provide heightened predictability through the possibility to control entry 
and exit of people and of goods, and through the possibility of exercising power within 
these boundaries.69
Raffestin has pointed out that the social and historical embeddedness of political borders 
makes them highly complex systems, more so than many other boundaries70: the particular 
role of borders for a political system is dependent on historical context. The rules of the
One should see the king less as the sovereign but as the one who traces the line.) Cf. Benveniste, Le 
Vocabulaire des Institutions Indo-Europeennes.; Raffestin, "La frontiere comme representation: 
discontinuite geographique et discontinuite ideologique," 296.
66 Cf. Luhmann, "Territorial Borders as System Boundaries.", Strassoldo and Gubert, "The Boundary: 
An Overview of Its Current Theoretical Status."
67 Raffestin, "La frontiere comme representation: discontinuite geographique et discontinuite 
ideologique.": TJn systeme de limites assume quatre megafonctions : traduction, regulations, 
differenciation et relation.’ (p.300)
68 Cf. Ibid.: 301.
69 Early industrialisation and the setting up of customs borders in order to help young industries to 
develop may be seen as a example of this.
70 “Le processus d’emergence, devolution et de stabilisation de la frontiere est semblable a celui de 
n’importe qu’elle autre limite; il est simplement plus complexe, a certains egards, apparemment plus 
socialise et surtout plus enfonce dans l’historicite”. Raffestin, "La frontiere comme representation: 
discontinuite geographique et discontinuite ideologique," 198.
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game differ according to time and circumstances. Thus, when it is rightly said that the 
Treaty of Westphalia set out the basic structure of the territorially oriented international 
system today, this only refers to the specific rules of the game which have been the 
currency of the system since. For example, the Middle Ages in Europe were a time of a 
completely different territorial and legal organisation of rule in which territorial contiguity 
was of less importance than fiefdom.
Another special characteristic of political borders is their distinctly territorial relevance.71 
Despite all the abstraction inherent in borders, there is always a territorial element in 
delimiting a community’s borders. In that respect, political borders are witness to the fact 
that human life is connected to a physical existence. This thesis concentrates on borders of 
modern states, but conceptualises these as related to the fundamental behaviour of 
boundary-drawing in human existence.
71 This does not mean that borders are necessarily fixed. For example the non-enter zone of a ship is a 
mobile territorial border.
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2. Problems and varieties of definition of the term ‘border’
Anderson emphasises that ‘[w]hat frontiers represent is constantly reconstituted by those 
human beings who are regulated, influenced and limited by them.’72 This constant change 
over time is also mirrored in the variety and changes of usage of terms designating borders.
2.1. European languages and terms designating ‘border*
The evolution of the fundamental role borders have for the modern state is shown by how 
terms naming borders in European languages have evolved together with the state. The 
languages retain differences between the various communities’ experiences but also 
demonstrate common features.
The term ‘border’ itself does not point to a specific shape, whether border line, border 
zone, border region, whether fragmented or continuous. A border’s function is to define a 
political community as distinct from another, and historically, several shapes have fulfilled 
that function. Thus, the following account of differences in meaning of the terms 
designating ‘border’ also mirror historical change. Early modern states had loose control 
over their ‘marches’ and it was one of the features of the modern state to extend control 
across the territory and up to the borders. The denser population was one important factor 
pushing this change: empty spaces or those which were not used for extraction of 
resources did not need exact lines. The ground was surveyed, exact maps were drawn and 
border guards were established. Thus, in the course of the 19th century, state attitudes to 
borders or frontiers changed as states’ abilities to extend full authority over peripheral 
regions increased. Today, borders retain a dual meaning of line and zone.
The evolution of the French terms illustrate this duality of line and zone: French has the 
wordsfrontiere, limite, front, and marche (archaic). Frontiere, derived from Latinfrons, developed 
from original architectural and military meanings into one referring to the military border 
area where the enemy was faced. Limite was the general word designating the end of the 
kingdom up until the 16th century. It developed into a legal and abstract term, mainly 
referring to questions of the line of demarcation. According to Febvre, the rise of a much 
more clearly defined view of sovereignty in the 15th and 16th century -  culminating in the
72 Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World, 1-3.
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T reaty of Westphalia -  led to a merging of the terms frontiere and limite. 73 By the end of the 
17th century, frontiere referred generally to the end of a kingdom or province. Today, only 
frontiere is consistently used designate a political state boundary.
English differentiates between border, boundary, frontier, limit and march. According to 
the definitions of the Oxford English Dictionary,74 border, derived from French, is the 
word with the widest general meaning, comprising the meanings of boundary and frontier. 
Its original geographic meaning has been transferred to a more general figurative meaning. 
It can designate a line or a zone. Boundary refers to the end of something, geographically 
or figuratively. Frontier has departed from its early general military meaning to designate 
the area or line as that part of the country where it borders on another. Additionally, the 
word has assumed a very specific meaning in the US context of settling the continent by 
settlers of European origin. Both ‘frontier’ and ‘border’ can refer to a zone as well as a line. 
Limit only refers to a border line today, but also retains a figurative sense. March refers 
mainly to an area of land which lies on the border and is becoming historicised. Much of 
this differentiation of meaning in English may be attributed to historical developments and
73 Cf. Lucien Febvre, Pour une Histoire a part entiere (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1962).
74 Border (earliest use in ME, adopted from old French):
1. A side edge, brink or margin; a limit or boundary; the part lying along the boundary or outline
2. A frontier; pi. the marches, the border districts ME; the frontier line (first mentioned in 1535)
3. A strip of ground forming a fringe to a garden
4. A defined edging, of distinct material, colour, shape, pattern etc.
5. fig. A limit, boundary, verge 1728
Boundary (1626):
That which serves to indicate the limits of anything; the limit itself
Frontier (ME, adoption from old French):
1. f  The front side; the fore-part -1551
2. f  The front line of foremost part of an army. Hence, ‘attack, resistance*. -1523
3. The part of a country which fronts, faces, or borders on another country; the marches; U.S. ‘That 
part of a country which forms the border of its settled or inhabited regions’
4. t  A fortress on the frontier; a frontier town -1769; a barrier against attack -1690
Limit, ME
1. A boundary, frontier; a landmark. Now only: A bounding line or terminal point
2. One of the fixed points or values between which the possible or permissible range of anything is 
confined; a bound beyond which something ceases to be possible or allowable, ME.
3. math. (...)
March, ME (adopted from French)
1. Boundary, frontier, border
a. The border of a country (...); often collect, pi., esp. with ref. to the borderland of England 
and Wales. Now hist.
b. The boundary of an estate
2. Country, territory. Obsolete
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experiences which privileged a particular usage of a term -  hence also the difference 
between US, British and Australian English.75
The German language has evolved in a way as to collect the various meanings under one 
term, emphasising their common nature.76 The Slavic route ‘granica’ referred originally to a 
march which divided two areas. For the English-speaking reader of this thesis, it may thus 
be important to note that the word ‘Grenze’ in German refers to the entity of the border as 
well as to an abstract function and also to a general social phenomenon of distinguishing 
social units. ‘Grenze’ can refer both to a border zone as well as a line. It designates equally 
the state border as well as the one between two ‘Lander’.
75 American English associates with frontier the specific historical experience of the advancing line of 
the settled continent and therefore uses border for the international line between states. Cf. 
Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World., p.9. The British refer to ‘the 
Borders’ to describe those regions of southern Scotland and northern England which were contested 
over centuries. Western Herefordshire and Herefordshire is also referred to as ‘the Welsh Borders’. In 
both regions, this implied a region where different groups (and jurisdictions) overlapped.
76 One example to illustrate a similar constellation is the German term ‘Schrank’ which does not have an 
English correspondent but has to be translated according to context with ‘wardrobe’, ‘cupboard’, 
‘bookcase’, ‘cabinet’ or locker’; conversely, the English word ‘box’ is split up into a number of 
German words which together comprise the English meaning of ‘box’: ‘SchachteP, ‘Karton’, 
‘Sammelbuchse’, Loge’, ‘Zeugenstand’, ‘Zelle’.
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2.2. Usage of terms by researchers
Not only language communities, but also researchers of political borders have used the 
terms ‘border’, ‘boundary’ and ‘frontier’ with considerable variation. This can be attributed 
to a difference of perspective of the various disciplines. Cohen has also pointed to the fact 
that while some social scientists have tried to do justice to the (often imprecise) use of the 
terms in everyday language, others have oriented themselves more towards traditional 
usage within their subject.77 Prestcott asked for precise definitions to be used within one 
subject area: ‘There is no excuse for geographers using the terms “frontier” and 
“boundary” as synonymous’.78
Malcolm Anderson has analysed the current use of terms for political border: ‘Frontier’ is 
the word with the widest meaning, signifying both a line and a border zone or region. It 
originates from military language. Today it is used to refer to a precise legal/administrative 
line or to a region where two entities meet. It can also be used to refer to a changing zone 
of settlement or civilisational advancement (as used by Turner in 1898 in his The Frontier in 
American History).79 ‘Border’ can also be used for a zone, mostly conceived as narrow, or a 
line of demarcation. ‘Boundary’ is always used for a line of demarcation or delimitation and 
thus the narrowest of the terms. Anderson therefore uses the term frontier consistently in 
order to describe the dividing line or zone between two states. ‘Frontier’ is normally used 
to refer to the international border; ‘boundary’ is used to refer to the borders of political 
and administrative authorities below the state level.80
J.R.V. Prestcott makes a distinction between boundaries and frontiers according to criteria 
of their shape (zone or line) linked to their historical evolution. For him both ‘[p]olitical 
frontiers and boundaries separate areas subject to different political control or sovereignty. 
Frontiers are zones of varying widths which were common features of the political 
landscape centuries ago. By the beginning of the 20th century most remaining frontiers had 
disappeared and had been replaced by boundaries which are lines*1 Borders are for him 
‘the adjacent areas which fringe the boundary.’82 His usage of the terms links two aspects of
77 Anthony P. Cohen, "Boundaries and Boundary-Consciousness: Politicizing Cultural Identity," in The 
Frontiers of Europe, ed. Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort (London/Washington: Pinter, 1998), 25.
78 Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, 36.
79 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (Madison: State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin, 1894).
80 Cf. Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World, 9f.
81 Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, 1.
82 Ibid, 12.
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borders, namely their physical nature and their historical development. Frontiers thus seem 
a feature of the past whereas boundary lines are a characteristic of the present. Variations in 
the use of English may partly account for that (he is Australian). Anderson has remarked 
that Prestcott’s suggested usage does ‘not correspond to the ordinary language in the 
United Kingdom.’83 For the purposes of this thesis, it does not seem opportune to de-link 
the two terms of border line and zone, however. As it is suggested above, border lines and 
zones are by no means mutually exclusive, but that they are both a feature of the modern 
border.
Contrarily to Malcolm Anderson, anthropologists have tended to give boundary the widest 
meaning: the term has been used to designate the greatest diversity of things. ‘Border’ was 
used ‘situationally specific’ and ‘frontier’ was reserved for geopolitical and legal senses 
only.84 For Cohen, the important distinction which anthropologists make is the one 
between material and ideal: ‘Generally in anthropology the distinction can be accomplished 
simply by regarding frontiers and borders as matters of fact; whereas boundaries are the 
subjects of claims based on a perception by at least one of the parties of certain features 
which distinguish it from others.... [BJoundary suggests contestability, and is predicated 
on consciousness of a diacritical property.’85
The usage of terms in EC/EU circles also is not consistent. Tindemans urged for the 
‘gradual disappearance of frontier controls... between member states’.86 The Schengen 
Convention of 1990, however, defines internal and external borders, by referring to those 
between Member States and those with third countries. The same document talks about 
the objective of completing an area without internal frontiers. European Union Council 
Documents use the terms external borders and frontiers interchangeably, even within the 
same Presidency.87 The Select Committee on European Communities Committee of the 
House of Lords has tried to avoid ambiguities by distinguishing clearly between external 
frontiers of the Schengen area and internal borders between Schengen states.88
83 Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World, 10.
84 Cf. Cohen, "Boundaries and Boundary-Consciousness: Politicizing Cultural Identity," 26.
83 Ibid.
86 Leo Tindemans, "The Tindemans Report," Bulletin of the European Community. Supplement 1/76 (1975).
87 Council of the European Union (German Presidency), "Note. Commission Initiative for a Decision 
Establishing a Convention on Controls on Persons Crossing External Frontiers," (Brussels: 1994), 
Council of the European Union (German Presidency), "Note. Joint Action for a Further 
Improvement in Security at External Borders," (Brussels: 1994).
88 Select Committee on European Communities Committee, "Schengen and the United Kingdom's 
Border Controls," (London: House of Lords, 1999).
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Since there is no agreement on one particular usage in social sciences, this thesis has 
chosen to use the various words in the following sense: border and frontier will both be 
used to refer political borders. The two terms differ in connotations, but both can refer to 
a state ‘boundary’ as both a line and a zone. ‘Frontier’ will be used to refer to international 
state borders, linear or zonal. ‘Border’ is used with reference to administrative and political 
borders on all levels. Boundary will be understood as the most versatile term: while it can 
be understood as a political border (on any level), emphasis will be made on the term’s 
ability to designate an abstract ‘limit’, thus referring to the ‘idea’ of differentiation behind a 
border.
The above discussion of linguistic variety around borders and boundaries points to an 
underlying variation in the perspectives on borders regarding their functions, role and 
shape. Indeed, a definition of borders on which all researchers could agree has yet to be 
found. Consequently, it does not seem useful to present a makeshift definition here. 
Instead, the following account of the dimensions of borders is intended to provide a closer 
description of the phenomenon.
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2.3. Dimensions of borders
This section aims to highlight the inherent variety of the term border by pointing to the 
dimensions of natural and artificial borders, lines and zones, points of contact and of 
isolation as well as phenomenon with internal and external effects. These dimensions are 
an important background to the Schengen negotiations which had to do justice to this 
richness of functions in its provisions.
Borders are multi-faceted phenomena with both practical and abstract dimensions. A first 
important distinction is made by Malcolm Anderson: they are both institutions and 
processes. As institutions, they are based on political decisions and regulated by legal texts 
and administrative provisions. Indeed, the ‘frontier is the basic political institution: no rule- 
bound economic, social or political life in complex societies could be organized without 
them.’89 Borders are institutions of the state and for the state, they are administered by it, 
are the foundation for its development into the modern state and contribute to the identity 
of state and society. As processes, frontiers are characterised by four dimensions: they are 
instruments of state policy, they depend on the de facto control governments can exercise 
over them, they are markers of identity, and ‘frontier’ is a term of discourse with changing 
meaning over time and depending on context.
A further distinction can be made between natural and artificial borders, thus the question 
whether borders are imposed by nature or formed through human action. Natural borders 
are a concept which have had currency in Europe since the end of the sixteenth century.90 
The idea of natural borders is derived from the view that geographic elements such as 
mountains, rivers or the sea are natural barriers for the contact between communities. 
Underlying the discourse of natural borders was often an expansionist project as Franco- 
German history shows. For example military writers of the 18th and 19th century regarding 
the border between Germany and France use this concept for justification.91
The historian Lucien Febvre has criticised this concept: Taut-il s’arreter a montrer que, du 
reste, ces frontieres fluviales ou cotieres n’ont rien de “naturel”, ou, de fa?on plus generale,
89 Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World, 1.
90 Malcolm Anderson mentions that Andre Thevet used the idea in order to overcome medieval 
divisions on French territory. He derived his image from Caesar’s and the geographer Strabo’s 
descriptions of Gaul. Cf. Ibid, 21.
91 Cf. Carl Baur, Welches ist dieAchteund naturliche Grenzezwischen DeutschlandundFrankrekh?Eine 
MilitdrischeBetrachtung (S.L: 1813), N.N.^Militdrische undPolitischeBemerkungen iiberdieRhein-Grenze (S.I.: 
1798).
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que la notion de frontieres naturelles ne repond a rien pour le geograph, qu’il n’y a rien de 
de “donne tout fait” a l’homme par la nature, rien d’impose a la politique par la 
geographic?’92 Although the geographer Friedrich Ratzel is sometimes associated with the 
idea of natural borders, he denies that there is anything like an absolute border,93 thus a 
geographical area which, by its nature, is destined to become a border. When Ratzel talks 
about natural borders he refers to the political use of an existing natural differentiation, 
thus displaying all the ‘artifice’ of human will and power.94
International law uses the concept of natural borders in order to introduce a reliable means 
of measurement over time, although even here, the use is arbitrary.95 Caflisch asserts that 
the certitude of natural borders ‘leaves something to be desired’ and that also the often- 
stated advantage of natural borders -  their permanence -  has to be doubted. This is 
because also natural phenomena, such as the position of rivers, tend to change constantly. 
He also states that in times when borders were mostly zones, they had more of the 
character of natural borders than the modern border lines do.96
Despite the fact that natural borders in the absolute sense do not exist, one must not 
neglect the powerful myth of natural borders. Febvre has studied the evolution of such 
myths in France.97 He attributes the success of these myths to the complex reality at a time 
when people had no clear idea where the actual border lay. The border in the system of 
fiefdoms was multiple, unclear and difficult to mark whereas the myth was clear and 
simple: ‘Sie waren klar und eindeutig -  zu einer Zeit, da die wirkliche Grenze, die der 
Lehnsfolgen, unscharf und schwer erkennbar war. Das ist es, was ihre Popularitat 
ausmacht, und nicht Angriffslust, Beutegier und Herrschaftsdrang der damaligen
92 Febvre, Pour uneHistoire apart entiere, 21.. Section on word and meaning of border. Translation: “Does 
one have to continually emphasise that these river or coastal borders have nothing ‘natural’, or more 
generally, that the idea of natural borders does not mean anything to a geographer, that there is 
nothing ‘ready made’ by nature for human beings, nothing which geography would have forced onto 
politics.”
93 Cf. Ratzel, Politische Geographie, 387.
94 Ibid, 404f.
95 For example, it is unclear which limit is to be defined ‘the natural border’ (of the land-sea boundary): 
the end of the land, the end of the 12 mile maritime zone, the end of the zone of economic 
exploitation or the end of the continental shelf? So-called natural borders cannot answer these legal 
questions.
96 Lucius Caflisch, "Essai d'une Typologie des frontieres," Relations Internationales 63, no. automne (1990): 
280.
97 Tracing the evolution of such myths, Febvre finds that most countries which have such a myth are in 
fact referring to Roman borders. Furthermore, he shows that the myth of natural borders itself has 
not been stable in France. The 15th and 16th century claimed the four streams Rhone, Saone, Maas 
and Schelde as natural borders (supposedly emerged from the Treaty of Verdun of 843) whereas the 
17th, 18th and 19th century referred to the Rhine and the Alps as the natural borders. Cf. essay on 
word and meaning of border Febvre, Pour une Histoire a part entibre.
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Franzosen.’98 According to Febvre, the myths of natural borders only became dangerous 
when the rise of the nation-state brought antagonisms between peoples, necessitated exact 
demarcation, and every piece of land received a value it had not had before.
Although a number of today’s political borders coincide with natural differentiations in the 
landscape -  i.e. the part of the Franco-German river along the Rhine, the French-Spanish 
border in the Pyrenees or the border between Hungary and Slovakia on the Danube -  they 
are essentially the outcome of negotiations and treaties. They have been settled in the 
aftermath of war, through international agreements, or forced upon losers of wars.99 
Geographic barriers may then serve as markers and symbols of differentiation, but by no 
means impose themselves cogently on societies.
Another dimension of borders is their physical extension. As has been pointed out above, 
borders can be both lines and zones, and have varied historically. There has been a debate 
as to why border zones or marches precede the border line. Early political geography took 
an evolutionary view with reference to social Darwinism: Friedrich Ratzel’s writings state 
that undefined border zones are the sign of less mature societies, whereas border lines are 
the attribute of developed societies. Jacques de la Ferriere echoed this view on the level of 
the state system when he observed that the border line was the sign of a finished, 
accomplished world (monde fini) whereas the border zones such as the limes belonged to 
an incomplete world. The latter originated from a society in expansion whose territory was 
not yet formed.100
Such deterministic explanations have to be rejected and others have to be sought on deeper 
structural levels: Lucien Febvre employed the above-mentioned insight that a new 
understanding of sovereignty in Western Europe has to be linked to the establishments of 
border lines: in the middle ages, the state was the agglomeration of manorial systems in 
which a distinction between public and private affairs did not exist. The development 
leading up the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 saw the evolution of a much more clearly 
defined, exclusive principle of sovereignty which necessitated clear boundaries. The rise of
98 Ibid, 22. Translation : They (the myths) were clear and unambiguous -  at a time when the real border, 
the one of fiefdom, was unclear and difficult to discern. That was the reason for their popularity, and 
not aggressiveness, eagerness for the spoils or will to power of the French.
99 Michel Foucher shows that 24.3% of current European borders have been drawn between 1910 and
1924 and another 29.9% between 1945 and 1949. Many of these have emerged as consequences of 
international agreements. Michel Foucher, "Les frontieres dans la Nouvelle Europe," Politique 
Etrangere, no. 3 (1990): 577.
100 Jacques de la Ferriere, "La frontiere dans la theorie et la strategic militaires," Relations Internationales 63, 
no. automne (1990): 250., Ratzel, Politische Geographie, 388.
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nationalism with its attachment to national soil then reinforced this development.101 This 
link between borders and state sovereignty was exemplified also in the negotiations for 
European border policies when concerns regarding a loss of sovereignty led some 
governments (e.g. France) to refuse certain far-reaching agreements.
The national attachment of populations in border zones has been subject to a number of 
studies with varying results: Peter Sahlins concluded from his work that border zones or 
frontiers are defined by an especially strong attachment of the population to national 
culture.102 His description of the importance of the respective French and Spanish national 
culture in a Basque valley in the Pyrenees illustrates that. While in some instances 
differentiation against each other takes place in border zones, this attachment to a 
particular national culture might also be attributed to deliberate government action: the 
attempts of the French state to instil a sense of French citizenship into the diverse 
populations along the borders are a good example. Eugen Weber has illustrated that such 
an attachment is the result of a deliberate policy which suppressed regional languages and 
imposed national French culture with the help of military service, migration, schooling, 
religion and ‘national’ customs.103 What is more, in many instances, such policies did not 
completely succeed so that the attachment of the populations in border zones can be 
multiple. An imprecise fit between borders and nations is a ubiquitous feature in Europe.
It can be summarized therefore, that the border line always exists together with a border 
zone and that, as anthropologists have been able to establish, these ‘frontiers, which are 
territorial in nature, are political and social features of the borders of all modern nation­
states.’104
Borders represent the dimensions of contact as well as those of isolation. They are 
instruments of the state, aiming at asserting its control over exit and entry. For this 
purpose, a legal division is made between those who are inside and subjected to state 
authority, and all others. However, the ability of a state to completely enclose itself is 
limited. Even under circumstances of strict controls, there remains an element of openness 
and contact at every border. History has shown how extremely difficult and costly
101 Cf. Febvre, Pour une Histoire a part entiere.
102 Cf. Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees.
103 Cf. the classic study by Eugen Weber Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural 
France, 1870-1914 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1977).
104 Wilson and Donnan, eds., Border Identities. Nation and State at International Frontiers, 9.
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(financially and politically) it is to close a border tightly.105 The growth of international trade 
and economic interdependence has made isolation even more costly for states. The inner- 
German border never was a complete obstacle to the movement of goods and people. ‘As 
a result of the complicated social and political construction of this border, in the long run it 
was surprisingly permeable in both directions -  and in several ways.’106 Not only could 
asylum seekers pass through the border, East German citizen could emigrate once the 
financial arrangements between the governments were made and also, economic goods 
could pass fairly easily.107
A border’s emergence can be internally or externally driven. Internally defined borders 
point to the fact that groups characterise themselves by reference to their own 
characteristics and customs. Externally driven boundary-making means that borders 
emerge with reference to others or through international negotiations. Such a perspective 
on European borders has for example been suggested by the anthropologist Frederik 
Barth108, and seems implicit in many accounts of boundary formation in Europe.109 There 
are a number of examples where people defined themselves in opposition to one group in 
particular with whom they could not communicate and extended this concept to all 
foreigners. For example, the Slavic root ‘neme’, means mute, dumb, unintelligible -  and 
German.110
Similarly, the external and internal effects of borders have been analysed. Tomke Lask has 
identified a difference between German and French by an etymological examination of the 
terms ‘Grenze’ and ‘frontiere’. The original concepts of the words pointed in different 
directions. The French sense was inward looking, a border to defend the territory, the
105 see for example the experience of th GDR
106 Albrecht Funk, "Control Myths: The Eastern Border of the Federal Republic of Germany before and 
after 1989," (1994), 4. Unpublished paper, see published version in French Albrecht Funk, "Les 
Mythes du controle: la frontiere orientale de la Republique Federale d'Allemagne au tournant des 
annees 1990," in Controles: Frontieres-Identites. Les enjeux autour de I 'immigration etdel 'asile. Cultures& 
Conflits, ed. Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1997).
107 Cf. Alphones Losser, "La frontiere interallemande: exemple type d'une frontiere "passoire" dans le 
domaine economique," Relations Internationales 64, no. hiver (1990).
108 Cf. John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1982).
109 Cf. Breuilly, "Sovereignty, Citizenship and Nationality: Reflections on the Case of Germany.", Hagen 
Schulze, Gibtes uberhaupt eine deutsche Geschichte? (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1998).
110 Muteness is to be interpreted here in the sense of those with whom one cannot communicate. In 
Czech, ‘nemecky’ means German and ‘nemy’ mute, in Polish ‘niemicki’ and ‘niemy’ respectively. Even 
in Hungarian, which is from a completely different language group, but part of the eastern 
neighbours of Germany, a similar fusion of meanings can be found: ‘nemet’ means German and 
‘nema’ means mute.
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German border was outward-looking.111 The origin of the French word stems from the 
military and refers to the zone of battle where armies ‘faced’ each other, often a line of 
defence. The German word is derived from Slavic origin and has the meaning of a border 
zone with an imaginary line which serves to separate two territories. ‘A la difference du mot 
frangais “frontiere”, “Grenze” se refere originellement a l’espace a chevalsurla ligne 
separatrice\m The German language thus gives the border the connotation of horizon, 
which can move with the standpoint of the speaker. Lask also finds that the modern 
meanings of the French and German words converge towards a representation of a more 
and more virtual line.
The above sections have shown that the characteristics of borders as a concept cannot be 
described unambiguously. The border has to be conceptualised as both process and 
institution, as artificial, but often relying on ‘natural’ givens, as line and zone, as a point of 
both separation and exchange and with effects both internally and externally. The next 
section moves from the dimensions of political borders to the intricate link between 
modern state governance and borders.
111 Cf. Tomke Lask, "Grenze/frontiere: le Sens de la frontiere," Quademi, no. 27 (1995).
112 Ibid.: 70. Translation : Different from the French word ‘frontiere’, ‘Grenze’ refers originally to the 
space on both sides ofa separating line*
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3. Borders as intrinsic to the idea of the modern state
It has been remarked that drawing boundaries is directly related to the modern way of 
governing: Don Michael, a social psychologist, states that in ‘the West, the mythology, 
certainly since the Renaissance, has included beliefs that take as natural and right: 
individualism, science, rationality, efficiency, free speech, democracy, progress, 
competition, a “Christian” god, moral superiority, technological know-how, male 
dominance.’113 Part of this mythology of individuation is also the idea of states being 
bounded in order to be governable. Furthermore, the mentioned modes and expectancies 
are themselves ‘reified and operationalized, expressed and maintained, by boundaries -  
physical, ideological, factual, procedural, organizational, relational.’114 Thus, ideas of 
political borders are at the heart of a mythology of statehood.
The state needs borders in order to be governed. Put differently, a prerequisite for a 
functioning modern state as a ‘bordered power-container’115 is that it can represent itself as 
territorial and as extending its power up to the border. This is what the centrality of the 
symbolism of borders consists in. It will be shown that international law makes a tight link 
between territory and the state. Furthermore, the specific roles borders have taken on for 
governance will be outlined: they are decisive for the conceptual divide between citizens 
and aliens and also for the ensuing entitlements or refusal thereof. They allow governments 
to maintain a monopoly over economic control as well as internal order through political 
control and enforceability of law. Finally, they have become the basis on which the state 
provides security to its citizens.
113 Donald N. Michael, "Governing by Learning: Boundaries, Myths and Metaphors," Futures 25, no. 1 
(1993): 82.
Ibid.
115 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), 120.
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3.1. Ethnic and civic nations and borders
Before going into the specific role of borders, a few remarks about the relationship 
between different kinds of nationalism and the views on delimited territory and borders are 
made. This is not the space to present an elaborate discussion of nationalism. Others have 
done so with great scholarly depth and knowledge.116 Different kinds of relationships 
between nation and state are only be presented insofar as they can contribute to an 
understanding of borders.
The nation and territory are closely linked in European historical experience and 
interpretation. Generally speaking, nationalism has been a central political doctrine in 
western Europe since the end of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
The fusion between nation, state and territory became what has been called a mythomoteur 
of European nationalism, a myth which was central in defining identity in European 
polities.117 The originally French principle of the nation-state which spread to Western 
Europe in the 19th century incorporated the idea that the state is primarily legitimated 
through the nation that organises itself within it -  contrarily to earlier principles of 
legitimacy of territorial politics and the ruler.
Although a number of theories of nations can be differentiated,118 Malcolm Anderson 
points to common threads: firstly, that the nation is seen as the basis of legitimacy and 
secondly, that it is assumed that the nation is bounded.119 He cites Benedict Anderson: ‘The 
nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a 
billion living beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.’120
116 see for example Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1991), Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism, John 
Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), Ernest Gellner, 
"Nationalism and the Two Forms of Cohesion in Complex Societies," in Culture•, Identity, and Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Montserrat Guibemau, Nationalisms. The Nation-State 
and Nationalism in the 20th Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), John Hutchinson and Anthony D. 
Smith, eds., Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth 
Century.
117 Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World, 25, Armstrong, Nations before 
Nationalism, 9.
118 For example Anderson distinguishes: the nation as a contractual or quasi-voluntary association, the 
nation as a natural unit whose membership is destiny, the nation as a metaphysical ideal and the 
nation as the political project of an elite minority. Cf. Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation 
in the Modem World, 4If.
Cf. Ibid, 42.
i2° Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 7.
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The concept of a nation in itself is depends on boundaries, but not necessarily geographic 
ones. Nations are large social groups with a feeling of solidarity and reference to common 
values, a common past and a common culture. Two broad concepts of the emergence and 
evolution of the nation can be distinguished: one of the ethnic or cultural nation 
(Kulturnation)121 and one of the political or civic nation (Staatsnation). Both concepts refer 
to a bounded, sovereign nation state as their ideal. The former has been used mainly to 
describe the development and situation in Central and Eastern Europe where the nation 
defined itself first via a common language and culture. The latter refers to a situation where 
a nation emerges in an existent state without reference to ethnic differences (Western 
Europe, main examples: France and Britain).
The distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism also has effects on the relationship 
between the nation-state and its borders. The civic nation emerges from an already existing 
state or governing authority. The example of France shows that the state acquired 
territorial clarity long before the Revolution, and that even myths of natural borders of 
France existed since the second half of the sixteenth century.122 Such territorial clarity came 
into existence through political developments of the land of the French kings and through 
administrative, military and political necessities. Thus, the emerging nation had an existing 
‘mythical’ space within which in could be imagined. Its identity was primarily wedded to 
the constitutional values of the state and nation, so that the existing or idealised borders of 
the state could become the point of identification for the nation. Once in existence, such 
borders could lead to a reinforcement of the territorial imagination of the nation through 
their tangibility and their function of representation and symbolic significance.
The ethnic-based nation works according to different principles: the nation exists where 
members feel bound to the linguistic or cultural foundations of the nation and participate 
in it. The historian H. A. Winkler on German nationalism and its lack of linkage with an 
existing state: ‘Fiir den deutschen Begriff von “Nation” war dabei die Gemeinsamkeit der 
Sprache (“Gezunge”) der bestimmende Gesichtspunkt: ein Riickgriff, der nahe lag, wenn 
man bedenkt, dafl die “deutsche Nation” keine irgendwie geartete Verwaltungseinheit 
bildete. In Frankreich und England dagegen, ging die Nationsbildung von der Monarchic 
aus, was dem Begriff „Nation“ einen in Deutschland nicht moglichen Bezug auf den Staat
121 The term Kulturnation refers only to the cultural aspect of nations whereas ethnic nation also refers to 
the tribal and kinship aspects. In practice, many nations which have defined themselves as Kulturnation 
have also included the ethnic traits. Cf. for example the German principle of descendence for 
conferring citizenship.
122 Cf. Febvre, Pour une Histoire a part entiere.
- 66 -
Borders and the modern state
gab.’123 The ethnic nation is therefore not primarily a political project. Only when it merged 
with the political ideals of the nation-state, territorial clarity became a necessity.
The ‘Kulturnation’ is threatened when the concept of a coherent ethnic and linguistic 
community begins to disintegrate. To the contrary, the ‘Staatsnation’ is endangered when 
the physical border which divides citizens from aliens weakens or when the internal 
authority is fundamentally challenged. This has obviously consequences for a number of 
policy areas, not least of all those of immigration. For the ethnic nation, it is vital to retain a 
coherent community in terms of linguistic and ethnic culture, whereas the civic nation 
needs to integrate aliens into the political and cultural community.
The complex of nation-state-territory124 has undergone significant changes. On the one 
hand, the territorial principle seems still very attractive. The right to national self- 
determination has been enshrined into the United Nations Charter and has become an 
accepted principle of the world order after WWII. After the Cold War, a large number of 
states (re-)gained political and territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the principle of 
the exclusive exercise of state power over its own territory has seen changes through the 
European integration project. Integration and projects of cross-border cooperation and 
indeed cooperation in Schengen have undermined the principle of exclusive state control
125over territory.
The idea of the nation has changed over time, too: all European states today would claim 
to have both elements of a Staatsnation and a Kulturnation -  to a varying degree. On the 
whole, the idea of civic nationalism seems to be on the rise in Western Europe: historical 
developments and their interpretation, mainly the experience of fascism in Europe with its 
perversion of nationalism, has discredited ethnic nationalism to some extent. Furthermore, 
many European states are beginning to recognise (with varying speed) that they are or are 
becoming multi-national states and societies. To the extent that this recognition challenges
123 Winkler, Derlange Wegnach Westen. Deutsche Geschichte vom EndedesAltenReiches biszurn Untergangder 
WeimarerRepublik, Ilf. Translation: For the German concept of ‘nation’, the decisive aspect was the 
common language: an obvious reference if one considers that the ‘German nation’ did not form any 
kind of administrative unit. In France and England, on the contrary, the nation-building originated 
from the monarchy, which gave the concept of ‘nation’ a relation to the state which was impossible in 
Germany.
124 Cf. Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World.
125 It is true that unbundled territoriality has always existed, indeed was a prerequisite for the functioning 
of the territorial state system. The extent to which central functions of the state are affected by 
current European developments is of a different dimension, however.
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the self-understanding of cohesion of a nation, multiculturalism could be seen to 
undermine the traditional complex of nation-state-territory.
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3.2. Borders, territoriality and international law in the modern state system
This section elaborates the various uses the border has traditionally had for the modern 
state in Europe. The remainder of this thesis will show that many of these were challenged 
through the Schengen negotiations on border controls and compensatory measures.
Territory/borders and the modern state are mutually constitutive in their genesis. They 
cannot be decoupled in the understanding of international law and most importantly, the 
state relies on territoriality for governance: the perception of unity and assertion of 
sovereignty which territory allows, as well as the possibility of control with which it 
provides the state, are indispensable to the modern state.
Torpey has summarised the constitutive nature of limiting movement for state authority:
States have sought to monopolize the capacity to authorize the movement of persons 
-  and unambiguously to establish their identities in order to enforce this authority -  
for a great variety of reason which reflect the ambiguous nature of modern states, 
which are at once sheltering and dominating. These reasons include such objectives 
as the extraction of military service, taxes, and labor; the facilitation of law 
enforcement; the control of “brain drain”...; the restriction of access to areas deemed 
“off-limits” by the state, whether for “security” reasons or to protect people from 
unexpected or unacknowledged harms; the exclusion, surveillance, and containment 
of “undesirable elements,” whether these are of an ethnic, national, racial, economic, 
religious, ideological, or medical character; and the supervision of the growth, spatial 
distribution, and social composition of populations within their territories.”126
3.2.1. Territorial control in the evolution of the modem state
Historically speaking, the ability of the state to exercise control over its territory changed 
enormously. Early modern states had loose control over their peripheral regions. The 
development of the modern state was concomitant with the extension of state control over 
the whole of the territory up to the borders. What had earlier been termed ‘marches’ 
became clearly documented border lines. States’ attitudes changed so that now the exact 
definition as well as control of borders with border guards and posts became an objective.
The history of cartography illustrates this. For example, attempts in Prussia at more precise 
‘land measuring’ began in the early 18th century. In the 1770s, the eastern parts of the 
Prussian monarchy were measures in fairly accurate maps (1:50 000). The major attempt at
126 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 7.
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documenting territory happened in the 19th century in several phases with the help of the 
military.127 The first atlas (for administrative and statistical purposes) appeared in 1827/28. 
Also in Bavaria, cartography was intensified in the early 19th century through the order of 
Kurfiirst May IV. Joseph with the aim of using the maps for tax purposes.128 It was also in 
the 19th century that ‘instructions’ were given to produce uniform bases for measurements 
in all parts of Prussia. This also facilitated a common set of maps for Prussia, Saxony, 
Bavaria and Wiirttemberg, decided upon in 1878.
Most state theories of the emerging nation-state of the 17th and 18th century implied a 
contract, thus a two-way relationship between territory and state. The state relied on clear 
territory to provide order, law and security to its citizens. Domestic order presupposed 
enforceability of law, thus clear boundaries. In order to govern effectively, knowledge 
about the population -  for example in the form of economic data -  was necessary. 
Government obtained information about the population and enforced law on a territorial 
basis in order to provide the (territorially limited) population with security and prosperity.
Liberal contract theory today takes up this reciprocal view. State authority is mainly derived 
from a bond between the community and government. For government to fulfil its tasks, 
the population needs to be bounded, so that control can be exercised over entry, resources 
and all threats to the social order. Thus, the role of government is to preserve the 
boundaries of the community by territorial behaviour. Michael Walzer argues for example 
that states have a right to exclude people from immigration since the community could not 
function without a control on immigration.129 Rawls also assumes a closed society for the 
purposes of his theory of justice.130 Nozick’s theory, too, has been interpreted to mean that 
(collective and individual) property rights can be an argument for the control of entry to 
territory.131 Yet other interpretations, not necessarily liberal, base their defence for the
127 Gerd Kriiger and Jorg Schnadt, Konigreich Preufien. Berlin-Brandenburg im Kartenbild (2002 [cited July 
2002]); available from http://geog.fu-berlin.de/de/Karto/2bik/Kap4/kap4_l-03.php3, Wolfgang 
Scharfe, Von der GemarkungskartezurLandesaufnahme. Berlin-Brandenburg im Kartenbild (2002 [cited July 
2002]); available from http://geog.fu-berlin.de/de/Karto/2bik/2bik_r.php3. Interestingly, Scharfe 
reports that the Prussian King Frederick II refused in 1749/50 to have measurements improved 
because this could be of advantage to Prussia’s enemies.
128 175 Jahre Stemwarte Bogenhausen (2002 [cited July 2002]); available from http://www.usm.uni- 
muenchen.de/hist.html.
129 Walzer in P.G. Brown and H. Shue, eds., Boundaries, vol. 16 (Ottawa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981). 
(acc. to Anderson)
130 Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
131 Cf. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
- 70-
Borders and the modern state
control of territory on the distinct bases of communities, i.e. ethnic, civic, cultural, 
imagined.132
For control to be politically feasible, it needs to exclude other sources of authority apart
from the state. Territorial exclusivity is therefore constitutive of the order of the state, a
structuring principle of political communities. Bertrand Badie puts forward a reason for the
ideal of territorial exclusivity: exclusive juridical competence is only possible if other
sources of authority internally and externally are excluded. Territoriality, in this perspective,
is therefore conceptually prior to community:
Si...le territoire est un instrument de controle des individus et des groupes, ce 
controle ne sera politiquement pertinent que s'il dispose de l'exclusivite, c'est-a-dire 
s'il tarit les autres sources de production de l'autorite... Le principe de territorialite 
presuppose que le territoire soit reconnu comme constitutif d'ordre, comme principe 
structurant des communautes politiques, sans qu'il ne derive prealablement de 
quelque solidarite sociale qui lui serait anterieure, distincte ou qui le transcenderait.133
Territorial control is exercised through mechanisms of control on the whole of the 
territory. This can reach from the statistics and forms in which the state obtains knowledge 
about the citizens up to the presence of police and technological surveillance mechanisms. 
These can only be meaningfully obtained on a limited territory, often precisely even at the 
borders.
Torpey has made a significant contribution to exploring the importance of territorial 
control to the development of the modern state with his study on the emergence of the 
passport. He argues ‘that the emergence of passport and related controls on movement is 
an essential aspect of the “state-ness” of states.’134 By showing that the authority to regulate 
movement has ‘been intrinsic to the very construction of states since the rise of absolutism
132 This is not to ignore the enormous differences and oppositions between various authors such as 
Benedict Anderson, John Rawls, Will Kymlicka and ethnic based foundationalist argumentations. 
Also, the longstanding debate about justice of limiting immigration and controlling territory should 
not be ignored. See e.g. Peter C. Meilaender, "Liberalism and Open Borders: The Argument of 
Joseph Carens," International Migration Review 33, no. 4 (1999)., N o ta A l, Anarchy, Stateand Utopia, Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice.] etc.
The main point here is, however, to distinguish between the two fundamentally different views on the 
relationship between territory and community. In the first, it is the interests of the community which 
generate the need to control territory, in the second, it is the territorial behaviour of existing 
government which fashions the community.
133 Badie, La fin des territoires. Essaisurledesordre international etsurl'utilite sociale du respect, 47. Translation: If 
territory is an instrument of control of individuals and of groups, this control is politically pertinent 
only if it disposes of exclusivity, that is if it silences the other sources of production of authority (...). 
The principle of territoriality presupposes that the territory be recognized as constitutive of order, as 
structuring principle of political communities, and not derived from some kind of social solidarity 
which precedes it, is distinguished from it or transcends it.
134 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 3.
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in early modern Europe’, he draws attention to the control ‘techniques of identification 
that have played a crucial role in the development of modern, territorial states resting on 
distinctions between citizens/nationals and aliens.’135
Denis Retaille has reflected on the relationship between community, identity and territory 
and has emphasised their conceptual interlinkedness. Positing territory as a socially 
constructed phenomenon, he views the action of constructing it as a discourse ‘stupefiant’ 
in which a partial identity is widened to encompass an imagined space. Once delimited, this 
space becomes the criterion for identity.136 The argument advanced here is that there is a 
mutually constitutive element between the territory and the community enclosed. By a 
process of generalisation and unification, the local is widened to encompass the whole.
3.2.2. International law, sovereignty and borders
International law ties together borders and the state through concepts of sovereignty and 
stability of the state system. Post-Westphalian international law is founded on a horizontal 
international structure, with legal equality and territorial exclusivity of all units. Territorial 
borders can reduce complexity internationally in order to define which law applies to 
whom. In principle, this division of the international system means the thorough 
application of one principle, territoriality, to all spheres of life of people located within.
Sovereignty is linked conceptually to the idea of one government possessing the monopoly 
of force in order to enforce law and produce a domestic order. International law as well as 
Realist theories of international relations have proposed a close relationship between the 
territoriality and sovereignty. For Maurice Flory, one is not conceivable without the other 
in international law: ‘En droit international, on ne peut en effet concevoir l’un sans l’autre 
car un Etat suppose un territoire et parce qu’en dehors des territoires antarctiques, il 
n’existe pas de territoire sans Etat.’137
us Ibid, 5.
136 “(L)e contenu sert d’abord a designer le contenant, puis le contenant determine le contenu. L’identite 
partielle est etendue a un espace imagine ; une fois delimite, l’espace imagine devient le critere 
d’identite.” Denis Retaille, "L'imperatif territorial," in L 'internationalsans territoire, ed. Bertrand Badie 
and Marie-Claude Smouts, Culture & Conflits (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1996), 25.
137 Maurice Flory, "Le Couple Etat-territoire en droit international contemporain," in L 'internationalsans 
territoire, ed. Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1996), 252. In international 
law, one cannot conceive one without the other since a state presupposes a territory and because 
there is no territory without state outside the Antarctic.
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This is echoed in the conception of a German lawyer on the importance of borders for the 
state. For Rupprecht, the border receives its meaning as a result of the state authority 
which it circumscribes.138 This concept of the function of the border resulting from its 
centrality for state authority played a crucial part in the national and European debates 
regarding border controls.
Lucius Caflisch has emphasised that borders are the markers and precondition of external 
sovereignty. The function of borders is to divide public power between public entities, 
whether local or state. He furthermore states that territorial sovereignty legally requires the 
continued and effective exercise of state power.139
For the modern state, it is the essence of statehood to dispose exclusively of this space of 
sovereignty: ‘[Le territoire] est l’espace de souverainete dont dispose a titre exclusif tout 
Etat.’140 Flory adds that in political science, an ‘International sans territoire’ (title of the 
collection by Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts to which his essay is a contribution) 
is imaginable, but that international law cannot decouple the two and asserts their 
‘perennite juridique.’141
Since territory and state have become inseparable units in international law, borders serve 
as the indicators of the limits of the sovereign legal entity. T)e la confrontation entre egales 
souverainetes resulte la necessite d’une delimitation qui fait apparaitre la frontiere destinee a 
empecher tout empietement sur une autre souverainete.’142
138 Die Funktion einer Grenze zwischen Staaten ergibt sich aus der an ihr jeweils endenden staatlichen 
Macht bzw. aus ihrer geographischen Umschreibung einer bestimmten Staatsgewalt Reinhard 
Rupprecht and Markus Hellenthal, Innere Sicherheit im Europaischen Binnehmarkt (Giitersloh: Verlag 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1992), 40. Rupprecht works for of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior. 
Translation: The function of a border between states results from the state power ending there, or 
rather from its geographical circumscription of a specific authority of the state.
139 “H ne suffit pas d’acquerir la souverainete territoriale. Encore faut-il, on l’a souligne, la valider et la 
conserver a travers Pexercice effectif et continu de la puissance publique.” Translation: “It is not 
enough to attain territorial sovereignty. It has been emphasised that it has to be validated and 
preserved through the effective and continuing exercise of public power.” Caflisch, "Essai d'une 
Typologie des frontieres," 267., with reference to Max Huber, "lie de Palmas," Recueil des sentences 
arbitrates 2 (1928).
140 Flory, "Le Couple Etat-territoire en droit international contemporain," 252. Translation: (The 
territory) is the space of sovereignty of which each state disposes exclusively.
141 It should be noted here that legal scholars are beginning to see a weakening of the link of 
international law and the territorial state. Economic globalisation and international citizenship rights 
embedded in interstate law allow to trace the beginnings of a new kind of global jurisprudence, says 
Richard Falk, a leading legal scholar. Cf. Richard A. Falk, Law in an Emerging Global Village: A Post- 
Westphalian Perspective (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998).
142 Flory, "Le Couple Etat-territoire en droit international contemporain," 252. Translation : The 
confrontation of sovereign equals necessitates a delimitation which makes the border seem destined 
to prevent all infringement of another sovereignty.
- 73 -
Borders and the modern state
Also the Realist tradition of international relations has such a view of sovereignty linked to 
exclusivity of territory: in the essay Rise and Demise ofthe Territorial State, John Herz defined 
the characteristics of the modern nation-state before the nuclear age to consist in the 
‘’impermeability’, or ‘impenetrability’, or simply the ‘territoriality’ of the modern state. The 
fact that it was surrounded by a hard shell rendered it to some extent secure from foreign 
penetration, and thus made it an ultimate unit of protection for those within its 
boundaries.’143 This shows obviously an idealised view of the modern state where ‘power 
indicated the strategic aspect, independence the political aspect, sovereignty the legal aspect 
of this selfsame impermeability.’144 Herz found that the nuclear age had ended such a unity 
of power, independence and sovereignty, but retains this congruence as an ideal. Later, 
Herz has pointed out, however, that he sees the emergence of what he called new 
territoriality in an environment of nuclear penetrability and technological relationships of a 
shrinking world. He finds that the ‘territorial urge and the urge to maintain (or establish, or 
regain) one’s “sovereignty” and “independence” -  all of these do not seem to have 
diminished in importance in these decades of the nuclear age.’145 Thus he sees the territorial 
imperative still at work, partly due to the centrality of sovereignty to the state.
This idealised version of sovereignty and territory has to be opposed with the fact that such 
exclusivity of sovereignty has never existed. Retaille speaks of the fiction of total 
sovereignty which relies on the concepts of exclusivity and exhaustivity.146 Indeed, 
extraterritoriality was always needed to make the system work. Only by establishing 'alien' 
enclaves within states could the vital diplomatic communication be ensured that was 
needed. Ruggie adds ‘[w]hat we might describe as an "unbundling'' of territoriality, then, of 
which extraterritoriality was the first and most enduring instantiation, over time has 
become a generic contrivance to attenuate the paradox of absolute individuation.’147 What 
remains, however, is that the fiction of territorial exclusivity is closely related to the 
(constitutive) fiction of total sovereignty of the modern state.
143 Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," 474. Obviously, territoriality has here a very 
specific meaning here, namely only and markedly that accorded to the specifically modern state. Since 
this is threatened in the age of nuclear weapons, Herz speaks of the "passing of the age of 
territoriality" (p.475)
144 Ibid.: 475.
145 Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," 78.
146 Retaille, "L'imperatif territorial," 29. “Les trois principes de lTtat moderne fonde sur le territoire, 
1’unite, le primat du politique, manifestent la decouverte de l’imperatif territorial en deux attributs 
superposes: l’exclusivite et l’exhaustivite que l’on retrouve dans la fiction de la souverainete totale.”
147 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. Essays on international Institutionalization, 190.
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A principle of territorial stability -  and concomitant non-changeability of borders by force 
-  allows predictability and a higher degree of security in the international system. The 
strategy of international law for the stabilisation of borders has generated a number of 
specific principles148: firstly, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus allows a revision of a treaty 
when fundamental elements leading to the treaty no longer exist, but excludes specifically 
any revision of a treaty which establishes a border.149 Secondly, the 1978 Vienna 
Convention on the succession of states stipulates that any successor state is not bound by 
any treaty of its predecessor (tabula rasa), except those establishing an international 
border.150 Thirdly, the principle of uti possidetis, used heavily in the process of 
decolonisation, means that new states have to maintain as international borders the 
administrative lines of the old empire. Fourthly, the principle of intangibility of borders 
(same principle under different name), has been established at first summit of the OAU, 
Cairo 1964; it means that the colonial borders between countries which are heirs of 
different colonial powers have to be maintained. Lastly, two principles have been 
established to guarantee territorial stability even in a situation of war. The first one says that 
any change of territorial control durante bello has no effect on the legal right to the territory 
and the position of the border. The second one, ius liminii, states that the owner of a 
territory before hostilities will be retroactively restored to all rights to his territory after the 
end of war, even if the territory was occupied or annexed.
An international system of territorial stability allows domestic governments to maintain 
their role as the source of authority within.151 The Schengen solution undermined territorial 
exclusivity to some extent and thus challenged principles of international law.
148 Cf. Georges Abi-Saab, "La perennite des frontieres en droit international," Relations intemationales 64, 
no. hiver (1990).
149 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, 1969, art. 62, quoted after Ibid.
150 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States, 1978, art. 11, quoted after Ibid.
151 The division of world society into entitled and non-entitled is often viewed as greatly injust and a 
result of the practices of highly developed states to exclude. In practice, the principles of modern 
governance, which rely on borders, clash with liberal principles of global human entidement. Political 
reasons for entitlement (feasibility of governance) clash with wider moral deliberations regarding 
universal human rights. Re-thinking this situation in favour of a more just situation is certainly 
important with a view to upholding liberal values of entitlement. For these discussions, however, it 
should be borne in mind how fundamental this rethinking would be. Taking away the negative effects 
of borders also entails curtailing the state’s ability to govern effectively according to established 
principles of inclusion and exclusion, control and order.
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3.3. The importance of borders for the functioning of the modern state
Having shown the constitutive function of borders/territory and the state in international 
law, the following section moves on to show the central role of borders for governance. 
The inside-outside division is important in every dimension of governance; borders 
function as the basis of reinforcing this division through symbolic and practical 
characteristics: ‘Geographic boundaries are not only tangible; they possess other important 
attributes: they often acquire intense symbolic significance, and the direct impact of 
political action is frequently earliest and strongest in a geographic context.’152
3.3.1. Symbolic and practical functions
Practical and symbolic functions of the border are closely linked. Practical measures at the 
borders serve a symbolic purpose of deterrence and of representation of the ability of the 
state to act. Visibility of border controls is an important component of the symbolic role of 
the border. Indeed, the growth of visibility of border controls in the last century has 
contributed largely to a consciousness of the border in the whole of the population.153 If a 
border is open in the sense of few controls on the movement of people and goods, but 
retains its legal relevance, its impact may be felt less immediately by the population but its 
existence is nevertheless still acknowledged.
The importance of the non-material elements of borders has to be emphasised: ‘Myth, 
symbol, communication, and a cluster of associated attitudinal factors are usually more 
persistent than purely material factors.’154 On the basis of national myths, ‘[n]arrowed in­
group loyalties’ can emerge. ‘Nations... provide their citizens with more vibrant public 
identities than transnational and global organizations will ever be able to do.’155
Borders serve as signals. As such, they indicate to insiders and outsiders the limit of a state. 
They do that often with the help of border markers. These can consist in control 
instruments, a line on the street, markings of open territory with artificial and natural 
objects. State symbols such as the flag or the image of the head of state are displayed at the
152 Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism, 9.
153 Cf. also Torpey’s study on passport controls Torpey, The Invention of the Passport.
154 Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism, 9.
155 William McNeill, "The Care and Repair of Public Myth,"Foreign Affairs 61, no. 1 (1982): 12. McNeill 
does not advocate the nation-state as a necessary or ideal site, however. He states that the existence 
of a world society and a world full of conflict necessitates a balance between broadly inclusive public 
identities and narrow group loyalties.
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border. Amongst these, border controls by specific border control personnel have an 
especially important function which includes both the ‘actual’ control and further meaning. 
Border control guards wear uniforms which mark them as representatives of the state and 
emphasise the official function of their task. They represent the ability of the state to act 
and control movement across the border. A physical barrier at border control signals the 
limit of the exercise of national power. The border control agents also have a power of 
symbolising the state through the potential of the impact of their actions. These state 
officials represent state power in that they are entitled to exercise the full extent of the law. 
Their decisions can lawfully lead to indictment, expulsion or other repressive measures. 
The knowledge about such repressive power of the control forces, which is concentrated at 
the border, makes such controls a representation of the state and state power. Thus, 
visibility and experience of border controls reinforces the awareness of the existence and 
dividing function of the border in the population.
These mechanisms of symbolisation mean that most citizens have contact with the border 
even if they do not live close by it. The media, but also the enormous increase of individual 
travel in Europe and the ’myth’ of the border in the form of general knowledge about the 
‘use’ of the border, all led to a production of the ‘reality of the border’ even for those living 
away from the border. The symbolisation connected to the border re-occurs in different 
circumstances of civic life. This means that citizens have become aware of the existence 
and importance of the border for the state also in their everyday lives.
3.3.2. The economic function
On the one hand, the border serves as a contact point with the international system for 
trade. Export and import always are done via an international border. Both are vital for the 
modern state’s economy. Maintaining a high degree of permeability for this purpose is in 
the interest of any state involved in the international trade system.
On the other hand, the state may wish to have a tight control over borders for economic 
reasons: the border offers an opportunity for the state to protect national production of 
goods and the labour market if so wished. Goods can be checked for their compliance with 
national safety or quality standards at the border. Plant and animal health are crucial to 
societal health, and diseases can represent considerable damage to the national economy.156
156 Cf. the outbreak of food and mouth disease in Europe in the year 2000.
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Controlling at the border is the most efficient way of controlling the moving of goods. 
When already on the territory, control becomes practically much more difficult due to the 
dispersion of goods which might be impossible to expel. Also diseases might already have 
been transmitted.
Furthermore, the border also allows the state to have a certain extent of control of the tax 
base. Torpey points to the inherent link between restricted movement and economic 
(taxation) objectives: ‘Such devices as identity papers, censuses, and travel certificates thus 
were not merely on a par with conscription and taxation as elements of state-building, but 
were in fact essential to their successful realization.’157
This fiscal function of the border is becoming increasingly problematic due to changes in 
the structure of international financial markets and of the international political economy.158 
Indeed, it has been one of the greatest challenges in European integration to work through 
the contradiction of maintaining fiscal barriers and promoting integrated trade. The 
Schengen project itself is an attempt to mediate between interests of national control and 
freedom of movement.
The modern welfare state depends on being able to have such an amount of control as to 
predict the economic necessities and provide the financial means to counter needs. The 
recent decades have however seen an increasing inability of states to avoid the erosion of 
their tax base. The opportunities to circumvent the knowledge of state and border 
authorities and to bring money outside the country have risen considerably with global 
financial and European economic integration. Similarly, smuggling and fraud are an 
increasing problem with regard to trade and the maintenance of standards in European 
member states.
Looking at the economic function of the border reveals a paradox of the border: it allows 
state control, but also prevents unhindered trade. Generally speaking, economic integration 
facilitates legal transactions across borders and is therefore welcomed by states in Europe, 
but integration also makes more it difficult to retain control over economic activities across 
and within its borders. For example, the fact that numbers in cross-border traffic rose
157 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 15.
158 Cf. Richard O'Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter, The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1992).
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considerably in the 1980s, brought with it the difficulty of keeping control levels at the 
borders at high levels.159 In addition, such integration has the unintended consequence of 
also making illegal interactions, i.e. moving of goods, capital and persons across borders 
easier. Thus, there is an underlying tension between integration and the modern state in the 
economic domain.
3.3.3. The identity function
The border has a vital function for the construction of identity. Boundaries -  the result of 
social processes -  allow to structure reality into meaningful units. Drawing boundaries 
includes giving different meaning to the units separated. For each individual unit, the 
boundary represents the division between inside and outside.
Societies can be conceived as both large collectivities of individuals and as possessing their 
own social structures. Additionally, societies are characterised by a common orientation, 
common institutions, practices and norms.160 Boundaries of societies are thus the basis of 
such a common meaning, a common interpretation of life, an identity. A mechanism of 
defining inside and outside offers members of a community the possibility to develop a 
sense of belonging. The boundary is the line at which the we-you oppositions can 
crystallise.
Any perceived difference can be constructed into the origin of a border. Cohen emphasises 
the symbolic role of borders in constructing difference: ‘Since boundaries are inherently 
oppositional, almost any matter of perceived difference between a community and the 
outside world can be rendered symbolically as a resource of its boundary. ... The 
boundaries consist essentially in the contrivance of distinctive meanings within the 
community’s social discourse. People construct their community symbolically, making it a 
resource and a repository of meaning.’161
159 see tables on cross border traffic in the appendix. In contrast, numbers of officers of the 
Bundesgrenzschutz remained relatively stable during that time.
160 The properties of society have long been a subject of debate between sociologists. This general 
definition is by no means an attempt to give any definite explanation, but rather tries to include the 
elements which inform the understanding of society in the rest of the thesis. It follows Giddens, and 
includes both Weberian and Durkheimian perspectives on society.
161 Anthony P. Cohen, ed., Symbolising Boundaries. Identity and Diversity in British Cultures (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1996), 17.
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Whether conceived more in ethnic or political terms, national identity is associated with an 
affiliation to a territory, solidarity between a present community with a continuity over time 
and ‘a feeling of being one of the units of which the global society consists.’162 Armstrong 
shows how identity can thus become linked with territory: ‘Over long periods of time, the 
legitimising power of individual mythic structures tends to be enhanced by fusion with 
other myths in a mythomoteur defining identity in relation to a specific polity.’163 The 
importance of consciousness and an awareness of the border which thus becomes a part of 
people’s identity is also emphasised by Cohen: ‘[The] boundary is essentially a matter of 
consciousness and of experience, rather than of fact and law. As an item of consciousness, 
it is inherent in people’s identity and is a predicate of their culture.’164
Peter Sahlins’ research also emphasises the importance of borders for state formation and 
the development of national identity. In a study of the events in the Spanish-French border 
region over centuries, he shows that national identity was not a sentiment that could be 
imposed by a central authority. Instead, ‘the adoption of national identities was part of a 
contextual and oppositional process of self-differentiation. Peasants became either French 
or Spanish because they were not the other, but not because they were no longer Catalans, 
Cerdans or peasants.... And in constructing the national boundary of France and Spain, 
they had created for themselves new identities as French people and Spaniards.’ A set of 
local conflicts had led to a growing ‘importance of differences perceived among villagers in 
proximity to each other.’165
A border can become a monument to the lack of national unity for a state (such as divided 
Germany) or a state-less nation (such as the Kurdish nation). Identity questions can 
therefore become the prime motive for political attempts to change borders.166 Also 
subnational identity is displayed at the borders. In Germany, for example Bavaria or Saxony 
in Germany have a strong regional identity which also gives them political weight. At the
162 Waever et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, 21. See also chapter 2 on the 
relationship between nation, state and borders.
163 Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism, 10.
164 Cohen, "Boundaries and Boundary-Consciousness: Politicizing Cultural Identity."
165 Peter Sahlins, "State Formation and National Identity in the Catalan Borderlands During the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in Border Identities. Nation and State at international Frontiers, ed. 
Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 55.
166 In reverse to the examples just mentioned, a border can also be introduced to do justice to national 
boundaries: In the case of the Czech and Slovak Republics, the borders were introduced to adapt the 
political organisation to national ideals.
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Land borders, the visitor encounters signs announcing the entry into the territory of the 
‘Freistaat’ Bayern.167
Thus, national borders are both an expression and a marker of identity, but also a symbol 
of the (national) identity. This special historical importance and meaning of political 
borders may be explained with the characteristic of clarity of the territorial boundary. The 
border is an easily accessible practical and symbolic indicator of difference.
The abolition of border controls -  as symbolisation of the identity marker and 
representation of state authority -  therefore can represent a fundamental change. However, 
as will be shown below, the discourse on the European and national level concentrated on 
the loss of security through the abolition of border controls and compensatory measures. 
The identity discourse did not play a large role in the Schengen negotiations: the abolition 
of border controls was officially framed as a technical issue so that identity issues were not 
pushed by the authorities. Additionally, the legal and administrative nature of the border 
was retained so that identitiy questions did not become immediate.
3.3.4. The governance function
Governance in the modern state is bound up with the ability to enforce order domestically 
and to distinguish between citizens and aliens with all rights and duties which this 
differentiation entails.
The legal role of the border is therefore relevant not only externally in the international 
system, but also extends to the inside of the individual state. By giving the state the 
possibility to enforce restrictions of entry, the border clearly delimits the space and the 
population to which national law is applicable. All common and penal law is applicable to 
the whole of the territory of a state and to everyone sojourning there. The population of a 
state has particular rights and also duties which can be realised or enforced on the territory. 
Torpey points to the connectedness of territorial control, citizenship and modern state- 
building: ‘Documentary controls on movement were decisively bound up with the rights 
and duties that would eventually come to be associated with membership -  citizenship -  in 
the nation-state.’168
167 Most Lander are artificial constructs and thus do have much less of a historical sense of identity. 
However, a gradual sense of belonging together also emerges on the Lander level.
168 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 19.
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As has been pointed out above, enforceability of domestic law gives territory a central place 
in the modern state. Legitimate use of power by the state authorities relies on a bounded 
territory: the evolution of the modern state coincided with the development of a central 
administrative power of government which could exercise internal power.169 For Anthony 
Giddens, the nation-state is, therefore, a ‘bordered power-container’: ‘All traditional states 
have laid claim to the formalized monopoly over the means of violence within their 
territories. But it is only within nation-states that this claim characteristically becomes more 
or less successful.’170 He also mentions that processes of internal pacification, thus the 
exercise of public power and surveillance, are integral parts of this evolution.
This way of governing requires a finite territory which provides specific features: 
Clarity as to where and to whom state power applies;
Inescapability to the extent that distance within the territory should not make a 
fundamental difference to the application of state power;
The borders of the territory as a possible crystallisation point of state power.
Governance in modern states also implies predictable control over the economy, more 
particularly state revenues. Borders are crucial in this respect as has been highlighted above. 
Foucault has remarked on the modern art of government as economic, therefore requiring 
knowledge:
To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the 
level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the 
wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive 
as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods.171
Control over the borders allows the state to some degree to have relevant knowledge about 
a number of factors crucial for governance: the knowledge of which and how many people 
are present on the territory, the collection of relevant economic data, the statistical 
recording and analysis of data etc. Currently, the control of entry of people and the control 
of exit of financial means are central to this controlling function of the border. Thus, the 
border is a vital element in the state’s ability to control and also to protect people from 
what are deemed unwanted influences.
169 Cf. Weber, "Politik als Beruf."
170 Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 120.
171 Michel Foucault, "Govemmentality," in The Foucault Effect, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and 
Peter Miller (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 92.
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In a practical sense, borders have the function of allowing the state institutions to build up 
forces at strategic points in order to exercise control. The police forces would not be able 
to exercise such effective control without borders. If a person subjectable to state sanctions 
could move around freely, law enforcement would hardly be effective. Strategically 
speaking, the borders are the most effective way of controlling. At the same time, borders 
represent the limits to the authority of the state. In congruence with the enclosed 
Westphalian model of sovereignty, police and other law enforcement services have to limit 
their activities to the national territory. Formal integration as envisioned in the Schengen 
Agreement therefore also threatened governance fundamentally.
3.3.5. The differentiation function
As has been shown in the sections on the economic, identity and governance role of the 
border, the functioning of the modern state is predicated on being able to draw a line 
between inside and outside. This mechanism is most clearly at work in the function of 
borders in defining citizens and aliens. It is on the basis of borders that belonging to a 
certain state is defined. Thus, the link between citizenship and rights relies on the 
assumption that the population in a state is congruent with citizens, and that very few 
citizens live abroad for longer periods of time.
The border is most central in the principle of citizenship of ius soli where the right of 
citizenship is conferred according to the place of birth. It is much less true for the ius 
sanguinis where citizenship is accorded due to descent. However, even here a reference to a 
space of origin is retained which is circumscribed by borders.172 Most European states 
today have a mixed system of both rights for according citizenship, meaning that the 
territorial principle playes a large role for nationalisation.
The differentiation between citizen and alien has consequences for political, social and civil 
rights. Nationals and foreigners are constructed as opposed groups where the former live 
in a complex net of rights and duties in a state, whereas the latter have rights only on the 
basis of international norms and agreements or specifically granted by national laws.
172 See for example the debate in Germany regarding the ‘Aussiedler’ and their reference to descent from 
Germans who had originally come from the German territory.
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Borders define thus the basis of the polis: modern democracy is ultimately a territorial 
democracy where the right to vote is predicated on territorial qualifications.173
The consequences extend much beyond voting rights, however. The inside/outside 
division implies the applicability of law. Thus, there are certain duties which only apply to 
nationals: compulsory military service or replacement measures for example. The other side 
of the coin are rights -  such as the one to a passport -  which are usually only given to 
nationals of a country. Similarly, access to many aspects of the welfare system of the 
modern state was foreseen only for citizens: ‘European welfare states... are premised on the 
notion of a closed membership in which citizens are entitled to universal health care, 
extensive child care benefits, liberal unemployment benefits, and state-financed higher 
education.’174
The granting of rights to non-nationals conflicts with the basic set-up of the system. For 
example, the extension of voting rights to citizens living aborad and to non-citizens on the 
territory has led to an attenuation of the territorial principle. Koslowski has pointed to the 
predicament of European states in a world where the proportion of non-citizens with 
entitlements has risen. ‘Effective and legitimate democratic welfare states that are based on 
closed membership may have been possible in the demographic context of increasing 
population growth within the established membership, but increasing proportions of 
resident aliens characteristic of postwar European demography have made sustaining 
welfare states increasingly expensive.’175
Koslowski shows that the distinction between social, political and civil rights as 
components of citizenship allows to differentiate between treatment of foreigners 
according to ius soli or ius sanguinis depending on the issue involved. The liberal principles in 
the constitutions and institutions of modern states ensure that inclusion of foreigners takes 
place beyond the limits set by citizenship and state borders.176 However, Koslowski states 
that the ‘issue of political rights incumbent in formal state membership... ultimately takes
173 Even in cases where citizenship is conferred according to the ius sanguinis, e.g. formerly in Germany, 
the original right to vote is derived from belonging to a certain national territory.
174 Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens. Demographic Change in the European State System, 91., with reference to 
Gary P. Freeman, "Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State," in From Foreign 
Workers to Settlers? Transnational Migration and the Emergence of New Minorities, ed. Martin O. Heisler and 
Barbara Schmitter Heisler (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985).
175 Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens. Demographic Change in the European State System, 91.
176 The according of far-reaching social rights to ‘Gastarbeiter’ by the German Constitutional Court was 
a decisive step for inclusion of this group of foreigners in Germany.
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precedence.’177 He argues that the liberal rights of the modern institutions date from a time 
of population growth in which the membership of the state also coincided largely with the 
people entitled. Today’s environment of migration and shrinking populations calls into 
question the feasibility of this construction.
Thus, the system dividing citizens from aliens with consequences in many areas of 
governance is still in place in principle. Primarily political rights are granted according to 
this principle. It is challenged, however, in the context of migration and the granting of 
rights to non-nationals. Also the project of European integration, giving rights to nationals 
of other European states and facilitating movement and sojourn outside the home country 
stands in tension to this principle of differentiating between citizens and foreigners.
3.3.6. The security function
The relationship between borders and security is an illustration of the centrality of borders 
for governance. Indeed, the state has relied on borders for the provision of external 
security since its beginning and the provision of domestic security has increasingly become 
linked to clear state borders. The fact that the border in the modern state system is linear 
and can be easily identified renders it most useful for fending off enemies or apprehending 
criminals. In and out can be clearly defined, which is a prerequisite for providing security. 
The border is also central for enforcing internal security. It is vital for defining citizens who 
are entitled to state protection and the state’s laws can be enforced up to the border. Thus, 
the border has a central importance for both internal and external security.
Often, the security function of the border is mixed with nationalist assumptions that ‘our’ 
rule of law is superior to that of others, the ‘own’ police more efficient and the national 
judicial system fairer. It is therefore often taken for granted that taking away the border and 
border controls would weaken the internal security of the state. Such assumptions have 
been particularly strong in France and Britain. Conversely, in states where these 
assumptions have not held (e.g. Belgium or Italy), concern regarding an erosion of the 
internal border has been weaker.
It should be added that there is no necessary logical link between security provision and the 
state. The link has been established through historical developments and may therefore be
177 Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens. Demographic Change in the European State System, 92.
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historically contingent. Indeed, one has to admit ‘the extent to which the meaning of 
security is tied to historically specific forms of political community.’178 This connection has 
also become important in the national and European discourses on border controls and the 
security arrangements made in the Schengen Agreements.
178 Waever et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, citing R.B.J. Walker, "Security, 
Sovereignty and the Challenge of World Politics," Alternatives XV, no. 1 (1990).
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3.4. Borders and security
Security has been conceptualised in many fundamentally different ways in the history of IR. 
Any definition of security embraces a particular view of the character of international 
relations. What is common to most interpretations is that security provision, thus the 
protection of citizens and state from threats, is seen as a traditional task of the state. Once 
something has been identified as a security issue, the dealing with this issue takes 
precedence. Differences arise from debates about what poses a threat, who defines threats 
and what therefore security consists in.
This thesis foregrounds a conception of security as specific social intersubjective relations. 
Ole Waever: ‘... we can identify a specific field of social interaction, with a specific set of 
actions and codes, known by a set of agents as the security field.’179 Security is no objective 
state and its mechanisms and logic are the result of social interactions.180 This is not 
unconnected to traditional concepts of security: central elements are ‘the specific quality 
characterizing security problems: urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of 
extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby 
preventing the political “we” from dealing with any other questions.’181
The definition of threats -  the turning of an issue into a security concern -  depends on 
specific actors, but also on existing established social understandings of what constitutes a 
threat. Certain social actors, such as politicians and parts of the media, have the ability to 
‘securitise’ issues more easily than others. The ability to securitise also depends on the 
nature of the threat: while securitisation usually involves the identification of an issue as a 
threat and an explanation why this is a threat and to whom, established actors and 
established ‘threats’ have less of a need to provide this explanation. This has to do with the 
social authority of these actors: established and accepted experts for an issue in the public
179 Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 51.
180 Cf. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992). It ought to be added that already a number of 
‘classics’ of the social sciences and international relations in particular were concerned with the social 
constructedness of phenomena. Max Weber’s approach may be cited here, and also ‘classical realists’ 
such as Carr or Morgenthau. Although this approach is not fundamentally new, the specific use of 
this perspective to deepen the understanding of the nature of international security relations within 
the discipline has taken off since the mid-1980s and has produced important literature. Alexander 
Wendt has marked a new departure with his essay on anarchy in the state system which concentrated 
on the interaction of states in the production of international norms and rules. The Copenhagen 
School to which is made allusion here, is part of this development and has presented theories of 
security and social constructivism of various degrees of radicalism.
181 Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 51.
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arena are credited with an ability to establish whether something is a threat. With respect to 
the border and security, the professionals of border security, the Ministry of Interior and 
the media play a special role in defining what issues related to border control can become a 
threat.
Thus, this approach gives the state and the state elites a central role in the definition of 
security: Tn naming a certain development a security problem, the “state” can claim a 
special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its 
elites.’182
3.4.1. External security
The centrality of the role of the border for security has been emphasised by scholars whose 
main concern was the purely military role of the border: de la Ferriere speaks of the 
necessity of establishing a permanent linear border only in the case when two antagonists 
are in competition for the same space.183 From that essentially Realist viewpoint, the border 
is in itself a monument to antagonism. For de la Ferriere, the rationale of the border lies in 
the security it offers to the enclosed collectivity: ‘En definitive la raison d’etre d’une 
frontiere reside dans la securite offerte a la collectivite qu’elle englobe.’184 He goes on to 
emphasise that not only arms, but a combination of the military and political-economic role 
of the border assure this security.
One might not want to follow de la Ferriere in his argument that all relations between 
neighbouring states are necessarily antagonistic. With regard to his view to boundaries 
which have been established by force, one has to concede that he shows forcefully how 
international society has interpreted borders for a long time as a differentiation and 
protection from an enemy.
Indeed, the territorial state has traditionally been seen as the basic political unit by Realists 
because it offered security to society and the individual. John Herz was originally an 
exponent of the classic position which he describes thus: the ‘chief thesis was to the effect 
that for centuries the characteristics of the basic political unit, the nation-state, had been its 
“territoriality”, that is, its being identified with an area which, surrounded by a “wall of
ibid, 54.
183 Cf. Ferriere, "La frontiere dans la theorie et la strategic militaires."
lg4 Ibid.: 248.
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defensibility”, was relatively impermeable to outside penetration and thus capable of 
satisfying one fundamental urge of humans -  protection.’185 Later, Herz had to conclude 
that even though the territorial protective shell was waning, the state was still retained. 
Herz ascribes this to the continuing power of sovereignty, nationalism and independence.
The lasting importance of territoriality and the markers of the end of territorial sovereignty, 
the borders, may also be interpreted differently: of central importance are perceptions of 
security provided with the help of the border, rather than the objective ability of the state 
to provide protection (at least over the short to medium term until the effects of such an 
inability become visible). The importance of the border in symbolising territorial 
sovereignty (statehood) and societal cohesion must not be underestimated. In other words, 
although the border provides less security in practical terms in the nuclear age, the 
remaining actual security function together with the symbolic value of the border are 
strong enough to ensure the cohesion of the state.186
Borders’ military importance has decreased at least in Western Europe where integration 
has made armed conflict seem unlikely. Nevertheless, the border and territory seem to have 
acquired a deep-lying attachment of people who continue to associate borders with security 
even in the face of increased threats such as nuclear arsenal which make borders irrelevant.
3.4.2. Internal security
The central task of the border for internal security is the following: modern governance 
uses the border as a ‘line of defence’ against threats of the territory and its population. The 
visible limit of the state is not only a symbol of state authority, but also allows a 
representation of state authority. By placing agents there with the task to deter certain pre­
defined categories of people, the state aims at fulfilling its security function. That the 
border is a terrain of special manifestation of the state power monopoly is also 
demonstrated through the fact that in a liberal state, the border zone is one of the few 
places where people can be stopped and searched without a direct indication of an offence.
185 Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," 76f.
186 States have always tried to give the impression of being able to provide such security. In the nuclear 
age, arrangements were made for relative stability and security; therefore, the ability to provide 
security has been transferred from the territorial defence capabilities to the abilities of government to 
negotiate such an arrangement. Thus, the state remained the centre of provision of security and also 
identity. Territoriality was no longer directly related to the provision of security, but that image 
remained.
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The border therefore has an important representative and symbolic value also internally. 
Borders mark the limits of state authority, but also often have an importance for societal 
security. They mark the end of an area in which a particular set of norms and rules has 
validity and can be enforced. Internally, they limit an area of rights and duties as well as an 
area of legitimate exercise of state power to enforce these rights and duties. However, the 
border line is also where the jurisdiction of the state’s law enforcement agencies stops, so 
that it becomes an incentive for criminals to escape across the border.
Experts of internal security describe the border as the geographic circumscription of state
power.187 The pacification of the state territory within its borders and the defence against
dangers for the area and the people who live within it are essential to the existence of the 
188StcltCi
For security professionals, the importance of border controls therefore lies in their ability 
to deter criminals. According to Rupprecht, the risk of detection grows with the intensity 
of controls at the border. At the same time, the border becomes a line at which the state 
aims to stop the influx of elements which are considered threatening to social and cultural 
cohesion: borders are instruments for limiting immigration and the influx of organised 
crime and terrorism -  and also the escape of the state’s own criminals and terrorists.
This link between internal security and the border is not automatic, however. 
Compensatory measures, which became a major issue in the Schengen negotiations, such as 
the shifting of controls to the interior of the country are theoretically possible without 
endangering the concept of internal security. Criminals could be detected also in the 
country, illegal immigrants expelled and public order in general maintained. In practice, 
however, this is politically unfeasible because it would entail a significantly higher frequency 
of control of the population. The right of the state to interfere in the private sphere of 
citizens without a legal reason has to be limited in order to be acceptable. There is a trade­
off between internal freedom from control and effective border control. The advantage of 
the border to allow relatively thorough controls is due to its linear character in the modern 
state. The amount of personnel needed to replace controls at the linear border completely 
with internal controls (without any other compensatory measures) would be enormous.
187 Cf. Rupprecht and Hellenthal, Innere Sicherheit im Europdischen Binnenmarkt, 131.
188 T)ie Befriedung des Staatsgebietes innerhalb seiner Grenzen und die Abwehr von Gefahren die auf 
diese Gebiet und die darauf lebenden Menschen einwirken, sind essentialia der staatlichen Existenz.’ 
Ibid, 132.
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The argument becomes skewed, however, if border controls are emphasised as the only 
means for achieving security and governability, not due to their practical use but due to 
some inherent feature. In that case the existence and consciousness of borders is seen as 
decisive for statehood. Therefore compensatory measures could not attain the same 
constitutive objective -  unless the whole of the Schengen area is to be seen as one territory 
to be governed. Strictly speaking, the arguments pointing to the indispensable constitutive 
nature of borders for national security and governance cannot be reconciled logically with 
advocating compensatory measures.
It should also be mentioned that internal security is to some degree a function of subjective 
feelings of security which are influenced by ‘myths’ and traditions. The media, but also 
popular culture can be influential in shaping such ‘myths’. The frequent depiction of the 
‘villain’ in the literatures of modernizing states as foreign and of the heroes as national 
helped to spread the (only partially correct) image that threats to internal security come 
from abroad, and that the authorities protect citizens from them.
In summary, the border is central to security both internally and externally. It serves as a 
crystallisation point of fears regarding security but also as the point where the state aims to 
provide a significant fight of the threat.
Borders and the modern state
4. Conclusions on the abolition of border controls
This chapter has shown that borders are intrinsic to the idea of the modern state. The 
citizen-alien divide is inherently connected to this idea of state and national identity. 
Borders serve as the signals for this system distinguishing between citizen and aliens. The 
system of states is predicated on their existence and the ability to control the entry of 
aliens.
The border thus serves as a societal and individual point of identification and of 
differentiation. It allows the state to exercise control, obtain knowledge about the 
population and enforce law. Furthermore, borders have a central role in the idea that and 
how the state provides security for its citizens. The provision of internal and external 
security depends on the existence of a border.
Such a centrality of borders has implications within the state. Social and political behaviour 
which is predicated on the existence of borders reifies the existence and necessity of such 
borders. Thus, the control situation at the border not only allows the state to fulfil its 
postulated role with regard to security and prosperity, but also re-instates the necessity of 
the border for security in the minds of citizens and security forces.
Taking away borders therefore threatens the idea of governance of the modern state. 
Generally speaking, the increased predictability which borders can provide is lost. The close 
link between borders and the functioning of states within the state system implies that the 
whole system of governance would be undermined if borders were no longer to exist.
This leads to the question what it means to take away border controls but not borders? On 
a practical level, taking away only the control of borders implies less ability of the state to 
control the movement of goods and persons onto, from and on its territory. For example, 
the entry of foreigners who eventually would be entitled to social, civil and also political 
rights would be much more difficult to control. The capturing of data would be rendered 
more difficult or become impossible. The border is often the most economical point to 
raise certain information with regard to numbers and intentions of people entering the 
territory. Its abolition would render more difficult the enforcement of national laws and 
security standards. Compensatory measures can aim at making up for this increased 
difficulty to control to some extent.
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Military security enforcement at the border has lost most of its importance in Western 
Europe after the end of the Cold War. As outlined above, already the advent of aircrafts at 
the beginning of the century and long-distance weapons in the nuclear age diminished the 
relative importance of ground troops opposing each other at the borders. European 
integration in the post-War era made military conflicts in Western Europe appear 
impossible. The disappearance of an overarching bipolarity replaced the opposition of two 
large political and ideological groupings with attention to inner-state conflicts and state- 
building in Eastern Europe. The debate of losing border controls therefore raised much 
less military security concerns at the borders of Western Europe but rather fears for 
societal cohesion and domestic order.
On an abstract and societal level, losing border controls means a loss of the dividing line at 
which societal identity crystallizes. The act of control at the border assures nationals of the 
ability and willingness of the state to enforce rules and ensure societal security. The 
visibility of such an act and the consequences of non-compliance are a powerful 
representation of state power. An abolition of border controls means that an institution is 
lost which visualises and symbolises the ability of the state to act: to ensure security for its 
citizens and to exercise control.
It has to be remarked, however, that it is impossible to take away borders completely as an 
act of political will. Borders are deeply embedded in the social structure and reproduced 
not only through state action but also by the daily actions of citizens, thus cannot be taken 
away in their totality. Eliminating the border posts leaves untouched the legal or 
administrative function of the border. In fact, numerous administrative borders have 
remained within the modern state with a lot of importance for citizens’ daily life -  
Germany and its Lander being a prime example. However, the high symbolic meaning 
attributed to the state border by the public and the overpowering importance attributed to 
the border by officials and lawyers, give the state border a special role.
The effects of abolishing border controls but retaining the legal and societal role of the 
border are difficult to assess theoretically. While this chapter has shown that the state is 
based on the existence of borders for practical and symbolic reasons, the concrete effects 
of measures aiming at abolishing border controls have to be studied in individual cases. It 
will be shown that a growing concentration on the loss of the security function of the 
border led to a policy of compensatory measures.
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The Schengen negotiations between Member States did not aim at a European state which 
would dissolve the international legal and administrative role of the borders. States were 
not willing to give up national governance. Instead, the negotiations were initiated to 
further international trade and cross-border relations as foreseen in the founding treaties of 
the European communities. However, the unintended result of the Agreements was to also 
impinge on originally national rights of sovereigny and governance. Thus, there emerged a 
tension between a movement towards closer European integration and the remaining 
ability of states to retain efficient governance. While the first would have allowed gradual 
abolition of borders between member states, the latter demanded that borders retain their 
various functions for governance.
Neither national elites nor European-level officials had given much thought to the 
consequences of an abolition of border controls for national governance before 1985. The 
evolution of the European border policies outlined in the following chapter shows the 
gradual introduction of national concerns for governance and security: the plans for taking 
away border controls were made in the interest of an economic and political Europe. The 
compensations suggested and the solutions found, depended on the various actors’ 
perceptions of the consequences they foresaw for national governance capacity.
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This chapter retraces the evolution of policies on border controls on a European level. A 
number of issues will be emphasised: firstly, it will be shown that the origins of Schengen 
lay both in an economic integration logic and in political visions of a integrated Europe. It 
has to be noted that in the initial agreements leading up to the first Schengen Agreement, 
such abolition of internal border controls was not considered a difficult issue and the 
implications had not been thought through.189 The negotiations for the Schengen 
Implementing Convention had to work through the problems which had by then been 
identified. The solutions found aimed at compensating for the perceived loss of the 
security and ordering function of the border described in the previous chapter.
It will secondly be shown that a discourse on the threat of migration and crime came to 
dominate the justification for a reinforcement of the external borders while a discourse on 
European integration argued for the abolishing of internal border controls. In this context, 
it will be mentioned that a rise of numbers of migrants and crime did in fact take place, but 
that a concentration on security aspects and deterrence at the borders limited the policy 
options and focused on the solutions foreseen in the Schengen Agreements. The chapter 
thus shows how the security dimension gradually dominated the agenda of negotiations -  a 
perspective which had a ‘tradition’ in earlier European cooperation such as TREVI.
The chapter also points to the fact that the changes of 1989 constituted a significant 
uncertainty for the negotiations of the SIC in their last phase. Few weeks before the 
intended signing of the SIC, the fall of the wall had implications also for the European 
border policies. The outcome of the peaceful revolution in East Germany and Eastern 
Europe was not clear yet. However, questions of security immediately became of concern. 
The first Schengen Agreement and the negotiations up to the autumn of 1989 did not have 
to address Germany’s contested and ambiguous Eastern border. Many of the implications 
of this development for Germany and its European neighbours will be spelt out in detail in 
chapters four and five, while this chapter shows the implications of 1989 for the Schengen 
negotiations themselves. It meant a delay of signing as well as lengthy negotiations 
concerning implementation and safeguards for ensuring the lasting security of the border 
arrangements.
The chapter begins with an outline of the gradual European cooperation in Justice and 
Home Affairs as a background to the evolution of Schengen. In a next step, the early
189 Cf. criticism for ‘having made the third step before the first’, Dieter Wenz, "Den dritten Schritt 
zuerst gemacht. Schwierigkeiten der Ordnungshuter," FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, 16 October 1992.
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circles of cooperation which had an influence on the Schengen negotiations are examined. 
The chapter then identifies the origins of the European agreements on border controls in 
pre-existing political commitments and treaties (Benelux Treaty and the Franco-German 
Agreement of 1984, European Treaties) as well as in underlying political rationales which 
referred to (societal) security through control. Following this, the evolution of negotiations 
and the content of the agreement will be detailed. The chapter will conclude by showing 
how the ‘Schengen rationale’ was paralleled in other political processes at the time.
Evolution of the Schengen negotiations
1. Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs in the European 
Community
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in the EC framework has to be considered 
an important context for the Schengen negotiations. While in the beginning, there was a 
rather loosely-defined relationship between the Schengen negotiations and broader 
negotiations in the EC framework, Schengen gradually became more dominant. In the 
Schengen framework, reference was made to EC-level conclusions and opinions. 
Conversely, the laboratory character of Schengen for the wider European Community was 
often emphasised and care was taken to ensure the compatibility of the arrangements with 
Community law.190 As shall be seen below, the rationale for Schengen emerged from similar 
sources as those for cooperation in the area of ‘Justice and Home Affairs’.
Indeed, negotiations with relevance to border policies took place in a number of circles in 
parallel. The Schengen negotiations between governments aimed at international 
agreements outside the European treaties while negotiations in the EC/EU context 
(primarily also conducted in an intergovernmental framework) tried to resolve the matters 
directly following from the treaties.
Membership in these two arenas differed, with Schengen having only five participants in 
the beginning against the nine and from 1986 twelve Member States of the European 
Community. This meant that within the EC framework, agreement had to be reached 
between all members whereas the negotiations outside the treaties included only those 
willing and able to cooperate.
These two areas of interaction also tied in with existing or newly founded coordinating 
groups of specialised politicians or professionals (e.g. the TREVI meetings, or meetings of 
customs officers MAG). Often, the topics dealt with were similar in these circles so that 
some institutional competition between the groups can be identified.
The following can only point out the major stepping stones in the development of a 
Community policy during the relevant years. For in-depth scholarship on the development
190 Nevertheless, integration into the Treaties according to the Protocol attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam proved not unproblematic. Especially the process of ‘ventilation’, the dividing of the 
Schengen acquis between the pillars remained contentious.
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of the field of Justice and Home Affairs, a number of studies can be referred to.191 
Intergovernmental cooperation on JHA matters in the EC may be said to have started in 
1967 with the signing of the Naples Convention (which made provisions for cooperation 
between customs authorities). In December 1975, a European Council in Rome stipulated 
regular meetings of ministers of the interior and justice. This was realised with TREVI 
meetings which became a regular meeting circle for experts as well as high-level officials of 
relevant issues over the years. As a result, a considerable acquis was produced by 1993.192
The Single European Act raised the immediacy of the issue of an internal market without 
borders. One result were regular meetings every six months of Ministers of the Interior 
from 1986 onwards. Another consequence was the setting up of an A d hoc Group on 
Immigration in London on 20 October 1986. It was to study the consequences and 
conditions of free movement and also to coordinate asylum and refugee policies between 
EU member states.193
The Rhodes European Council in 1988 created a Coordination Group on Free Movement 
which was charged with coordinating work done by various groups on terrorism, customs, 
policing immigration and asylum as well as legal cooperation. Its members were high-level 
officials from the EC Ministries of the Interior. The Palma Document which the Group 
produced in June 1989 was intended as a work programme towards ‘an area without 
internal frontiers’, recommending essential and desirable measures for the completion of 
the internal market.194
Cooperation in the EC structures also led to the set-up of a number of groups, such as the 
CELAD (Comite Europeen de Lutte Anti-Drogues as a group of drug coordinators) in 
1989, the CIREA (Centre for Information, Research and Exchange on Asylum, staffed by
191 RolandBieber andJorgMonar, eds. Justice and Home Affairs in theEuropean Union - the Development of the 
Third Pillar (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995), Tony Bunyan, ed., Key Texts on Justice and 
Home Affairs (London: Statewatch, 1997), Heiner Busch, GrenzenlosePolizei? Neue Grenzen undpolvzeiliche 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa (Munster: Westfalisches Dampfboot, 1995), den Boer, "Justice and Home 
Affairs: Cooperation without Integration.", Monica den Boer and William Wallace, "Justice and 
Home Affairs. Integration through Incrementalism?," in Policy-Making in theEuropean Union, ed. Helen 
Wallace and William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Jorg Monar and R. Morgan, 
eds., The Third Pillar of the European Union (Brussels: 1995).
192 Cf. a document from the K.4 Committee detailing the acquis. Reproduced in Bunyan, ed., Key Texts 
on Justice and Home Affairs. This acquis contained such varied components as the Naples Convention, 
Dublin Convention, or the Agreement setting up the Europol Drugs Unit.
193 This group is not to be confused with the group of the same name set up by the European 
Commission in 1989 to whom the Dublin Convention owes a lot.
194 Group of Coordinators, "Report of the Group of Coordinators to the European Council," (Madrid: 
1989).
- 9 9 -
Evolution of the Schengen negotiations
the General Secretariat of the Council) and the CIREFI (Centre for Information, Research 
and Exchange and Immigration, also staffed by the Council Secretariat and charged with 
monitoring the immigration policies of the EC states) in 1992. Also the initial ideas for 
Europol (1995) and its precursor the European Drugs Unit (1991) were negotiated in the 
TREVI/EC circle.
The Maastricht Treaty represented a major institutional change for cooperation. The 
creation of a pillar for Justice and Home Affairs, although a heterogeneous construction 
between issues regarded more or less intergovernmental, meant an institutionalisation of 
the earlier cooperation structures. A Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers was 
introduced as well as a Coordinating Committee (K.4) together with three steering groups 
covering immigration and asylum; security, police and customs; and judicial cooperation. 
TREVI was thus integrated into Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.
The next major change in JHA was the incorporation of Schengen into the treaties with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and the communitisation of issues regarding migration, asylum, visas 
and border controls.
Having outlined the major institutional steps in EC/EU cooperation on Justice and Home 
Affairs, the following will concentrate specifically on the origins of cooperation on border 
controls in Europe.
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2. Early circles of security experts
Long before concrete treaties on the abolition of border controls were in place, a policy- 
network between national agencies for internal security developed. They were mainly 
concerned with the issues of transborder crime and terrorism.195 These policy networks 
later became important to the evolution and content of border agreements for a number of 
reasons: they had already established a community of experts in the field of internal security 
with similar interests - these links sometimes became more influential than those with other 
national ministries.196 The usefulness of such networks was proved to the participants 
through these early exchanges of information; they then aimed at creating more lasting 
structures for collaboration.
Most importantly, the discussions and papers presented in these circles led to a common 
language and definition of the problem. Since experts from fields such as social policy, 
health or development were hardly involved in these groups, a group-specific interpretation 
emerged. These experts in the provision of internal security came to a common 
interpretation of the ‘threat’ posed and the solutions which ought to be offered.
This discourse became influential in later discussions of border controls and issues related. 
Even if the persons involved in later negotiations were not identical, the rationale of 
thinking had already become common and accepted knowledge amongst officials dealing 
with European-level issues. For this reason, the development of these groups and their 
output is presented in detail below.
195 for a detailed analysis for reasons of police cooperation in Europe, see Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 58-98.
196 Cf. Ibid.
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2.1. From Interpol to European groups
The first attempt to create a network of national criminal police services can be traced back 
to Interpol which was founded in September 1923 in Vienna. Problematic in terms of 
democratic control, the organisation derived its legitimacy from its efficiency in providing a 
centre of contact and information for police officers. After its work had been 
compromised by the Nazi regime after 1938, the organisation was re-founded in 1946 
under French leadership: the seat was to be in France and the Secretary General French. 
National differences in approach, a lack of financial means and ‘rivalry’ with other 
organisations and European circles in the 1970s and 1980s prevented it from becoming an 
effective European centre for the fight against terrorism and drugs.197
Contacts between law enforcement services grew also through exchanges or meetings in 
informal groups from the 1970s onwards. Bigo speaks of a ‘very large number of informal 
groups’ which were created.198 He mentions that the German and French officials were the 
most active in these circles, followed by the British while the Southern states were much 
less represented. These groups were a means of developing not only networks of 
knowledge, but also of common trust. With more formalisation these groups became 
influential in outlining the dangers to which states saw themselves exposed, in politicising 
them, and in proposing useful countermeasures.
The first of such ‘clubs’ emerged in 1971, the Club of Berne and the Pompidou Group. 
The former comprised the members of the then European Community and Switzerland, 
and united high-level officials of national intelligence services. It was the first to install 
reflection groups on a common threat to Europeans and the methods to encounter it. 
Rather than criminalizing terrorism (which was the emphasis of Interpol), the Club of 
Berne saw terrorism as a corollary of the Cold War, and thus politicised the issue and 
possible solutions. It inspired the systematic policy of visas for non-European countries as 
well as the notion of the non-desirable foreigner. Both became important in the Schengen 
framework.199 The Pompidou Group, founded at the initiative of Georges Pompidou 
concentrated on the fight against drugs. It united officials from a wide range of Ministries 
(Health, Social Affairs, Justice, Interior) and therefore could serve less as a centre of 
exchange and ‘synchronisation’ of interests of police officers. It became a group of
197 for details, see Ibid, 62-74.
19<* Ibid, 83.
199 Cf. Ibid, 85f.
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exchange of information, initiated scientific studies and spread information on the varying 
national systems of drug policy. Other groups, focussing more on repressive measures 
against drugs, developed in parallel. They remained secret; the German Bundeskriminalamt 
played an active and influential role within them.200
Other groups of importance were the Quantico Group (created in 1979 on US initiative as 
a meeting place for civil servants from Germany, France, UK, Australia, US, Canada), the 
Vienna Club (1979, founded on the initiative of Interior Ministers of Germany, Italy, 
Austria, Switzerland and France to combat terrorism, but also clandestine immigration 
from the East) and the Police Working Group on Terrorism (created in 1983 as a forum 
for West European police and security chiefs).
Cooperation among national customs officers started soon after the Treaties of Rome. 
Initially, it has to be seen as completely separate from police cooperation. No organisation 
comparable to that of Interpol existed and there were apparently few meeting groups.201 
One group, which was to play a role also for the Schengen negotiations, was set up in 1967 
in the framework of the Naples Convention: the Mutual Assistance Group (MAG). As 
Bigo mentions, it played an important role in mobilising the customs officers against the 
suppression of internal borders and in developing a discourse of the rise of transnational 
crime.202 Its subgroup MAG 92, founded in 1989, analysed the effects of the abolition of 
border controls and developed an External Frontier Strategy. It comprised the Directors- 
General of Customs and worked with the Group of Coordinators and Trevi 1992 (see 
below).203 The inclusion of customs officers in the Schengen negotiations also shows how 
central the question of economic control and the transport of goods were to the project.
200 For a detailed research on informal groups on drugs, refer to Ibid, 92ff.
201 Cf. Ibid.
202 Ibid, 96.
203 Cf. Tony Bunyan, ed., Statewatching the New Europe (Nottingham: Russel Press, 1993), 178,97.
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2.2. TREVI
A group with lasting influence was founded by a meeting of European Ministers of Interior 
in Rome in December 1975 which stipulated regular meetings of Ministers to exchange 
information for anti-terrorist purposes: TREVI.204 Bigo has analysed archival documents 
and concludes that too large a circle of participants inhibited it from being an efficient 
group initially.205 By 1986, however, the existing structure of TREVI acquired momentum 
and became an important forum of innovations in the area of police cooperation, anti­
terrorism and fight of international crime. The journal of the German Ministry of the 
Interior says in 1987, that TREVI has developed into a central instrument of cooperation 
in the area of internal security, especially the fight against terrorism.206
Meetings took place on three levels: ministerial meetings, conferences of high-level officials 
and work groups with professionals and experts. This organisation on the top level as well 
as the professional level facilitated the spreading of a common knowledge and viewpoint 
on the issues concerned. Bigo mentions that the high-level officials played a key role in this; 
they saw in this exchange on the European level an emerging common discourse which 
would support their position in national politics.207
The actual work was conducted in several working groups: the first, dealing mainly with 
measures and information against terrorism and for security, was set up in 1977. The 
second working group was dedicated to police tactics, organisation and equipment since 
the beginning. In 1985, cooperation for the preservation of public order (e.g. hooliganism) 
was included in its tasks. Working Group m  was founded in 1985 to combat organised 
crime: it prepared the way for the European Drugs Unit. WGIV and V on nuclear safety 
and measures in emergencies never met.208
204 The origins of the name (and of the project) has engendered a long debate. Initially not intended as 
an central forum, the origin of the name was not documented and later reconstructions were difficult. 
Answers vary according to states: Italy likes to refer to the Fontana di Trevi in Rome where the initial 
meeting took place, Germans refer to a pre-project called ‘Terrorisme Radicalisme Extremisme et 
Violence Internationale’ they introduced there (a name which has stuck), the Dutch refer to the first 
chairman A. R. Fonteijn; cf. Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, den Boer, "Justice and Home Affairs: 
Cooperation without Integration."
205 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 86f.
206 "EG verstarkt den Kampf gegen Internationalen Terrorismus und Rauschgifthandel," Innenpolitik, no. 
V (1988): 3.
207 Cf. Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 88. “Les hauts fonctionnaires jouent la un role cle, car ils voient dans 
l’echange d’informations entre leurs unites une ressource propre a l’Europe qui joue en leur faveur 
dans les jeux politiques nationaux : ils ont done interet a promouvoir l’europeanisation.”
208 Cf. den Boer, "Justice and Home Affairs: Cooperation without Integration," 394.
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TREVI work became important for the issue of border controls directly from the year 
1988 onwards. During that year, the forum ‘TREVI 1992’ was set up to reflect on the 
consequences of the abolition of internal border controls intended by the Single European 
Act for 1992.209 The main work coming out of this group was the Programme of Action, 
agreed by TREVI Ministers in June 1990.210 ‘TREVI 1992* group reported to the Group of 
Coordinators.
The Group of Coordinators was also set up in 1988, at the European Council in Rhodes, in 
order to keep an overview and coordinate the numerous groups and consultations on 
terrorism, police, immigration and judicial cooperation. It was composed of high-level civil 
servants from 12 Interior Ministries and it prepared an important contribution to the 
debate about border controls, the Talma Document’, which was adopted in June 1989 at 
the European Council in Madrid. The Palma Document was the first Europe-level 
document to present in detail the logic of compensatory measures for the lifting of internal 
border controls. It also mentioned two facets of the task, one set of actions directed at the 
inside 'ad intra\ the other directed at the outside 'adextra'- thus referring to a division 
between EC-internal and external measures which were heavily used in the 1990 Schengen 
Convention.211
Another important contribution of the Group of Coordinators were the 1992 
recommendations for the structures of the title on Justice and Home Affairs in the 
Maastricht Treaty, marking the shift from the ad hoc mechanisms created since the 
foundation of TREVI to a new Directorate General in the General Secretariat, a Council of 
Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs and the specialised K.4 Committee.
Due to its intergovernmental status, TREVI was not controlled by any of the EC 
institutions. It has often been criticised for this by the European Parliament and also by 
civil rights advocates.212 The group has also been criticised by practitioners for being too far
209 The forerunner of Trevi 1992 was the Ad hoc group on free movement and the effects of 1992, 
created 1988 in Athens. In 1989, the group name changed into Trevi 1992. It was disbanded in 1992.
210 Trevi 1992, "Programme of Action Relating to the Reinforcement of Police Cooperation and of the 
Endeavors to Combat Terrorism or Other Forms of Organised Crime," ed. Trevi (1990). The 
Programme represents a ‘synthesis of the arrangements (...) between police and security services’ in 
relation to ‘terrorism, drug trafficking or any forms of crime including organised illegal immigration’. 
Cited after Bunyan, ed., Statewatching the New Europe, 21.
211 Group of Coordinators, "Report of the Group of Coordinators to the European Council."
212 J. Benyon et al., eds., Police Cooperation in Europe. An Investigation (Leicester: University of Leicester 
Press, 1992), L. Van Outrive, "Police Cooperation," (Brussels: European Parliament Committee on
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removed from practice and representing a political forum of senior bureaucrats and 
politicians. At the same time, it has been pointed out that the practical impact of TREVI is 
difficult to assess due to the secrecy of its negotiations.213
As mentioned above, these groups were important for setting the tone for the discussion of 
the abolition of border controls in Europe. By nature of the tasks and interests of the 
officials involved, they put an emphasis on the prevention of terrorism, drugs and all other 
transnational crime. Their general rationale was to encounter these phenomena by the 
international cooperation they had developed, on both formal and informal level. One 
important outcome was to define a common way of think and a vocabulary for these 
threats.
Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, 1992). quoted after den Boer, "Justice and Home Affairs: 
Cooperation without Integration."
213 Cf. den Boer, "Justice and Home Affairs: Cooperation without Integration," 396.
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3. Origins of European cooperation on border control policies
Cooperation on border policies was motivated by a number of reasons. The first one was 
the insight that political and economic deepening of European integration and the abolition 
of border controls were interdependent. The programme for the completion of the Single 
Market by 1992214 identified impediments to the free flow of goods, persons, services and 
capital: physical, fiscal and technical barriers such as different industrial standards, 
bureaucracy and national practices. Consequently, all barriers to free movement would have 
to be taken down in order to attain further integration. Cooperation in the abolition of 
border controls became thus an indispensable element for deepening of European 
integration. A different reason for cooperation was that states realised that the lifting of 
border controls would rid them of important control mechanisms for which compensation 
could only be found in common solutions: thus, the envisaged abolition of border controls 
in the interest of the completion of the Single Market touched upon interests of 
governance which were to be worked through by agreements dealing with the 
consequences of the loss of border controls.
214 Cf. Paolo Cecchini, TheEuropean Challenge 1992: The Benefits ofa Single Market (Aldershot: Wildwood 
House, 1988), European Commission, "Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council," (Brussels: 1985).
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3.1. Political origins
3.1.1. European Single Market and Citizen's Europe
Influential for the policies with regard to abolition of border controls were the dynamics of 
European integration, namely the requirements for the completion of the Single Market 
and a Europe close to the citizens. The plans of lifting of border controls served as an 
impetus and as a background to the negotiations between Schengen states. However, the 
intention to abolish border controls goes back much further than the 1980s. Indeed, 
already the Treaty of Rome founding the European Community foresaw the creation of 
one ‘internal market characterised by the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital’215 and promised that ‘[e]very citizen of the Union shall 
have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.’216 
Another article gave the right of free movement to all workers of Member States.217 Putting 
these principles into practice proved more difficult than the formulation of objectives. 
Despite some progress through the customs union (1968/70) and measures taken to 
reduce the formalities at the border for the transport of goods, the free movement of 
persons was not realised by the beginning of the 1980s due to remaining hesitations of 
national governments. Customs and control points had been retained at the borders 
because they were the most efficient place for exercising controls regarding taxes (VAT), 
trade, health and statistics.
The delay in abolishing European barriers was met with frustration by some politicians. 
Especially those who saw European integration as a means to enhance economic prosperity 
and reach reconciliation and lasting peace in Europe pleaded for further measures. 
Germany was particularly interested in advancing these developments. Helmut Kohl’s 
vision of a ‘Europeanised Germany’ sprang from the conviction that only an embedding of 
Germany into European institutions and processes could prevent a restarting of nationalist 
inimical processes in Europe. He therefore emphasised in his annual governmental 
declaration (Regierungserklarung) in 1982 that citizens had to be given an understanding of 
European politics as politics for peace in freedom by concrete steps such as the abolition 
of border controls.218
215 European Communities, "Treaty Establishing the European Community," Art. 3 (ex Art. 3).
216 Ibid, Art. 18 (ex Art. 8a).
217 Ibid, Art. 39 (ex Art. 48).
218 Deutscher Bundestag, "121. Sitzung, Regierungserklarung Dr. Helmut Kohl," (Bonn: 13 October 
1982). Translation of part of the inaugural speech: European politics have been and are always
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The European Parliament was the institution which kept most firmly in mind the 
perspective of abolishing border controls. Already Leo Tindemans’ report in 1975 outlined 
a vision for a Citizens’ Europe closer to the people. This included ‘the gradual 
disappearance of frontier controls on persons moving between member countries, as a 
corollary of passport union.’219 A report of the European Parliament of 1983 mentions a 
number of questions of Members addressed to the Council and the Commission regarding 
border controls and remaining tensions between the freedoms envisaged in the Treaty and 
the reality.220
The reasons for the lagging behind of political developments in that area are difficult to pin 
down on any single cause. One reason was certainly that Member State governments did 
not feel compelled to take down border controls. With the memory of the war still fresh in 
people’s minds, national governments wished to retain this visible sign of state authority 
and ability to protect. Eurosclerosis or a general slow-down in European integration made 
advances in areas close to the heart of national governance unlikely. The border question 
embodied the ongoing tension between European cooperation and national control.
Thus, it was not until 1985 that developments for the completion of the Internal Market 
and therefore the abolition of border controls went under way: the reports of the Dooge 
Committee and of the Adonnino Committee in March and June 1985 on ‘A people’s 
Europe’ were crucial in giving new impetus to the European agenda. They included 
proposals regarding European citizenship, common European symbols and also the easing 
of border controls in the interest of the Single Market.221 The European Council of March 
that year decided upon the creation of a Single Market by 1992 and asked the Commission 
to draw up a programme and timetable. The Commission White Book by Lord Cockfield 
was published in June and identified barriers to trade (physical, fiscal and technical) and
primarily politics for peace in a context of freedom. We have to remind our citizens of this through 
very concrete steps, through the abolition of border controls, through an intensification of cultural 
relations and through an improvement and reinforcement of youth exchange.
219 Tindemans, "The Tindemans Report," 383.; interestingly, Tindemans places this issue under the 
heading of: External signs of our solidarity.
220 Rudolf Schieler, "Bericht im Namen des Politischen Ausschusses iiber die Mitteilung der 
Kommission an den Rat iiber den Entwurf einer Entschliefiung des Rates iiber die Erleichterung der 
Bedingungen, unter denen die Kontrolle der Biirger der Mitgliedsstaaten an den Binnengrenzen 
erfolgt und iiber die Paflunion und die Abschaffung der Personenkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen 
der EG.," ed. Europaisches Parlament (Briissel: 1983)., cited after Busch, GrenzenlosePolizei?Neue 
Grenzen undpolizeiliche Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 19.
221 Ad hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs (Dooge Committee), "Report to the European Council," 
Bulletin of theEuropean Communities, no. 3 (1985).; Committee for a People's Europe (Adonnino 
Committee), "A People's Europe," Bulletin of theEuropean Communities, no. 7 (supplement) (1985).
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proposed a number of measures to be implemented for the creation of the Single Market.222 
The Cecchini Report of 1988 took up this rationale and identified the cost of ‘non-Europe’ 
and the concrete obstacles for the free flow of goods, persons, services and capital within 
the Community.223 The 1986 Single European Act was a direct result of the White Paper 
and the Adonnino Report and gave a deadline for the completion of the Single Market for 
31 December 1992. This date therefore also set the horizon for the lifting of border 
controls and was therefore influential for the work of the Schengen negotiators.
3.1.2. Benelux Agreement and French-German Agreement
Since the European-level avenue to the abolition of border controls seemed blocked during 
the 1970s, a different starting point for lower barriers was sought. The direct origins of the 
Schengen project can be seen in the Benelux Accords of April 1960/62224, the French- 
German Saarbriicken Accord of July 1984 and the preparations for the Single European 
Act in Fontainebleau in 1984.225 The Benelux Convention of 11 April 1960 was the first 
European agreement on the transfer of border controls to the external borders of the 
sovereign territory of the states concerned. It foresaw common external borders and the 
suppression of controls at the internal borders. With only 14 articles, it is also much shorter 
than both Schengen Agreements. It goes further than the Schengen Agreements in some 
respects (e.g. providing for a common visa for Benelux independent of length) and less far 
in others (it contains much less compensatory measures).226
222 European Commission, "Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the 
European Council."
223 Cecchini, TheEuropean Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market.', see also Ernst & Whinney 
(Management Consultants), "The 'Cost of Non-Europe1," ed. Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities (Luxembourg: 1988).
224 Secretariat General de l'Union Douaniere Neerlando-Belgo-Luxembourgeoise, "Convention Benelux 
concernant le transfert du controle des personnes," Bulletin Benelux, no. 2 (1960).
225 Fijnaut adds to the roots of Schengen the French-German Agreement on police cooperation in the 
Saar region of 1977. He says that “the German Government at the time was of the opinion not only 
that the scope of this Agreement with France should be enlarged to the whole territory of both 
countries, but also that similar agreements had to be concluded with other western European 
countries such as the Benelux countries.” C.J.C.F. Fijnaut, "The 'Communitization' of Police 
Cooperation in Western Europe," in Free Movement of Persons in Europe, ed. Henry G. Schermers, et al. 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 86.
226 The 1960 Convention provided for the shifting of controls to the external borders of the Benelux, 
while the 1962 Agreement introduced some compensatory police measures such as hot pursuit. 
According to Bigo, however, these compensatory measures remained marginal and were only used 4 
times in 15 years. Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 80FN.
The German-Austrian Agreement of August 1984 contained similar provisions as the French- 
German one.
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The road to the Schengen Agreements depended on economic necessities as well as 
organisational interests. Bigo -  relying on interviews and documents from the Schengen 
Secretariat -  indicates that the French-German Agreement and the Schengen Accords were 
kindled by two main facts: the interests of the Benelux Secretariat of finding a new, lasting 
purpose for its personnel and the strike of customs officers in February 1984: a strike of 
Italian customs officers blocked all non-Italian lorries at the border; this led to a ten-day 
blockade by French lorry drivers on French frontiers as a ‘revenge’ -  with repercussions all 
over Europe, especially in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.
Protests pushed the French government to admit that customs controls on the lorry 
drivers’ papers were no longer fitted to the density of traffic.227 Thus, the agreement was 
partly a response to demands from industry and traders. At the German-French summit in 
Rambouillet on 28/29 May, the French President and German Chancellor agreed to do 
away with formalities for EC travellers between the two countries with the objective of a 
total suppression of border controls. Helmut Kohl remarked later on the positive results of 
that meeting: ’Wenn ich vom Abbau von Barrieren spreche, denke ich natiirlich nicht nur 
an die wirtschaftlichen Barrieren, sondern auch an die tatsachlichen Grenzbarrieren. 
Gliicklicherweise sind wir ja bei unserer letzten deutsch-franzosischen Konsultation auf 
diesem Weg ein wesentliches Stuck vorangekommen.’228
The head of the Bundeskanzleramt, Waldemar Schreckenberger, and the general secretary 
in the Elysee, Jean-Louis Bianco were charged with negotiations. The Accord of 
Saarbriicken was concluded soon afterwards on 13 July 1984 by Schreckenberger and 
Roland Dumas, then France’s Minister for European Affairs.229 Immediate measures 
included a control procedure without waiting (with a green badge for cars with EC citizens) 
and spot checks. Further consultations until the fall were to plan measures for cooperation 
of police and customs of both countries and for harmonizing visa regulations. It was 
planned that all controls could be lifted by the end of 1986.230
227 Ibid, 114f.
228 Deutscher Bundestag, "73. Sitzung am 6. Juni 1984," (Bonn: 1984). Translation: “If I speak of the 
reduction of barriers, I naturally do not only think of the economic barriers, but also of the actual 
border barriers. Fortunately, we have advanced decisively in this direction at our last German-French 
consultations.”
229 Cf. Lothar Warscheid, "Barockes Menuett nach Europaischen Noten," Saarbrikker Zeitung, 14/15 July 
1984.; Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, "Deutsch-franzosische Vereinbarung iiber 
den Abbau von Grenzkontrollen," Bulletin, no. 86 (1984): 764.
230 Cf. "Neues deutsch-franzosisches Grenzabkommen," Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, 15 July 1984, Presse- und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, "Deutsch-franzosische Vereinbarung iiber den Abbau von 
Grenzkontrollen."; "Freie Fahrt an der Franzosischen Grenze," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 13 July 1984.
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The Secretariat of the Benelux Union saw a chance in this development of creating a region 
of free movement together with the two -  economically important -  neighbours. It 
therefore offered its organisation as an institutional backbone to the enterprise.231 Bigo 
mentions (following from interviews) that the Secretariat had its own organisational 
interests, hoping to find a new goal and to avoid laying off a part of its personnel.232 
Through the incorporation of the Schengen Secretariat, the experience from the Benelux 
Travel Union with regard to a free travel area was transferred to the Schengen negotiations. 
This development was decisive for the Schengen negotiations: It transformed the 
enterprise into a real European project and provided a model for the Schengen accords.
The logic of these agreements -  the transfer of controls to the external borders in 
compensation for abolition of internal border controls (Benelux Convention) and the close 
cooperation of police and customs on both sides of the border as well as visa 
harmonisation (French-German Agreement) -  found entry in the Schengen Agreements.
Thus, the abolition of border controls and the adaptation of concomitant policies was 
considered unproblematic. The realisation of full free movement was to happen within 
weeks. This shows that the effects of abolishing border controls on a number of policy 
areas had not been through through.
231 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 115.
232 Ibid, 114.
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3.2. Rationales for common policies on border controls
The rationales concerning border policies all pointed to the necessity of common policies. 
While one set concentrated more on the existing inefficiency of border controls and the 
positive effects of abolishing controls at internal borders, the other perspective put 
emphasis on the security aspect, compensatory measures and the necessity to secure the 
external borders. An emphasis on the former view can be seen in the discourse regarding 
the completion of the Internal Market and rise of traffic. The latter view was most 
prominent with regard to illegal immigration. However, arguments often mixed these two 
perspectives, especially with regard to illegal immigration and to a lesser degree also with 
regard to organised crime.
3.2.1. The deepening of integration and the internal market
Monica den Boer and William Wallace have identified a number of arguments which were 
important during the founding phase of a common European policy regarding borders.233 
One was the importance for politicians of European integration as such. Referring to the 
EEC Treaty and the objective of laying the foundations of ‘an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’ (preamble), giving ‘the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States’ to every citizen (Art 8a), a discourse existed which saw 
border controls as great barriers to bringing closer together the peoples of Europe. Helmut 
Kohl’s speech when taking up office in 1982 was a witness to this importance attributed to 
further integration.234 Also the Adonnino Report or the 1985 Commission White Paper 
demonstrate that the abolition of border control figured high on the European integration 
agenda in the 1980s.
A second important issue which was used in advocating the abolition of border controls 
was the completion of an internal market. Here, the abolition of barriers to the free flow of 
goods was just as important as the movement of persons. As spelt out above, plans for the 
Single European Act of 1986 were a great impetus to the development of comprehensive 
common border policies. As mentioned above, the Adonnino committee had 
recommended an easing of frontier controls in the name of a people’s Europe in 1985. 
Also the Tindemans report of 1975 and various statements of the European Parliament 
had gone in the same direction. The Cecchini report for example outlined in 1988 the
233 Cf. den Boer and Wallace, "Justice and Home Affairs. Integration through Incrementalism?," 497.
234 Deutscher Bundestag, "121. Sitzung, Regierungserklarung Dr. Helmut Kohl."
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obstacles to free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The report also 
calculated that such barriers were a cost factor to the Community of around 5 % of 
GDP.235 Also scientists pointed to obstacles to the completion of the Internal Market. A 
Chatham House Paper of 1988 by Pelkmans, Winters and Wallace presented some of the 
barriers to trade in the EC and estimated their costs. The scientists also presented their 
analysis on policy options to eliminate such barriers and the implications for the European 
Community points.236 TREVI ministers emphasised that cooperation in the area of internal 
security was not least due to the impending completion of the internal market.237
A further rationale referred to the intensification of cross-border movement in Europe. As 
Europe’s prosperity grew, communication facilities improved, more and more people 
wanted to travel for business or pleasure purposes. Some politicians were concerned that 
borders represented barriers for integration by travel and exchange. A question put to the 
government by the German SPD Parliamentary group in 1984 refers expressly to the 
problems of barriers for travellers and the desiable intensification of youth exchange and 
tourism. The government emphasises in its answer that it considers the lifting of barriers 
for travellers as crucially important.238
Growing transborder traffic was an important background to the debate regarding border 
controls. The statistics for Germany show a significant rise of cross-border traffic and 
overall border crossings from the second half of the 1980s onwards, while numbers had 
remained fairly stable before.239 Interestingly, the year reports of the Bundesgrenzschutz as 
well as media statements of Ministry officials hardly .ever mention increasing trans-border 
traffic as a problem for security. It has to be assumed, however, that rise of traffic was of 
particular concern to the countries which were transit or destination countries for the 
transport of goods and persons. In Germany, for example, the rise in budget and personnel 
of the BGS in the second half of the 1990s was certainly partly due to this rise of traffic.240
235 Cecchini, TheEuropean Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market.
236 Jacques Pelkmans and L. Alan Winters, Europe's Domestic Market (London: RDA/Routledge, 1988).
237 “Fuj- den EG-Bereich ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit einer engen Kooperation nicht zuletzt aus der 
Tatsache, daft bis 1992 der europaische Binnenmarkt verwirklicht sein soli.” "EG verstarkt den 
Kampf gegen Internationalen Terrorismus und Rauschgifthandel," 2.
238 Bundesregierung, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine kleine Anfrage der SPD Fraktion," ed. 
Deutscher Bundestag (Bonn: 1984).
239 See tables on cross border traffic in the appendix.
240 Numbers of customs officers are likely to have risen as well. Numbers could not be obtained, 
however. The appendix provides a table on the rise of budget and personnel of the BGS.
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In summary, the discourse referring to the completion of the Internal Market and 
concomitant phenomena such as rise of traffic emphasised the need of common policies in 
order to reach a common objective. The Internal Market and the lifting of border controls 
was seen as advantageous to all members so that solutions had to be found to encounter 
any adverse effects.
3.2.2. Illegal immigration
Two further rationales mentioned by den Boer and Wallace became central only after the 
mid-1980s and especially after the end of bipolarity in 1989. They were discussed also 
before that, but their impact on European-level discussion grew significantly after 1989. 
One of these is the attraction of a prosperous, democratic and secure Europe to migrants. 
Numbers of migrants to Western Europe show that there was a marked rise of migrants to 
OECD countries which concerned Germany in particular.241 Migration to Western Europe 
was an important topic of public debate. Growing numbers of asylum seekers242 and 
migrants were interpreted as a threat. As will be shown below in the chapter on the 
German debate (chapter five), the main fear was a threat to social cohesion by migrants. 
Additionally, also the financial aspect is likely to have been of concern. Deterring 
immigrants with the help of stepped-up border controls as well as providing for asylum 
seekers during the application process is costly.
Thus, governments feared migration’s concomitant financial burden as well as a stress on 
social cohesion.
The end of the Cold War and the lifting of the Iron Curtain brought with it freedom of 
movement for citizens of Central and Eastern Europe, but also increased fears of 
uncontrolled immigration to Western Europe. The border of Western Europe with the 
countries in the East received attention under a new light. It became now the line 
immigrants had to cross in order to get to the affluent and established Western societies. 
The 1991 Berlin conference about illegal immigration -  bringing together Western 
European and Central and Eastern European states -  emphasised the importance of this 
topic. It was the first international attempt to include the CEE states into a solution to 
safeguard Western Europe from uncontrolled migration.
241 see table and figure in the appendix.
242 see tables in the appendix.
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Also the media all over Europe began to dedicate increased attention to the topic of 
immigration and illegality. Large numbers of articles in newspapers and magazines are a 
witness to this.243
In summary, the threat of illegal immigration was seen to concern all Western European 
states (albeit to varying degrees) and common solutions and policies were sought in a 
number of EC and extra-EC groups and initiatives. Germany’s debate regarding these 
issues will be spelt out below in chapter five.
3.2.3. Cross-border crime
Another important argument for common border policies in Western Europe was the 
‘development of illegal cross-border activities alongside legal economic integration.’244 
Organised crime in general was often used to justify a new policy regarding borders, from 
the mid-1980s onwards, but especially after the changes of 1989. Ease of communication, 
use of refined technology, elevated levels of cross-border traffic were all factors seen to 
support (organised) crime. The spread of the Italian Mafia was perceived as a concrete 
danger. After 1989, a new threat in the shape of Russian organised crime became a concern 
for politicians.245 The end of the Cold War was thus seen as a watershed which entailed 
new threats and groups of criminals.
Cooperation among police services was advocated as the best solution by security 
professionals and politicians. A statement from a French official is indicative: ‘After the 
end of the Cold War, a new type of threat is emerging, particularly the organised crime 
which is developing in Central and Eastern Europe. Given the means of communication 
today, there is a need to find common answers to these problems together with a number 
of countries.’246 For security politicians, the necessity for cooperation extended not only to 
organised crime, but also to the above-mentioned threat of illegal immigration:
243 for a useful account see Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der A uslanderpolitik in Deutschland (Miinchen: Beck, 
2001).
244 den Boer and Wallace, "Justice and Home Affairs. Integration through Incrementalism?."
245 Cf. for example German publications on the threat to Europe and Germany by organised crime: 
Bundeskriminalamt, ed., OrganisierteKriminalitdtineinemEuropadurchldssigerGrenzen (Wiesbaden: 
Bundeskriminalamt, 1991), Zwischenbericht der gemeinsamen Arbeitsgruppe Justiz/Polizei 
Bundeskriminalamt, "Strafverfolgung bei Organisierter Kriminalitat," (Wiesbaden: 1990),Dagobert 
Lindlau, Der Mob. Recherchenzum Organisierten Verbrechen (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1987), 
Werner Raith, Mafia - Ziel Deutschland (Koln: Rosier, 1989), E. Rebscher and W. Vahlenkamp, 
Organisierte Kriminalitat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden: 1988).
246 Bigo and Hagedorn, "National Report: France."
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‘International operierende Kriminalitat und illegale Einwanderung fordern eine 
Verstarkung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit.’247
One prime concern in the area of organised crime was drug trafficking across borders. It
was argued that criminals were taking advantage of different legal systems on two sides of a
border and that therefore common policies had to be enacted within the European area.248
This discourse of the advantages of a common European area without border controls for
security against organised crime and drugs trafficking is best summed up by Wolfgang
Schauble in a speech in the Hague in November 1989:
Die Erfahrung zeigt, daft Grenzkontrollen gegeniiber der gegenwartigen Bedrohung 
durch organisierte Kriminalitat und Terrorismus nur eingeschrankt wirksam sind. 
Trotz der Grenzkontrollen ist Europa fur international operierende, organisierte 
Straftater bereits heute zu einer kriminalgeographischen Einheit 
zusammengewachsen. Das ist besonders offenkundig bei der RauschgiftkriminaUtat. 
Fur die internationalen Rauschgiftkartelle ist Europa langst ein einheitlicher 
Absatzmarkt geworden.249
The deepening of the internal market and the threat of illegal immigration and organised 
crime were therefore all arguments which were used to demonstrate the necessity of 
common border policies and closer cooperation. By pointing to the threat represented by 
certain phenomena and inefficiencies of controls at the internal borders, the debate 
emphasised the advantages of common action and policies.
3.2.4. Security-led discourse and compensatory measures
This discourse on the necessity of common border controls produced a rationale which set 
its emphasis on the security aspect of borders and compensatory measures.
It emphasised that the opening of borders necessitated new forms of cooperation between 
European law enforcement services. This was due to the loss of the crucial function of the 
border in the fight against crime. An article in the journal Innenpolitik is indicative: it
247 "Beratung des Schengener Abkommens im Deutschen Bundestag," Innere Sicherbeit  ^no. 2 (1992): 1. 
Translation: Internationally operating crime and illegal immigration necessitate new international 
cooperation.
248 Cf. for example Edmund Stoiber, "Bekampfung der Organisierten Kriminalitat," PolitischeStudien 43, 
no. 326 (1992).
249 Wolfgang Schauble, "Europa ohne Grenzen - eine sichere Gemeinschaft," Innere Sicherbeit, no. 5 
(1989): 11. Translation: Experience shows that border controls have only limited effects with regard 
to the present threat by organised crime and terrorism. Despite border controls, Europe has grown 
into a criminal-geographic unit for internationally operating, organised criminals. This is especially 
obvious in the area of drugs crime. For the international drugs cartels, Europe has long become a 
unitary market.
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recognises border controls as crucial elements in the fight against drug trafficking, the so- 
called ‘Ameisenverkehr’ (ant traffic) of consumers. It also mentions the importance of 
border controls for search for terrorists and for the prevention of illegal entry.250 Similarly, 
an officer of the BGS writes:
Die Grenzen als aufierer Schutzring unserer Staaten sind von alters her ein 
strategisches Bekampfungsmittel von hoher Effizienz gegen illegale Migration und 
damit zusammenhangende grenziiberschreitende Kriminalitat. Die Filterwirkung der 
Grenze spielt daher im nationalen und internationalen Sicherheitsverbund eine 
wichtige Rolle.251
The consequence of this was clear: the removal of internal border controls would not mean 
the abolition of all controls. New forms of controls, police cooperation and immigration 
policies were to replace this.
This link between border controls and security was made already by the first Schengen 
Agreement. All documents dealing with freedom of movement or the removal of border 
controls after 1985 mentioned compensatory measures. The initial actors in the Schengen 
process even stated that the opening of borders would bring with it a rise of all forms of 
crime and fraud.252
It is interesting to observe that despite the fact that initial views of the negotiators on the 
level of the working groups (officials and experts from the ministries) converged on the 
common belief that border controls were necessary for the fight of crime and that their 
abolition would necessitate new policies, it took five years from 1985 to 1990 to come to 
an agreement on the shape of these compensatory measures. And it took another five 
years, until 1995, for the actual implementation of the agreements. This might be explained 
by the fact mentioned above that hesitations regarding sovereignty remained, especially due 
to the fact that these agreements ‘Europeanised’ issues which were at the heart of the self- 
understanding of the modern state: crime and immigration control.
250 "Offnung der Grenzen erfordert neue Formen der Kriminalitatsbekampfung," Innenpolitik, no. IX 
(1987): 6.
251 Ludwig Rippert, "Sicherung der Aufiengrenzen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Schengen'sFinal 
Daysf The Incorporation of Schengen into the New TEU, External Borders and Information Systems, ed Monica 
Den Boer (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1998), 94. Translation : The 
borders as the outer protection ring of our states are of old a strategic means of high efficiency to 
fight against illegal immigration and connected trans-border crime. The filter function of the border 
therefore plays an important role in the national and international security cooperation.
252 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux.
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Bigo has characterised the Schengen negotiations as a trading place between governments 
which linked issues which were initially separate, such as drugs, immigration, asylum and 
borders. This was possible, according to him, by making the negotiations an exchange of 
menaces and fears.253 By viewing all these issues primarily254 under the angle of security and 
by intimately linking them to border controls, the Schengen negotiators were actually 
constantly conjuring up an image of insecurity and of what would happen if the proposed 
counter-measures were not enacted. The fears connected to the individual issues of 
organised crime or drug dealing were thus transferred to the whole issue of border controls 
as such. This process worked especially well because the actors were experts for the 
provision of security and therefore also the legitimate and accepted actors for the definition 
of threats to society and the state.
253 cf. Ibid, 122.
254 These issues could also be viewed from the perspective of health, of freedom, of choice and 
creativity. These elements were, however, never brought into the picture and into the negotiations. 
The point here is that the issues concerned certainly had a security aspect to them. This is due to the 
fact that borders are at the heart of the self-understanding of state elites of the divide between 
domestic order and international anarchy.
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4. Structure of the Schengen negotiations
The circle of countries involved in the Schengen negotiations consisted initially of five 
countries and widened only gradually: the initial members France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany were joined by Italy in November 1990, Portugal 
and Spain in June 1991, by Greece in November 1992, Austria in April 1995 and Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark in December 1996 (at the same time Norway and Iceland received 
observer status).255 This means that the negotiations of Schengen I and Schengen II were to 
a large measure shaped by the original member states. The shape of the acquis was by no 
means determined by 1990, but the fundamental decisions had already been taken. Within 
the five founding countries, France and Germany were dominating, especially with regard 
to security interests. As Bigo remarks, most countries seem to have had differing policies 
over time, depending on the domestic political arena.256 The exception seems to have been 
Germany which has presented the most homogeneous long-term strategy.257
The negotiations took place on a number of levels: on the level of State Secretaries and 
Ministers; on the level of senior officials in the Central Negotiation Group and on the level 
of specialist officials in the Working Groups. The system underwent changes over the time 
of negotiations, adapting to new tasks and areas, but the basic structure remained the same. 
The following formal sequence can be identified for the negotiations: if the Executive 
Committee decided on tackling a certain area, the actual negotiations were transferred to 
the working groups. These reported to the Central Group which was responsible for tying 
together the negotiations, for general decisions and contentious questions. If a political 
decision became necessary, they referred decisions to the regular meetings of Ministers.
The following outlines the various groups and institutions of the Schengen system, 
indicating the tasks and responsibilities of the various groups.258
255 Dates given are the dates of signature
256 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 120FN. He mentions that in France, Charles Pasqua and Robert Pandraud 
were central in formulating a discourse on the security deficit and the necessity of an 
intergovernmental agreement between 1986 and 1988; that the team of Joxe was leaning much more 
towards communitarisation; that later ministers placed less importance on the issue and that by the 
return to office of Pasqua, the implementation was still pending.
257 Cf. Ibid, 121.
258 Cf. the figure in the appendix giving an overview over the negotiation structures.
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4.1. Executive Committee
The highest level meetings in the Schengen framework were those of the Ministers and 
State Secretaries, afterwards renamed the Executive Committee. They met around twice a 
year to review the reports and proposals from the Central Group and Working Groups and 
to take the fundamental decisions for the development of Schengen.
On the basis of the Schengen Convention, the group was effectively transformed into the 
Executive Committee in October 1993. The legal basis of the Executive Committee 
(COMEX) lay in the Schengen Convention (Title VII) which charged it with supervising 
the application of the Convention.259 The Executive Committee’s members were Ministers 
and State Secretaries of the Member States. Each signatory state had one seat in the 
Committee. Additionally, observers from the European Commission and applying states 
(e.g. Austria) as well as representatives with official observer status (Iceland, Norway) were 
present. It met about five times a year.260
Schengen is directed by a presidency rotating every six month. The presiding state holds 
the presidency in meetings both of the Executive Committee as well as in those of the 
Central Group. The rank and the ministry of origin of the national representatives differed 
according to arrangements within states. The protocols of meetings show that the majority 
of representatives originated from the Ministries of Foreign or European Affairs 
(Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Greece).261 Some 
complemented these representatives with those from other Ministries: the Netherlands, for 
example, also sent a representative from the Ministry of Justice (89 -  93), Portugal sent 
additionally delegates from the Ministry of the Interior from 1994 onwards. Belgium 
changed the Ministries over time: it sent initially a State Secretary for European Affairs 
(until 1991), then a Minister for Foreign Trade and European Affairs. Germany was first 
represented by the Chancellery, and from 1996 onwards by the Ministry of the Interior. 
Austria only sent representatives from the Ministry of the Interior. As a consequence, there 
was a difference of emphasis from European or integration policy to matters of legal
259 The following describes the working structure of COMEX. It can be assumed, however, that the 
earlier Ministerial meetings followed a similar pattern since COMEX only formalized the existing 
structures.
260 Cf. Wouter van de Rijt, "Le fonctionnement des institutions Schengen. "Pragmatisme, Toujours"," in 
Schengen's Final Days?, ed. Monica den Boer (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 
1998).
261 This information has been inferred from the protocols and relies on the accurate indication of 
Ministries of origin therein.
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cooperation to those of economic interests. Also van de Rijt draws attention to the basic 
difference between members from Ministries of Foreign Affairs and those from the 
Ministry of the Interior. He observers that the latter have -  as a consequence of their 
function -  more of a police ‘fibre’ than the diplomats.262
The national representatives were mainly State Secretaries from the various Ministries. 
Some countries, however, sent Ministers as representatives at the negotiations. For 
example: Minister Urbain, Minister for Foreign Trade and European Affairs (93-95) and 
Minister Vande Lanotte (1995 onwards) for Belgium, or Ministers Cresson, Guigou, 
Lamassoure and Barnier for France (1989 -  1995).
The formal end of the Executive Committee came with the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999. Schengen was then brought under the structures of Justice 
and Home Affairs.263 This meant also that the tasks of the Executive Committee were 
transferred to the JHA Council.
262 Cf. van de Rijt, "Le fonctionnement des institutions Schengen. "Pragmatisme, Toujours"."
263 For a good analysis of the changes to Schengen by the Amsterdam Treaty, see Tony Bunyan, "Post- 
Amsterdam JHA Working Structure & JHA Conventions," Statewatch European Monitor 1, no. 2 (1999).
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4.2. Central Negotiation Group
The Central Group served as a coordinating body for the negotiations. It prepared the 
meetings of the Executive Committee and directed the work of the various working groups 
and sub-groups.
Most national representatives in the Central Group and heads of the national delegations 
were top-level bureaucrats. According to Bigo, the participants in the Central Group were 
primarily professional diplomats whose main concern was to ensure that the results of the 
negotiations fit the general national European policies and the relationship of Schengen 
Members with their neighbours in the South.
Meetings took place in about a monthly rhythm.264 This was necessary in order to review 
the work of the specialist groups and to structure preparations for the next meeting of 
Ministers and State Secretaries. In rare cases, competences were delegated from the 
COMEX to the Central Group, for example in the area of visas with regard to the 
Common Consulate Instruction.265
The national delegations in the Central Group consisted of-around 5-10 members. This 
number was augmented to 10 -  14 members when a country held the presidency. The 
members of the Central Group national teams were sometimes, but not necessarily, also 
members of the specialist Working Groups.
264 Cf. van de Rijt, "Le fonctionnement des institutions Schengen. "Pragmatisme, Toujours"."
2« Cf. Ibid.
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4.3. Working Groups
Most of the detailed work of the Schengen negotiations took place in the working groups. 
Their work concentrated on the varied specialised aspects of free movement and 
compensatory measures. They were formed according to the necessities of the negotiation 
process; therefore their number and function of changed over time according to exigencies.
The groups met frequently in order to cope with the task of forming agreements out of the 
diverging national regulations and interests. Bigo states that the meetings of the Working 
Groups took place regularly and frequently between 1985 and 1990: around 50 times a 
year, thus one meeting per week.266
Four main working groups267 existed during the early negotiations of the SIC: police and 
security (WG I), movement of people (WG II), transport (WG III), and 
customs/movement of goods (WGIV). Additionally, an ad hoc group on SIS emerged in 
the early nineties.268 Group I, II and IV had a number of subgroups which prepared work 
on particular aspects of the topic for meetings of the group. These were: drugs, weapons 
and ammunition, information and security: immigration, police and surveillance of borders, 
ad hoc group of lawyers and translators (group I); law of foreigners, visa, asylum, border 
controls (group II), health, phytosanitary problems, dangerous substances and COCOM 
(group IV).
The sub-groups were staffed with security and law enforcement specialists, originating 
from the relevant services and ministries. Different from early groups of cooperation in 
home affairs was that border police services were involved. Apparently the services 
themselves pronounced an interest and could not be kept out given their central role with 
regard to land and sea borders.269
It is difficult to obtain clarity on the actual shape of the working groups. One problem is 
the secretive nature of the negotiations which made obtaining information difficult. Bigo 
points out that the organisational structure he arrived at through interviews with 
participants does not correspond to that given by the ‘commission de controle’ of the
266 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, p. 123.
267 For a full figure of the negotiation structure, please refer to the appendix.
268 Cf. the protocols available and for example den Boer, "Justice and Home Affairs: Cooperation 
without Integration."
269 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 125FN.
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French Senate.270 He poses the question whether officials gave the correct information to 
the Parliamentary Committee on Border Control or whether the structures were so obscure 
as to make it impossible even for participants to keep an overview. Paralleling this 
discrepancy, the documents available for research in the framework of this thesis271 did not 
mention the subgroups on information and security as well as the one on police and border 
surveillance, but included one on telecoms.
Another difficulty is the fact that the structure of the working groups changed over time, 
so that it is problematic to pinpoint any definite shape at a given point in time. Especially 
after 1990, a number of changes seem to have been made to the negotiating groups. This 
coincided with the progress of the negotiations so that new necessities arose.
For example the subgroups to Group I changed in the following way: the groups on 
weapons and ammunition as well as the one on telecoms were retained, but a new group 
emerged which united legal experts. The subgroup on drugs was turned into a working 
group of its own by a decision of the Ministers and State Secretaries in June 1992.272 A sub­
group on borders was installed around 1994. Also the subgroups of WG II underwent a 
change. By 1992, the ones on asylum and visa had been retained, but one on readmission 
and one called Vision (Visa Inquiry Open-border Network) had been added. The changes 
in the working groups indicate the areas which still were under debate by the early 1990s 
and received special attention (these areas were weapons and ammunition, drugs, asylum 
and visa as well as readmissions). Working group ID seems to have been transformed from 
‘transport’ to one of ‘judicial cooperation’ around 1993, and working group IV ‘changed 
from customs/movement of goods’ to one on ‘external relations’ in 1994.
Apart from the Working Groups, the documents available also refer to a committee called 
‘Regulation of border problems’ which united experts from working group I and II and 
reported to the Central Negotiation Group. This committee created the ad-hoc technical 
working group ‘Common Handbook’ and ‘visa experts’.273 The committee became 
influential for the Schengen acquis in developing the Common Handbook for border 
controls as well as other regulations with regard to implementation in the area of Schengen
270 The report does not mention the groups Information & Security and Drugs, but adds the one on 
Telecoms.
271 See list of documents in the bibliography. The information on working groups was pieced together 
from the entirety of the documents available. An incomplete organizational chart can be found in: 
SCH/Com-ex (94) 21.
272 SCH/M (92) PV 1
273 SCH/Front (91) 5; SCH/M (91) 3
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visas. The classmarks of protocols suggest that this committee was the precurser for the 
subgroup ‘border’ of Working Group I. Additionally, documents are available of a 
committee on border controls which reported to the Central Group (starting in 1993). This 
group was different from the subgroup ‘borders’ of working group one. Its task were visits 
to the borders of Member States to check on practices of border controls
To sum up, while it is difficult to determine the exact number of groups and committees 
from the available documents, it is clear that working groups and their subgroups dealt 
with the technical questions of the abolition of border controls and compensatory 
measures. They changed over time according to perceived necessities during the 
negotiations.
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4.4. The General Secretariat
The General Secretariat has for a long time been an unofficial coordinating institution for 
the Schengen process, mentioned in neither of the Schengen Conventions. It emerged 
from the Benelux Secretariat and was only mentioned in the Treaty of Amsterdam, one of 
whose protocols integrated the Schengen Secretariat into the Council Secretariat. The 
importance of the experience incorporated through the Benelux Secretariat must not be 
underestimated. The Secretariat has been and is a central administrative, linguistic and 
logistical service to the Schengen partners. Since it had no legal personality of its own, it 
acted by delegation of powers of the Schengen Ministers.274
The Secretariat certainly had an important coordinating role, not least due to the fact that 
its employees provided knowledge and continuity due to their long-term presence (e.g. J. 
Verraes or W. van de Rijt). Coordination was also provided through liaison officers in the 
General Secretariat which were long-serving national officials. For example, the Dutch R.J. 
Smit, the German K.P. Nanz, the French A. Bianchi were present first in their national 
delegations before transferring to the General Secretariat in 1991/92.
The outcome of the Schengen negotiations structure was influenced in varying degrees by 
different groups of actors: on the one hand, Bigo emphasises that the pyramid image of the 
organisation is deceptive if it suggests that the top level could veto the decisions of the 
Working Groups. Instead, he writes, that each subgroup managed to have its bureaucratic 
interests passed in the Convention.275 The working group members being experts of 
security provision and of the ‘technical’ questions connected to such work, the senior 
national bureaucrats and diplomats in the negotiations in the Central Group and the 
Executive Committee were willing to accept the threat analyses of the experts and the 
solutions offered. It has to be emphasised that this analysis of loss of security and 
subsequent threat of international crime and immigration only imposed itself so powerfully 
in the negotiations because its main elements had been established already by the beginning 
of the 1980s in the groups of security experts in Europe outlined above.
274 Cf. van de Rijt, "Le fonctionnement des institutions Schengen. "Pragmatisme, Toujours"."
275 ‘chaque sous-groupe a reussi a faire passer ses interets bureaucratiques dans la convention’. Bigo, 
Polices en Reseaux, 126.
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On the other hand, the decision making process was taken out of the hands of the 
practitioners as it went up the hierarchy.276 The role of the negotiators in the Central Group 
and Executive Committee was different from the one of national representatives in the 
working groups. According to Bigo, the members of the Central Group -  mostly high-level 
diplomats and civil servants - introduced most hesitations regarding sovereignty and 
expected guarantees.277 Given the fact that politicians had initially thought that 
negotiations would only take a few months, the length of the negotiations alone shows that 
security professionals were able to impose their concerns.
Summing up the organisation of negotiations of Schengen, it can be said that the Ministries 
of Foreign or European Affairs were central (the exception was Germany where the 
Chancellery was involved) for the most fundamental decisions. The Central Group was 
composed of high-level officials from a number of national ministries, amongst them 
Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice. In the Working Groups, 
professionals and specialised civil servants from the relevant ministries were present. The 
hierarchical decision-making process ensured that decisions with fundamental political 
implications were taken at the top while expert input in terms of knowledge of 
practitioners was fed in through the working groups.
276 c f. Ibid.
277 Ibid.
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5. Evolution and Content Analysis of Agreements
The Schengen acquis consists of two Treaties, which are different in legal quality, content, 
length, and -  it may be argued -  also in objectives. While the first Schengen Agreement 
was conceived as an administrative agreement which required no parliamentary 
ratification,278 the second Implementing Convention had to be ratified in all member states. 
While Schengen I concentrated on provisions for the abolition of border controls, 
Schengen II elaborated in detail compensatory measures with respect to the security of the 
new Schengen area.
5.1. Phases of Negotiation
The duration of negotiations for the Schengen Agreements can be assessed in different 
ways. Talks for the actual two Agreements lasted from late 1984 until June 1990. However, 
intensive discussions in the various committees continued in order to make implementation 
acceptable to all Member States by mid-1995. After 1995, negotiations continued in order 
adapt the treaties to changing political and security circumstances, refining provisions for 
the application of the Agreements.279 This thesis concentrates on the evolution of the actual 
Schengen Agreements with regard to the role of borders for the state. By 1995, the 
fundamental decisions in this respect had already been taken. The following will therefore 
concentrate on the period between 1984 and 1995.
Negotiations for Schengen I were completed comparatively quickly (ca. December 1984 to 
June 1985) and conducted mainly by the Ministers of Transport and Foreign Affairs. 
According to Bigo, the discussions concentrated on questions of practicalities of free 
circulation of goods and persons so that an accord could be reached without much 
difficulty.280 Based on the model of the 1958/60 Benelux Treaty, the agreement emphasised 
the creation of a space of free movement.
278 The Agreement has also been called a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, cf. J.A.M.E. Verraes, "Schengen, an 
Agreement to Cooperate" (paper presented at the Institute for the Study of Public Order, Leicester 
University, 1993).
279 One of the most notable changes after 1995 for the Schengen framework was the integration into the 
European Treaties, a decision which necessitated intensive negotiations and discussions between 
Schengen partners and with EU institutions.
280 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux.
-129-
Evolution of the Schengen negotiations
Negotiations for Schengen II were much more protracted and under the augurs of 
reinforcement of security and controls. The discussions can be roughly divided into a 
number of stages: in the first phase, the Schengen partners were focussed on defining the 
issues at stake. The legal areas and shape of compensatory measures had to be determined. 
Observers of the negotiations emphasise that the first necessity of the negotiations was to 
get to know each other and national differences in existing regulations such as visas. They 
also mention that given the relatively small circle of participating countries, personalities 
and personal relations played an important role in the early negotiations. The first phase 
was also the period in which the negotiators aimed to become familiar with particular 
national concerns and interests. The relevant officials from the Benelux states were familiar 
with their partners and their legal provisions so that the approximation had to take place 
between France, the Benelux and Germany.
The second phase (1986 -  1989) of the negotiations concentrated on the actual 
compensatory measures, particularly standards of border controls, in the working groups. 
Furthermore, decisions were made on the shape of the Agreement, on contents and 
division into chapters. According to Didier Bigo, the mid-1980s were a crucial time in the 
development of the SIC but were kept very secretive: ‘Les annees 1985-1988 sont celles de 
la maturation du projet mais ce sont aussi les annees ou les negociateurs de Schengen sont 
tellement discrets sur leurs activites que certains membres de leurs propres ministeres ne 
sont pas tenus au courant des discussions.’281
It was initially planned to conclude preparatory work for one or several international 
treaties in 1988 so that ratification by 1990 could be ensured. The German head of the 
Chancellery was positive that texts for signature would be ready by the end of 1988.282
In a meeting on 3 June 1987, a meeting of State Secretaries and Ministers decided that an 
additional international treaty would be concluded on the transfer of border controls to the 
external borders and on the creation of compensatory measures.283 At the end of 1987, 
treaty texts already existed for the areas of fight against crime and common minimal
281 Ibid, 121. Translation : The years 1985 -  1988 are those of the maturation of the project, but they are 
also the years when the negotiators of Schengen are so secret about their activities that certain 
members of their own ministries are not kept informed about the course of discussions.
282 Prof. Dr. Waldemar Schreckenberger, "An den Vorsitzenden des Innenausschusses - Unterrichtung 
des Innenausschusses von der Umsetzung des Schengener Abkommens," ed. Bundeskanzleramt 
(1988). Statement of the head of the Bundeskanzleramt in a letter to the Committee on Internal 
Affairs of the Bundestag.
283 Innenausschufi des Deutschen Bundestages, "Kurzprotokoll, 23. Sitzung des Innenausschusses," ed. 
Deutscher Bundestag (Bonn: 1988).
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prosecution standards for drugs, weapons law, border controls and border checks, visa 
policy, formalities in asylum law -  although some details remained to be settled.284
With regard to border controls, principles regarding systematic and intensive controls and 
checks at the borders were decided upon in December 1987. State Secretary Neusel stated 
that the sub-group on border controls had basically finished its formulation of elements for 
the treaty. He also mentioned that proposals regarding carriers’ liability and measures 
against people smugglers were already decided upon.285
A meeting of State Secretaries and Ministers on 14 June 1988 in Remich, prepared by a 
Central Group meeting in May considered an early draft of an Agreement on Free 
Movement. This comprised sections on border controls, drugs, weapons and ammunition 
and exchange of information.286 Important reserves remained regarding the nature of the 
external border controls. The Minister and State Secretaries emphasised that the abolition 
of border controls had to go hand in hand with the highest level of security in the countries 
concerned, ensured especially by reinforced controls at the external borders. Problematic 
were especially the controls of nationals of EC Member States who were not part of 
Schengen.
One of the crucial issues was to ensure the compatibility of Schengen with EC law. With 
regard to external border controls, the heads of the Central Group worked to ensure 
together with representatives of the Commission that citizens of EC states who were not 
Schengen members would not be treated as third-country nationals.
Despite the fact that an international treaty had been decided upon in principle, by no 
means all issues were already settled by 1988. Remaining hesitations existed with regard to a 
number of issues: the Netherlands differed from the other members in view of minimal 
standards for prosecution with regard to drugs offences. Details regarding the control of 
small arms needed to be fixed. A number of details with regard to legal aid needed settling. 
The other remaining topics were hot pursuit, transborder observation, exchange of liaison 
officers, measures to prevent dangers emanating from another member state and details 
regarding content and data protection in the SIS.287
284 Schreckenberger, "An den Vorsitzenden des Innenausschusses - Unterrichtung des Innenausschusses 
von der Umsetzung des Schengener Abkommens."
285 Innenausschufi des Deutschen Bundestages, "Kurzprotokoll, 23. Sitzung des Innenausschusses."
286 Cf. SCH/M (88) PV 1.
287 Innenausschufi des Deutschen Bundestages, "Kurzprotokoll, 23. Sitzung des Innenausschusses."
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By June 1989, most of the remaining problems had been resolved and the signing was set 
for 15 December 1989. Indeed, compromises had been reached in the areas of checks of 
persons at the border, visas, asylum, external border controls, drugs and weapons law. 
Ministerialdirigent Dr. Glatzel of the Chancellery mentions, however, that a compromise 
on questions of tax harmonisation and the protection of financial secrets could not be 
reached and the question remained open.288
A third phase in the negotiations can be identified with the rupture of the changes in 
Eastern Europe. A few weeks before the planned completion of negotiations, the context 
of the negotiations was transformed. The fall of the wall meant that Schengen negotiators 
had to take into account the new political and security situation in the East. The most 
important elements during this time of the Schengen negotiations were provisions to 
ensure the security of the Eastern Schengen frontier and the development of the Schengen 
Information System.
In September 1989, Hungary opened its frontiers for refugees from the GDR. A process of 
peaceful protests and revolutions in Central European states took place, the most 
emblematic event of which was the breech of the Berlin Wall in the night of 9 November. 
The changes of autumn 1989 led the German government to call off the signing of the SIC 
on 14 December, one day before the planned signing. The government of West Germany 
insisted that citizens of the GDR enjoy free movement also with a passport of the GDR. 
The other Schengen partners were hesitant, especially France. The lack of clarity regarding 
the legal status of GDR citizens was planned to be resolved through an addition to the 
existing SIC.289 Negotiations stopped until the end of April 1990, by which time it had 
become likely that German unification would take place.290
288 sp d  Arbeitsgruppe Schengener Ubereinkommen, "Sitzung vom 18.1.1990," ed. Fraktion der SPD im 
Deutschen Bundestag (Bonn: 1990). The document comes from the first meeting of the SPD 
Working Group on the Schengen Agreement. It was founded with a view to the changes envisaged to 
the ratification of the Schengen Agreement. The Working Group comprised members of a number 
of Committees.
289 Ibid.
Dr. Glatzel emphasises the importance of solving this issues in consultations with France.
290 The detailed account of Zelikow and Rice as well as memoirs of politicians show that decisive steps 
had been taken in the time ahead. France hoped to bind Germany closer into a European network by 
way of EMU and further political integration. Chancellor Kohl and his advisors began to respond 
positively to this from the end of February onwards. Kohl signaled to Jacques Delors that Germany 
was willing to engage more in the process of European integration. Horst Teltschik spoke 
confidentially with Jacques Attali. A French-German initiative for political integration was the result. 
Cf. Jacques Attali, Verbatim. Chronique des annees 1988-1991, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Paris: 1995), Horst 
Teltschik, 329 Tage:Innenansichten derEinigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza
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By mid-1990, arrangements had been made to ensure freedom of movement also for East 
Germans. A note in the protocol to the SIC by the Federal Republic of Germany regarding 
the inclusion of all of Germany into the treaty was added. The Convention was signed on 
19 June 1990 by the five original members.
A fourth phase for negotiations can be discerned between 1990 and 1995 during which the 
implementation of the Agreements was prepared and further members were admitted. A 
major concern for government representatives was to ensure that implementation would 
reach the agreed levels of controls at the external borders and the standards of 
compensatory measures deemed necessary. For example, the development and 
functionality of the SIS remained problematic until late in the negotiations. Also the 
common handbook for officials conducting the controls at the borders was written and 
refined during that time in order to instruct the border guards with which methods to 
ensure the level of security agreed. Relations to EU institutions were also a matter of 
discussion, particularly the relationship between the SIS and a planned European 
Information System (which was to complement the planned External Borders 
Convention).291
The decision of December 1994 to implement the SIC from 26 March 1995 onwards did 
not end negotiations. However, the fundamental decisions had been taken by this time and 
the character of the Schengen system was defined. The following section will present in 
detail the genesis and provisions of the two Agreements which resulted from the 
negotiations.
Rice, Stemstunde der Diplomatic. DiedmtscheEinbeitunddasEndederSpaltungEuropas(Germany Unifiedand 
Europe Transformed), trans. Klaus-Dieter Schmidt (Berlin: Propylaen, 1997).
291 Cf. the reproduction of a Note of 1992 by the Portuguese Presidency on the ‘instrument’ to be used 
to effect the planned EIS in Bunyan, ed., Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs.
-133-
Evolution of the Schengen negotiations
5.2. Schengen I
The Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 is officially called ‘Agreement between the 
governments of the states of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic regarding the gradual abolition of controls at the 
common borders’. As outlined above, the Benelux Travel Union and French-German 
Agreement of July 1984 can be considered the starting point of Schengen. The offer of the 
Benelux Union to use its General Secretariat as an institutional centre widened the circle of 
participating countries to five.
5.2.1. Genesis
As the events leading up to the conclusion of the first Schengen Agreement outlined above 
illustrate, officials were primarily interested in practical solutions to the demands of a 
growing and more complex trade between countries; they did not intend a fundamental 
change to state relations or a challenge to state sovereignty. Events such as the strike of 
lorry drivers put pressure on Transport Ministers and also on leading politicians to admit 
the necessity of changes to the policies of controls at the borders.
Bigo points out that geographic contiguity (and therefore possibly economic interests) was 
more important for the conclusion of that agreement than a convergence of political 
visions regarding Europe.292 He is certainly right in pointing out economic motives as 
important forces. At the same time, politicians such as the German chancellor were also 
intent on deepening integration via bi- and multilateral agreements allowing free movement 
to citizens -  also in the absence of an EC-level agreement. While European Community 
declarations and committees were contemplating measures for the realisation of the 
freedom of movement, ‘classic’ international treaties went ahead with measures gradually 
lifting border controls.
5.2.2. Content
Despite the fact that the agreement was a multilateral agreement outside the framework of 
the EC, it is clearly closely connected. The preamble refers to the objective of ‘an ever
292 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 115.
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closer union between the peoples of the Member States of the European Community’ and 
to the will to abolish controls on persons, goods and services of the European Community.
The Agreement is relatively short (compared to the Implementing Convention) with 33 
articles. It is divided into short term and long-term measures, of which the former were 
envisaged to be completed by 1 January 1986 and the latter by 1 January 1990. Similarly to 
measures provided for in the 1984 Franco-German Agreement, the short-term measures 
foresaw a simplified control method whereby cars crossed the border with reduced speed 
without being stopped. Spot checks with the aim of more thorough controls of documents 
on goods were allowed. These were to happen next to the road so that traffic could cross 
the border unhindered (Art. 2 and 12). A green badge in the windscreen was to indicate 
cars with only EC passengers (Art. 3). Common control stations were to be established by 
1 January 1986 (Art. 5). Special arrangements were made for the inhabitants of 
communities adjacent to the border so that they can cross the border at any time (Art. 6). 
Visa policies were envisaged to be approximated (Art. 4) to protect the whole area against 
illegal immigration. Member States agreed to fight illegal trade with drugs and to coordinate 
their policies in this regard (Art. 8). Controls of the driver’s log and transport documents at 
the border were to be abolished (apart from spot checks, Art. 5 and 11).
Long-term measures aimed at complete abolition of controls at the common borders and 
their transfer to the external borders. Members aimed at a harmonisation of differing laws 
which were seen as the basis of border controls. At the same time, additional measures for 
the protection of internal security and against illegal immigration were to be taken (Art. 17). 
Agreements on police cooperation were foreseen as well as measures against crime, such as 
the introduction of hot pursuit (Art. 18). Visa policy also was to be harmonised (Art. 19). 
Tax exemption limits were to be raised (Art. 21), indirect taxes harmonised (Art. 26) and 
the transport of and checks on goods to be facilitated.
A clear emphasis was set on the realisation of free circulation and movement. Practical 
solutions to the problem of obstacles to trade and transport were important, dominating 
over security concerns. Measures to complement the eventual abolition of border controls 
were included, but only in a very general way and not spelt out in detail. References to 
police cooperation (such as cooperation between authorities, hot pursuit) with the aim to 
fight drug and arms trafficking, illegal immigration, tax evasion and smuggling were made 
only in 4 articles out of 33 (Art. 8,9,18 and 19). The fight against illegal immigration was 
mentioned in four articles (7,9,17 and 20). Interestingly, the expression ‘compensatory
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measures’ cannot be found in the first Schengen Agreement. The term used are 
‘complementary measures to safeguard internal security and prevent illegal immigration’ 
(Art. 17). This emphasis is changed conspicuously with the Schengen Implementing 
Convention which focussed on the formulation of compensatory measures which would 
allow the realisation of the area free of border controls agreed in 1985. While 
complementary measures mean additional measures to safeguard security, compensatory 
measures pointed clearly to the fact of loss of security safeguards which had to be made up 
for.
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5.3. Schengen II
The ‘Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic regarding the gradual abolition of checks at their 
common borders of 19 June 1990’ (SIC) is much more than pure implementation of the 
1985 agreement. As will be described below, it extends to new areas with a different 
emphasis. It is the much more complex document and has to be considered more 
important both in its content as well as in its consequences.
5.3.1. Genesis
Negotiations for the SIC were started because security experts and national governments 
felt that a direct implementation of Schengen I without measures to compensate for the 
loss of internal border controls was impossible. The Schengen Agreement made reference 
to some complementary measures for the protection of internal security. The ensuing 
negotiations aimed to define and harmonise these standards.
The context of Schengen II was different from the one of the 1985 agreement. The time of 
negotiations was much longer and the European and world political context changed 
enormously during the time of negotiation. Despite the fact that the influence of these 
developments must not be underestimated, it is also clear that the fundamental decisions 
and agreements of Schengen II regarding border controls were made before the end of 
1989.
As mentioned above, developments in the framework of European integration provided an 
important background to the Schengen negotiations. The reports of the Adonnino 
Committee for a ‘People’s Europe’, the Commission White Paper by Lord Cockfield on 
the ‘Completion of the Internal Market’, the signing of the Single European Act have all 
been cited as important. The progress on the EC level also put pressure on the Schengen 
negotiations to finish in time in order to serve as a model and testing ground for EC-wide 
measures.
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The larger European social context of the negotiations must not be forgotten. Terrorism 
occupied the agenda of European governments since the early 1970s.293 The security 
services in several countries perceived a Europeanisation of terrorist threats and made this 
public. Bigo holds that the spectres invoked were exaggerated, mainly due to the interests 
of law enforcement agencies to create links to exchange information.294 However, while the 
interests of the secret services and polices are not to be denied, it is likely that the growing 
pressure on these organisations led them to seek the help of other national terrorist 
organisations.295 Bigo mentions that in his interviews, the mid-decade was often identified 
as a turning point in terms of regrouping of European terrorism.296 While the extent of this 
regrouping is still disputed, it can be safely stated that the terrorist attacks of 1985 and 1986 
did create much public attention and fears.297 Due to the discourse of threat as well as 
continuing terrorist attacks in the 1980s and early 1990s, terrorism as a danger was still 
present in the consciousness of European societies.
At the same time, national debates about immigration were beginning to build up political 
momentum. As mentioned before, migration into OECD countries as well as stocks of 
foreign populations298 showed a steady rise from the mid-1980s onwards. Also traditional 
emigration countries like Italy began to gain inhabitants.299 The numbers of asylum seekers 
in OECD countries also began to rise in the mid-1980s, with Germany particularly 
concerned.300 The rise of the number of foreigners led to debates about integration and the 
right of asylum/immigration. Although these reached their height only after the signing of 
the SIC, the rising numbers of immigrants were already part of the social context for
293 The Baader-Meinhof gang of West Germany (founded in 1968), Italy's Red Brigades (active in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s) and France's Direct Action (founded in 1979) were among the most 
prominent terrorist groups in Europe.
294 Bigo, ed., L ’Europe des Polices et de la Securite Interieure, 19ff.
295 One clear indication of cooperation is the common communique of RAF and Action Directe called 
Tur die Einheit der Revolutionare Westeuropas’ (transl: For the unity of the revolutionaries of 
Western Europe) of 15 January 1985.
296 Bigo, ed., L 'Europe des Polices et de la Securite Interieure.
297 Events during those years were: The assassination of General Rene Audran in France by the Action 
Directe (25 January 1985), the shooting of Dr. Ernst Zimmermann in Germany, head of the arms 
company MTU (1 February 1985), an arson attack on the US airbase in Frankfurt and the killing of a 
GI (8 August 1985), the killing of the Siemens board member Karl-Heinz Beckurts and his driver (9 
July 1986), the killing of the high-level official Gerold von Braunmiihl (10 October 1986) and the 
assassination of the head of Renault, Georges Besse, in Paris (17 November 1986). In September 
1988, an attempt on the life of Permanent Secretary Hans Tietmeyer failed, in November 1989, the 
head of the Deutsche Bank Alfred Herrhausen was killed by the RAF and in 1991, the head of the 
‘Treuhand’ Carsten Rohwedder was assassinated. Additionally, the nightclub La Belle in Berlin, where 
US soldiers frequented, was bombed in 1986. The suspects were Libyans, but also the East German 
secret service was believed to be involved.
298 see table on stocks of foreign population in the appendix.
299 Cf. the table on migration to OECD countries in the appendix.
300 See tables on asylum seekers in Germany in the appendix.
-138-
Evolution of the Schengen negotiations
negotiations. After the unexpected changes of 1989/90, the fear of uncontrolled 
immigration became even more relevant to the negotiations for implementation.
5.3.2. Content
The text of the SIC is substantially longer than the first Schengen Agreement. It has 142 
articles divided into the following titles or chapters:
Title I is concerned with definitions. It is unique in its nature and important for both 
application of the Convention and its interpretation in that it defines the terms of internal 
and external frontiers and thus fills them with legal content. Internal borders are therefore: 
the common land borders of the parties to the treaty as well as their airports for internal 
flights and their sea ports for ferries between member states. External borders are all other 
borders of the parties to the treaty.
Other matters defined refer to foreigners, permissions of stay, asylum application and 
seekers, border crossing and border control. The necessity of definition of these concepts 
in the framework of this treaty exemplifies the novelty and problematic of issues 
concerning sovereignty and the application of state authority under the circumstances of 
this new treaty.
Title II is concerned with the abolition of controls at the internal borders with regard to 
persons. It allows for the crossing of internal borders at all places. Art. 2. par. 2 gives 
permission to a state to re-establish border controls for a limited time if public order or 
national security necessitate it. External borders may only be crossed at border checkpoints 
and during the opening times. This section also gives rules for the checks on passengers on 
flights, changing from an external to an internal flight in the Schengen area. It furthermore 
outlines the conditions for entry of third party nationals and the control at external 
borders. The title is also concerned with all aspects of visas, refugees and asylum.301
These provisions were later complemented with concrete instructions to the officers at the 
border in the so-called Common Handbook.
Title El is concerned with police and security. It gives details regarding police cooperation 
promising cooperation between especially authorised central authorities or direct contact
301 Chapter 7 on the responsibility for treating an application for asylum has been superseded by the 
Dublin Convention since 26 April 1994.
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between services in cases of urgency. Further bilateral agreements are allowed. Police 
observation is dealt with in Art. 40. It lists in detail the conditions for taking up and ending 
observation, the circumstances of observation, the officials allowed to observe, the crimes 
which make observation admissible. The same detailed prescriptions are to be found in the 
section on hot pursuit. In addition, bilateral agreements are to spell out the modalities of 
hot pursuit between two countries.
This title is also concerned with conditions and modalities of legal assistance in criminal 
matters. It furthermore deals with a prohibition of double sentence, extradition, the 
transfer of the execution of sentences, drugs (fight against trafficking* controls) and arms 
and ammunition (classification of prohibited, permissible and obliged to register).
Title IV is dedicated to the Schengen Information System. It details the running and use of 
the system, which data are to be entered and who is to get access. Another section (fairly 
long with 16 articles) deals with data protection and security. This is followed by rules 
regarding the sharing of costs of the system.
Title V is concerned with the transport of goods. The goal is to avoid all controls at 
internal borders and do checks on technical safety, animal and plant protection and hygiene 
in the country. The parties are to reinforce cooperation with regard to security of the 
transport of dangerous goods through the harmonisation of a number of regulations.
This is followed by a separate title dedicated to data protection. Additionally, this title 
provides for national data protection regulations before data can be loaded into the SIS.
Title VII is dedicated to membership and function of the Executive Committee. Title VIII 
deals with legal aspects of applicability of the Convention. It also presents the necessity of 
ratification of the Convention.
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5.4. Comparison between Schengen I and II
A comparison between the Schengen agreements I and II quickly reveals that the two 
documents are of a very different nature. Generally speaking, a shift can be observed in 
objective from an emphasis on freedom of movement to an emphasis on measures for 
security to counteract the abolition of controls at the internal borders.
Monica den Boer has written on the different nature of the two agreements. She argues 
that the first agreement referred more to the short term and the freedom of goods and 
services while the second agreement aimed at the long term and was directed at 
compensatory measures for the freedom of persons.302 Van Outrive is quoted in a similar 
direction when he says that Schengen I was an agreement on the freedom of movement 
while Schengen II was about the control of that freedom.303
The expression of ‘compensatory measures’ itself is not mentioned in the Convention. 
However, its extensive regulations regarding police cooperation, hot pursuit, cross-border 
observation, legal aid, extradition, fight against drug trafficking, arms and ammunition and 
the SIS are an illustration of such measures. During the time of negotiations, the concept 
of compensatory measures became the publicly acknowledged philosophy of Schengen.304 
German officials were prominent in pressing for and formulating them. The German 
representative Schreckenberger wrote for example in 1988 that preparatory work for 
‘compensatory measures’ had to be finished by the end of the year for border controls to 
be lifted in 1990.305 The term became pervasive in the time after 1985 and is mentioned in 
nearly every text dealing with the ongoing Schengen negotiations.
The Schengen Implementing Agreement touches upon areas that were not present in the 
1985 document. The SIS was not foreseen in the Schengen Agreement at all. Other issue 
areas saw an extension of compensatory measures: while an approximation of laws in the 
area of drugs and weapons and ammunition was aimed for in 1985, the detailed provisions 
in the SIC make these essentially new areas.
302 den Boer, "Schengen, Intergovernmental Scenario for European Police Cooperation, a System of 
European Police Cooperation." quoted after Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 120FN.
303 Lode Van Outrive, "The Entry into Force of the Schengen Agreements," (Brussels: European 
Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, 1992). quoted after Bigo, Polices en 
Reseaux, 120FN.
304 The Benelux Agreement contained few compensatory measures. Addtionnal ones on hotpursuit were 
agreed in 1962, but rarely used according to Bigo Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 80FN.
305 Schreckenberger, "An den Vorsitzenden des Innenausschusses - Unterrichtung des Innenausschusses 
von der Umsetzung des Schengener Abkommens."
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The changed emphasis can also be seen in the detail with which compensatory measures 
are treated. Hot pursuit and observation, legal aid are mentioned once in the first Schengen 
Agreement as possible options for a common fight against crime, but are by no means 
spelt out. Contrarily, the major part of Schengen II is dedicated to spelling out modalities 
of police and judicial cooperation in order to counteract an identified security deficit. Only 
37 articles (Title I and II) of 142 deal with border crossing, border control and the control 
of immigration and asylum as such. All the others are concerned with compensatory 
measures of some kind.
The SIC also shows continuing resistance from some states regarding questions of 
sovereignty. The result was that a number of issues were only decided upon with general 
rules whereas the concrete application was up to national measures or bilateral treaties. The 
General Secretary of the Benelux Union is quoted as saying that each country has its own 
way of doing things. The Benelux Union had already a visa union and was not ready to take 
over the stricter French visa provisions.306 In this issue, a final solution was found, even if 
only for short-term visas of three months. Long-term visas remained the competency of 
individual countries.
The issue of hot pursuit is illustrative of a sovereignty problem which could not be 
regulated. The provisions of the treaty only provide general outlines. The actual scope of 
action was to be agreed in bilateral agreements. (Art. 10). This has led to major practical 
discrepancies. France, which had great reservations in this respect does not allow officers 
of other countries to apprehend a criminal. Other countries have limited the area of 
pursuit, while yet others have limited the time allowed. Only Germany allowed full pursuit 
to all foreign officers with the right to apprehend a suspect.
A major new principle introduced by the Schengen Agreements has to be noted: the 
Agreements are framed in a way that each country’s interests have to be ensured by the 
others as if they were their own. Indeed a French Senator has remarked that the Schengen 
Agreements give other countries the key to one’s territory which is a matter of trust, but
306 Cf. Innenausschufi des Deutschen Bundestages, "Bericht fiber die Reise einer Delegation des 
Innenausschusses vom 4. Juli bis 8. Juli 1988 in die Lander Frankreich, Luxemburg, Belgien, 
Niederlande zum Thema: Ubereinkommen von Schengen," ed. Deutscher Bundestag (Bonn: 1988).
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also entails obligations for all partner states.307 This statement illustrates a shift of 
perceptions regarding sovereignty whereby France has to rely on its partners to ensure its 
security. Standardised controls at the external borders demand that each party trust the 
other parties to take into account its vital interests. The option of re-establishing border 
controls for a limited period of time308 is only a measure of exception and cannot 
counteract the new principle.
To sum up: according to the Convention, common European rules apply to the controls at 
the external borders, and checks on entry and exit at the internal borders are only permitted 
in special circumstances in the interest of public order and internal security. While the 
Schengen Agreement places an emphasis on the development of a European space of free 
movement, the Schengen Convention details the compensatory measures emphasising 
security and control which become the conditio sine qua non for the abolition of border 
controls. Given that Schengen represented a threat to professionals for ensuring national 
security, compensatory measures became an appropriate way to ensure institutional 
continuity as well as the level of security. Thus, the SIC establishes a clear link between 
freedom and security on a European level.
The old image of the border as embodying the authority of the state, barrier to invasion, 
instrument of defence becomes obsolete through the application of the SIC.309 The 
Schengen Convention divides the existing state borders into internal and external borders 
of Schengen countries; it spells out a common body of rules for external border controls; 
the Schengen regime also provides for control teams composed of other member states 
regarding the quality of border controls. All this combines to detract from the sovereignty 
of the state to define the modalities and level of the control of its borders -  an act which 
has hitherto been regarded as representing and refying the authority of the state. Despite 
the fact that the legal and administrative national function of the border has been retained, 
the dematerialisation of the border brings with it the loss of the borders as a marker of 
state authority. Its function becomes more abstract and symbolic and therefore changes its 
role for the state. It has become the object of an intergovernmental agreement, later even 
integrated into the European treaties, and therefore moved from the realm of national
307 Paul Masson and Xavier de Villepin, "Rapport de la Commission de controle du Senat sur la mise en 
place et le fonctionnement de la convention d'application de l'accord de Schengen du 14 Juin 1985," 
(Paris: Senat, 1991).
308 Art. 2 par. 2
309 Cf. for a similar argument Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 130.
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control to one of mixed authority. Mutual dependence and trust with regard to borders and 
security of national territory have also become necessary with the new regime.
Freedom and security have become interlinked concept in which the freedom of EC 
citizens can only be realised in a framework of security. This security is to be provided in a 
common area and with common standards for external border controls.
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6. The Schengen rationale in other circles
The discourse of security and freedom was also taken up in other circles in Europe. While 
the connection between Schengen negotiations and broader ones in the EU were initially 
rather loosely-defined, the Schengen approach gradually came to dominate.
Meetings between the relevant ministers often dealt with similar issues to those in the 
Schengen framework. An example is the meeting of Ministers responsible for migration, 
which prepared the Convention on the Crossing of External Borders and the Dublin 
Convention. The following outlines two examples of political processes which mirror the 
Schengen rationale.
6.1. Budapest Process
One ‘export’ to the Schengen discourse where Germany played a major part was the so- 
called Budapest process. ’Gelegentlich entwickelte sich eine im Anschluft an eine deutsche 
Initiative entschlossene Errungenschaft zu einem Wegbereiter weit iiber Schengen hinaus. 
Zu denken ist unter anderem an die Kampagnen gegen das Schleuserunwesen, die auf 
weitere internationale Foren, etwa den Budapester Prozefl, iibergriffen.’ 310
The expression ‘Budapest process’ refers to a series of meetings of states from East and 
West, beginning in January 1991 in Vienna. At that conference a first international platform 
for the fight against migration between East and West was created. The meeting on 30/31 
October 1991 in Berlin was a follow-up with 27 states from Central, Eastern and Western 
Europe. The invitation was an initiative of the then German Minister of Interior Wolfgang 
Schauble. Minister Schauble was of the opinion that the border was no intelligent means of 
investigation. He said in a speech in November 1989 in The Hague that he did not think 
border barriers a good means of control.311 Instead, he advocated the cooperation of 
national police forces and the development of new forms of cooperation. The initiative of 
a meeting with Eastern neighbours in order to define a common strategy therefore fit
310 Horst Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel," (2001). Translation: At times, an achievement which had 
been decided upon on a German initiative developed into a forerunner way beyond Schengen. This 
refers, for example, to the campaigns against human smuggling which spread also to other 
international forums such as the Budapest Process.
311 Schauble, "Europa ohne Grenzen - eine sichere Gemeinschaft."
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Wolfgang Schauble’s conviction that the fight against immigration had to be conducted on 
more levels than just strict border controls.312
Central in the discussions were short-term measures of police and foreigner law to deal 
with migration. The final communique signalled a common strategy of East and West in 
the area of fight against human smuggling for the first time. A report of the German 
Ministry of Interior mentions that the participating states followed the German suggestion 
of a three-step-system: the creation of a harmonised visa policy, the implementation of 
carriers’ liability and cross-border pursuit were to fight human smuggling close to the 
‘source’. Activities at the borders were to be reinforced with the help of intensive checks at 
and along the border. Finally, re- and deportations were to be conducted if illegal 
immigrants had reached the West European countries via one of the partner states. A 
working group was to suggest concrete measures to realise the agreement.313
This meeting illustrates the idea of ‘safe third countries’ which was developed and practiced 
by Germany concomitantly with the Schengen Agreements. The idea was that illegal 
migrants coming from a safe third country neighbouring Germany were to be readmitted 
to that country. Legally, this was possible only if those countries were classified as free of 
persecution, thus safe, for the groups of people concerned. Mickel has called the results of 
the Berlin Conference ‘Schengen-Ost’, because both the measures concluded as well as the 
underlying rationale fit with the Schengen provisions.314 Indeed, the three steps suggested 
by Germany for the conference can all also be found in the Schengen philosophy.
The follow-up conference in Budapest in February 1993 extended this logic and 
recommended border surveillance measures against illegal immigrants, concrete regulations 
in order to expel them and criminalised the smuggling of humans.
312 This contrasts with the opinion of Rupprecht mentioned above who saw border controls as central 
to the internal security of the state.
313 "Hlegale Einwanderung - Europaer einigen sich auf gemeinsames Vorgehen gegen Schleuser- 
Banden," Innenpolitik, no. VI (1991).
314 Wolfgang Mickel, ed., Handlexikon der Europaischen Union, 2 ed. (Koln: Omnia Verlag, 1998).
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6.2. External Borders Convention and Dublin Asylum Convention
The External Borders Convention (EBC) and the Dublin Asylum Convention (Dublin I) 
similarly contain clear elements from the Schengen rationale, or rather contain elements 
which are also present in the Schengen agreements. The External Borders Convention and 
the Dublin Convention are agreements between all Member States of the European 
Community.
The Conventions were negotiated by the Ministers responsible for questions of 
immigration policies of the EC member states. Negotiations for both started in the late 
1980s. Thus, it is plausible that they took up elements of agreements found in the 
Schengen framework. The Dublin Convention was signed in 1990, but only implemented 
in 1997. The External borders convention was never signed. Both conventions refer to the 
obligation under Art. 8a of the Treaty of Rome for the creation of an area without internal 
borders (similarly to the Schengen Agreement).Their contents are the following:
The External Borders Convention allows for sanctions if borders are crossed other than at 
authorised crossing points; it stipulates a common list of countries requiring visas; it applies 
the principle of carrier’s liability; it defines a list of inadmissible third country nationals and 
plans an electronic system for controls. The Dublin Convention details rules according to 
which the state responsible for treating asylum applications can be determined. In principle, 
these rules give responsibility to the state into which the applicant enters first. There are a 
number of exceptions (family reunion or extended stay in other Member States etc.), but 
the principle remains.
Despite the fact, that members of the Schengen negotiations process were not identical 
with EC member states, the institutional and sometimes personal link has to be accepted as 
given. EC ministers negotiating the two conventions were the ministers responsible for 
migration, thus mostly from the Ministries of Interior. Often, there was a congruence if not 
of persons, the of departments which dealt with the questions in the Conventions and 
Schengen. In Germany, for example, the Permanent Secretary (BMI) who gave reports on 
Schengen to the Committee on Internal Affairs of the Bundestag on a regular basis, Hans 
Neusel, was also the German member of the Group of Coordinators. This Group was 
charged with coordinating the work on necessary compensatory measures in various
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groups. Its work was crucial for the shape of compensatory measures in the EBC.315 The 
similarity of Schengen and the preparations to the EBC is shown also in a report of 
Permanent Secretary Neusel when he states that a declaration by TREVI Ministers of 
15.12.1989 covers thematically all areas that are also covered by the Schengen 
Implementing Convention.316
With regard to the EBC, the link with Schengen becomes clear even in the terminology: the 
discussions refer to compensatory measures, a common list of inadmissible persons, 
external and internal borders, and a common electronic information system.317 The 
negotiations also show similar hesitations and problems with regard to sovereignty and the 
assurance of security.
One major difference between the EBC and the Schengen Process is that no concrete date 
for an abolition of border controls was envisaged although 1992 was a goal. This was due 
to the fact that some Member States (e.g. the United Kingdom) expressed their doubt 
whether the realisation of the Internal Market at the end of 1992 also included the 
obligation of the opening of the border to third country nationals. This problem and 
remaining differences between the UK and Spain regarding Gibraltar led to a sidelining of 
the Convention. The German government insisted on an abolition of all border controls 
between EC states (if compensatory measures were put in place).318 It also advocated a 
speeding up of discussion in 1990, in order to be able to meet the envisaged date of 1992. 
With broad membership of Schengen and the integration into the treaties, the convention 
has become practically obsolete. It is an example, however, of an application of the same 
approach as Schengen.
The Dublin Convention which was more successful and entered into force in September 
1997, is a similar example of the philosophy of ‘security for freedom within.’ Its provisions 
parallel those originally written for the Schengen Implementing Convention. Even more, it 
fit the Schengen framework so closely that it supplanted the regulations of the SIC when it 
entered into force.
315 Staatssekretar Neusel, "Unterrichtung des BT-Innenausschusses iiber den Stand der Beratungen der 
Einwanderungs- und Trevi-Minister der EG," ed. Bundesministerium des Innern (Bonn: 1990).
316 Ibid.: “... deckt thematisch alle Felder ab, die auch Gegenstanddes Zusatzvertrages zum Schengener 
Ubereinkommen sind.”
317 Apparently, a European Information System was initially planned to fulfil this role. C f. a confidential 
note cited in Bunyan, ed., Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs.
318 Neusel, "Unterrichtung des BT-Innenausschusses iiber den Stand der Beratungen der 
Einwanderungs- und Trevi-Minister der EG."
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These Agreements and Conventions were cited in order to show that the philosophy of 
Schengen did not remain contained to the Agreement itself. For one thing, this is due to 
the fact, that circles preceding Schengen and these Conventions had already elaborated a 
common understanding of dangers and possible solutions. At the same time, these circles 
had established a network of experts who were then also charged with developing measures 
ensuring security after the abolition of border controls.
It is the dual philosophy of freedom and security of Schengen, however, which proved the 
most practicable policy acceptable for the public. The fact that Schengen negotiations 
involved many deliberations of experts who brought their knowledge to the table led to a 
result which was acceptable to other circles comprised with similar experts. The knowledge 
or ‘savoir’ developed in Schengen fit best the political, strategic, European and public 
exigencies of the time. It is therefore not surprising that it found entry also in other -  
parallel -  deliberations.
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7. Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to retrace the evolution of European border control policies, 
rationales of security and freedom as well as the ability to govern. It was shown that a 
European regime of border controls emerged -  despite the fact that borders are 
intrinsically linked to the governance of the modern state. The tension between national 
sovereignty and the deepening of European integration and the internal market led to 
compromises: the compensatory measures introduced were an attempt to find a common 
denominator in making up for the loss of security through internal border controls. The 
emerging common border regime led to a situation where authority over controls at 
national borders is effectively shared and exclusive national control over entry on the 
national territory is ended. At the same time, the rationales aiming at security provision and 
economic prosperity and freedom led to a philosophy which combined freedom and 
security and saw both as mutually constitutive.
The remaining part of the thesis will aim to explore Germany’s negotiating behaviour in 
more detail and retrace the rationale for its position.
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This chapter presents the history of German borders and the relationship of the state to its 
borders. The peculiarity of the German position with regard to an uneasy territorial identity 
and thus also its definition of citizenship will be emphasised. It will also be shown that 
German perceptions and historical experiences of the Eastern border and the Eastern 
neighbours were very different from the relationship with the West. The country’s 
important historical economic and political position in central Europe will be discussed and 
it will be shown that many of the political decisions in Germany’s history were connected 
to changes to its -  internal and external -  borders. The discourse on migration and crime 
coming from the East can only be adequately understood in the light of Germany’s close 
historical links to and experiences in Eastern Europe.
Equally, the difficult, ambiguous situation for Germany in the phase of change after 1989 
can be highlighted through this historical account. On the one had, exchange and openness 
towards the East had long been a political objective and reminded of old ties to the East. 
On the other hand, open borders towards the East were feared to have unforeseen 
consequences for Europe in terms of unmanageable amounts of migrants and inflow of 
crime.
This chapter therefore represents the historical context for negotiations on border controls. 
German historical experiences influenced not only the perspective and position of the 
German delegation. German history in this respect also created fears and expectations on 
the side of Germany’s neighbours.
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Avant propos: the German language and borders
Before giving an account of the historical development of Germany’s borders and of the 
problematic nature of German identity in relationship to its borders, some particularities of 
the German language concerning borders have to be noted. Language can help to illustrate 
the ‘mental map’ of a particular group and partly conserves past experiences.
First of all, German is one of the few European languages which has only one word for 
‘boundary’, ‘border’, ‘frontier’ and limit. ‘Grenze’ is a derivative from West Slavic ‘greniz(e)’ 
or ‘granica’, which is a rather rare root in German words.319 Interestingly, the term is 
derived from a stem which means to 'protect' and 'to keep'.320 The word was first used in 
German in 1262 and entered the general language around 1280 through the Latin of the 
knights of the orders and coexisted for a long time with other words referring to the 
marches of the German-inhabited area such as ‘Marken’. The modern word ‘Grenze’ was 
spread only by Luther who used it in his translation of the bible in the 16th century.321 Thus, 
the term entered the language region from the east. This illustrates the exchange with that 
region and the influence it had. At the same time, it was this area where the definition of 
the limits of German areas lacked clarity at the time.
The term ‘Grenze’ in German designates state borders, as well as sub-state borders or a 
border region. In order to be more precise when speaking about a specific type of border, 
the speaker will add to the word ‘Grenze’ another noun, thus the words ‘Grenzregion’, 
‘Grenzraum’ or ‘Grenzlinie’.322 The word ‘Grenze’ itself contains all of these meanings. 
What is more, the word ‘Grenze’ also conjures up the much more general meaning of an 
encounter of two entities and the limit of something. An encyclopedia defines it as the 
dividing line between two areas -  in the figurative sense also between social givens.323 
Another encyclopedia defines the border as the limit of a thing beyond which it ends.324 It 
could thus refer to practically anything: the line between languages, (Sprachgrenze or
319 Brockhaus Enzyklopadie, 19 ed. (Mannheim: F.A. Brockhaus, 1989).
320 Alexander Demandt, "Zur Geschichte der Grenzen Deutschlands," in Grenz-Falle, ed. Martin Sabrow 
(Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2000).
321 Cf. Ulrich von Alemann, "Grenzen schaffen Frieden," Die Zeit, 4 February 1999.
322 border region, border area, border line.
323 Brockhaus Enzyklopadie, 17 ed. (Wiesbaden: F.A. Brockhaus, 1969).: „Trennungslinie zwischen 
verschiedenen Gebieten (natiirlicher oder rechtlicher Art); im iibertragenen Sinn auch zwischen 
gesellschaftlichen Gegebenheiten."
324Meyers Lexikon, 7 ed. (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1926).: „Das Ende einer Sache, jenseits 
dessen sie aufhort".
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Dialektgrenze), between cultures (Kulturgrenze) or between mentalities (Mentalitatsgrenze) -  and 
many more such encounters. The word indicates that something is different on one side of 
the ‘Grenze’ from the other side.
Often, the word is used to refer to what is inside, rather than what is outside, thus 
indicating a limit: the word ‘Schmerzgrenze’ for example means the limit of the pain one is 
able to bear (threshold of pain). T)ie Grenzen des Machbaren’ (the limits of the feasible) is 
a common expression in the German language.325 In most of these cases, English or French 
would use a variety of expressions, not necessarily only the word border or boundary. 
Thus, the German word Grenze unites within it the meanings of a range of words in other 
European languages and it is up to the context to give further definition to the word. 
Speaking about the border in Germany necessarily has different connotations from the 
English or French or any other major European language. The word always refers to some 
kind of difference and it is up to the context to determine the specific meaning.
The language used in connection with border controls is also interesting. Indeed, border 
control is not easy to translate. Grenzkontrolle in German is most often associated with the 
action of checking at the border itself. If border control is supposed to refer to the 
surveillance of the area of the border, then Grenzuberwachung or Grenzsicherung would be the 
more appropriate expression in German. In fact, Grenzsicherung is probably the word most 
often used by politicians and professionals. The word ‘sicher’ in this context is extremely 
interesting. Again, the German word unites a number of English meanings. Sicherung as in 
Grenzsicherung means protection or making safe. Sicherheit, a closely related word, means 
safety if used in the sense of safety procedures for example (Sicherheitsvorschrifien). It also 
means security, for example, when one refers to classical protection from threat, as in 
militdrische Sicherheit. This means that the word Grenzsicherung refers to first of all the 
technical fact of making the border safe (from whatever the threat defined may be), but 
also conjures up the fact of people therefore being secure.
The language of the illegal crossing of the border in German is also indicative. The word 
which is officially used is Grenzverletzung, literally meaning hurting of the border. Such an 
expression attributes personal character to the border itself, as something which can be 
hurt. The connotation is that it is not the border which is hurt, but the sovereignty of the 
state, the state itself. This example refers to the relationship between the state and its
325 ‘Die Grenzen des Wachstums’ was the translation of the ‘Limits of Growth’ report of the Club of 
Rome.
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borders spelt out in chapter two. Although the relationship may well have changed from 
the time when this linguistic term was coined, the language nevertheless conserves this idea 
of the border protecting the state. Using it conjures up the meaning of ‘damage’ done to 
the state or community.
-155-
Germany’s historical relationship with its borders
1. Topography of German borders
The identity of Germans has been and is closely connected to being in the centre of 
Europe. As is spelt out below, much of German history is connected to changes of the 
position of borders.326 The fact of having borders with many neighbouring countries has 
influenced the perceptions of political and strategic necessities in the past, but also in the 
present. The formation of the German state over the centuries has happened with 
reference to and in close relationship with its neighbours, mostly in an act of 
differentiation. Germany has traditionally had - for better or for worse - to live with its 
position in the centre of Europe, with what is called ‘Mittellage’. Today, the country has 
land borders with 9 states, these being Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland and the Czech Republic. The country also borders the 
Baltic Sea in the north-east and the North sea in the north-west.
The majority of Germany’s borders today are land borders with a length of 3758 km 
(Austria: 816 km, Czech Republic 811 km, Poland 442 km, Denmark 67 km, the 
Netherlands 567 km, Luxembourg 135 km, Belgium 156, France 448 km and Switzerland 
316 km). The former inner-German border amounted to 1393 km.327 The country’s coasts 
have a length of 907 km.
The borders vary in their geographical nature. Not only are there land and sea borders, but 
also borders which are clearly marked by natural phenomena such as rivers and others 
which are topographically less clearly defined. Although the concept of natural borders is 
rejected here in the tradition of Lucien Febvre328 and others, it should be noted that many 
borders of Germany today coincide with markers, whether these be interpreted as linking 
or dividing.
326 This is not unusual, of course, since until very recently the main object and result of disputes and war 
was control of territory. The peculiarity in the German case is that the position of borders and the 
gain or loss of territory has played a central part in national debates and the formation of a self-image 
of the nation. As will be spelt out below, the development of German identity and the German 
question is tied to a lack of a specific territorial image and often to specific territorial problems.
327 Statistisches Bundesamt, StatistiscbesJahrbuch 2000 (2000 [cited 2002]); available from www.statistik- 
bund.de. The BGS uses slightly different figures: Austria: 795 km, Czech Republic 810 km, Poland 
454 km, Denmark 69 km, the Netherlands 572 km, Luxembourg 134 km, Belgium 157, France 453 
km and Switzerland 411 km. The difference has been explained to the author by a BGS officer as due 
to different measures of sea and river lines. Cf. Grenzschutzdirektion Bundesgrenzschutz, 
Bundesgrenzschutz - Federal Border Police, 2 ed. (Koblenz: 2001).
328 Cf. Febvre, PouruneHistoireapartentiere. Rivers, mountains or even the sea can have the quality of 
linking as well as dividing two communities. Switzerland, for example, is a nation set completely 
within the mountains, a fact which has not hindered it historically to develop a national bond.
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A number of Germany’s borders are ‘water-based’: Lake Constance and the Rhine on the 
border with Switzerland, the Rhine, the Saar, Mosel, Sauer and Our on the border with 
France, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea as sea borders. The eastern border is now fixed 
along the rivers of Oder and Neisse. Purely land borders are the south-eastern borders of 
Germany -  they are set within a mountainous area.
As outlined above, the Schengen Implementing Convention of 1990, divides a country’s 
borders conceptually and practically into external and internal frontiers of the EU. The 
external borders include the land borders with non-Schengen states, the coasts, the islands 
and international airports. According to this division, Germany has 3.983 km of external 
borders of which 1.744 km are land borders and 2.239 km are coastal and sea borders.329 
1.253 km is the length of the border between Germany and Poland and the Czech 
Republic, which presents itself as the one of the most problematic external frontiers to 
border control services since the end of the Cold War.
German territory has not always been this clearly delimited. Indeed, the historical genesis of 
today’s shape of Germany has been very changeable. Not only have the borders of the 
German speaking area changed relatively much over its history, but also the German nation 
was difficult to link to a fixed territory. Indeed, the German concept of nationhood, based 
on culture and later also genetics, can also be attributed to the unstable relationship of the 
country with its borders. The following section will thus outline the historical development 
of Germany’s borders.
329 Rippert, "Sicherung der Aufiengrenzen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland." Counted according to 
Schengen criteria, the coastal lines have a length of 1098 km (North Sea) and 1052 km (Baltic Sea). 
Bundesgrenzschutz, Bundesgrenzschutz - Federal Border Police.
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2. Uneasiness of German historic and territorial identity
Popular images of a country are hard to pin down; they show themselves for example in 
the ‘mental maps’ of the population, in maps used in school books and atlases, metaphors 
used in popular culture and political discourse. Such images of a country are important not 
only for the subjective identification of citizens but also reflect the meaning of borders and 
territory for both the nation-building process and governance. Anderson has referred to 
this process and the fact that the nation-state is connected to a precise sense of territorial 
identity and control: ‘[T]he state-nation-territory bonding exemplified by revolutionary 
France became the mythomoteur of nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism in 
Europe.’330 What is referred to here are processes of social spatialization, thus ‘the ongoing 
social construction of the spatial at the level of the social imaginary... and in the form of 
interventions in the landscape.’331
It may be stated in a rather general sense that the collective image of Germany does not 
refer to a specific shape or image of the country. This is different from France, for 
example, where there is a widespread conception of the country as the ‘hexagon’, implying 
that this is the natural and lasting shape of the country.332 Germany, has had a much 
contested idea of its ‘natural’ shape. Indeed, it may be said that the idea of borders in 
Germany is much rather a derivative of an abstract concept of the state itself, of the 
political, social, institutional and constitutional ensemble that forms the state. This is due to 
a number of factors which include the historical fragmentation of the empire until 
1870/71, the frequent changing of borders and an ongoing uneasiness with defining 
‘Germanness’ -  from the days of the 1848 Parliamentary Assembly in Frankfurt, through 
the ‘Grofl-‘ or ‘Kleindeutsche Losung’333 up to today’s debate about changes of the law of 
naturalisation or the law of immigration in Germany recently. The following section will 
link such historical developments to border changes.
330 Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem World, 25.
331 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness, 7.
332 This is, of course, a historical and empirical error. There are no natural borders as such. However, the 
early territorial clarity of France and the spread of the idea of natural borders from the 16th century 
onwards helped to sustain the idea. Cf. Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modem 
World, 2If.
333 Literally the small or large German solution, thus the question whether to include the whole or parts 
of Austria in a German state.
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One remnant of historical developments are images remaining in the German language, 
such as the one of ‘Germany in the borders of 1937’ -  a legitimate objective for the 
German Christian Democrats for a long time.334 An objective, which they gave up only 
gradually and which was put forward as one of their main concerns in opposing the 
‘Ostpolitik’ of the Brandt government at the beginning of the 1970s.335
This chapter will show that Germany today has ended a history of territorial instability and 
has reached the end of a German ‘Sonderweg’. The example of the image of ‘Germany in 
the borders of 1937’ shows that the public discourse does retain images although they do 
not coincide with today’s reality. Other representations for the historical image of Germany 
often retain the empire nature of historical Germany: ‘Germany in 1914’ (in the most 
popular German school atlas, next to the map of Germany in 1937)336, ‘Roman-German 
Empire 10th century’, ‘Holy Roman Empire of German Nation at 1648’ and ‘German 
Empire 1871 -  1918’ (in a book by the press office of the German government).337
Apart from emphasising the historical volatility of German territory, these various 
representations also give the impression to the reader, that in comparison to France or 
Great Britain, no fixed image of Germany has developed.
334 Cf. for example: Bernt Conrad, "Unbehagen iiber Riihe und Vogel. Warnung vor "Auflockerung" 
von Rechtspositionen in der Diskussion um Oder-Neifie-Linie," Die Welt, 25 February 1985, "Strauft: 
Deutschland besteht fort in den Grenzen von 1937," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 5 June 1985, "Strauft: 
Ostvertrage sind keine Grenzanerkennungsvertrage," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 13 November 1985.
335 Cf. for example Schulze, Gibtesuberhaupteinedeutsche Geschichte«*, p. 13. One should remind oneself of 
the political weight of the refugee organisations from the former German land in the East. The 
Conservative parties found in them an important constituency and could obviously not afford to 
neglect their concerns.
336 Ferdinand Mayer, "Diercke Weltatlas," (Braunschweig: Westermann, 1974 (1883)).
337 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Tatsachen iiber Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Societats-Verlag, 1999).
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2.1. Lack of continuity
The fluidity of Germany’s historical borders can easily be demonstrated by a tourd’horizon 
of its current frontiers. Indeed, most of German history since the 19th century was 
influenced by hopes to change the location of borders in order to bring the ideas of nation 
and state into congruence (a Germany in the shape of the Medieval Reich, the revision of 
the borders of the Versailles Treaty, the restitution of the borders of 1937). However, when 
can we start speaking of ‘German’ borders or German history?338 This question does not so 
much refer to legal or even institutional continuity of the current state, but rather to the 
cultural and sociological processes which underlie the current self-image of Germany’s 
past. There are always several German pasts which are referred to in major debates in 
Germany, changing according to current political interests and deeper convictions. The 
debates of what is German history is not new, as Hagen Schulze’s writings on German 
history demonstrate.339
This difficulty to speak of German borders is therefore connected to the inability of the 
Germans to define the historical identity of the German nation. Schulze sums up the 
German difference the following way: ’Was ist anders mit den Deutschen?... Ihnen fehlt 
es, zeitlich gesehen, an Kontinuitat, raumlich betrachtet an einer Mitte wie an festen 
Grenzen.’340 He refers to the universal nature of the Holy Roman Empire on the one hand 
and to the emerging of more than 300 territorial entities in middle Europe on the other 
hand, both of which prevented a unified German state to emerge. This principle of 
territorial fragmentation, supported through the guarantee of sovereign rights for the state­
like entities in the Treaty of Westphalia, remained in place until the foundation of the 
German Reich in 1871. German-ness was not a political concept, but rather a purely 
cultural one. From the mid-18th century onwards, ‘German’ culture and language became 
the means of the newly rising German ‘Bildungsburgertum’, the bourgeoisie, to define itself 
against the dominant French culture at court. The old German Reich may have included a 
number of non-German peoples, and the German nation as a cultural term only started to 
be used in the second half of the 18th century. The emphasis in the German concept of the
338 For the following account of the German debate about its history, I have drawn largely on Hagen 
Schulze’s excellent volumes. Schulze, Gibt es iiberhaupt einedeutsche Geschichte?and Schulze, Staat und 
Nation in derEuropaischen Geschichte. Winkler, Derlange Wegnach Westen. Deutsche Geschichte vorn "Dritten 
Reich "biszur Wiedervereinigung, Winkler, Derlange Wegnach Westen. Deutsche Geschichtevom EndedesAlten 
Reiches biszum Untergangder Weimarer Republik.
339 Schulze, Gibt es iiberhaupt eine deutsche Geschichtef*
340 Ibid, 20. Translation: What is different with the Germans? (...) They lack, temporally speaking, 
continuity, spatially speaking, a middle and fixed borders.
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nation at the time was therefore on culture, not on a political project. The impact of the 
French revolution was thus felt mainly in its aspect emphasising the inclusion of the people 
whereas the democratic aspects of sovereignty of the people and self-determination had 
less influence. Nationalism in Germany turned into a political project rather late. Breuilly 
even asserts that for the ‘majority nationalist ideology meant little until well after the 
formation of the nation-state.’341 Thus, the borders of Germany were only connected to a 
vague cultural notion of a German nation.
341 Breuilly, "Sovereignty, Citizenship and Nationality: Reflections on the Case of Germany," 37.
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2.2. Building a nation: myths of unity and wars of unification
At the beginning of the 19th century, views on the German nation comprised three 
perspectives: the nation as a cultural community (in the tradition of the enlightenment), as 
an ethnic community of destiny (under the influence of the Romantic movement) and as a 
political community.342 German nationalism received an impetus in the early 19th century: 
the end of the Empire in 1806 and the resistance against Napoleonic occupation gave the 
inhabitants of middle European states (Prussia, Bavaria, Sachsen, Wiirttemberg, Sachsen- 
Coburg-Gotha) a sense of belonging together -  in opposition to France. Indeed, the self­
definition through identifying enemies became a constant of German identity -  as in most 
other modernising nation states.343 Even the name of the Einigungskriege, the wars of 
unification, against Denmark, Austria and France (1864,1866 and 1870/71), bear witness 
to the fact that unity was created through external enemies. Indeed, Weiler shows that 
these wars were the decisive event binding together German citizens in a notion of 
common citizenship.344 France became the ‘Erbfeind\ the hereditary enemy in the 
imagination of Germany. As is often the case, wars or military threats ‘give state frontiers a 
symbolic as well as a practical significance.’345 ‘The Franco-Prussian war as arguably the first 
popular national war fought in Europe imparted a national meaning to the frontiers 
produced by German victory which had been missing before but it is typical of nationally 
informed histories that these differences were then essentialized and projected back into 
the past.’346 What is more, France had the most developed perspective on a distinction 
between foreigners and citizens and ‘linked this to a sharp demarcation of the national 
frontier.’347
Since there was not much in the present of the 19th century to support this new German 
identity, a German past was ‘constructed’ through myths and stories. This finds a parallel
342 Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, eds., dtv-Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, vol. 2 (Miinchen: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989).
343 Schulze, Gibt es iiberhaupt eine deutsche Geschichte? , 28.
344J.H.H. Weiler, "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance," in The Politics of European Treaty 
Reform. The 1996Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond, ed. Geoffrey Edwards and Alfred Pijpers 
(London and Washington: Pinter, 1997).
345 Breuilly, "Sovereignty, Citizenship and Nationality: Reflections on the Case of Germany," 47. Breuilly 
notes in this context that the Southern and South-Eastern border bore no symbolic significance even 
after 1871. At the same time, he emphasizes the continuing importance of sub-state borders.
346 Ibid, 49. Breuilly mentions that only France represented a threat to the security of German states: “it 
was regarded as the most important threat to international and social stability (followed closely by 
fears of Polish rising in the Prussian, Russian and Austrian areas of occupation).” (p. 46).
347 Ibid, 46. Breuilly mentions also that the introduction of ius sanguinis in Germany in 1913 was a result 
of the French-German conflict (over Alsace) in the 1870s and 1880s.
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also in other states, including Great Britain.348 The Romantic movement, the collection of 
German fairy tales, Romantic literature set in a mythic German past all contributed to this 
effort. German philosophers like Hegel were popular, who had declared the idea of a 
people (Voik) to be pre-existing and perennial, finding its manifestation in the language of 
the people. The people became a romanticised, even holy entity. Already in 1717, the 
philosopher Leibniz had published a pamphlet against the influence of French language in 
Germany, denouncing the fact that francophile leaders ruled over German provinces and 
that Germany was under the French yoke.349 Humboldt emphasised the link between 
language and national character in 1806, calling the language the ‘soul of the nation’, 
without which one could never understand national characteristics. He privileged language 
over descent as a means for defining a national character.350 Sometimes, the meaning of the 
German nation was reduced to a notion of descent from the Ancient Germanic peoples, 
and the virtues which writers like Tacitus and contemporaries had attributed to the 
Germanic tribes. The work of the philosopher Fichte was used to support this argument. 
He stated that German -  contrary to other Germanic languages -  had developed 
continuously from its origins. He drew the conclusion that only the Germans really had a 
people, and that only the Germans had the capacity for real and reasoned love to their 
nation.351 This link between a German culture, language and even descent, and the German 
nation became a lasting feature in discussions of German-ness and in the political debates 
around the foundation of a German national state.
The foundation of a German nation-state became an objective of the liberal forces at the 
beginning of the 19th century. This was mainly a vision influenced by Prussian, Protestant 
ideas making reference to a strong German Empire of the Middle Ages. The German 
Federation (Deutscher Bund) from 1815-1848 referred back to the territorial borders of the 
Holy Roman Empire. It consisted of 39 members and constitutionally and culturally 
different entities: the Austrian empire (without Hungary), 5 kingdoms (Prussia -  except 
East and West Prussia, Sachsen, Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Hannover), 1 electorate (Hessen), 7 
great duchies (Baden, Hessen-Darmstadt, Luxemburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Sachsen-Weimar), 10 duchies, 11 principalities and 4
348 Cf. the work of Hobsbawm and Ranger on the construction of traditions in Britain over the last two 
centuries. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992).
349 Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed., Unvorgreiffliche Gedanken, BetreffenddieAiisubungund Verbesserungder 
Teutschen Sprache (1717), Barock (Miinchen: 1963).
350 Cf. A. Flitner and G. Giel, eds., Wilhelm von Humboldt, Werke (Darmstadt: 1961), 58f.
351 Herbert Fichte, ed., Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Gesammelte Werke (Berlin: 1971), 276ff.
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Free Cities (Liibeck, Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt). The kings of Great Britain (Hannover), 
Denmark (Holstein) and the Netherlands (Luxembourg) were members.
Under Prussian leadership, economic unification antedated political union. The many 
internal customs duties that the Holy Roman Empire had known were gradually eliminated. 
After preliminary steps in the shape of the Prussian Customs Law (1818) and regional 
customs unions (1828), the German Customs Union was established in 1834 (since 1868 
with a customs parliament). This union was to become a decisive stepping stone for the 
German Empire of 1871.
A first attempt at unification under national auspices happened in 1848 in Frankfurt after 
the March revolution. The enterprise exemplified the difficulty of identifying a German 
nation and the question of whether Germans could found a nation-state at all or whether a 
multinational state would be more appropriate.352 The goal of the Tarliament of professors’ 
was to found a monarchic, democratic and liberal German state. A major debate was the 
problem of whether to include Austria-Hungary in a German state (larger German solution 
(Grofldeutsche Losung) as a federation with two variations: all of Austria-Hungary or only 
German-Austria) or whether to leave Austria outside of the union (lesser Germna solution 
(KleindeutscheLosung) excluding Austria). The solution found was a proposition of a smaller 
within a wider federation (only German Austria); this was rejected by Austria which was 
not ready to dissolve its empire. As a consequence the small national solution was accepted 
by Parliament. This enterprise ended, however, when the Prussian king rejected the offered 
imperial crown and imposed instead a new constitution in Prussia. These events were the 
final blow to that part of the liberal movement which had favoured a federal, multinational 
solution for a German state. Hopes of national unification remained in the liberal 
bourgeoisie, however. Politically, Prussia was no longer willing to submit to any Austrian 
domination and insisted on a federation in which only Germanophone Austrians could 
participate and which would have given Prussia the lead.
The wars of unification under the leadership of Prussia against Denmark (1864, about 
Schleswig and Holstein), Austria (1866 about Schleswig and Holstein) and France (1870/1) 
thus took place under the auspices of the ideal of a small-German state for all Germans.
352 German nationalists in the debate denied the Czechs, Slovenes and Danes the right to national self- 
determination in case a German nation-state was to be founded. These claims had to subordinate 
themselves to the historically superior German claims, it was argued. Cf. Winkler, Derlange Wegnach 
Westen. Deutsche Geschichte vorn Ende des Alien Reiches bis zum Untergangder WeimarerRepubliky 118.
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The war against Austria ended all hopes of including parts of Austria in a German 
federation. The Peace Treaty of 23 August 1866 gave Austria’s consent to a new formation 
of the German federation without Austria. Bismarck used French territorial claims in order 
to ensure that the Southern German states joined his side. The shape the German Empire 
took eventually in 1871 (including Prussia and excluding Austria with the Bavarian border 
as the external border in the south) was just as much legitimated by an interpretation of the 
past, thus by myths created of what was the German nation, as it was by political events.
This image of national unity remained an important part of German thinking, despite the 
fact that the German Empire was politically, socially, economically and culturally of a plural 
nature. The ‘Kaiser’, although Prussian, was fashioned into a symbol for the unity of the 
German people. The Weimar Republic saw embittered social conflicts, yet the ideal goal of 
a nation-state remained.
Hitler’s rise to power was built on these myths and transformed them into the superiority 
of the German Volk. The supposed ‘entitlements* of the Deutsche Volk featured large in the 
speeches and writings justifying the policy (and also the crimes) of the Third Reich. The 
end of the Second World War left German historians and people with a feeling of 
discontinuity of German past and present, or rather a feeling of discontinuities in German 
history. The ‘German catastrophe’ meant that the dreams of German nationhood had led 
the way to crimes unimaginable, committed in the name of the German people. After the 
first efforts of reconstruction and the immediate material needs were fulfilled, a general 
interest in the past was generated by a need of orientation and identity. The two German 
states were seen as a result of the catastrophic politics conducted in the name of and for 
the people, but unification of these two German states was judged to be a legitimate 
political objective, enshrined in the Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic. The German 
question therefore remained open until the unification. One sign of this is the fact that the 
myth of restoring the 1937 frontiers was maintained throughout the Bonn Republic. 
German identity had become thus linked to the German state (s) that it was felt that a 
unification would lead to the fulfilment of the long-term objective of a German nation in a 
German state.
Since unification in 1990, historians see the current Federal Republic as the only thinkable 
state for the German nation which has no legitimate rival in the imagination of the majority
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of Germans.353 The remaining problematic borders with Poland were recognised in the 
process leading to unification and political remarks about a Germany in the borders of 
1937 have subsided.
This short outline has shown the discontinuities of German history and the continuity of a 
German ideal of some kind of German nation. It explains the uneasiness of Germans when 
thinking about their past and identity and therefore also about Germany’s borders. A lack 
of clarity of the German borders in history is a logical concomitant of such uncertainty.
It is against this background of a disputed national past that the following quick 
representation of the history of current German borders needs to be understood. The 
recent nature of many of them is grounded in the historical development of the successive 
German states and the difficulty of identifying a German history as the one of one state 
and its borders.
353 Cf. Schulze, Gibt es iiberhaupt einedeutsche Geschichte, Winkler, Derlange Wegnach Westen. Deutsche 
Geschichte vomEnde des Alien Reiches bis zum Untergangder WeimarerRepuUik. Timothy Garton Ash agrees 
in his book on the transformations in Middle and Eastern Europe after 1989. Timothy Garton Ash, 
History ofthe Present. Essays, Sektches and Despatchesfrom Europe in the 1990s (London: Allen Lane - The 
Penguin Press, 1999).
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2.3. A short history of German borders
The following traces back the origin of today’s borders of Germany. A number of 
Germany’s current borders were fixed in their position only after the Second World War. 
Many of these actually date back to much older times, however.
The inner German border, fixed after World War II through agreement between the Allied 
forces who were to govern the zones into which Germany had been split, was an anomaly. 
The growing tensions and enmity between East and West and the foundation of two 
different German states led to a gradual ‘solidification’ of the border, culminating in the 
building of an actual wall in 1961. Although also an outcome of World War II (similar to 
Germany’s other eastern frontiers), this border continued to be perceived by the 
government as most ‘unnatural’ in the West because it divided the same nation.354 The 
journal of the Federal Ministry of the Interior of 1986, for example, speaks of the 
dismantling of automated killing installations of the GDR in 1984, but says that the 
unnatural German border has not become more permeable through this.355 Interesting is 
the use of the word ‘unnatural’ in this context. The lack of natural borders has already been 
outlined above. The term indicates here that the German government regarded it as natural 
that all German citizens should be within one state and not be kept from one another by a 
border. This is interesting since Germans had lived abroad in Eastern Europe for centuries 
before as the next section will show.
Germany’s oldest borders go back to the 15th century. With very few exceptions,356 what is 
today the border between Germany and Switzerland was fixed in 1474 in a Treaty between 
the Swiss Confederation and Austrian rulers, at that time in possession of the area between 
Constance and Basel.357 It has not been changed by any of the major European Treaties 
that accounted for many other changes: e.g. the Treaty of Westphalia or the Congress of 
Vienna.
354 On the other hand, in view of the war experiences, many in France or Britain were willing to accept 
the situation since it meant a weakened Germany.
355 “Die unnatiirliche deutsch-deutsche Grenze ist dadurch jedoch nicht durchlassiger geworder!” 
(sentence bold in the original) "Der Bundesgrenzschutz erfiillt als Polizei des Bundes verlafilich seine 
Aufgaben," Innenpolitik, no. Ill (1986).
356 Minor changes were: The city of Schaffhausen extended its territory gradually until the 17th century; 
the Fricktal changed hands from Austria to France and then Switzerland in 1801/2.
357 Cf. Marc Lengereau, Les Frontieres Allemandes, vol. 3, Bilans et Enjeux (Bern
Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1990), 19.
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Today’s border with Austria is also an old one. Bavaria’s borders to the south and east go 
back to the late Middle Ages, experiencing only further definition and clarity. Until 1806, or 
even 1871, this border cannot be termed an external border of Germany, since Bavaria was 
part of the larger German Empire or German Federation. In a longer perspective, however, 
this is an old political border which has changed function from an internal border in an 
Empire to an external border of a modern state.358
Germany’s eastern border was much more changeable and sensitive to the development of 
German national identity. For a long time, borders were not sharply defined and fixed in 
treaties. Especially in the area directly east of Germany, the definition of spheres of 
influence for trade, settlement and rule was a disputed issue. There was a relatively small 
population in that area, little geographic barriers and changing power constellations.359 
Religious conversion, settlement and conquest were the means for the advancing of 
German language and culture in the East.360 Conquest, mission of the Slavs and 
colonisation ‘Germanised’ the Eastern territories from the Middle Ages onwards. Of 
importance was here the Deutsche Orden (Teutonic Order of Knights), founded in the late 
12th century, whose centre was moved to Marienburg in West Prussia in the early 14th 
century. Gradually, the order reached possession of Danzig, Estonia, Gotland and the 
Neumark, increasing also its influence in trade and production in the Baltic Sea region. In 
the 15th and 16th century, Poland came to dominate the area of influence, but the order had 
already established a lasting influence for German culture and trade.
Very influential was also the Hanse, a term originally used for a community of tradesmen 
abroad -  later also for an alliance between major cities from the Netherlands in the West to 
Eastern Livland. The emphasis of this alliance moved gradually east in the course of 
German Eastern settlement. Politically and economically influential, the demise of the 
Hanse only came at the end of the 15th century.
The border with today’s Czech Republic illustrates the long and complicated history of 
Germany’s eastern border: the areas of Bohemia and Silesia are examples of former inter­
imperial borders of Germany which no longer exist: the Silesian wars of 1740-1742 and 
1744-45 in which Prussia fought against Austria brought Silesia into the possession of
358 The history of Salzburg shows, however, that even here the border was changeable. For a long time, 
the city was a full member of the Holy Roman Empire, then belonged to Bavaria until 1815.
359 Cf. Demandt, "Zur Geschichte der Grenzen Deutschlands."
360 For the German relationship with the East, see section below.
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Prussia, confirmed in the Peace of Dresden (1745), the Peace of Aachen (1748) and the 
Peace of Hubertusburg (1763). At the end of WWI, the Versailles Treaty fixed the 
German-Czech border in reference to the old imperial line, whose northern part had been 
fixed around the 17th century as the line between reformation and counter-reformation.361 
Poland demanded the area of Upper Silesia, but a referendum in March 1921 resulted in a 
positive vote for Germany by 59.6%. The League of Nations then adopted a compromise 
solution which meant that large numbers of German speakers remained in Poland and vice 
versa.
During the Third Reich, the fact that German speakers had long been settlers in the area 
(by 1938, they were a large minority of 28% in Czechoslovakia, the second biggest national 
group after the Czechs with 46%) became Hitler’s pretext for annexing Bohemia and 
Moravia in 1938. The end of WWII led to a further change of the location of the border. 
The area east of the river Neisse became Polish so that the eastern section of the old 
German-Czech (or German-Austrian) border became the new Polish-Czech border. In the 
west of Czechoslovakia, the old border was reinstated, the north-western part bordering on 
the GDR, the south-western part on the FRG. The change of the border also led to the 
expulsion of around 3 million Germans from the Polish and Czech territories. The 
resulting refugee organisations in West Germany have played an important part in post-war 
German policy.
Today’s German-Polish border is yet another illustration of Germany’s problematic history 
and its relationship to borders. It is also, however, a symbol of the changed use of and 
relationship to borders in the decades after WW II. Poland’s vicinity to the German 
Empire was a source of longstanding conflicts over border areas. It reached its first peak of 
political power in the 15th century after a victory over the Teutonic Order of Knights. The 
divisions of Poland (1772-1795) under the leadership of its neighbours Prussia, Russia and 
Austria lead to a de facto dissolution of the state. The renewed Polish state, proclaimed in 
the middle of WWI, was set up with contested territorial borders. It had a difficult starting 
position so that disputes about territory and the preservation of agreed borders became a 
major preoccupation.362 In the time between the wars, Germany and Poland clashed
361 Foucher, Fronts et Frontieresy 485.
362 After WWI, a number of territories were given to Germany after referenda. Upper Silesia was divided 
and only the smaller part of it (but economically more important) was integrated into Poland. The 
area around Teschen and the border in the Tatra region were disputed with Czechoslovakia and fixed 
by ambassadorial conferences. A war broke out between Poland and the Soviet Union about the 
location of the Polish Eastern border (1920/21) which was fixed to Polish advantage in the Peace of
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politically repeatedly over the location of the German eastern border (fixed in the Versailles 
Treaty) which the Weimar Republic refused to recognise. A ‘customs war’ about Upper 
Silesian coal also took place. A German-Polish non-aggression treaty in January 1934 
reassured Poland. However, by 1938, the Third Reich started to insist on a reintegration of 
the free city of Danzig into German territory and extraterritorial transport routes through 
Polish territory. The one-sided termination of the non-aggression treaty by Germany 
exposed the illusion of territorial certainty and was soon followed by the German 
aggression against Poland on 1 September 1939, the start of WW II.
Despite the fact that the German territory was fixed by the Allies during the peace 
conferences (to the border on the rivers of Oder and Neifie), the German Democratic 
Republic and Poland never signed an official peace settlement. For the Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, the restoration of German territory to the shape of 
1937 remained a political objective. It was refugees from the former German areas of 
Pomerania and Upper Silesia who opposed recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, holding 
that these areas belonged to Germany historically. The former residents of Bohemia and 
Silesia also insisted on intransigence with the argument that no former German areas 
should be permanently given up.363 The West German government gave a territorial 
guarantee to the Polish government in 1970. The Brandt government was of the opinion 
that the West German government could not sign a binding treaty for a unified Germany 
and thus could not go further than such a guarantee. Tensions remained between the 
interests of refugee organisations and political intentions of the government.364 During the 
negotiations leading to German unification, recognition became a crucial stepping stone as 
will be explained in the following chapter.
The western border of Germany has also had a varied history which illustrates the 
evolution of the relationship between France and Germany. The Treaty of Westphalia 
transferred the rights regarding Alsace from the Hapsburgs to the French king. The
Riga in March 1921. In summary, Poland risked conflict with all its neighbouring states with regard to 
the fixing of its borders. This weighed on relations also in the time after the war.
363 They were leading a longstanding battle for the recognition of their property rights in Bohemia.
364 The refugee organisations had continuously expressed their demands for Germany to be restored to 
the borders of 1937. Amongst other, this sparked off a debate regarding the portrayal of Germany in 
school atlases in the early 1980s. Cf. Dieter Baur, "Pochen auf Grenzen von 1937," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 
6 April 1981, "Grenzstreit in Schulbiichern beigelegt," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 14 February 1981, ""Soviel 
wie moglich retten". Spiegel-Interview mit Vertriebenenminister von Hassel," Der Spiegel 1968, Rudolf 
von Thadden, "Warum fallt den Sudetendeutschen der Ausgleich mit Tschechien so schwer?," Die 
Zeit, 20 December 1996, Heinrich Windelen, "Information oder Propaganda?," Deutschland-Union- 
Dienst 30, no. 59 (1976)., "Frage der Ost-Grenze ist noch offen," Die Welt, 25 October 1983.
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Treaties of Nijmegen (1672-1678/79) gave the French a patchy influence throughout the 
area. In 1679, the French king took possession of major parts of Alsace, justifying the 
action with ‘historic rights’. The next major European conference which occupied itself 
with this territorial question was the Vienna Congress which decided to leave all territory 
acquired during the 17th and 18th century under French rule. Nevertheless, a sizeable 
German-speaking community remained in the area until the present day. This was the 
excuse for Chancellor Bismarck for appropriating Alsace-Lorraine after the war of 1870/71 
in the Treaty of Frankfurt. However, this territorial change must not strictly be interpreted 
as an expression of ethnic politics and an attempt to bring all German speakers into the 
new German Reich. It was rather a strategic decision which was presented with a publicly 
welcome excuse in the shape of German culture. Indeed, the appropriated area not only 
included all German speaking parts, but also primarily French speakers, for example the 
cities of Metz and Chateau-Salins.365
In 1919, Germany had to return Alsace-Lorraine to France without any conditions, re­
establishing the status quo of 1870. In the interwar period, Alsace-Lorraine was the object of 
demagogic assaults, claiming the ‘return* to the Reich for all Germans. During WWII, the 
re-annexation of Alsace and the re-establishment of the border of 1871 was therefore an 
important objective (July 1940).366 After the end of the War, the old border was reinstalled, 
but France also held the protectorate over the Saarland. Only in 1954 was the Saar area 
returned to autonomy and reintegrated into West Germany by 1959.
The German borders with Luxembourg and the Netherlands date largely from the 18th and 
19th century. The border with the Netherlands can essentially be traced back to the Treaty 
of Westphalia which enshrined the independence of the United Provinces.367 In 1815, the 
final act of the Vienna Congress founded the kingdom of the Netherlands (comprising 
today’s Luxembourg and Belgium) and the border was thus fixed.368 The border agreed 
then did not respect ethnic cleavages so that a sizeable minority of French speakers 
remained in the Prussian Rhineland and vice versa. Both minorities were confronted with 
politics of turning them into Germans or French respectively.
365 Cf. Lengereau, Les Frontibres Allemandes, 19.
366 The annexation was extended to Lorraine in November 1940. The people of Alsace and Lorraine 
never received German citizenship, but had the obligation to serve in the Wehrmacht.
367 Originally, the Low Countries were part of the *Reich\ It was in 1648 that the United Provinces 
formally left the Holy Roman Empire.
368 Belgium became independent in 1830 and a treaty called des 24 articles of November 1831 fixed the 
borders of Belgium and gave it a neutral status.
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After WW I, statutes of the League of Nations established in parts a new line of the border 
with Belgium: after a plebiscite, Eupen and Malmedy became Belgian. In effect, the border 
was pushed about 30 km to the east, leading to a situation where there were no more 
French speakers in German territory, but a number of German speakers remained in 
Belgium. The border was fixed in a protocol in Aachen in November 1922. During WW II, 
the territories of Eupen and Malmedy as well as the whole of Luxembourg were annexed 
to the Reich. The peace conferences at the end of the war fixed the border again in the old 
position. German speakers remained in Belgium, but arrangements were made for the 
accommodation of linguistic minorities.
The German-Danish border has been mentioned before as it was subject to a dispute as 
late as the 1860s when Prussia fought Denmark over the fixing of the border. Minorities on 
both sides had led to claims to the area. The Vienna Congress had attributed the duchies of 
Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg to Denmark, with the latter two being members of the 
Deutsche Bund. After 1865/66, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein became part of the 
Prussian state and later the German Empire. After WW I, the destiny of Northern 
Schleswig was put to a plebiscite. The result split the region into two and led to the 
integration of the larger northern section into Denmark and of the southern section into 
Germany. WW II and the peace conferences did not change the German-Danish border. 
Subsequent arrangements were made to accommodate the remaining minorities on both 
sides. Even today, the Danish speaking community in Schleswig-Holstein enjoys special 
cultural and political rights and vice versa.
This short history of the German borders shows that the definition of German borders 
was problematic. The frontiers with France and Denmark were much disputed. The 
reasons for this lay in political-military interests, often covered in nationalist arguments. 
But the border which remained most problematic was the eastern border. Not only was the 
border here most changeable, it also was a witness to the problematic relationship of 
Germany with its eastern neighbours which will be explored next.
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3. Germany and the East
Germany’s relationship with its eastern neighbours has historically been problematic. This 
relationship was different from the one to France on the Western border where there had 
been close interaction since Germanic times. In a process of conquests, assimilations and 
oppositions, the French and German nations emerged in mutual differentiation. Demandt 
emphasises that even the Roman-Germanic language border has remained comparatively 
constant despite changes of the state borders.369
The following will show that the difficult relationship with the East was due to an 
uncertainty as to the differentiation against Germany’s eastern neighbours. One the one 
hand, Germans have had longstanding relations with the East, often assimilated into these 
societies and held a fascination for Slavic culture. Only since Frederick the Great did 
relations between Poles and Germans become problematic. On the other hand, Poland, 
Czech or Russia -  all Slavic countries -  have held a symbolic place in German images of 
enmity. For example Neumann has shown how Russia has been constructed as Europe’s 
Other over the last 500 years.370 It is these tensions which created uncertainty and as a 
backlash also the myth of superiority of the Germans with regard to the Slavs.
One word of caution: the historical relationship between Germany and such a vast region is 
a multifaceted and complex phenomenon. The experience and interpretation of 
harmonious or inimical relationships depended on many factors, not least amongst them 
social class and position. This complexity cannot be rendered adequately here. The 
following account is merely presented to show the ambiguous relationship of Germany to 
its eastern neighbours -  a relationship which became of renewed relevance after the fall of 
the Iron Curtain in the Schengen negotiations.
369 Demandt, "Zur Geschichte der Grenzen Deutschlands."
370 Cf. Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as Europe's Other," Journal of Area Studies, no. 12 (1998).
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3.1. Migration, exchange and the East as a German area of influence
Over the centuries, Central and Eastern Europe became an important area of influence for 
German culture, language and economic interests through migration and exchange.
Germans settled in the East since the Middle Ages.371 Around 1100, German speakers 
started to settle east of the river Elbe and along the Baltic Sea. In the mid-12th century, so- 
called Saxons from Rhine and Mosel settled in Siebenbiirgen, in the then Hungarian 
kingdom. In the 18th century, settlers from Southern and central Germany also moved east 
in larger numbers on the invitation of the Emperor (since 1716/18).372 On the invitation of 
Catherine the Great around 30 000 German settlers moved into the area of the lower Volga 
river in 1763 to make use of the rich land. The political background was the intention to 
secure the area against the Tartars. By 1914 around 700 000 Volga Germans lived between 
Urals and the Ukraine. During the World Wars, the Volga Germans suffered progroms and 
deportation, more than halving their number. After WW II, many emigrated back to 
Germany despite the fact that they were rehabilitated within the USSR in 1964.
During the early Middle Ages, the border area between the Frankish empire and the eastern 
areas was ‘marked by wide stretches of empty land.... The frontier itself was not static... 
[and] continued instead as a smudged line along the course of the Elbe, Saale and Enns.’373 
The reasons for the eastward movement have been sought in demographic pressures and a 
crusading ideology. Rady emphasises also that the ‘new and vigorous eastward policy 
pursued by the German princes owed much... to the new dynasties which took power on 
the frontier during the course of the early 12th century.’374 These were the Welf branch of 
the Bavarian dukes, the Ascanian family and the counts of Schauenburg.
The mostly peaceful German settlement was in some parts of (later) Poland preceded by 
violent conquest. Contemporary sources are witness to mistrust between the settlers and
371 There were earlier contacts, of course: There was Germanic settlement on the southern shores of the 
Baltic and throughout the area of modern Poland until around 700. Slavs then moved westward and 
sttled up to the Elbe which led to the expedition of Charles the Great against the Slavs east of the 
Elbe at the end of the 8th century. This should not be regarded as the beginning of settlement of the 
Slavic area by Germans. Clearly defined bodies of Slavs and Germans did not exist yet at that time. 
Only the foundation of the Moravian, Polish and Abodrite dukedoms began to change this. Cf. 
Martyn Rady, "The German Settlement in Central and Eastern Europe During the High Middle 
Ages," in The German Lands and Eastern Europe, ed. Roger Bartlett and Karen Schonwalder 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), 16.
372 Banater Schwaben and Sathmarer Schwaben.
373 Rady, "The German Settlement in Central and Eastern Europe During the High Middle Ages," 18f.
374 Ibid, 22.
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the Slavic population.375 In other areas, the native princes invited the settlers in. The know­
how of Germans in agriculture promised benefits to the economy. The settlers were 
granted special economic and cultural rights, allowing limited self-government. These 
innovations were soon adopted by the Slavic populations so that distinctions gradually 
eroded.376 German settlement also led to the growth of urban communities. These were 
linked to a trading network in the West. Also new churches and monasteries changed the 
appearance of the landscapes.
Within two centuries, the German speakers came to dominate the lands between the Elbe 
and the Oder, parts of Pomerania and Prussia on the Baltic coast and there were also ‘a 
thin stratum of German-speakers with heavier concentrations in the towns’ in Courland 
and Livonia.377
Researchers emphasise that relations between Germans and Slavs were experienced as 
mostly harmonious and and that it is a nationalist misreading of the past which led 
historians to interpret relations differently.378 Contact between the population groups was 
close and frequent and Germans often assimilated to the local populations. Karin Friedrich 
emphasises for the early modern period, for example, that ‘for over 300 years the Polish- 
Lithuanian state was an example for the successful cohabitation of several groups of 
linguistic, ethnic and religious origin, who carved for themselves a common political 
identity under the aegis of “Sarmatian” nationhood.’379 Similarly, Norman Davies 
emphasises that only one of ten recorded centuries can be said to have been dominated by 
entrenched mutual conflict.380
With regard to identity, studies of the Polish area suggest that the early settlers had a fluid 
identity and that a change occurred in the early modern period in which German speakers 
mainly assimilated to their Polish environment. Differentiations have to be made:
375 Cf. Ibid, 13.
376 Thus, ‘German law’ villages were not necessarily German villages.
377 Rady, "The German Settlement in Central and Eastern Europe During the High Middle Ages," 11.
378 Norman Davies, "One Thousand Years of Polish-German Camaraderie," in The German Lands and 
Eastern Europe, ed. Roger Bartlett and Karen Schonwalder (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 1999), Karin Friedrich, "Gives Patriae: 'German' Burghers in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth," in The German Lands and Eastern Europe, ed. Roger Bartlett and Karen Schonwalder 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), Rady, "The German Settlement in Central and 
Eastern Europe During the High Middle Ages."
379 Friedrich, "Gives Patriae: 'German' Burghers in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth."
380 Cf. Davies, "One Thousand Years of Polish-German Camaraderie."
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German burghers who migrated over several centuries - mainly for trade and crafts - 
to other Polish royal towns were under pressure to choose between a German 
(“alien”) and a Polish identity and, in a majority of cases, assimilated to their Polish 
environment. The traditions of Royal Prussia, however, provided its burghers with a 
strong political and national Prussian identity and distinguished them as Prussians 
from their German counterparts in the Polish and Lithuanian provinces. 
Nevertheless, what the burgher elites in all parts of the Commonwealth had in 
common was the civic consciousness of being citizens of a common fatherland, the 
Polish-Lithuanian republic. The attempt of the nobility to deny burghers a political 
consciousness equal, but not identical, to the noble nation of the Commonwealth had 
failed long before the Constitution of 1791 recognized the burghers as a political 
estate.381
Relations became more problematic with Prussian leaders who thought that Prussia could 
only prosper if Poland had no important role. This had lasting consequences and will be 
explored in the following section.
Migration also took place in the opposite direction so that many inhabitants of current 
Germany are descendants from eastern emigrants. At the end of the 19th century, German 
agriculture and industry were in need of foreign (often seasonal) workers and many 
migrants had come from the East. No reliable numbers are known, but an act of 1885 (in 
response to political nationalism) banning workers from the East and expelling those 
present in Germany resulted in the expulsion of 30 000 people. In 1890, the ban was lifted 
since landowners depended on the season workers from the East. A further indication of 
the numbers involved is given by Murphy who states that around half a million Poles and 
Mazures (from Eastern Prussia) had migrated to the Ruhr Area before 1914.382 They settled 
in the Rhineland for work in the heavy industries; other destinations were industries in 
northern Germany and rural Prussia for agricultural work.
After the Second World War, the migrants from Eastern Europe came for different 
reasons: they were former citizens of the Reich or ethnic Germans who were forced to 
leave. Official estimates of the German government state that in 1950, around 12 million 
citizens of East and West Germany were expellees. In the 1950s and 60s, smaller numbers 
of political refugees came to Germany from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other CEE 
countries. In the 1980s, immigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe grew
381 Friedrich,"Cives Patriae: 'German' Burghers in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth."
382 RC. Murphy, Guestworkers in the GermanReich.'A Polish Community in Wiihelmian Germany (Boulder, CO: 
1983). cited after Karen Schonwalder, "Invited but Unwanted? Migrants from the East in Germany, 
1890 -1990," in The German Lands and Eastern Europe, ed. Roger Bartlett and Karen Schonwalder 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999).
-176-
Germany’s historical relationship with its borders
markedly.383 Integration of post-war refugees represented a challenge to German society. 
Although most accounts present this process as a success story, research has recently 
questioned this and shown that there was also considerable opposition to ‘Polacken’, 
mostly in the rural areas.384
This account shows that the exchange between Germany and Eastern Europe was no one­
way street. Germans migrated East in large numbers over the centuries, taking with them 
German culture, language and skills. They assimilated there into local societies although 
keeping a heritage of German culture. Eastern European immigrants to Western Europe 
started to come towards the end of the 19th century. Despite the fact that they were 
subjected to tight controls and obligations of seasonal work, many eventually remained and 
settled in Germany.385 Today, regions such as the Ruhrgebiet show this heritage through 
the many Polish names remaining there.
Migration is only one facet of the links between Central and Eastern Europe and the West. 
For centuries, Russia was linked to western Europe through dynastic ties and through 
importing western culture. On the imperial level, for example Tsar Peter IE was born as 
Count of Holstein-Gottorf and Catherine the Great was a Prussian princess.
Also trade and economic influence created lasting ties between Germany and its eastern 
neighbours. The aforementioned Teutonic Order, founded in 1190, was important in 
establishing German influence in the areas neighbouring Germany. The Hanse, a term for 
an alliance of trading cities from the Entherlands in the West to Eastern Livland, also was 
influential in promoting German dominance in trade. The organisation was politically and 
economically powerful and secured its members trading privileges. It remained influential 
until the 16th century.
This German influence in trade translated into a tradition of industrial and technical 
relations with Central and Eastern Europe.386 As a result, the German government and
383 See table on ethnic Germans coming to Germany in the appendix.
384 Cf. Schonwalder, "Invited but Unwanted? Migrants from the East in Germany, 1890 - 1990."
385 They also settled in mining areas of France and Belgium.
386 Otto Wolf von Amerongen, Der Weg nach Osten. Vierzigjahre Brikkenbau fur die deutsche Wirtschaft 
(Miinchen: Droemer Knaur, 1992). „Wir haben eine Tradition in den industriellen und technischen 
Beziehungen mit Mittelost- und Osteuropa. Vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg und auch bis zum Zweiten 
Weltkrieg war Deutsch die Hauptfremdsprache der russischen Ingenieure." p. 314.
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business were the most engaged in Central and Eastern Europe in the year immediately 
following the fall of the wall.387
Exchange occurred between Germany and Eastern Europe in both directions, but the 
more lasting cultural and structural impact was certainly made through German settlers in 
the East. The areas east of Germany became the traditional German sphere of influence. 
German was spoken in all adjacent regions. German culture dominated especially in the 
cities and East European intellectual life up to the 19th and early 20th centuries. At the same 
time, however, German relations with the East became increasingly problematic from the 
18th century onwards. Political rivalry and economic nationalism led to difficult relations in 
which Germany denied Poles the right to national self-determination. At the same time, a 
feeling of superiority with regard to ‘Slavs’ emerged.388
387 By 1992: 105 billion DM of loans and transfer fees, over 50% of all western aid. Ibid, 313.
388 One might also argue that this feeling is due to a much longer development, starting with the Roman 
feeling of superiority towards tribes outside the Empire and continuing with the threat of ‘barbarians’ 
to the East Roman Empire.
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3.2. The problematic relationship with the East
Despite the fact that relations with Central and Eastern Europe were harmonious for most 
of the early German settlers, later political and economic relations between Poland, Russia 
and western Europe were much less so. Thus, a distinction ought to be made between the 
individual experiences of settlers and powerful political myths influencing public opinion.
Slavs in general were portrayed as threatening to western civilization.389 Yet another 
distinction has to be made in the relations to Poland or Czech and Russia. While the 
former were increasingly portrayed as inferior and denied self-determination, Russia -  
albeit represented as uncivilized and barbaric -  remained a power factor to be reckoned 
with.
Relations started to become especially difficult in the 18th century. While Russians had been 
viewed as barbarians by western Europe even in the 16th and 17th century,390 strategic issues 
and Russia’s position in the European power constellation became more important in the 
18th century with Russia’s predominance at the Baltic Sea. Tsar Peter I opened a ‘window 
on the West’ and western European opinions held it to be a ‘newcomer among the great 
nations (which) stood supreme between Europe and Asia, and looks to dictate to both.”391 
Many Germans sought their fortune in the service of the Tsar. Russia and its Tsar were 
seen as barbarians, but willing and able to learn from Europe. At the same time, it was seen 
as a valuable ally against the Turks. Also during the 19th century, the ‘theme of the 
barbarian at the gate’ was reinforced.392 Not only Germany, but also the French and 
English took this perspective: Neumann quotes de Bonald as referring to the ‘nomadic 
character’ of the Russians or l’abbe de Pradt viewing Russia as ‘built up despotically and 
asiatically’.393 The 20th century continued this theme: Adenauer wrote just after the war that 
‘Asien steht an der Elbe’.394 Russia was now often viewed as authoritarian or totalitarian, 
replacing the old stereotype of barbarian and uncivilised. In parallel, however, there was 
always also a fascination with Russia’s difference which was understood as an opportunity 
for the future. Neumann mentions here the conservatives of 19th century Europe who
389 Indeed, German literature stands in a tradition of a West’ and East’ differetiation, whose roots can 
be found in the Middle Ages.
390 Neumann, "Russia as Europe's Other."
393 Ibid.
392 Ibid.
393 Ibid., p. 40, 42. Especially the time before the Napoleanic excursion saw an orchestration of 
publications highlighting the strategic danger in a powerful Russia.
394 Hans Peter Mensing, ed., Konrad Adenauer. Briefe, 1945-47 (Berlin: Siedler, 1983).; ‘Asia is standing on 
the river Elbe’
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hoped that Russia retained ideas of the ancien regime and could help Europe to find back to 
its own proper self. Russia was seen as a nation of ‘primitive health’ and advanced 
spirituality which might ‘furnish (Europe’s) spiritual renewal.’395
The relationship to Poland was different and engendered a lasting negative stereotype of 
the Slavs. Frederick the Great ‘undoubtedly changed the tone for the worse.’396 In his 
calculations, Prussia could only thrive if Poland was destroyed. He apparently commented 
his role in the dissolution of the Polish Commonwealth with the words ‘ Vita mea, mors 
tua. *97 From then onwards, the constituting German Polish nations met each other with 
growing enmity: ‘In the hands of Prussian leaders, German identity was nurtured with a 
sense of superiority over Germany’s eastern neighbours.’398 The official ‘myth’ regarding 
Poles and Slavs in general stereotyped them as ‘lazy, incompetent and incorrigibly 
rebellious savage(s).’399 Anarchy and inefficiency marked the ideas of historians as well as 
the public with regard to Poland. ‘Polnische Wirtschaft’ became a common expression for 
‘shambles’.
One important example of this are the debates in the Paulskirche in 1848. During the 
debates of what areas were part of the German state to be constituted, there was no space 
for the interests of neighbouring nations. Von Gagern, a leading liberal, explained the 
mission of the Germans to rule the people in the East who had no claim to sovereignty. 
Strategically, the eastern neighbours were to be kept in check with Austria’s help: ’Es gelte 
durch den Fortbestand Osterreichs, sei es Slawen-, sei es Magyaren- Reiche an der 
Ostgrenze Deutschlands zu hindern.’400 Indeed, the inclusion of all of Austria in the new 
empire was to ensure the success of a ‘holy war of the culture of the west against the 
barbarians in the east.*401 Thus, the Polish nation was denied a right to its own state.
German superiority with respect to Slavs became deeply engrained as these examples show. 
During the Third Reich, these stereotypes bore their fruit. Although the excesses of the
395 Fridtjof Nansen in 1923, quoted in Neumann, "Russia as Europe's Other," 36.
396 Davies, "One Thousand Years of Polish-German Camaraderie," 261.
397 Ibid.
398 Ibid.
399 Ibid, 262.
400 Winkler, Der lange Wegnach Westen. Deutsche GeschichtevomEndedesAlten Reiches hiszum Untergangder 
WeimarerRepublik, 119. „dafi wir diejenigen Volker, die langs der Donau zur Selbstandigkeit weder 
Beruf noch Anspruch haben, wie Trabanten in unser Planetensystem einfassen.“
401 Ibid. „dieser heilige Krieg der Kultur des Westens gegen die Barbarei des Ostens“, p. 122. In this 
quotation, Poland and Hungary are included on the ‘Western’ side, thus expressing the fears projected 
into Russia.
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Nazi era can hardly be judged typical, they are a good example of what dimensions the 
German perspective on Slavs could take and what consequences it could engender. Slavs 
were eliminated from humankind, they were TJntermenschen’ in the racial discourse of the 
Nazis so that all policies regarding their native lands was permitted. The East was turned 
into the supposedly vital ‘Lebensraum’ for the Germans. The ‘drive to the East’ (Drang 
nach Osten) was taken as a sign of the vitality of the German people. To some extent, the 
rights of the Germans to the eastern lands were presented as if they were ‘empty lands’. 
The gravest crimes of the Holocaust were committed in the East as if this were area to 
dispose of.
The end of the war led to yet another discontinuity in German historical identity. The 
relationship with the East and most particularly the racist stereotyping of the Nazis was not 
problematised. In the Democratic Republic, there were deliberate attempts to educate 
people as philo-Slavic. Poles were represented positively in poems and prose, and the plural 
nature and common experiences in the border provinces was emphasised (see e.g. 
Johannes Bobrowski).402 The asymmetrical relationship with Russia refashioned the 
relationship under new ideological auspices. It is to be assumed, however, that underneath 
the surface, the old stereotypes remained -  also due to the fact that the old cliches had 
never been critically worked through.
In the Federal Republic, the relationship with the East was shaped under the impression of 
political opposition and pragmatic solutions. The political and educational emphasis turned 
west. Knowledge about the East and its historical relationship with Germany was not of 
primary concern. History lessons in schools hardly dealt with Eastern Europe. Scholars and 
political experts for Eastern Europe remained, but their work was overshadowed by the 
overpowering ideological rift.
To sum up, the German relationship to the East was characterized by ambiguity and 
complexity. Migration and trade led to numerous linkages and exchange. Growing political 
rivalry led Prussian leaders to paint Slavs and Poles in particular as barbarians and nomads, 
inferior to the west. The East was seen as a source of instability and chaos. On the other 
hand, the East -  especially Russia -  was also mystified as having strong spirituality, and 
there was an undercurrent viewing Russia as a ‘land of the future’. After the war, large
402 Thomas C. Fox, "Imagining Eastern Europe in East German Literature," in Germany and Eastern 
Europe. Cultural Identities and Cultural Differences, ed. Keith Bullivant, Geoffrey Giles, and Walter Pape 
(Amsterdam, Atlanta: Rodopi, 1999).
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numbers of refugees and migrants led to a picture (in Germany) in which the East was seen 
as an area of potential emigration.
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4. Conclusions
This chapter has described the problematic territorial identity of Germany. The history of 
the country was characterised by an uneasiness with regard to identity definition: ’Diese 
Unsicherheit in der Bestimmung der deutschen Identitat kontrastiert scharf zum 
historischen Selbstverstandnis von Deutschlands westlichen Nachbarn.’403 Germany or 
rather the successive German states have had many shapes during their history, even if only 
counting from the 19th century onwards (the German Empire, Germany after 1919, 
Germany after 1937, Germany after 1945, Germany after 1989). Going further back, the 
shape of the Holy Roman Empire and all individual German principalities have to be 
considered. This accounts for the fact that there are many diverse historical image of 
Germany in collective consciousness.
Germany’s borders were changeable, most prominently in the East. Looking back on the 
different historical development of the eastern and western frontier, it becomes clear that 
the former commanded much more sensitivity. After WW I, the question of the eastern 
border problem remained unresolved404 and was the object of challenges in the 1930s, 
whereas the Western border was essentially settled after WW I although Alsace remained a 
point of dispute. Therefore, talk about ‘Germany in the borders of 1937’ met with high 
sensitivity with Germany’s eastern neighbours from after WW II until the 1980s. At the 
same time, the eastern border of Germany is much more connected with the above 
mentioned search for a definition of German-ness. Myths abounded about ‘the East’ which 
was wild, uncivilised and threatening. German culture and ‘soul’ was repeatedly defined in 
opposition to Slavic culture and civilisation. Indeed, German claims to supremacy were 
based on an argument of cultural and political superiority to the East.
The eastern border was perceived as protection as well as a moveable object if political and 
military means allowed. Only after WW II did a major change come about. A thorough re­
orientation of the political elites led to the incorporation of principles of territorial stability 
and inviolability of borders into the political culture of Germany. At the same time, the 
claims of refugees from the eastern territories were a constant element of Germany politics. 
The agreement of the political elites was that if a revision of the eastern border had to be 
reached, this was to be with the means of a treaty of both German states. The eastern
403 Schulze, Gibt es iiberhaupt eine deutsche Geschichte? ,18.
404 The solutions found led to sizeable German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
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border was politically recognised and fixed by international law in the process of 
unification. It remains a border with Slavic countries whose political culture and mentality 
are much less known to the majority of contemporary West Germans, especially elites, than 
the West.
Despite the lack of a fixed image of Germany, the stability of borders has become part of 
German consciousness today: the recognition of the Oder-Neisse showed that such an act 
stirred only the emotions of a relatively limited group of former refugees. The recognition 
of the current borders as final is generally accepted. Unification was seen as the end of the 
German question but also the end of territorial instability.
A heritage of German history certainly remains, however. German elites take into account 
the hesitations of neighbours and partners regarding German involvement in territorial 
questions. Any political arrangements which could remind people of the German rule over 
neighbouring countries are approached with great caution. This obviously played a role for 
the Schengen negotiations when dealing with questions of police presence abroad or 
preservation of sovereignty based on territorial integrity.
This short history of Germany as a nation and state as well as of its borders was intended 
as a background to the discussion of the role of borders and border controls at the end of 
the 20th century. It was my intention to show
1. that Germans have long lacked a collective mental map of the country (which the 
French have for example), and that German borders in the East commanded great 
sensitivity,
2. that the stability of borders after WW II has been generally recognised,
3. that German-ness originally referred to a cultural essence rather than a political 
project; the process of the emergence of a German nation-state -  and its borders -  
was therefore connected to the cultural idea of German-ness,
4. that the changes of 1989 not only involved territorial changes for Germany, but 
also stirred concerns of Germany’s neighbours with regard to its future role in 
Eastern Europe as well as the security of its eastern border. France, Great Britain 
and Poland all had major reservations with regard to German unification.
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This chapter shows the interaction of two main strands in the German debate of border 
controls: one was the issue of Germany’s eastern border and the country’s relationship to 
Eastern Europe and the other was the gradual dominance of security concerns in border 
policies. The former was partly resolved in the process of unification. The latter issue was 
crucial in the Schengen negotiations and received new dynamics through the changes of 
1989.
The previous chapter outlined Germany’s historical relationship with its borders. It showed 
a historical uneasiness to fix an image of Germany. This chapter demonstrates how these 
issues became important again in the national debate regarding borders around 1989.
This debate was set in a context which contained a number of challenges. Firstly, the 
German debate before 1989 had left open the legal questions regarding the Eastern border. 
Secondly, the prospect of unification raised old concerns of Germany’s neighbours 
regarding German dominance in Europe and its turn eastwards. Unification pushed for a 
closure of the open question of the Oder-Neisse border -  both due to Germany’s 
international partners as well as due to German legal self-understanding. The disintegration 
of the Soviet Union with the ensuing political uncertainty raised fears regarding possible 
floods of migration and crime. The border debate was also partly conditioned by 
Germany’s commitment to the European integration process. It was active in promoting 
policies furthering market integration and abolishing internal border controls.
German policies regarding borders from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s were faced with 
the challenge of managing a balance between rising numbers of asylum seekers, 
immigrants, organised crime, and great fears on the side of the population about 
unmanageable ‘floods’ of migrants.
The arguments for reinforcing external border controls and abolishing internal border 
controls were dominated by security concerns, thus threats to social cohesion in the form 
of migration and crime. The border was presented as an important barrier and filter, and 
thus indispensable for security provision at the external borders. At the same time, the 
abolishing of internal border controls was justified through the inefficiency of internal 
border controls and the superiority of European cooperation.
Thus, while 1989 opened up a set of questions regarding Germany’s borders, the debate 
regarding the role of the border for security did not change fundamentally. The importance
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of the border in this respect had been emphasised by security professionals since the 
beginning of the negotiations. The opening up of Eastern Europe foregrounded potentials 
threats, however, and thus intensified the debate.
The German debate regarding border controls
1. Actors in German border policies
The following sets out the major players in the policy field of internal security in Germany. 
While there are indeed many actors involved, two institutions have proved crucial for 
devising border policies, also in the context of the Schengen negotiations: the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior and the BGS. They therefore receive more detailed attention in the 
subsequent sections.
1.1. The structure of the policy field regarding border controls
Generally speaking, a policy network consts of various political and social institutions, 
groups and individuals. Majone defines a policy community as ‘composed of specialists 
who share an active interest in a certain policy or set of related policies: academics, 
professionals, analysts, policy planners, media and interest-group experts. The members of 
a policy community represent different interests, hold different values, and may be engaged 
in different research programs, but they all contribute to policy developments by generating 
and debating new ideas and proposals.*405 Den Boer has identified the members of the 
community of European police cooperation to represent a variety of professions (police, 
politics, academia, civil service). As characteristics of the field, she mentions fluctuating 
membership and participation but also a relatively high institutionalisation of the members 
of the policy community, to the extent that the actors have created their own rules and 
procedures.406
Although the German policy community resembled the above description of the European 
one in terms of institutionalisation and the development of particular procedures, it 
differed significantly in terms of participants: The decisive community was largely limited 
to civil servants in the federal ministries, security professionals from the law enforcement 
services and elected politicians who either specialised in internal security or were concerned 
with European integration. Expertise and reference to data played a large role in the 
political debate -  which gave the professional security services and the bureaucrats in the 
Ministry of the Interior important influence. Academics and interest-group representatives 
were nearly invisible in the debate. Only the organisations of expellees from areas now part
405 Cf. Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument andPersuation in the Policy Process (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 161.
406 Cf. den Boer, "The Quest for European Policing: Rhetoric and Justification in a Disorderly Debate."
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of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Russia were very vocal in the debate on the 
recognition of the eastern border of Germany. The media, quality newspapers as well as 
broadsheets and television, also played a role in the debate regarding unwanted foreigners 
and asylum seekers in Germany.407 They mostly highlighted and reinforced a discourse of 
asylum abuse which was present in parts of the population and was voiced by a number of 
politicians. With regard to the Schengen negotiations, media interest was low. Extended 
coverage only took place during the phases of intended and actual abolition of border 
controls. At those points in time, both the advantages for citizens as well as the warnings 
of security professionals were reported.
The debate regarding border controls was framed nearly exclusively in terms of internal 
security. The second part of the chapter will show that it was the arguments of the security 
experts, the bureaucracy and politics that structured the debate so that the influence of 
other actors remained low. A number of organisations such as NGOs, lawyers’ associations 
or courts could have made relevant contributions to the debate, framing it in terms of their 
perspectives, i.e. civil rights (whether based on citizenship or universal), constitutional 
values other than security (liberty to exercise individual rights) or the loss of sovereignty in 
an area which is at the heart of governance. This was not the case, however. They were not 
able to portray the issues of immigration and asylum in a way that they would be perceived 
as potential assets. Instead, the threat posed by ‘imported’ crime and culture was prominent 
in the discussion. In this respect, the institutionalised interests of security experts and 
bureaucracy acted as gate-keepers to the NGOs who were not able to set the agenda. 
NGOs addressing the issue from a perspective of rights were not able to counteract the 
force of the security logic. Thus, the central actors in the national debate were the civil 
servant security professionals on the one hand and political elites responsible for overall 
government in the Chancellery.
For security professionals, the European level held a particular importance. In the national 
bureaucratic negotiations, more weight could be given to an argument by security 
professionals if they felt that a European coalition of experts existed, such as in the topic of 
internal crime and terrorism. The circles of security experts which had been formed from 
the 1970s onwards were supportive in this sense.
407 On this debate, see Heribert Prand, Deutschland - Leicht Entflammbar (Miinchen: Carl Hanser Verlag, 
1994).
-189-
The German debate regarding border controls
The German position in the Schengen Agreements is a result of a specific combination of 
institutional interests, larger political objectives and publicly acceptable demands. It 
represents the consensus on the necessity of measures in a specific political sector in a 
particular historical and political context. Nevertheless, border control policy had to be 
compatible with overall European policy.
Border issues and controls do not generally constitute an element of the public debate. 
Only when major changes are proposed or events catch the eye of the public, do they 
become important issues. Also during the Schengen process, public attention with regard 
to border issues themselves was small. Often, the issues to be decided had a rather 
technical appearance and therefore received little media attention.408 Only major events in 
the policy field attracted the attention of the media and thus also the public. Peaks of 
public attention were therefore the July 1984 French-German Agreement as the first of its 
kind; the German-Austrian Agreement in August 1984; the first Schengen Agreement in 
June 1985; the signing of the Schengen Implementing Convention in 1990; the envisaged 
implementation date for the internal market at the end of 1992; the enactment of the SIC 
in 1995. In between these periods, public attention was relatively low. Some attention was 
dedicated to the repeated postponement of implementation. Even today, the Schengen 
Agreement is relatively little known in the public.409
Although public debate was not focused on the details of the European agreements on 
border policies, keeping the borders tightly controlled and limiting immigration were 
recurrent themes in the tabloid and serious press. Significant rises in the numbers of asylum 
seekers and ethnic Germans in Germany were counted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Attacks on asylum seekers’ homes and ‘different looking’ foreigners became more 
frequent.410 The issue received large media attention, focussing on retracing the numbers of 
asylum seekers in recent years and the abuse of the liberal asylum law in Germany.
Actors arguing for a change of the current system became influential in the time of attacks 
on foreigners. The originally conservative argument that the practice of asylum had to be
408 Bigo makes a similar argument as to why the issues received little public attention. He emphasises 
that while the issues had a technical appearance, the decision to be made were political. Bigo, ed., 
L 'Europe des Polices et de la Securite Interieure, 29.
409 In a quiz show on German tv in 2001 -  thus six years after the start of implementation - , the 
candidate was not even able to identify the name of the agreement which abolished border controls. 
The choice was between Luxembourg Treaty, Maastricht Treaty, Schengen Treaty or Nice Treaty.
410 Cf.Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Auslanderfragen, Daten undFakten zur Auslandersituation 
(Berlin: 2000).; see the table on attacks on foreigners in Germany in the appendix.
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changed to a situation where there would be fewer numbers and less abuse convinced a 
wider public, impressed by the crimes committed against foreigners. The ‘asylum 
compromise’ of 1992, a change of the constitution which limited the right to asylum 
received wide coverage. This legal change also introduced a central role for border control 
in asylum policy. Thus, the -  rather fundamental - changes in border policies were often 
started by concern about other political issues.
It is indicative that no public opinion poll institute conducted a survey regarding fears or 
expectations of the Schengen process of opening internal borders. However, internal 
security surveys existed and they contained illegal immigration and foreigner crime as 
objects of enquiry.411 These showed high concerns for personal security and a limiting of 
the numbers of asylum seekers. It can be stated, therefore, that negotiations of the 
Schengen Agreements happened without much direct public attention or scrutiny while 
issues such as migration and asylum were high on the agenda. Thus opinion-building and 
decision-making was often limited to the political elites.
1.2. Federal Ministry of the Interior
The German constitution grants all legal competence to the Lander unless it has been 
explicitly transferred to the federal level. Art. 73 Nr 5 of the German Basic Law gives the 
federal government exclusive competency over the controls of people and goods at the 
border. Only this explicit mandate gives the federal government the permission to use a 
federal force -  police matters are otherwise the competency of the Bundeslander. In 
Bavaria, a special administrative arrangement of 1975 gives the competence to guard the 
borders to the Bavarian Border Police, the Bayerische Grenzpolizei.412
411 See for example the ipos-surveys commissioned by the Ministry of Interior: "Grofie Zufriedenheit 
mit dem Politischen System und der Demokratie," Innenpolitik, no. VII (1988), "Politik in den Augen 
der Burger," Innenpolitik, no. V (1991), "Zufriedenheit der Burger mit der Demokratie erreicht 
Hochstwert," Innenpolitik, no. V (1990).
412 This is a recognition of the special position of Bavaria already in the German Empire. Bavaria is 
legally equal to all other Lander, but does retain a special status in some respects. For example, the 
Bavarian constitution still confers a Bavarian citizenship -  which is legally void due to the 
overarching German citizenship, but holds symbolic power.
The Bavarian Border Police was founded after the war under the Allied Forces. In 1953, a non­
published administrative agreement was concluded between the federal government and the Bavarian 
government, giving the competence to control passports to the Bavarian Border Police. The 1975 
Agreement clarified the legal situation and accorded all tasks of border control to the Bavarian Police. 
The general interpretation of the legal situation states that the Lander may fulfill these tasks as long as 
the federal level does not legislate to do otherwise. In 1992, a modification of the agreement made 
the BGS responsible for the guarding of the open border line with the Czech Republic and of the 
new Munich airport. C f." Verwaltungsabkommen zwischen dem Bundesminister des Innern und der 
Bayerischen Staatsregierung fiber die Wahrnehmung von Aufgaben des grenzpolizeilichen 
Einzeldienstes in Bayern," 3 July 1975.
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The Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI) in Germany is the central institution charged 
with the provision of security internally. This comprises protection from crime, protection 
of constitution and state, security in information technology and also border controls. The 
Federal Minister of the Interior is charged with supervising the work of the federal border 
guards, the Bundesgrenzschutz. Amongst its other tasks are: responsibility for employees in 
the public sector -  most BGS employees are civil servants -, political education of citizens, 
promotion of sports, aid in emergency situations and policies on asylum seekers and 
foreigners in general. This bundling of tasks indicates not only a conceptual link between 
internal security and border controls in Germany, but also an institutional one.
The Ministry is hierarchically ordered. The organisation is headed by the Minister and the 
Permanent Secretaries (two are Members of Parliament, two are civil servants).413 The day- 
to-day running of the Ministry as well as the supervision of policy proposals are the 
responsibility of the Permanent Secretaries. As so-called political civil servants, they comply 
with the general policy of the Minister. The Permanent Secretaries head the organisational 
units of the Ministry: around 10 units (Abteilungen), around 1-3 sub-units (Unterabteilungen) 
and a number of departments (Referate). With regard to border controls, the BGS unit, but 
also the police unit, constitutional law unit and internal security unit are of special 
importance.414 These were also involved in the Schengen negotiations (the German 
involvement in the negotiations is outlined in chapter seven).
The Minister is part of the cabinet, and appointed and dismissed by the chancellor. In the 
German political system, the competence of the Minister is set within a field of tension: the 
chancellor has the Richtlinienkompetenz, the competence for the general guidelines of policy 
and takes responsibility for overall decisions (Kanzlerprinzip). Within that, each Minister 
leads his or her Ministry independently and under his own responsibility (Ressortprinzip). 
This means that no Minister can design a policy against the express wishes of the 
chancellor. On the other hand, a minister has the right to make basic decisions 
independently and on his own responsibility. It is within this tension of competence that 
policy-making takes place. Given the growing links between the national and the European 
level with regard to border policies, it can be validly supposed that the fundamentals of
413 For a table showing the Ministers and permanent secretaries from 1983 onwards, please refer to the 
appendix.
414 The organisational structure of the Ministry can be found in the appendix.
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interior policy with implications for a European border policy complied with the intentions 
of the chancellor.
With regard to border controls, this policy area remained in the hands of the Ministry until 
European integration interests pushed them onto the European-level agenda. It was then 
that the Chancellery took over until the fundamentals had been agreed. The BMI remained 
closely involved in the process because its expertise was important for the progress of 
negotiations and for safeguarding Germany’s interests.
Summing up, in the German debate regarding borders, the Ministry of the Interior was 
regarded as competent in regard to border controls whereas the chancellery dealt with 
general policies regarding foreigners and migration and defined Germany’s overall interests 
on a European level. With regard to border policies, the BGS has a special role in the 
German political system which will be outlined in the following section.
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1.3. Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Guard)
The following outlines tasks and history of the Federal Border Guard in Germany who 
were an important actor in the national border control debate and centrally involved in the 
Schengen negotiations. The nature and tasks of the BGS have changed considerably over 
time. At its foundation it served as a para-military force with the tasks of border control 
and the countering of any anti-democratic movements -  at a time when the young, semi­
sovereign West Germany was not permitted to have an army. By the end of the 1990s, it 
had changed to a police service with an emphasis on the actual control of borders and 
protection of rail and air traffic.
1.3.1. History of the Bundesgrenzschutz
The development of the Bundesgrenzschutz has to be seen within its historical context.415 
First of all, a ‘federal police’ is an exception to the German constitutional system which 
places emphasis on the primary legal competences of the Lander -  thus making police an 
exclusive Land competence. This was owed to the historical constitution of Germany out 
of many autonomous entities as well as the disastrous experience of centralization during 
the Third Reich. Nevertheless, Germany needed a federal force with powers to guard its 
borders, but also able to fulfil tasks of public order maintenance and territorial defence. 
It thus differs from the French ‘gendarmerie’ which fits with a generally centralized 
administrative and police system.
Secondly, the distinctive features of the BGS owe to its origins in a divided Germany which 
was not permitted to maintain an army. Thus, it was founded in 1951 as a paramilitary 
service. Its task as defined in the first law on the Bundesgrenzschutz was the protection of 
the borders against dangerous disruptions of the public order in an area of up to 30km 
from the border. It was intended to be used against (Communist) infiltrators and partisans. 
In 1953, the the Bundestag raised the initial numbers of personnel from 10,000 to 20,000 
after plans of the government for a genuine federal police had been opposed from Bavaria.
415 For the summary of the BGS history, I have referred to Martin Winter, "Kleine Geschichte des 
Bundesgrenzschutz," Burgerrechte&Polizei 47, no. 1 (1994)., Bundesgrenzschutz, Geschichte (2000 [cited 
2001]); available from http://www.bundesgrenzschutz.de/allgem/chronik/chronik.htm, Wolf-Dieter 
Narr, "BGS - Die Bundespolizei," Burgerrechte & Polizei 47, no. 1 (1994).
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In 1956, the ‘reserve function’ of the BGS for an army became apparent when a changed 
law on the Bundesgenzschutz gave civil servants of the BGS the opportunity to change 
over to the newly formed Bundeswehr. 57% of BGS officers made use of this option. 
Now that it had lost its substitute role for a military, a debate on the use and the future of 
the BGS began. The official explanation given for its continuing existence was given as 
follows: in the case of crisis, the BGS could act as a buffer by its nature of being a police 
force; police would lead less easily to military escalation on the demarcation line; a national 
police service would be needed in the case of an internal uprising. They thus retained a 
para-military function to the extent that they were tasked with territorial defence. This was 
reinforced in 1965 when they were given the status of combatants, making them part of the 
fighting troops in the case of war. At the same time, they also had a more police-oriented 
role in their function of public order maintenance.
A change towards more police tasks occurred with the new law on the BGS (2. 
Bundesgrenzschutzgesetz) in 1973. The protection of the borders remained a central task 
and was complemented with other tasks: support of the police of the Lander in special 
situations; the limitation of the area of service to up to 30 km in the border region was 
lifted. Since the 1970s, this special police of the federal level has acted as a reserve for the 
Lander and they have been present at major demonstrations. In 1976, a law on the 
structure of personnel of the Bundesgrenzschutz completed a process of assimilating the 
structures from military to the ones of police. Education and rank of the BGS were 
assimilated to those of the police of the Lander.
As a result of the planned abolition of EC internal border controls, a planning group 
(Planungsgruppe BGS 2000) was set up in 1987. Its proposals included compensatory 
measures for the loss of tasks at the borders.416 German unification and the disappearance 
of the German Democratic Republic rid the BGS of one of its important tasks and original 
focal points as envisaged at its foundation. The BGS of the former GDR (founded in 1989, 
2,300 personnel) was added to the BGS. A new ‘Grenzschutzprasidium’ East was founded 
with a final number of personnel planned to be 8,300. However, the use of the new 
personnel was at first not possible since all new state employees had to be checked for 
relations with the Staatssicherheitsdienst of the GDR. There was therefore a shortage of 
personnel in the East which had to be compensated with Western personnel.
416 Cf. "Kaum eine Lebensstellung - Der Bundesgrenzschutz auf der Suche nach seinen Aufgaben im 
Jahr 2000," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 1988.
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In 1992, a new law gave the BGS the new tasks of rail and air traffic protection, thus 
emphasising even more police tasks. This necessitated a new organisational structure. The 
services for border controls and the police standby component were integrated into one 
service divided along regional lines. With the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement 
between Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal in 
1995, the controls at the internal borders were suppressed.
As far as the BGS’ tasks go, it evolved from a force against Communist rebels to a reserve 
police of the federal level. Guarding of the borders has always been their explicit task, with 
a special reference to the inner German border. The internal German border, or any 
borders, however, although important symbolically for their tasks, was not a concentration 
point of their forces.
The BGS developed from a service military in nature to one structured like police in the 
course of its history. It can no longer be compared to the Gendarmerie in France or Spain 
since it has lost its military character, both in organisation and in its task. The only 
remaining such task is the use of the BGS in the case of emergency or defence. However, 
there are still policemen of the Lander police who remark on the esprit de corps of the 
service, reminding of military. Diederichs quotes an officer of one of the Lander police: 
T)en BGS einsetzen heifit Aufgabenerfullung um jeden Preis.’ He adds that the units of the 
BGS are little mobile and that they are more focussed on executing orders than problem 
solving and adjusting to the situation.417
1.3.2. Tasks and organisation
The Basic Law and federal laws charge the BGS with important tasks in the area of border 
security and public order maintenance. The duties of the BGS today are specified in the law 
on the Bundesgrenzschutz which has been last revised in 1994.418 Several additional laws 
such as the Alien Act, Asylum Procedure Act and the Air Traffic Law also have regulations 
which describe the tasks of the BGS. These include:419
417 Otto Diederichs, "In welcher Verfassung ist der BGS?," Burgerrechte &Polizei 47, no. 1 (1994): 34f. 
Translation: Using the BGS means fulfilment of tasks at any price.
418 "Bundesgrenzschutzgesetz," Bundesgesetzblatt 19 October (1994).
419 by the year 2000. Bundesgrenzschutz, Bundesgrenzschutz - Federal Border Police.
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- border-police protection of the Federal territory 
railway-police duties
protection against attacks on the security of air traffic
protection of constitutional institutions of the Federal Government and the Federal 
Ministries
duties on the North Sea and the Baltic Sea
- police duties in states of emergency and in the case of defence 
involvement in police duties abroad under the responsibility of an international 
organisation
- support of the police service at the German Parliament
support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protect German diplomatic and 
consular missions abroad
- support of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation in protection and escort 
services
support of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the field of 
radio communication
support of the police forces of the Federal Lander, particularly with large-scale 
operations
assistance in cases of catastrophes or particular accidents including airborne rescue 
services
Organisationally, the BGS is located within the Ministry of Interior. The BGS unit in the 
Ministry consists of two subdivisions, one dealing with general, administrative economic 
and personnel matters, the other with actual interventions, that is principles of 
interventions and leadership, rail and air traffic protection and international cooperation. 
Here, the main policies regarding the BGS, its tasks, organisation and future planning are 
designed. Responsibility for the Schengen negotiations in the Ministry lay within the BGS 
unit, with the Schengen representative and the Department for International and Police 
Cooperation.
The organisational location of the BGS within the BMI has advantages for both the 
ministerial bureaucracy and the service itself. High-level civil servants in the BGS division 
often have practical experience in the service, having headed a regional office or even made 
a whole career of policing. The BGS conducts its work ‘on the ground’ and is therefore the 
prime institution collecting information on the process of border controls, their efficiency
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and needs. At the same time, the dangers and needs perceived can be communicated 
through the hierarchy. The analyses of the high-level bureaucrats will then be the basis for 
further planning. Thus, the BGS unit provides a link between ministerial bureaucracy and 
actual practice of border controls. At the same time, the information given to the Ministry 
is heavily influenced by the perceptions of the BGS, read and analysed also by BGS 
professionals; it therefore tends to emphasise the security-aspect of borders.
The work of the BGS is traditionally divided into two branches or types of work: one is the 
‘Einzeldienst’ which conducts the actual controls of traffic and persons at the border. The 
‘Verbandspolizei* are stand-by federal police responsible for tasks such as protection of 
federal institutions, interventions abroad, and support of the Lander police during 
demonstrations or other major events.
Not much is publicly available about the actual conduct of controls at the border. In the 
interest of secrecy and security, reports and press releases of the BMI remain tight-lipped 
with regard to this topic. Also exact numbers of BGS employees at the German borders, 
particularly the inner-German border, before unification were rarely published. The 
following information was available: a 1986 report of the Ministry of the Interior mentions 
the number of 2,000 officers at the official crossing points of the inner-German border.420 
A 1991 report of the BGS states that of 18,500 members, only 2,100 were employed at the 
borders.421 The year reports specify that by 1998, around 20,000 security forces worked at 
the external borders (12,000 BGS officers, another 2,500 from Bavarian border police and 
water police of Bremen and Hamburg, and 5,500 from the customs service). 12,100 
officers were stationed at land borders, 5,100 on airports and 2,800 at sea borders. 9,300 
worked at the borders with Poland and the Czech Republic (6,200 BGS plus 3,100 
others).422 At the Western frontiers, there were significantly less officers. After Schengen 
implementation, there remained only the number of around 250. However, the BGS 
officially announced a plan in 1997 to increase the number of personnel to around 1,000.423
420 "Der Bundesgrenzschutz erfiillt als Polizei des Bundes verlaftlich seine Aufgaben," 13. In 
comparison: A 1988 report states that the BGS estimates that the CSSR and the GDR had 37,000 
officers at their borders with West Germany. "Eine Schneise in der Landschaft," Innenpolitik, no. VI 
(1988): 9.
421 Bericht der vom Bundesministerium des Innern eingesetzten Arbeitsgruppe zur Neuorganisation des 
Bundesgrenzschutz, 1991, p.l, quoted after Funk, "Les Mythes du controle: la frontiere orientale de la 
Republique Federale d'Allemagne au tournant des annees 1990," 80.
422 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1998," ed. Bundesgrenzschutz 
(Bonn: 1999).
423 Cf. Zeitschrift des BGS , 11-12/1997, p.8 cited after Heiner Busch, "Schengen und die Folgen," 
Burgerrechte & Polizei 59, no. 1 (1998).
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Thus, the reorganisation of the BGS mentioned in the above section on its history led to a 
significant increase of officers at the borders and to an emphasis of work at the eastern 
border.
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2. The changing context to the debate on border controls
The next section will give an account of the more immediate background to the discussion 
of the role of borders at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The 
following will divide the context for a German debate regarding border controls between 
an international and a domestic context. This division is often arbitrary, most visibly with 
German unification. Nevertheless, an attempt is made to differentiate between purely 
domestic issues and those of concern to Germany’s neighbours.
2.1. The border debate before 1989
After the war, West German governments tended to view the situation of the German 
borders as an external given. Politics were concentrated on managing the German political 
position within the given situation. Nevertheless, debates about borders repeatedly came 
up. Problematic were mainly the Eastern borders of Germany. The borders with the 
Western neighbours were charged with less difficulties. Border controls took place, but 
were considered not different from those between other European partners. The progress 
of European integration was linked to a closer relationship between states and constant 
exchange between governments so that borders gradually lost their military role and took 
on mainly administrative tasks. Nevertheless, borders were still regarded as possible lines of 
defence against threats from outside: an example is the order from the 
Bundesinnenminister Zimmermann in 1987 enabling the BGS to conduct AIDS-testing at 
the borders in order to reject infected people at the border.424
The inner German border was regarded as an anomaly. Fixed after World War II by the 
Allied forces, it engendered an ambiguous attitude. On the one hand, it had to be accepted 
as the outcome of the war, on the other hand, the division of the German people was 
considered ‘unnatural’.425 Reference was made to the border between the ‘zones’ 
(Zonengrenze) rather than a state border. This continued also after the building of the wall
424 Cf. "Innenminister irritiert Frau Siissmuth. Aids-Kontrollermachtigung fur Grenzschutz befremdet 
Gesundheitsministerium," SuddeutscheZeitung, 12May 1987, ""Pro Asyl" gegen Aids-Kontrolledurch 
Bundesgrenzschutz," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 12 May 1987, Martin E. Siiskind, "Ein Erlafi, der nichts als 
Schaden stiftet," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 14 May 1987.
425 “Die unnatiirliche deutsch-deutsche Grenze ist dadurch jedoch nicht durchlassiger geworder!” 
(sentence bold in the original) "Der Bundesgrenzschutz erfiillt als Polizei des Bundes verlafilich seine 
Aufgaben."
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when the areas of West Germany on the border were called ‘zone border areas’ 
(Zonenrandgebiete).
Public expectations of unification in the FRG were low. In the after-war period, the 
indefinite postponing of unification was considered the price for the West orientation of 
the Federal Republic. The political developments in the following decades confirmed this 
view. Even in the mid-1980s, when the GDR was in fact already showing signs of 
destabilisation, the general expectation of politicians and citizens alike was still that 
unification would not come for 10-20 years.426
A number of contradictory legal theories attempted to explain the situation and the 
consequences for the validity of borders. Most prominent in West Germany was the 
‘identity theory’ which postulated the identity of each of the German states with the 
German state of 1919 -1845, thus they had ‘replaced’ it. From this theory, the claim was 
derived that West Germany could act independently in legal matters 
(Alleinvertretungsanspruch). The West German jurisdiction, however, long tended to support 
the ‘roof theory’ according to which both German states were sections of the legally 
continuing German Reich, thus arguing that non alone could make treaties on issues 
pertaining to the Reich.
This debate became most relevant in the discussion about the relationship to the former 
German areas east of the Oder-Neisse line. While the refugees from these areas were very 
vocal and attempted to ‘save as much as possible’427 (von Hassel), the Brandt government 
towards the end of the 1960s was ready to negotiate an agreement with Poland in order to 
settle the border question.428 This was part of the new Ostpolitik with the aim of easing the 
tension between East and West. The outcome of these negotiations was the Warsaw Treaty 
of 7 December 1970 which guaranteed the Oder-Neisse line as the Western border of 
Poland.
This did not end the debate, however, since the above-mentioned legal disagreements came 
to bear. Many -  amongst them lawyers and members of parliament - argued that West
426 The Bavarian government facilitated a federal billion credit line in order to help avoid bankruptcy of 
the GDR in 1983.
427 C f." "Soviel wie moglich retten". Spiegel-Interview mit Vertriebenenminister von Hassel.", Windelen, 
"Information oder Propaganda?."
428 "Bonn zu Gesprachen mit Polen bereit," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 20 May 1969, "Gomulka schlagt 
Grenzvertrag vor," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 19 May 1969, Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Deutsche 
Geschichte vom "Dritten Reich" bis zur Wiedervereinigung, 285-88.
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Germany alone was not entitled to act and that only a unified Germany would be able to 
conclude a treaty valid under international law.429 An exchange of notes between the Allies 
and the German government also stated that the FRG could only act for itself. Formally, 
the recognition of the German-Polish border was thus postponed until a peace treaty was 
concluded between both German states and Poland. Also the constitutional court, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, concluded in 1975 that the Warsaw Treaty had not legally 
transferred any territory. Others, however, emphasised that the Warsaw Treaty was a valid 
international treaty and that therefore the Western border of Poland was the Oder-Neisse 
line.430 The remaining uncertainty of the issue was demonstrated also by repeated doubts 
expressed by Polish politicians regarding the intentions of the German government in the 
border question.431
An interesting illustration of the problem was the attempt of the government in 1979 to 
introduce a revised law on VAT which contained a new definition of the domestic area 
comprising only West Germany and West Berlin. Up to that time, the definition of the 
domestic area had referred to the borders of 1937. This proposed change was rejected by 
most of the conservative-led Lander, mostly Bavaria, in the second chamber.432
The sensitivity of the issue can also be shown through a debate in 1981 about the location 
of the German Eastern border in school atlases.433 The compromise found was that the 
current German borders as well as those of 1937 were to be shown. The 1937 line was to 
bear a legend referring to the 1975 Bundesverfassungsgericht rulings on the Treaties with 
the Soviet Union and Poland as well as the continuing responsibilities of the Four Powers 
for Germany as a whole. 434 This debate regarding the location of the Eastern German 
border continued well into the 1980s, as is shown by remarks of Franz Josef Strauss 
emphasing that in his opinion, the ‘Ostvertrage’ were no treaties recognising borders, or by
429 "Verfassungsexperte: Grenzfrage im Osten volkerrechtlich offen," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 25 October 
1983, Windelen, "Information oder Propaganda?."
430 Conrad, "Unbehagen iiber Riihe und Vogel. Warming vor"Auflockerung" von Rechtspositionen in 
der Diskussion um Oder-Neifie-Linie.", "Die deutschen Grenzen aus der Sicht eines Professors fiir 
Volkerrecht," Die Welt, 12 February 1979.
431 see for example "Zweifel an den Bonner Absichten," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 14 October 1985.
432 "Bundesrat lehnt Umsatzsteuernovelle ab," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 7 July 1979.
433 "Von der Schwierigkeit, die deutsche Grenze zu markieren," Die Welt, 10 February 1979.
434 Cf. Baur, "Pochen auf Grenzen von 1937.", ""Der Vorgang fing schon an zu stinken". Bremens 
Bildungssenator Horst von Hassel (SPD) iiber den Streit um die Ostgrenzen in den Schulatlanten," 
Der Spiegel, 6 April 1981, "Der Warschauer Vertrag gilt," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 7 April 1981, "Grenzstreit 
in Schulbuchern beigelegt.", "Pochen auf Grenzen von 1937," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 6 April 1981.
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the debate engendered by remarks of Theo Waigel emphasising that the German Empire in 
the borders of 1937 legally continued to exist.435
2.2. International context
The immediate international context for the Schengen negotiations and changes in border 
policies was mainly influenced through European integration, the destruction of the Soviet 
Union and transformation in Eastern Europe. Another important external element for 
German border policies were concerns of neighbouring countries resulting from German 
unification.
2.2.1. The effects o f1989/1992
The changes of the political landscape in Europe between 1989 and 1992 had crucial 
implications for the international debate regarding Germany’s borders. This section 
outlines the fears of Germany’s allies and neighbours which were opened up through 
unification -  not least of all Germany’s future behaviour towards the east. It then details 
how the closure on the German debate regarding its eastern border interacted with 
unification.
Given that Germany’s history was linked to changeable borders in the past, unification 
opened up old questions for Germany’s partners: on the one hand, there were questions 
regarding territorial claims in Eastern Europe, even a possible replay of history, and on the 
other hand, security problems in the Schengen framework were raised. The months 
between autumn of 1989 and October 1990 were characterised by excitement, but also by 
general insecurities and fears of Germany’s allies and neighbours.
The growing destabilization of the GDR and the process towards German unification 
alerted Germany’s neighbours and created a number of concerns. These concerns were on 
the one hand inspired by the current political and security situation and on the other hand 
by the historical experience of Germany’s expansionist and aggressive policies. They 
centered around a number of issues: disturbances to the global security arrangements, 
Germany’s intention to shift borders or reclaim territory, Germany’s predominance in
435 Doris Kopf, "Theo Waigel: Ich nehme nichts zuriick," Expressy 9 July 1989, "Straufi: Deutschland 
besteht fort in den Grenzen von 1937.", "Straufi: Ostvertrage sind keine 
Grenzanerkennungsvertrage."
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Central and Eastern Europe and the security of the eastern border. Especially the French 
and British leaders used historical comparisons in order to explain their doubts and fears.
France feared a too powerful Germany imposing itself on its neighbours, threatening the 
overall security arrangements in Europe. According to one of Mitterand’s closest advisors, 
Jacques Attali, the French President drew a parallel to 1913 fearing that Germany was 
setting the triple alliance of France, Great Britain and Russia against itself.436 He also 
suspected that the situation after the fall of the wall might lead to a re-awakening of 
nationalism (in Central and Eastern Europe) and that West Germany might eventually want 
to ‘take more’ than just the GDR.437 Apparently, a German government speaker asked in 
Paris at the end of 1989 at a dinner who would deny that Silesia was German territory -  a 
remark which led to talks over months in France.438 There were concerns regarding the 
predominance of Germany in Central and Eastern Europe. Zelikow and Rice quote an 
official from the Quai d’Orsay saying that one had to take care that Germany would not 
again become a hegemonial power.439 According to accounts of the process towards 
unification, Mitterand gradually gave in, realizing that unification could not be avoided. 
French hopes were then linked to binding Germany closer into a network of European and 
Western commitments.440
The security of Germany’s (new) eastern border was equally of concern. Formerly, the 
eastern border of West Germany had been one of the most guarded in the world -  
controlled mostly by the eastern neighbours. After the changes, the border with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia would have to be secured by the government of a unified Germany. Fears 
of migrations from Eastern Europe -  particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union -  
grew more and more important. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the concomitant 
waves of migrants was a further shock to European politicians, creating fears of large 
numbers of immigrants. A report of the French Senate gives voice to the worries which
436 Attali, Verbatim. Chronique des annees 1988 -1991, 363-65.
437 “La situation actuelle est peut-etre plus dangereuse que la precedente. Elle peut mener au reveil des 
nationalites. La RFA, a tres long terme, ne voudra-t-elle pas prendre plus que la RDA ?” Ibid, 341.
438 „Wer will bestreiten, daft Schlesien deutsches Territorium ist?“ Zelikow and Rice, Stemstunde der 
Diplomatic. Die deutsche Einbeit und das Ende der Spaltung Europas (Germany Unified and Europe Transformed), 
291.
Ibid.
440 Attali gives a detailed account of Mitterand’s changing position.
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concerned France, but also other Schengen partners: ‘Les frontiers de la France sont 
maintenant la ligne Oder-Neisse et le detroit de Gibraltar’.441
Great Britain was even more opposed to German unification. Margaret Thatcher saw the 
divided Germany as a result of the war which ought not to be changed. A major concern 
was a Germany which could dominate Europe. The Prime Minister feared a repetition of 
Munich 1938 and that the Germans would get in peace what Hitler did not manage in 
war.442 Attali recounts an incident in which she pointed out Silesia, Pomerania and Eastern 
Prussia on a map, predicting that Germany would take all that -  plus Czechoslovakia.443 
Only when Great Britain realised that German unification could not be prevented (around 
March 1990), did it engage in the process and concentrated on binding Germany into 
NATO.
The United States played a very active role in the negotiations, forging the 2 + 4 process. 
Although Foreign Secretary James Baker referred to the legitimate concerns of Germany’s 
neighbours’444, the US were less concerned about possible territorial claims or expansionist 
policies of Germany. The primary aim was to keep the unified Germany in NATO.
The Soviet Union under Gorbachev remained long opposed to unification of a Germany 
that was to be a NATO member. The Soviet influence in East Germany had been a crucial 
element in post-war foreign policy. Observers of the process assume that the reason 
pushing the Soviet Union to eventually give in had to do with the crisis of the Soviet 
Union, its disintegrating empire and the hopes for economic cooperation -  aid -  with the 
West. Mitterrand’s furious response when he heard of Gorbachev agreeing to German 
unification emphasises the suspected economic incentives for the Soviet leaders’ position: 
‘Qu’est-ce qui prend a Gorbatchev? 11 me dit qu’il sera ferme, et il cede sur tout! Que lui a 
donne Kohl en echange? Combien de milliards de Deutsche Mark?’445
A pre-condition to the allies’ giving in to German unification was the assurance of the 
German government not to extend Nato structures to ex-GDR territory, to offer a
441 Masson and Villepin, "Rapport de la Commission de controle du Senat sur la mise en place et le 
fonctionnement de la convention d'application de l'accord de Schengen du 14 Juin 1985." 
Translation : The borders of France are now the Oder-Neisse line and the Straits of Gibraltar.
442 Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street No. 10 (Diisseldorf, Wien, New York, Moskau: 1993).
443 Attali, Verbatim. Chronique des annees 1988 -1991, 369.
444 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Tatsachen iiber Deutschland, 176.
445 Attali, Verbatim. Chronique des annees 1988 - 1991,416. Translation: What’s got into Gorbachev? He 
tells me he will be firm, and then he gives in on all points! What has Kohl given him in exchange? 
How many billion Deutsch Marks?
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reduction of German forces and last but not least not to link German unification with the 
changing of Germany’s borders.
The problematic of the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border has been already laid out 
above. Recognition only came about under the pressure of the Allies. Ambiguity and 
hesitation on the side of the German government was due to the fact that Chancellor Kohl 
did not see Germany in a legal position to negotiate for a unified Germany, but also due to 
internal political hesitations regarding the interests of refugees.446 Indeed, Helmut Kohl 
refused recognition in a treaty for a long time. In November 1989, he emphasised that he 
could not speak in the name of Germany as a whole. Later, this legal argument was 
supplemented by the argument that raising the question of the Oder-Neisse border would 
reinforce the German extreme right.447
The difficulty of the question of recognition can also be inferred from the fact that there 
was a lively debate in Germany between government and opposition and within 
government which lasted from the autumn of 1989 until the decisive steps for recognition 
were taken.448 As pointed out above, the debate regarding the Oder-Neisse border predated 
the changes of 1989. Already in summer 1989, a heated discussion had been sparked of by 
remarks of Minister Theo Waigel that also the areas east of the Oder-Neisse were part of 
the German question.449 The refugee organisations attacked President Weizsacker for 
admitting that Poles had lived in the former German land for decades now and that the 
German border would not be changed.450 The governments who had opposed German 
unification, fearing a repetition of history and German hegemony in Eastern Europe saw 
themselves confirmed in the German hesitation to recognise the eastern border. While 
European states and the US were afraid that raising the border question would open 
Pandora’s box, they insisted that Germany be very clear about its borders before
446 "Haltung Kohls zur Grenzfrage "zweideutig"," FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, 14 December 1989.
447 Cf. for example Kohl in a conversation with Mitterrand: Attali, Verbatim. Chronique des annees 1988- 
1991, 424.
448 Cf. for example "Bisher Weitestgehende Garantie fur Oder-Neifie-Grenze," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 9 
November 1989, "Haltung Kohls zur Grenzfrage "zweideutig".", EghardMorbitz, "DieMachtfrage," 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 March 1990, Lothar Riihl, "Revision der Grenze zu Polen mit Europaischem 
Frieden unvereinbar," Die Welt, 26 February 1990, Horst Schreitter-Schwarzenfeld, "Taktieren mit der 
Grenze," Frankfurter Rundschau, 8 January 1990.
449 Cf. for example" 'Grenzstreit' Gewinnt Zunehmend an Scharfe," Die Welt, 19 July 1989, Kopf, "Theo 
Waigel: Ich nehme nichts zuriick."
450 Cf. Klaus J. Schwehn, "Vertriebene Werfen von Weizsacker in Grenzfrage Selbstherrlichkeit vor," 
Die Welt, 27 December 1989 1989.
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unification.451 The international pressures for recognition during the unification 
negotiations were so strong that the government decided to move on the issue.452
On 8 March 1990, the West German Parliament decided that after the elections in the 
GDR, a common declaration of Eastern and Western governments regarding the Polish 
border would be made. A treaty with Poland was to be made after unification. The same 
decision also implied that unification would take place according to art. 23 GG. Chief US 
diplomats interpret this already as the de facto recognition of the border because this process 
meant that all international treaties of West Germany would remain valid, thus also the 
1970 guarantee.453 The Kohl government finally recognised the Oder-NeiEe as the German 
eastern frontier on 14 November 1990 in a state treaty with Poland, after pressure from the 
former allies in the 2+4 talks.454
2.2.2. European integration
The developments in JHA as the immediate context for European border policies have 
been outlined in chapter three. In a more general way, the European integration process 
constituted an important background to the negotiations of border controls. Germany’s 
post-war political development was closely connected to European integration so that any 
discussion of unification and German borders necessarily also had a European component.
European integration can be said to have been about Germany from the start. The Cold 
War shut West-Germany off from the East and integrated it into the West. The country’s 
anchoring in the Western international institutions was seen as one of the prerequisites for 
eventual full sovereignty. Furthermore, it has been shown that Germany’s identity has 
become closely linked to a European identity, which is demonstrated by the fact that 
European integration remained a priority for German politicians even after unification.455 
Germany has been one of the motors of European integration in all of its components. 
This includes the development of the common market from which the German industry 
profited significantly. The four freedoms which were outlined already in the Treaties of
451 Attali, Verbatim. Chronique des annees 1988 - 1991, 377.
452 Cf. Timothy Garton Ash, Im NamenEuropas, trans. Yvonne Badal (Miinchen: Carl Hanser Verlag, 
1993), Zelikow and Rice, Stemstunde der Diplomatic. Die deutsche Einheit und das Ende der Spaltung Europas 
(Germany Unified and Europe Transformed). "Amerikanische Kritik an Kohl - Unbehagen iiber die 
Behandlung der Grenzfrage," Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 2 March 1990.
453 Zelikow and Rice, Stemstunde der Diplomatic. Die deutsche Einheit und das Ende der Spaltung Europas 
(Germany Unified and Europe Transformed), 312.
454 Breuilly, "Sovereignty, Citizenship and Nationality: Reflections on the Case of Germany," 58f.
455 Cf. Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration."
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Rome and then to be realised in the Single European Act in 1986 were therefore also in the 
interest of Germany and supported vocally in the EC negotiations which aimed at cutting 
down all barriers. Volumes have been written about the reasons for such a European 
orientation and its durability. Two aspects merit special mentioning in this context: firstly, 
German politicians of all parties felt that a reassurance of their Western partners of the 
reliability of Germany could be achieved only through a long-standing engagement in 
Western Europe. Secondly, Germany’s initiatives in the West European project were used 
by German politicians, most notably Helmut Kohl, to counterbalance other tendencies in 
German foreign policy (cf. the Europol initiative at a time when German attention was 
perceived to be directed inwards or more towards the East.)
European integration received new dynamism around 1985 after the politics of small steps 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Important advancements were: the Fontainebleau 
European Council in June 1984 which agreed to set up two committees for reform; the 
reports of the Adonnino and Dooge Committees (1985)456 aiming at a more efficient 
Europe, closer to its citizens; the Commission White Book for the completion of the single 
market; Jacques Delors’ Presidency of the European Commission which was marked by 
new initiatives in the integration process; the joining of Spain and Portugal in 1986 and the 
signing of the Single European Act. Thus, the debate regarding border policies in Europe 
coincided with a reinforced integration process to which German was committed. It was 
therefore politically difficult in Germany to reject any project which was seen as a corollary 
of European integration. This concerned also the Schengen process.
When negotiations about the Schengen agreements were first started, Germany still had a 
border with the GDR and Czechoslovakia which was most strictly supervised by those 
countries. It was thus the country representing the separation of Europe.
The Agreement of 1990 occurred in a completely changed context. The prospect of 
unification meant an external border with Poland and the Czech Republic and a longer one 
on the Baltic Sea. The end of the Soviet Union also meant the end of a superpower 
conflict, which had had its most likely ‘venue’ and most visible symbol on German ground. 
With regard to borders another thing had changed: after the end of the Cold War, 
Germany and its Western European partners could no longer rely on the neighbouring 
countries to guard the borders, but have to ensure the control of the eastern frontier. At
456 Ad hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs (Dooge Committee), "Report to the European Council.", 
Committee for a People's Europe (Adonnino Committee), "A People's Europe."
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the same time, the binding of Germany into European institutions had become even more 
important for Germany’s neighbours, so that Germany was careful not to give the 
impression of obstructing European agreements.
2.2.3. Demise of the Soviet Union and transformation in Eastern Europe
While German unification was the first ‘shock’ to the mental maps of Germans and all 
other Europeans, the demise of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of its empire 
represented a second one.457 This process equally had consequences on the debate about 
border controls in Germany. The re-establishment of the full sovereignty of central 
European states adjacent to Germany meant a decisive change.
As outlined above, Germany has historically had longstanding, ambiguous relations with 
these areas. The East was on the one hand perceived as an area of opportunity, but on the 
other hand the relationship with the Slavs was complicated since Frederick the Great. The 
policies of the Nazis had made reconciliation an even more distant possibility.
This led to two divergent argumentations which were present in the political scene, with no 
one being attributable to a specific party:
One official argumentation was that business and politics expected to develop links 
with this emerging area and profit from a growing market while at the same time 
supporting the democratic and stable development of the region.
- The other argument was careful to take into account the concerns of both Western 
and Eastern neighbours that Germany aimed at regaining its old ‘sphere of 
influence’ by expanding economically there.
In Germany, there was concern that these countries often had to establish completely new 
legal, political and economic structures in order to cope with the -  often brutally quickly -  
imposed changes to a market economy. There was great interest in Western European 
states to ensure that these structures guaranteed not only economic access for themselves 
but provided a stable political system. Security concerns of this kind were manifest in many 
speeches given at the time. The reform of administration in these countries was therefore 
encouraged not only by Germany, but also the whole of the EU.
457 The break-up of Yugoslavia might also be viewed as such a shock to the system. Both with regard to 
the fact that a war took place on the EU’s ‘doorstep’ and that large numbers of refugees had to be 
accommodated in EU countries (the majority of which in Germany).
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It has to be added that these central European countries were comparatively unknown to 
West German institutions and politicians. Post-war relations had been maintained, but 
compared to relations with Western partners, bureaucratic and economic exchanges had 
been limited and often blocked. Expertise of culture, of habits of people and 
administration, of structures and responsibilities was scarce in the former West Germany. 
East German experience existed, but was not always helpful since the basic structures in 
these countries had changed and the higher civil servants from East Germany were 
compromised. Attempts were made to quickly set up contacts with the newly independent 
states, which was most successful with the nearest neighbours, the Visegrad countries. 
Nevertheless, the transformation process was difficult to judge in terms of its stability and 
progress.
Germany was keen to develop economic ties with these countries. Investment by German 
companies was encouraged and supported by the German government. Economic interests 
in developing the markets in Eastern Europe also demanded that controls at the borders be 
limited in order to reduce the long waiting times at the borders. At the same time, these 
countries’ governments were anxious not to be shut out of Europe with new visa 
requirements. This was in conflict with Western concerns about security and stability of 
these countries and led to lengthy negotiations regarding visa requirements.
In terms of practical changes, the fully established rights of travel allowed a great number 
of citizens from Eastern Europe to come to Germany and vice versa. The motives of these 
journeys ranged from interest in the unknown West to the hope to find work, even if 
underpaid, in the rich zone in the West. Soon, however, visa restrictions were imposed on 
Poland and other countries. Only after the negotiation of Agreements which provided for 
Poland and other European states to take back undesired immigrants458, were the 
restrictions lifted. Germany was one of the advocates for lifting visa restrictions for Poland 
and Hungary, partly for economic reasons, partly for reasons which were connected to the 
role that these countries had played in the revolution of 1989/90.
To sum up, the political changes of 1985-1991 had significant implications for the 
discussion of borders and border controls in Germany. During that time, European 
economic integration pushed for an abolition of border controls. In 1989/1990, one of the
458 Agreement Schengen States -  Poland: March 1991
Agreement with Romania in September 1992; with Bulgaria in September 1994; with Macedonia and 
Croatia in April 1994 and with the Czech Republic in November 1994.
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most fiercely controlled borders in the world disappeared, charging Germany with the 
obligation to guarantee the security of the new external border of the Union. Finally, the 
end of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of the sovereignty of central European 
states had contradictory implications: the developments opened up a ‘new world* -  
politically, culturally and economically -  to West European states, especially Germany. At 
the same time, the open borders towards the East became associated with unforeseen 
consequences for Europe: it was seen as an opening for immigration and crime coming 
across the borders.
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2.3. Domestic context
The domestic context in Germany also changed significantly between 1985 and 1995 -  
with consequences for the debate on the role of borders.
2.3.1. Consequences of unification
German unification was politically the fulfilment of a long-pronounced intention -  but 
completely unexpected. The constitutional set-up of West Germany was such that the 
divided German state had been regarded as a temporary solution. Unification remained a 
goal for political elites, although no one believed that unification would come so quickly. 
When Chancellor Willy Brandt enacted the new Ostpolitik, he was accused by his political 
opponents for stabilising the GDR. Brandt himself retained unification as a goal but 
admitted that he had given up speaking about it.459 This was a widespread feeling amongst 
German political elites. It is demonstrated by the fact that even in 1988 Helmut Kohl 
doubted whether he would live to see German unification.460
The unification of Germany was seen by German politicians as ending the ‘German 
question’. Helmut Kohl stated repeatedly that the unified Germany would take the same 
political position as the former West Germany and confirm the borders.461 Germany’s 
borders after 1990 were recognised to be final. The former objectives of ‘Germany in the 
borders of 1937’ were no longer important in the political ‘mainstream’ of the conservative 
parties. Nevertheless, Chancellor Kohl had strong domestic political concerns with regard 
to refugee organisations and the extreme right. He feared that bringing up the recognition 
of the Oder-Neisse border would be an incentive to revisionist demands or give support to 
the extreme right voicing demands for territories beyond the border. For this reason, he 
tried to delay recognition for an extended period. However, when the Oder-Neisse border
459 Interview with Willy Brandt, U.S. News and World Report, 29 December 1969, cited after Ash, lm  
Namen Europas, 201.
460 Zelikow and Rice, Stemstunde der Diplomatic. Die deutsche Einheit und das Ende der Spaltung Europas 
(Germany Unified and Europe Transformed), 103.
461 For example, Helmut Kohl in conversation with Mitterrand: “Une Allemagne unifiee aura la meme 
position que la RFA sur le nucleaire et sur les frontiers; l’Allemagne unifiee confirmera les frontiers.” 
Attali, Verbatim. Chronique des annees 1988 - 1991.
A remaining question was the timing of the recognition of borders, whether it should be linked with 
unification and in which legal form (unilateral declaration or treaty) this should be done. Kohl’s 
hesitation on recognising the Oder-Neisse line raised suspicions.
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was finally recognised the influence of refugee organisations was shown to be of little 
significance.462
The integration of the new Lander into the old Federal Republic brought with it a number 
of economic and social tensions. Economic and monetary unification took place on 1 July 
1990, thus predating the decision of the GDR ‘Volkskammer’ for accession in August. It 
had become clear that independent economic existence of the GDR was unfeasible. The 
change from a planned economy to a functioning system of social market economy was a 
hitherto unprecedented process. The old export markets of the GDR were disintegrating 
and the preconditions for a new economic order had to be established. The reconstruction 
included privatising state enterprises and property, installing a new communication and 
transport infrastructure, improving the quality and efficiency of production, restructuring 
agricultural businesses and ensuring the development of a new landscape of science, 
research and development tuned to business interests. Also a new administrative and legal 
system had to be established. The re-building of the Eastern Lander was largely modelled 
on West Germany. Hopes of civil rights campaigners at the ‘Round Tables’ during the 
revolution for an alternative construction were disappointed.
Until 1997, the state invested or ‘transferred’ around 1000 billion DM from West to East.463 
In order to finance the enormous sums needed for the re-building of the Eastern Lander, a 
solidarity tax (5,5% - 6,5% of income tax) was levied. Despite all these efforts and an 
effective rise in economic activity and investment in the East, the discrepancies between 
East and West remained. Wages in the East remained lower (ca. 77% of Western wages in 
1997) and also productivity lagged behind.
The economic union and re-building effort coincided with the onset of a recession in 
1992/93. The economy grew slowly in the early 1990s and even shrunk in 1993 by 1,1% of 
GDP.464 Unemployment rose steadily in both East and West until 1997, but the East was 
hit much more. In 1997, the overall unemployment rate for Germany was 11,4% with the
462 There were, of course, remaining problems with the ‘Sudeten Germans’ who keep claiming rights in 
the Czech Republic. They even influenced the bilateral German-Czech treaty negotiations via their 
influence in the CSU. Problems remained also with regard to German minorities in Rumania and 
Poland. Concerns regarding unification remained in the population. However, it would be very 
difficult to link the success of the German extreme right during elections in the early 1990s to 
particular concerns regarding recognition of borders.
463 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Tatsachen iiber Deutschland.
464 See table on GDP in Germany in the appendix.
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situation particularly grave in the East. Whereas 16,7% were unemployed in the Eastern 
Lander, the rate was relatively lower in the West with 9,8%.
The economic problems did not correspond to the expectations of citizens. Although few 
people had actually believed that ‘unification will not cost citizens anything’ (Chancellor 
Kohl), the actual difficulties came as a surprise. Social tensions between East and West 
emerged. The citizens of the new Lander were generally disappointed with the slowness of 
equalisation of living standards; unemployment became a grave problem and young people 
began to move West. There was a growing feeling that the East was being ‘bought out’ by 
Westerners in the process of privatisation. Some Westerners felt that the solidarity tax was 
alimenting Eastern lack of innovation. Stereotypes of lazy Easterners and ‘Besserwessis’ 
became common.465
The building up of administrative structures in the East also proved a challenge. On the 
one hand, the former Eastern employees had to be trained in the Western administrative 
and legal system. On the other hand, state employees of the former GDR were discredited. 
All future civil servants had to be checked for connections to the secret service, a process 
which took time. Western civil servants proved reluctant to move East so that a number 
had to be transferred by order to fill the gap or encouraged with financial or career building 
incentives.
This was also true for the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS), the service responsible for controlling 
the border. Until 1989, European integration meant essentially Western integration. After 
the transformations, many policy areas which had hitherto been approached with a purely 
Western perspective had to be reassessed. The former inner German border had been 
heavily guarded while the border with Poland had been subject to relatively little controls. 
Thus, there was a lack of personnel in the East with experience of surveilling the eastern 
frontier. Even less was there personnel who had been trained to implement Schengen 
standards in the East. The BGS West therefore had to supplement the new BGS East, a 
process which met with considerable disenchantment from Westerners.466
After the changes of 1989, German attitudes towards the East remained ambiguous: on the 
one hand, German elites were still trying to re-orientate themselves and took care not to
465 *Besserwessis’ is a pun referring both to Westerners thinking that they were ‘better’ as well always 
knowing everything better.
466 Cf. for example "Unruhe wegen neuer Kollegen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 December 1990.
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alienate European partners through a marked turn eastwards. On the other hand, Germany 
itself saw itself as a bridge to the East. Especially the representatives of ethnic Germans 
emphasised this.467 German politicians referred to Germany’s historical role in Eastern 
Europe as well as the commitments resulting from unification when commenting on 
German engagement in Eastern Europe. This was echoed also be German business 
representatives: ’Aber wir konnen mit aller -  auch aus finanziellen Grunden -  international 
gebotenen Bescheidenheit als wichtiger Impulsgeber fur die Revitalisierung der 
osteuropaischen Wirtschaft dienen und insofern unsere historische Rolle 
wiederaufnehmen.’468 Sometimes, the activities were played down as ‘merely’ Germany’s 
geographical function.469
The economic interests of Germany in Eastern Europe must not be underestimated. Also 
political influence was sought through economic support -  the ability to influence the 
process of democratization and thus stabilization in the eastern neighbours was deemed 
important. It would be incorrect, however, to interpret this engagement as an attempt of 
Germany to reach a renewed hegemonial position in Eastern Europe.
Unification meant that Germany emerged as a state in the centre of Europe with a big 
economy and the largest population in Europe. The end of the German question led to a 
territorially stable state. German unification brought with it the practical changes of the 
disappearance of the most fiercely guarded border in Europe, of new, sensitive, external 
borders to guard, of the need of qualified personnel in the East. It also brought with it 
social and economic tensions. The next section will outline the rise of immigration, another 
factor which was interpreted to contribute to social tensions.
2.3.2. Rise of immigration
The border question was intricately linked with rising numbers of migrants in Germany. 
The specificity of the German system meant that migration into Germany was only
467 Cf. "Wir sind ein Briickenvolk. Rufilanddeutschen-Sprechen Wormsbecher und Staatssekretar 
Waffenschmidt iiber die Deutschen in der GUS," Der Spiegel, 10 May 1993.
468 Amerongen, Der Weg nacb Osten. Vierzigjahre Bruckenbau fur die deutsche Wirtschaft. Wolff von 
Amerongen was a leading German entrepreneur, member of the East Committee of German 
Industry, President of the German Association of Industry and Commerce and represented the 
German government inofficially in Eastern Europe. Translation: But we can, with all internationally 
imperative modesty -  also for financial reasons -  serve as an important impulse for the revitalisation 
of the East European economy and in that take up again our historical role.
469 A good example is also here Wolf von Amerongen, the former chief economic negotiator for 
Germany with Eastern Europe. Ibid.
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possible as a recognised refugee who was granted asylum, or as a so-called ethnic German. 
An exception was the migrant worker (Gastarbeiter) initiative of the 1960s and 1970s, which 
invited foreign workers for a temporary, but in principle unlimited period to stay in 
Germany. This led to a substantial group of immigrants in Germany, the largest of which 
was Turkish one, followed by (former) Yugoslavs and Italians.470 Acceptance of migration 
to Germany was reserved and when a recession hit Germany in the early 1980s, a general 
feeling of crises prevailed that transformed into fears and aggressions against foreigners. 
One reproach was that foreigners (especially the Turks) were taking away employment and 
that most asylum seekers were abusing the system.471
Asylum seekers came to Germany in growing numbers472 during the 1980s. Politicians 
accused them of using the German asylum law for economic reasons as an entry ticket to 
the supposed ‘social paradise5 Germany.473 Rising numbers of asylum seekers led to an 
increased discourse regarding the ‘flood5 of immigrants and the abuse of asylum law. 
Gradually, asylum policy came to symbolise for many Germans their disenchantment with 
immigration as such.474 The eventual result of this development was the change of the 
German law of asylum in 1992. At the same time, ethnic Germans began to migrate back 
to Germany in greater numbers. Encouraged by the German government, people of 
German descent living in the former Soviet Union, Romania and other areas, came to 
Germany. Numbers began to decline only in the mid-1990s when the German government 
tightened the administrative guidelines according to which the right to a German passport 
was granted.
Taken together the numbers of asylum seekers and ethnic German immigrants, 2,2 million 
people from former Communist states migrated to Germany between 1988 and 1992.475
470 According to official figures, Turks represented 28,8% of all foreigners in Germany in 1998, people 
from the Republic of Yugoslavia 9,8%, Italians 8,4% and Greeks 5,0%. See for example Beauftragte 
der Bundesregierung fur Auslanderfragen, Bericht iiber die Lage derAuslander in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Bonn: 2000).
471 Cf. Winkler,Derlange Wegnach Westen.Deutsche Geschichtevom "DrittenReich"hiszur Wiedervereinigung, 
371.
472 see below. A table and figure in the appendix are also provided.
473 German Minister of the Interior Zimmermann, cited in Herbert, GeschichtederAuslanderpolitik in 
Deutschland, 267.
474 „’Asylpolitik’ wurde vielmehr fiir viele Deutsche zum Symbol fur den bis dahin vielfach noch 
zuriickgehaltenen Verdrufi iiber die Zuwanderung iiberhaupt, iiber die vermeintliche Privilegierung 
anderer und die sozialen Schieflagen im Gefolge der Wirtschaftskrise der friihen 80er Jahre generell." 
Ibid, 269f.
473 Ibid.
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The following chart compares numbers of asylum seekers and ethnic German immigrants 
and shows that ethnic Germans represented the majority of newcomers in most years:476
Year All Asylum seekers ‘Aussiedler’
1986 142,438 99,650 42,788
1987 135,902 57,379 78,523
1988 305,749 103,076 202,673
1989 498,373 121,318 377,055
1990 590,136 193,063 397,073
1991 478,107 256,112 221,995
1992 668,756 438,191 230,565
1993 541,487 322,599 218,888
1994 349,801 127,210 222,591
1995 345,835 127,937 217,898
The issue of immigration of ethnic Germans and the difference made between ethnic 
Germans and other immigrants indicates the problematic of German citizenship and 
territorial boundaries of ‘Germanness’: the ethnic Germans comprised two categories of 
people: Germans of former German Eastern territories who were denied exit during the 
refugee waves after the end of WWII and people of German descent who had kept some 
link with German culture. In many cases (until the tightening of preconditions for 
immigration), these potential immigrants did often not speak German fluently.
In the 1970s, the German government had made great (financial) efforts to enable the 
immigration of ethnic Germans.477 Before 1987, migrants had mainly come from Poland, 
thus former German territories. After that, the numbers of ethnic German migrants to 
Germany from Eastern Europe began to rise. In the late 1980s, the number of emigrants 
from the Soviet Union and Rumania grew significantly in comparison with Polish
476 Source: Bundesministerium des Innern, "Das Bundesministerium des Innern. Informationen zu 
Aufgaben und Bilanz, Organisation und Geschichte.", Herbert, GeschichtederAuslanderpolitik in 
DeutschlandDietrich Thranhardt, "Germany's Immigration Policies and Politics," in Mechanisms of 
Immigration Control A Comparative Analysis o/Eumpean Regulation Policies, ed. Grete Brochmann and 
Tomas Hammar (Oxford: Berg, 1999). See also the charts in the appendix for German asylum seekers 
up to 2001 and those comparing numbers of asylum seekers in European countries.
477 For example a substantial loan was given to Poland (2.3 billion DM) which was conditioned on exit 
permits; also sums between 20.000 -  100.000 DM were paid to ‘buy free* people from Rumania.
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emigrants. Between 1986 and 1988, the number of ethnic German immigrants 
quintupled.478
The acceptance of such ethnic Germans touched upon the roots of ‘Germanness’ with 
political elites and the public. Leading politicians kept up the post-war definition that ethnic 
Germans were those people of German descent who had declared themselves for 
Germanness (Deutschtum) in their home country. For example the Parliamentary State 
Secretary Spranger emphasized that ethnic Germans were Germans with equal rights and 
that it was a national and moral duty to help them.479 However, it seems that this view had 
not been retained by the German population. Indeed, at least parts of the population 
regarded these immigrants -  often alien to contemporary German language and culture -  
as foreigners who were accorded unfair privileges.480
Experts showed that the German population tended to have a confused concept of the 
term foreigner, which included everyone not obviously German in language and culture, 
thus also ethnic Germans.481 Commentators argued that the political campaign of the 
conservative parties against asylum seekers over years, using continuously terms like 
‘breaking of a dam’, ‘glut of foreigners’, ‘floods of refugees’ had brought the public 
discussion to a head. The result was the votes for right-wing parties in 1989 and 
resentments also against the ethnic Germans, originally priviledged by the conservative
„ 482parties.
To some extent, the German development with regard to immigration is paralleled by most 
other industrialised states. For reasons spelt out above, most governments saw the 
regulation of immigration as ‘an essential element of their sovereignty.’483 Rogers shows 
that ‘the trend in host countries has been towards increased controls,’484 including 
introduction of quotas, safe third country rules, voluntary repatriation and efforts to keep 
migrations ‘at home’. The difference of the German position has to be seen in 
fundamentally different concepts of national identity from countries such as Great Britain, 
France or the US. German identity after the war did not include integration and
478 For a detailed analysis see e.g. Herbert, Geschichte der Ausldnderpolitik in Deutschland.
479 Deutscher Bundestag, "102. Sitzung," (Bonn: 26 October 1988).
480 See for example Herbert’s analysis who also gives examples from the German press reports of the 
time: Herbert, GeschichtederAuslanderpolitik in Deutschland.
481 Mannheimer Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in: "Im Jahr 2000 ein tiirkischer Kanzler," Der Spiegel, 13 
February 1989.
482 Heribert Prantl, "Die Saat geht auf: Auslanderhafi," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 8 February 1989.
483 R. Rogers, "The Politics of Migration in the Contemporary World," International Migration 30 (1992).
484 Ibid.
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assimilation of foreigners. Indeed, one lasting concept in German policies regarding 
foreigners was the concept of ‘locals’ versus ‘foreigners’.485
Thus, the goals of immigration policy did not correspond to reality in Germany. The 
history of work migration into Germany started during the last century, continued with 
migrant workers in the first decade of this century and was then resumed after the war with 
the ‘Gastarbeiter’.486 The issue of the ‘Gastarbeiter’ shows the discrepancy between public 
discourse, perceptions and political reality. When the migrant workers were first invited to 
come to Germany in the early 1960s, they were to stay for an agreed, limited period of 
time. The reality was, however, that the Gastarbeiter who had made a home in Germany 
and become part of German society (whether integrated or not), did not go back and could 
not be sent back. As Max Frisch commented: Germany recruited guest workers and got 
human beings.
In reality, Germany has been a country of both immigration and emigration. Flows in and 
also out of Germany were a constant. However, a percentage of foreigners remained in 
Germany permanently. Miinz and Ulrich show that the positive migration balance between 
1954 and 1999 was around 9 million (of which 6,7 million foreigners and 2,3 million 
Germans).487
As migration expert, Prof. Klaus Bade, asserts: Germany had become a country of 
immigration by the early 1980s at the latest.488 Bade states that immigration into Germany 
was administratively practised but never became a socio-political or conceptual topic. The 
security needs of the population and the interest in votes of politicians led to an open 
political disinterest in the topic (‘demonstrativem politischen Desinteresse’).489 Bade even 
cites the thesis that the immigration situation in Germany in the 1980s was only 
manageable because its existence was denied politically in the formula of T)eutschland ist 
kein Einwanderungsland’.
485 Cf. Klaus J. Bade, "Immigration and Social Peace in United Germany," Daedalus 123, no. 1 (1994).
486 Also the integration of large numbers of German refugees from the East could be included into this 
category. They all had to be integrated into German society and required enormous efforts of 
population and administration. Since they were ‘Germans’, came as refugees and had no choice but to 
stay, however, they are not considered work migrants officially.
487 Rainer Miinz and Ralf E. Ulrich, "Migration und zukiinftige Bevolkerungsentwicklung in 
Deutschland," in Migrationsreport 2000, ed. Klaus J. Bade and Rainer Miinz (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 
2000), 25.
488 Klaus J. Bade, "Zuwanderung und ihre Folgen" (paper presented at the Konferenz: Strategien zur 
Integration von Zuwanderern im internationalen Vergleich, Stuttgarter Schloft, 23 - 25 June 1999 
1999).
489 Ibid.
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To sum up, a rise in numbers of asylum seekers and ethnic German immigrants was part of 
the background against which the debate regarding border policies in Germany took place. 
The deep-seated distinction between Germans and ‘others’, symbolised through the 
German law of citizenship, made it possible for political elites to uphold a doctrine of no­
immigration while the political reality was much different.490
2.3.3. Rise of transnational crime
The rise of international crime was a source of disquiet to many people and served both as 
a background to and argument in the debate regarding border controls.
The fight against crime in general was high on the agenda for German citizens as surveys 
around the turn of the decade indicate.491 The surveys give no indication of a particular 
concern with regard to crime committed by foreigners. However, high percentages of 
foreigner offenders (ca. 30%) compared to their percentage of the population (around 8 %) 
were certainly a point of concern for the law enforcement services and also the population 
in general.
In parallel, international crime was found increasingly to target Germany. Since there was 
no criminal offence as such termed ‘organised crime’, the definition of this social- 
psychological, political as well as criminal phenomenon proved difficult. In Germany, a 
definition of organised crime for the purposes of law enforcement was only found in 1990. 
It included the elements of more than two people associating in order to commit crimes
490 In the meantime, the debate in Germany has changed considerably. Not only has a new citizenship 
law altered the old principle of ius sanguinis to one where immigrants can attain German citizenship 
after a certain period of residence. Several commissions (inner-party, cross-party) - amongst them the 
most prominent ‘Siissmuth Commission’ - have been called together to discuss the future of 
immigration in Germany. Some of these commissions have clearly emphasised that Germany is a 
country of immigration and furthermore, that it needs immigration for economic and demographic 
reasons and that immigration ought to be viewed as a positive value, both culturally as well as 
economically. The work of these commissions has also ended with a ‘myth’ that immigration -  once 
publicly admitted -  would be uncontrollable. The proposals for a new law of immigration 
(Zuwanderungsgesetz) accepts the necessity of (managed) migration for Germany. At the same time, 
the law mixes conceptually the categories of asylum seekers and other migrants (while retaining the 
legal difference).
491 Cf. "Grofte Zufriedenheit mit dem Politischen System und der Demokratie.", "Politik in den Augen 
der Burger.", "Zufriedenheit der Burger mit der Demokratie erreicht Hochstwert."
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using business structures and violent means or influence of politics, media, judiciary, 
administration or business.492
According the experts on organised crime, Germany was seen as unattractive for organised 
crime until the early 1980s due to the efficiency of its police and justice system as well as 
general awareness of politics and business against illegal deals.493 During the 1980s, 
Germany apparently became a target of organised international crime -  little observed by 
the public and also the law enforcement services. Reports show that Germany first became 
an area of rest, but then also turned into an area of operation.494
It was mainly the law enforcement services who came to emphasise the existence of 
organised crime in Germany during the 1980s. Raith says that there existed a hard 
controversy with regard to the existence of crime between German politicians, the public 
and police.495 Studies with regard to organised crime only began to emerge after the mid- 
1980s, most notably at the end of the decade.496 One important stepping stone was a study 
conducted by the Federal Criminal Police Office, begun in 1985, published in 1988.497 It 
was found that although there was no unifying model for organised crime in Germany, 
there were networks of criminals working in urban centres as well as organisations aiming 
at Germany from abroad. They were working in the areas of drug dealing, economic crime 
or blackmailing protection money. The study also predicted a steady rise of organised crime
492 Individual Lander or experts had suggested definitions before. The discussion of police experts began 
in the 1970s.
The working definition in Germany was coined by a common working group of police/judiciary and 
adopted by the conference of interior ministers in 1990:
“Organisierte Kriminalitat ist die von Gewinn- oder Machtstreben bestimmte planmaflige Begehung 
von Straftaten, die einzeln oder in ihrer Gesamtheit von erheblicher Bedeutung sind, wenn mehr als 
zwei Beteiligte auf langere oder unbestimmte Dauer arbeitsteilig a) unter Verwendung gewerblicher 
oder geschaftsahnlicher Strukturen, b) unter Anwendung von Gewalt oder anderer zur 
Einschuchterung geeigneter Mittel, c) unter Einflussnahme auf Politik, Medien, Offentliche 
Verwaltung, Justiz oder Wirtschaft zusammenwirken." Bundeskriminalamt, "Strafverfolgung bei 
Organisierter Kriminalitat," 3.
493 „Bis Anfang der achtziger Jahre gait die Bundesrepublik unter Mafia-Bossen, aber auch bei den 
Oberhauptern fernostlicher Unterweltgruppen als wahrer Horror: Die Polizei hatte den Ruf grofier 
Effizienz und moderner Ausstattung ..., die Gerichte schienen unbeugsam, die Geamten weithin 
unbestechlich, das Unternehmertum aufmerksam gegeiiber unsauberen Kunden.“ Werner Raith, 
Organisierte Kriminalitat (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1995), 28.
494 Cf. Konrad Freiberg and Berndt Georg Thamm, DasMafia-Syndrom (Hilden/Rhld.: Verlag Deutsche 
Polizeiliteratur, 1992).
495 Raith, Mafia - Ziel Deutschland, 41.
496 Bundeskriminalamt, ed., Organisierte Kriminalitat in einem Europa durchldssiger Grenzen, 
Bundeskriminalamt, "Strafverfolgung bei Organisierter Kriminalitat.", U. Dormann et al., Organisierte 
Kriminalitat - wiegrofi ist die Gefahr? (Wiesbaden: 1990), Butz Peters, DieAhsahner - Organisierte 
Kriminalitat in der Bundesrepublik (Rowohlt: Reinbek b. Hamburg, 1990), Raith, Mafia - Ziel Deutschland, 
Rebscher and Vahlenkamp, Organisierte Kriminalitat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, U. Sieber and M. 
Bogel, Logistik der OrganisiertenKriminalitat (Wiesbaden: 1993), E. Weschke and K. Heine-Heifl, 
Organisierte Kriminalitat als Netzstrukturkriminalitdt (Berlin: 1990).
497 Rebscher and Vahlenkamp, Organisierte Kriminalitat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
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in the near future.498 This report was followed by media attention to the attempts of police 
to fight organised crime.499
At the beginning of the 1990s, law enforcement services began to realise that ‘organised 
crime is a fact’ (President Zachert of the BKA in 1990),500 but also that there was no 
complete picture indicating the quantitative extent of organised crime. This was partly due 
to the structure of organisations of organised crime, but also due to lack of studies. Only 
from 1991 onwards did the Bundeskriminalamt start to construct so-called analyses of the 
situation (Lagebilder) aiming to give an overview of the situation and structure of organised 
crime. The first report of 1991 is not public. It is important in the context of the Schengen 
process because it refers back to data up to 1987. According to Freiberg and Thamm, the 
report states that nearly half of all proceedings against the bandwidth of organised crime 
during that time had an international dimension and that about half of all suspects were 
non-German citizens.501
Especially the Italian mafia was represented as a threat, gradually building up networks in 
Germany and infiltrating the restaurant business. In 1987, Dagobert Lindlau published a 
bestseller about the activities of ‘the mob’ in Germany, warning of organised crime and the 
Italian Mafia in Germany.502 The book has been repeatedly criticized as superficial and 
sensational, but is said to have had the effect of pointing Helmut Kohl’s attention on the 
problematic.503 Together with the 1988 BKA report, these publications apparently 
prompted Chancellor Kohl to his European FBI initiative in 1988.504 One of the problems 
was that once Lindlau’s mistakes had been exposed, the impression of a ‘scam’ with regard 
to the Mafia-scare remained, lessening the attention of political elite to the topic in general, 
says Werner Raith.505
498 Ibid.
499 Cf. for example the report on a journey of the head of the Land criminal office to the FBI: "Mafia 
und Cosa Nostra - eine Dienstreise wert," Suddeutsche Zeitung,, 7 October 1988.
500 Bundeskriminalamt, "Strafverfolgung bei Organisierter Kriminalitat."
501 Freiberg and Thamm, Das Mafia-Syndrom.
502 Lindlau, Der Mob. Recherchen zum Organisierten Verbrechen. The book was also followed by a series of 
articles in the Spiegel magazine. "Die Macht der Syndikate," Der Spiegel, 29 February 1988, 
"Milliardenbranche Stehlen & Hehlen," Der Spiegel, 14 March 1988, "Rauschgifthandel," Der Spiegel, 21 
March 1988, "Schutzgelderpressung," Der Spiegel, 7 March 1988.
503 Werner Raith: „Das Buch“, sagte mir der Leiter einer Fortbildungsveranstaltung fur Fahnder in der 
Abteilung Organisierte Kriminalitat in Essen Anfang 1989, „hatte allerdings einen Effekt. 
Bundeskanzler Kohl hat es in die Hand genommen und seine Leute angewiesen, doch ml 
nachzusehen, ob das alles tatsachlich so schlimm ist, wie Lindlau schreibt." Die Folge war eine Flut 
von Hearings in den Landtagen. Raith, Mafia - Ziel Deutschland, 37.
504 Cf. den Boer and Wallace, "Justice and Home Affairs. Integration through Incrementalism?."
505 Raith, Mafia - Ziel Deutschland, 38.
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After 1989, the risk analysis underwent an important transformation towards Eastern 
European threats. In the situation reports of organized crime of the BKA of the beginning 
of the 1990s, the largest groups of non-German suspected criminals were: Turks (around 
15 %), Italians (5 - 6%), ex-Yugoslavs (ca. 6%)506 and Poles (between 3 and 5 %).507 It was 
predicted that East European organized crime would increasingly target the West 
European market.508
One instance which caught the eye of the German public in particular was the theft of cars 
which were then transferred into the East.509 Already in 1989, the year report of the BGS 
mentions the occurrence of such thefts, pointing out that this category of crime was taking 
on characteristics of organised crime. According to the BGS, in 1989, high-quality cars 
were mainly smuggled to the Near East and the US, while diesel cars had Eastern 
European countries as their destination.510 Subsequent reports show a gradual shift of the 
destination countries to Eastern Europe for all kinds of cars although also the Near East 
remained a market. The economic damage was considerable: for 1992, the BGS fixes the 
damage by car crime at over 1 billion DM. Around 60.000 cars disappeared permanently in 
that year.511 Compared to that the numbers of cars retrieved at the border appear small:512 
In 1991, 353 cars were retrieved, in 1992 725; the number of retrieved cars rose to 1334 in 
1995, but remains small compared to the dimension of disappeared cars.513 The highest 
rates of retrievals were at the eastern border control stations in Frankfurt/Oder. In 1993, 
71% of all rediscovered cars were taken in there.514
506 These were Macedonians, Montenegrans and Serbs. In 1992, Bosnians, Croates and Slowenes 
represented another 2,6 % of suspects.
507 Bundeskriminalamt, "Lagebild der Organisierten Kriminalitat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1992," (Wiesbaden: 1992), Bundeskriminalamt, "Lagebild der Organisierten Kriminalitat in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1993," (Wiesbaden: 1993).
508 „Durch den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Zusammenbruch der osteuropaischen Staaten hat sich 
der Druck der Organisierten Kriminalitat aus diesen Landern auf den westeuropaischen 
Wirtschaftsraum verstarkt. Diese Entwicklung wird sich in den nachsten Jahren mit steigender 
Tendenz fortsetzen." Bundeskriminalamt, "Lagebild der Organisierten Kriminalitat in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1993."
509 Observers think that this had a huge psychological impact since this was a crime which could hit 
everyone and hurt many Germans at a particularly vulnerable point: their car.
510 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1989," ed. 
Bundesgrenzschutz (Bonn: 1990).
511 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1992," ed. 
Bundesgrenzschutz (Bonn: 1993).
512 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz-Jahresbericht 1995," ed. Bundesgrenzschutz 
(Bonn: 1996).
513 See the appendix for a table of the retrieved cars.
514 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1993," ed. 
Bundesgrenzschutz (Bonn: 1994).
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It was thus during the 1980s that the perception of danger of international crime rose in 
Germany. While during the mid-1980s, the international dimension of crime was beginning 
to be perceived as a possibility, it was only towards the end of the decade and the 
beginning of the 1990s, that transnational crime became a manifest problem. The changes 
in Eastern Europe and the opening of Western Europe towards the East as well as 
progress in international communication and transport were identified to be connected to 
the increase in numbers of crimes.
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3. Arguments for changes of border policies
This section presents the central arguments used by domestic actors to justify the changes 
in the border control regime in Germany and explores the rationale behind these 
arguments. Contrary to the actual development in terms of migration and organised crime 
spelt out above, this section explores the perceived threats and arguments in the debate 
regarding border controls.
Both the arguments used for justifying changes and the measures suggested retained a 
strong connection to the border itself. The justifications referred to the filter and security 
function of the border which would be endangered either through the uncontrollable rise 
of external phenomena (crime and immigration) or through the abolition of border 
controls themselves. Thus, the phenomena which the debate highlighted as reasons for 
changes of border control policies were both (at least partly) outside the control of German 
politics (international crime and migration) and also a result of a development which 
Germany itself had promoted (European integration).
What is common to all arguments is that they identify a possible threat to German society. 
The compensatory measures suggested were a political reaction to counteract that threat. 
They were constructed to ensure that the security function of the border be re-enacted on a 
different level. Some of these were directly border-related, others transferred the control 
and security function of the border to other areas (spatial control, police cooperation).
Three lines of arguments will be presented which advocated the changes to border policies 
which appeared in the Schengen agreements and other European agreements on border 
controls. One was the loss of the security function of the border at internal borders, 
another was the border as a barrier, a third one was the inefficiency of border controls. The 
first argumentation was mainly advocated by security forces and saw compensatory 
measures as important but not able to completely replace the loss of the security function. 
The second and third argument was found to be presented by politicians and tended to 
point to the superiority of compensatory measures.
The following presentation of the arguments in the German debate reflects the relative 
weight of the arguments themselves. The part on the security function of the border and 
fears of uncontrolled immigration and crime is rather long and it also took up the largest
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part of the inner-German debate. The issues of the border as a barrier to state authorities 
was mainly advocated by police forces and sometimes the Ministry of the Interior and took 
up less space. The least publicised argument was that of the existing inefficiency of border 
controls and the subsequent possibility to suppress them.
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3.1. The security function of the border
3.1.1. The border as a filter and the threat of a security deficit
One important line of arguments for reinforcing external border controls and 
implementing complementary measures was the loss of the security function at internal 
borders of the Schengen area. The central security aspects concerned were the fight against 
crime and immigration. According to security experts, the so-called filter-function of 
borders was lost through the abolition of internal border controls. Compensatory measures 
in the shape of high standard external border controls, police cooperation, a common 
information system and a common visa regime were therefore deemed necessary.
The security function of the border held a prominent place in the argumentation of security 
experts of the police, but also a of number of politicians in the area of internal security.515 
The state secretary of the Chancellery and Schengen representative Waldemar 
Schreckenberger:’ [Es gibt] Befurchtungen, daft mit dem Wegfall der Grenzkontrollen, die 
bisher auch eine wichtige Sicherheitsfunktion haben, die Sicherheit gefahrdet, zumindest 
aber eingeschrankt wiirde.’516
The police also tended to emphasise the security function of borders. Bernd Walter, a 
director in the BGS identified the importance of borders as filters and funnel. He conceded 
that border controls were no insurmountable barrier to criminals, but that their strategic 
value was crucial: ’Grenzkontrollen sind zwar im Regelfall kein liickenloses und 
uniiberwindbares Hindernis fur Straftater, bilden jedoch strategische Linien mit Filter- und 
Trichterwirkung, die bei Schwerpunkt- und Alarmfahndungen schnell und verzugslos 
aktiviert werden konnen.’517 Similarly, the President of the Bavarian Landeskriminalamt 
confirmed the importance of the border due to the positive results of the border police, 
which made 60% of its drug finds at the border. ‘Auch heute ist der Sicherheitswert der 
Grenzkontrollen nicht als gering einzuschatzen. 60 % der polizeilichen Fahndungserfolge 
werden an den Grenzen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erzielt. Uber 60 % der
515 See for example "Ein Sicherheitsfilter," Der Spiegel, no. 12 (1989), "Wichtiger Sicherheitsfilter soli 
bleiben - Gegen "freie Fahrt fur Rechtsbrecher",1' Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 21 April 1989.
516 Prof. Dr. Waldemar Schreckenberger, "Europaischer Binnenmarkt undlnnere Sicherheit,” Europaals 
Auftrag, no. 5 (1989): 1. Translation: There are fears that security is threatened or at least restricted by 
the loss of border controls which have had an important security function so far.
517 Bernd Walter, "Interpretationen und Tatsachen. Staatsgrenze - Kontur oder Limes," Kriminalistik, no. 
1 (1994): 51. Translation: Border controls may not be a complete and insurmountable obstacle for 
criminals, but they represent strategic lines with the effect of filter and funnel which can be activated 
quickly and without delay for investigations with a special emphasis or urgency.
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Rauschgift-Sicherstellungen finden an den Grenzen der Bundesrepublik s t a t t s o  dass die 
Filterfunktion der Grenzen nach wie vorzu bejahen ist.’518
Horst Eisel, formerly at the BMI, emphasises a second aspect of the security function of 
the borders: the mere presence of border guards acts as a preventive measure. ’Die 
Grenzsicherung entfaltet schon durch ihre Prasenz preventive Schutzeffekte.’519
Given this importance of border controls, it was argued that the impending abolition of all 
internal border controls would led to a security deficit. Compensatory measures were 
needed in order to preserve security at least partly. This was emphasised in nearly every 
contribution to the debate by the Bundesgrenzschutz, the Federal Ministry of Interior and 
politicians.520 Here an example by the President of the BKA: ’Der bevorstehende Abbau 
der Grenzkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen der Schengener Vertragsstaaten zum 1.1.1993 
und die Einfiihrung des EG-Binnenmarktes mzchen Ausgleichsmafiriahmen erforderlich, um 
die entstehenden Sicherheitsdefizite moglichst gering zu halten.’521
Edmund Stoiber, Minister of the Interior in Bavaria at the time, made a similar connection 
between abolition of border controls and compensatory measures: ”Die Innenminister der 
Lander haben daher festgestellt, daft der Wegfall der Grenzkontrollen erst dann vertretbar 
ist, wenn alle im Schengener Durchfuhrungsubereinkommen festgelegten 
Ausgleichsmaftnahmen realisiert sind.”522
518 Hermann Ziegenaus, "Sicherheitsdefizite der Grenzoffnung - Kompensationsmoglichkeiten," 
Politische Studien 43, no. 326 (1992): 39. (Emphasis in the original)
519 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: Border security provides preventive security effects 
already by its presence.
520 for example: "Europa ohne Grenzen - eine sichere Gemeinschaft," Innenpolitik, no. I (1990), Hans 
Neusel, "Bericht des Bundesministeriums des Innem fiber Ausgleichsmaftnahmen zum Schengener 
Abkommen," ed. Bundesministerium des Innern (Bonn: 1989), "Offnung der Grenzen erfordert neue 
Formen der Kriminalitatsbekampfung.", "Scharfere Kontrollen an deutschen Ostgrenzen," Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, 28 June 1993, Schreckenberger, "Europaischer Binnenmarkt und Innere Sicherheit.", Standige 
Konferenz der Innenminister und -senatoren der Lander, "Beschlufiniederschrift iiber die Sitzung der 
Standigen Konferenz der Innenminister und -Senatoren der Lander am 14. April 1989 in Koln," 
(Bonn: 1989).
521 Hans Ludwig Zachert, "Der neue kriminalgeographische Raum in Folge der Offnung des 
Binnenmarktes," Politische Studien 43, no. 326 (1992): 32. (Emphasis in the original). Translation: The 
impending loss of border controls at the internal borders of the Schengen treaty states on 1.1.1993 
necessitates the introduction of compensatory measures in order to keep the security deficits as small 
as possible.
522 Stoiber, "Bekampfung der Organisierten Kriminalitat," 19. (Emphasis in the original). Translation: 
The Ministers of the Interior of the Lander have determined that the abolition of border controls is 
only justifiable when all compensatory measures of the Schengen Implementation Convention have 
been realised.
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The link between the importance of border controls and heightened security has been 
subjected to criticism. Monica den Boer points out that one argument against this logic 
might be that international crime has spread in the past despite the existence of borders.523 
This argument may be encountered by the fact that the mere numbers presently involved 
make the border a necessary element in the fight against organised crime. If, however, 
border controls were not successful in stopping the spread of international crime when 
there was a relatively small number and when the number of travellers on the whole was 
less, how could border controls fulfil this function now?
According to the negotiating security experts, the high standard of controls at the external 
borders and the other additional compensatory measures ought to be able to be replace the 
filter function of the internal borders. However, the additional compensatory measures 
taken by individual countries such as Germany, France or the Netherlands 
(‘Schleierfahndung,’524 national police cooperations) point to the fact that individual 
countries were not convinced that the external borders alone could ensure the security 
function.
The emphasis on the filter function of the border also gives no indication as to which kinds 
of criminals are detected at the border.525 If it is mainly the ‘small fish’ that are caught in the 
net at the border, then the border cannot be termed to be an effective instrument in the 
fight against organised international crime, as most experts do. The security function of the 
border which does remain in this case is a relative success in the fight against smaller crime. 
This, too, would contribute to a feeling of security of the population. The connection 
between the filter function and the fight against international organised crime, however, is 
not cogently shown by the security experts.
3.1.2. Immigration and international crime -  fears of uncontrollability
Rather than any military threat, as had still been the case during the Cold War, an 
uncontrollable influx of international criminals and immigrants represented another main 
threat. This was partly due to the experience of high numbers of asylum seekers and ethnic 
Germans coming to Germany during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The presence of ‘too
523 den Boer, "The Quest for European Policing: Rhetoric and Justification in a Disorderly Debate."
524 ‘Schleierfahndung’ is a word describing a method of control and is best translated with ‘dragnet 
controls’. The first part of the word means veil, the second investigation.
525 Cf. den Boer, "The Quest for European Policing: Rhetoric and Justification in a Disorderly Debate."
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many’ foreigners was feared and resented by some social groups while at the same time, the 
official German-foreigner distinction clung to ius sanguinis.526
The argument used in Germany paralleled the one also used by Germany’s Schengen 
partners: a loss of internal border controls would make the movement of criminals, 
terrorists and their goods uncontrollable and lead to a loss of the filter function of those 
individual state borders which were also internal borders of the Union. Strict controls at 
the external borders to be done by the partner states were to ensure that all elements 
endangering internal security in the Schengen area were apprehended either when entering 
or leaving.
Thus, the identification of international crime (including terrorism) and immigration as a 
threat to German society predated the political changes of 1989. The recipes found in 
compensatory measures were by no means only conditioned by the changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In 1987, the Minister of the Interior Zimmermann emphasised that 
neither terrorism nor other kinds of crime could at the moment be fought without using 
borders for investigation.527 In 1988, for example, - coinciding with the first studies on 
organised crime in Germany - the Minister urged to find appropriate measures for the 
fight against international organised crime before it became firmly established in Germany. 
These criminals would be the first to make use of a Europe without borders. The 
Bundesgrenzschutz was to play a crucial role in containing them.528 The President of the 
Bundeskriminalamt, Hans Ludwig Zachert, emphasised that even before the abolition of
526 Another topic of foreigner policy which led to nervous reactions was the discussion in 1985/6 
whether the 1963 association agreement with Turkey gave Turkish citizens a right to free movement 
and to work in the EC-countries. The prospect that a stream of Turks would come to Germany 
caused concern in ministries and the public. Cf. Herbert, GeschichtederAuslanderpolitik in Deutschland. 
Even the liberal newspaper Die Zeit argued that the instinct of man caused him to stay with ‘his own’ 
and if foreigners came, they at least ought to accept the language, culture and values that they found 
in the country. Zeit-editor Theo Sommer spoke of a dam which had hitherto kept Anatolia’s poor 
away and which would now break. Theo Sommer, "Vertragsbruch oder Dammbruch," Die Zeit, 19 
July 1985.
527 „... wie Minister Zimmermann betonte ... konnten derzeit weder Terrorismus noch andere 
Kriminalitatsformen ohne Grenzfahndung effektiv bekampft werden." "Mehr Einsatze als je zuvor," 
Innenpolitik, no. H/III/IV (1987): 9.
528 Es kommt “nach den Worten Zimmermanns darauf an, ein geeignetes Bekampfungsinstrumentarium 
zu entwickeln und umzusetzen, ‘bevor sich die organisierte Kriminalitat bei uns einnistet’, denn diese 
Form des Verbrechens werde am schnellsten alle Vorteile eines grenzfreien Europas zu nutzen 
wissen“. Friedrich Zimmermann, "Grundsatzrede zur Inneren Sicherheit - Bekampfung der 
Organisierten Kriminalitat wird verstarkt," Innenpolitik, no. VI (1988).; see also Zimmermann’s 
statements at the annual presentation of the BGS report "Der Bundesgrenzschutz - ein wichtiger und 
verlafilicher Partner im Sicherheitsverbund," Innere Sicherheit, no. 1 (1988).
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border controls, international criminal organisations for smuggling and drug dealing had 
rooted themselves in Europe.529
After 1989/90, the same logic was applied, in Germany as much as in other Schengen 
states. The necessity of compensatory measures and strictness of external border controls 
was emphasised even more. Both international crime and immigration remained of concern 
and were closely associated with uncontrollability. These changes in Eastern Europe had 
the effect of alerting German society to a possible threat, making Schengen and national 
compensatory measures acceptable, and involving German authorities much more closely 
in the security provision, namely at what was seen to be a problematic eastern border.
Immigration remained a major concern in Germany although the emphasis changed. The 
political changes in Eastern Europe were identified as origins of new threats to Germany 
and Western Europe.530 The predicted enormous numbers of immigration as well as 
international crime were linked to the closeness to Eastern Europe, the political instability 
of the region and economic disparity between East and West. The attraction of Germany 
due to its successful economic and legal system, political stability, geographic position and 
social welfare were taken as a given.531
The reasons for the threat emanating from the East were identified in detail by one of the
leading experts of the BGS, Markus Hellenthal in the dissolution of police structures and
the partial loss of the state monopoly on violence in Eastern Europe. He furthermore
pointed to the difficult economic situation in Eastern Europe and the economic disparity
to Western Europe as an incentive for crimes directed against Western Europe:
Die Bedrohung der Inneren Sicherheit Deutschlands und Europas insgesamt hat 
durch die politischen Veranderungen in den mittel- und osteuropaischen Staaten, die 
Ablosung der friiher dort vorhandenen auch polizeilichen Strukturen (so 
verabscheuungswiirdig diese auch waren), der (sic!) wirtschaftlich grofitenteils auflerst 
schwierige Situation und die sich daraus verscharfenden Disparitaten zu den 
westeuropaischen Staaten sowie der immer unbeschrankteren Freiziigigkeit innerhalb 
ganz Europas eine neue Dimension erreicht.... Das besonders Bedrohliche daran ist 
die zunehmende Organisiertheit des Verbrechens und die in Osteuropa zum Teil 
bestehende Gefahr einer jedenfalls partiellen Aufterkraftsetzung des staatlichen 
Macht- und Gewaltmonopols.532
529 Cf. Zachert, "Der neue kriminalgeographische Raum in Folge der Offnung des Binnenmarktes."
530 see for example Stoiber, "Bekampfung der Organisierten Kriminalitat."
531 Cf. Ibid.
532 Markus Hellenthal, "Die aktuelle Entwicklung der illegalen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland 
insbesondere mit Blick auf die Schleuserkriminalitat und andere Felder der grenzbezogenen 
Organisierten Kriminalitat und die Gegenmaftnahmen des Bundesgrenzschutz in seiner neuen 
Organisationsstruktur," DiePolizei 85, no. 1 (1994). Translation: The threat to the internal security of
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Germany’s geographic position was perceived as particularly problematic in this respect. Its 
direct neighbourhood to the transition countries or rather countries whose democratic 
stability and development was perceived as unclear in the early 1990s was interpreted to 
mean a special exposure to crime emanating from the East. One common statement was 
that Germany had moved from a situation at the fringe of Europe to the centre of Europe. 
’Durch die politische Entwicklung in Europa hat sich die Situation Deutschlands von einer 
Randlage in eine Mittelpunktlage verwandelt’.533
Also public awareness changed after 1989. The rise of numbers of asylum applicants and 
ethnic Germans coincided with great preoccupation of the population. Political statements 
with regard to immigration and social policy predicted enormous numbers of immigrants 
to Western Europe and Germany. The threat of millions of Russians and other Central and 
Eastern Europeans moving to Germany also went through the media at the end of 1990, 
creating fears and a lively debate.534 The articles referred to the image of refugee ‘treks’, and 
the movement of masses of people which could not be checked. This was repeated at the 
height of the ‘asylum-campaign’ in 1991/1992 when articles problematised the topic of 
migrants and mentioned the danger of uncontrollable masses of people emigrating from 
the Soviet Union: ‘Was wird, wenn Gorbatschow die Grenzen offnet und 8 bis 10 
Millionen Russen kommen?’535
A director of the Bundesgrenzschutz in the Grenzschutzprasidium East joined the experts 
who predicted uncontrollable immigration from the East: T)ie Migrationsbewegung aus 
Osteuropa -  ausgelost durch den Sog der europaischen Wohlstandsstaaten -  kann alsbald 
Dimensionen annehmen, die weder mit grenz- noch mit allgemeinpolizeilichen Mitteln zu
Germany and Europe as a whole has reached a new dimension through the political changes in 
central and East European states, the replacement of the former police structures (as despicable as 
they may have been), the economically mostly extremely difficult situation and the worsening 
disparities to west European states as well as through the ever more unrestricted freedom of 
movement in Europe internally. (...) The especially threatening aspect is the growing degree of 
organization of crime and the danger of at least a partial repeal of the state monopoly of power and 
violence in parts of Eastern Europe.
533 Stoiber, "Bekampfung der Organisierten Kriminalitat."; Zachert, "Der neue kriminalgeographische 
Raum in Folge der Offnung des Binnenmarktes." Translation: Through the political development in 
Europe, the situation of Germany has changed from a margin position to a centre position.
534 " 'Igor Ante Portas'. Die Bundesrepublik braucht eine rationale Einwanderungspolitik," Die Zeit, 14 
December 1990, "Massen-Treck verhindern," Abendzeitung, 14 December 1990, "Sowjetdiplomaten 
warnen den Westen vor Millionen Zuwanderern," Frankfurter Rundschau, 6 December 1990. This 
continued into the late 1990s: Peter Schmitt, "Noch zwei Millionen 'Rufilanddeutsche'," Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, 9 January 1999.
535 "Die Asylanten-Katastrophe. Morgen auch bei uns?," Bild-Zeitung, 14 August 1991. Translation: What 
will happen if Gorbachev opens the borders and 8 to 10 million Russians come (to us)?
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steuern sind.’ He goes on to cite an expert: ’Experten rechnen fur die EG-Lander in den 
nachsten Jahren mit einem Wanderungsschub gewaltigen Ausmaftes.’536
Illegal immigration -  which is by definition uncontrolled -  was therefore one of the major 
points of concern both in the year reports of the BGS, as well as in the commenting 
articles. The numbers given by the BGS refer to those persons who were caught when 
crossing the border illegally. From these numbers, the BGS infers an enormous number of 
immigrants who succeeded in entering the country illegally for purposes of asylum 
applications. Markus Hellenthal cites the estimate of more than 300,000 illegal immigrants 
in 1994.537
A link was made between illegal immigration and asylum seekers. Since Germany’s legal 
arrangements do officially not allow any immigration,538 the great number of asylum seekers 
in Germany at the beginning of the 1990s was portrayed as an abuse of the liberal system 
by people who were in fact economic migrants and not politically persecuted individuals. 
The low numbers of recognition of asylum applications were taken as an indication that 
many of these people did not have a right to apply to the German system.539 Immigration 
of economic migrants with the purpose of applying for asylum was therefore considered 
illegal.
The fears in parts of the German population regarding migration to Germany found their 
sad climax in the attacks against asylum seekers’ homes and assassinations of foreigners. 
The table in the appendix shows that the years 1992/1993 saw a marked rise of attacks 
against foreigners.
After the change of the law of asylum, illegal immigration for the purposes of asylum 
became an offence against foreigner’s law. The concept of ‘safe third countries’ stipulated 
that an asylum applicant should have applied in the first safe state he went to. Germany
536 Walter, "Interpretationen und Tatsachen. Staatsgrenze - Kontur oder Limes." Translation: The 
migration movement from Eastern Europe can -  caused by the maelstrom of the European welfare 
states -  soon take dimensions which cannot be controlled by means of border or general police. 
Experts predict for the EC states a migration thrust of massive extent.
537 Hellenthal, "Die aktuelle Entwicklung der illegalen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland insbesondere 
mit Blick auf die Schleuserkriminalitat und andere Felder der grenzbezogenen Organisierten 
Kriminalitat und die Gegenmafinahmen des Bundesgrenzschutz in seiner neuen 
Organisationsstruktur."
538 For the ‘unofficial’ immigration see below in the assessment of the arguments.
539 See the numbers of recognition of asylum seeker in Germany in the appendix.
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being surrounded by states considered safe (also in the East), there was no reason to cross 
the border. Applications could therefore be rejected for being ‘manifestly unfounded’.
Generally speaking, the eastern frontier was represented as much more problematic than 
European internal frontiers. Both the border with Poland and with the Czech Republic 
were entry points for illegal immigrants.540 Here, the borders with Poland lost in their 
problematic in the time of reference, mainly due to good cooperation with Polish border 
police. A 1993 cooperation agreement with regard to the effects of migration movements 
seemed to be successful.541 The border with the Czech Republic remained a focal point of 
illegal entry.542
The reports do mention, however, illegal entry at internal borders of the EU as well.543 In 
the year reports of the BGS, this receives attention only since around 1994. The numbers 
of the mid-1990s were very small, however. For 1994, for example, illegal entries over the 
Schengen border amounted to 161 -  as against around 31.000 at the external borders. 
During the early 1990s, the emphasis of attention was clearly on the eastern border.544
Fears of large numbers of foreigners which could not be integrated were also conjured up 
by exaggerated figures. Even if they were later contradicted, the effect of an impression of 
large numbers of people waiting to immigrate remained. Prof. Klaus Bade draws attention 
to the exaggerated reports on future immigration in a situation of little political direction at 
the beginning of the 1990s:
The pressure of immigration from the outside grew into a “new mass-migration”, an 
“invasion of the poor,” and “onslaught on Europe,” and was frightfully exaggerated 
in sensational reports by the media and in widely distributed horror publications. The 
fear of foreigners grew accordingly, in an immigration situation without guidelines.545
540 The year report of the BGS of 1991 states that 88% of all illegal entries happen via the Polish and 
Czech borders. Since July 1991, a reinforced control pattern is enacted due to the migratory 
‘pressure’. Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 
1991," ed. Bundesgrenzschutz (Bonn: 1992).
541 Pressemitteilung zur Jahresstatistik des BGS 1998.
542 Pressemitteilung - Grenzpolizeiliche Feststellungen 1999.
543 Towards the end of the 1990s, the Austrian-German border is portrayed as the second concentration 
point of illegal entry after the German-Czech border. The explanation given in the press release is the 
Kosovo crisis which has prompted people to attempt to enter Germany via Italy and Austria.
544 According to a source in the Federal Ministry of Defence, the illegal entries over the internal borders 
surpassed in some months those of the external borders for the first time.
545 Bade, "Immigration and Social Peace in United Germany." Bade cites three examples: Manfred 
Ritter, Sturm aufEuropa:Asylanten undArmutsflikhtlinge. Drohteineneue Volkerwanderung? (Munich: von 
Hase &Koehler, 1990).; Jan Werner, Die Invasion der Armen: Asylanten und illegaleEinwanderer (Munich: 
von Hase & Koehler, 1992).; cf. Beate Winkler, ZukunfisangstEinwanderung (Munich: C.H.Beck, 1992).
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This attitude of painting a threat in potential immigration has thus to be seen in connection 
to the German debate of asylum and foreigner policies at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
conservative parties aimed to reform the right of asylum. A political campaign by the 
Christian union parties took place between 1990 and 1993 which aimed at a change of 
asylum law. The central argument of the campaign (supported by the Bild-Zeitung and the 
Welt am Sonntag) was that the majority of asylum seekers were defrauders attracted by the 
rich social system.546 The result was a subsequent tightening of immigration possibilities for 
ethnic Germans (conduct of the recognition process abroad, stricter examination of 
entitlement) and the introduction of a new migration compromise in December 1992 (safe 
third country regulation for asylum seekers, war refugees were granted temporary rights to 
stay, not asylum, introduction of quotas for ethnic German immigrants).
However, the painting of foreigners as possible abusers of the German system backfired. It 
found a resonance with socially disprivileged groups. The presence of growing numbers of 
ethnic German immigrants and asylum seekers, mainly from Eastern Europe, put a strain 
on the social system, but also on people’s willingness to accept such large numbers of 
foreigners. The strongest hostility was to be found in the social groups which rivalled 
directly with the immigrants on the labour and housing market.547 An incident in August 
1991 when a ship with thousands of Albanian refugees arrived in the Italian city of Bari 
caused reactions near to panic in Germany. The Bild-Zeitung predicted similar situations in 
Germany if politicians did not act.548
The problematic definition of ‘Germanness’ and the difference between public discourse 
and the perspectives of the population also contributed to disenchantment. The debate 
stirred up anti-foreigner sentiments which even led to brutal attacks. Parties at the extreme 
right on the political spectrum capitalised on this development and phrased sayings such as 
‘Das Boot ist voll’ (The boat is full) in order to indicate that they would refuse to tolerate 
any more immigration to Germany. Their remarkable election results around 10% in 1991 
showed the state of uncertainty of voters.
546 The debate suggested that a clear distinction could be made between ‘real’ asylum seekers and fraud 
which in reality was difficult. The argument about ‘swindlers’ in the face of low rates of recognition 
(see appendix) had become possible only because legal changes and decisions had at times even 
excluded the threat of torture as a reason for asylum. For a detailed account of the debate: Herbert, 
Geschichte der Auslanderpolitik in Deutschland.
547 Cf. Ibid, 277.
548 "Die Asylanten-Katastrophe. Morgen auch bei uns?."
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The general German dictum Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland’ which predates the 
changes of 1989,549 was also used as an argument of an immigration policy of strict controls 
at the borders and the turning back of non-legitimate immigrants.
Actual numbers did not correspond to these predictions. While experts still predicted an 
uncontrollable wave of immigrants in 1994, the numbers of refugees to Germany had 
stabilised and were even beginning to sink.550
The media participated in this discourse by reporting widely on abuses of the German 
system of asylum, on the huge numbers of asylum seekers and the privileges they obtained 
and the low recognition rate of applications. Broadsheets, TV and the serious mass media 
were part of this discourse, albeit with different emphasis. Often, the reports simply 
consisted in enriching the figures from the year report of the BGS slightly, or repeating the 
security arguments used by the BGS or politicians of internal security.551 The factual reports 
tended to emphasise the problems in guarding the eastern borders.552 However, there also 
was a critical discussion of the border regime. For example, the Siiddeutsche Zeitung often 
had commentaries which aimed at taking policies at the eastern border out of the purely 
security-oriented discourse and put them into a more general political context.553
Also the fight against cross-border crime remained an important justification for changes in 
border control practices, albeit now with a shift of emphasis in the threat from 
international crime in general to a threat from the Eastern neighbourhood of Germany. 
Fijnaut has pointed to the fact that Germany was particularly concerned by international 
crime: ‘One should not lose sight of Germany’s central geographical position on the 
European continent; this position means that Germany -  much more than any other State 
in western Europe -  takes part in the problems of (international) crime and crime-fighting
549 "Minister Zimmermann: "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland"," 
Innenpolitik, no. DC (1986).
550 See tables and figures on asylum seekers in Germany in the appendix.
551 "Grenzschutz hindert 30 000 Auslander an illegaler Einreise," FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, 30 August 
1995.; "Ostgrenzen besser sichern," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 6 October 1993.; "Bonn will Ostgrenzen 
besser sichern," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 9 June 1993.; Ralf Hiibner, "Das Tor nach Osten steht 
sperrangelweit offen," Neue Zeit, 25 August 1992.
552 "Nur langsame Annaherung entlang der Neisse," Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, 7 September 1993, "Polen 
befurchtet steigende Belastung," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 2 July 1993, "Scharfere Kontrollen an deutschen 
Ostgrenzen."; Michael Ludwig, "Schlepper schleusen Rumanen, Zigeuner, Bulgaren," Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, 26 August 1992.
553 "Die Aufriistung des Ostwalls," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 3 November 1993.; Heribert Prantl, "SZ- 
Interview mit Burkhard Hirsch zur Grenzsicherung. Warnung vor einem Bruch des Volkerrechts," 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 9/10 January 1993.; Heribert Prantl, "Asylkompromifi auf der Rutschbahn," 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 9 January 1993.
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of many Western, Eastern, Nordic and Southern European States.’554 In public statements 
of the Bundesgrenzschutz as well as of the responsible politicians, the rise of cross-border 
crime is mentioned as an important reason for the necessary compensatory measures.555 
Similarly to the argumentation with regard to immigration presented above, Eastern 
European countries were mentioned as a source as well as transit area for crime. 
Additionally, it was presented as an area of refuge for criminals.556
According to Hellenthal’s analysis, Western Europe and Germany were identified as new 
areas of action offering new criminal possibilities, while the East acted as an area of repose 
for criminals. ’Der Umbruch in den mittel- und osteuropaischen Staaten ebenso wie die 
Freiziigigkeit zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten der Europaischen Gemeinschaft haben 
international operierenden Tatergruppen neue und lukrative Aktionsraume und -  
moglichkeiten eroffnet.’557 The feared consequence was that Germany would also become a 
‘turntable’ of drugs and organised crime. Germany was perceived as a country of transit for 
criminals as well as an object for the attack of criminals.
German security experts made a strong link between economic disparity and rising crime 
rates in Central and Eastern Europe. This was considered the main source of the threat to 
internal security by Hellenthal of the BGS, head of the Grenzschutzdirektion Koblenz, and 
can also be identified as the main reason for the increased need for border protection in 
Walter’s article.558
554 Fijnaut, "The 'Communitization' of Police Cooperation in Western Europe," 81.
555 For example: "Zum Stand der Verhandlungen im Zusammenhang mit dem Schengener Abkommen," 
Innere Sicherheit, no. 3 (1988).; Rudolf Seiters, "Rede des Bundesinnenministers im Deutschen 
Bundestag anlafilich der ersten Lesung des 'Gesetzes zum Schengener Ubereinkommen vom 19. Juni 
1990 Betreffend den Schrittweisen Abbau der Kontrollen an den Gemeinsamen Grenzen'," Innere 
Sicherheit, no. 2 (1992).; "Offnung der Grenzen erfordert neue Formen der 
Kriminalitatsbekampfung."; Wolfgang Schauble, "Leidinien Kiinftiger Innenpolitik," Innenpolitik, no. 1 
(1991).; "Europa ohne Grenzen - eine sichere Gemeinschaft."; "EG verstarkt den Kampf gegen 
Internationalen Terrorismus und Rauschgifthandel."
556 Hellenthal, "Die aktuelle Entwicklung der illegalen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland insbesondere 
mit Blick auf die Schleuserkriminalitat und andere Felder der grenzbezogenen Organisierten 
Kriminalitat und die GegenmaBnahmen des Bundesgrenzschutz in seiner neuen 
Organisationsstruktur."
557 Cf. Ibid., translation: The transformation in the Central and East European states as well as the 
freedom of movement between the Member States of the European Community have opened up 
new and lucrative areas and opportunities of action to internationally operating groups of criminals. 
Similar views are voiced by the Minster of Interior Rudolf Seiters Rudolf Seiters, "Das Schengener 
Abkommen und die Innenpolitik im Zeichen von Binnengrenzkontrollabbau und Europaischer 
Einigung," Politische Studien 43, no. 326 (1992).
558 Cf. Hellenthal, "Die aktuelle Entwicklung der illegalen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland insbesondere 
mit Blick auf die Schleuserkriminalitat und andere Felder der grenzbezogenen Organisierten 
Kriminalitat und die GegenmaBnahmen des Bundesgrenzschutz in seiner neuen 
Organisationsstruktur.", Walter, "Interpretationen und Tatsachen. Staatsgrenze - Kontur oder
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The BGS tended to state that it was at the limit of its capacities and that therefore an 
augmentation of personnel and technological level was necessary. Indeed, the year reports 
show a constant rise of budget and personnel from 1985 to 1999. The budget more than 
doubled while the number of personnel rose by roughly a third.559 Despite these changes, 
the situation at the eastern border in 1994 was presented as still problematic, challenging 
the capacity of the BGS to the limit. ‘Die nach wie vor problematische Lage an den 
deutschen Ostgrenzen stellt alle zur Grenziiberwachung und zur Kontrolle des 
grenziiberschreitenden Verkehrs eingesetzten Krafte immer wieder vor grofie 
Herausforderungen und verlangt den Einsatz aller verfiigbaren Krafte.’560
Border-related crime received special attention as a specific category of crime which 
constituted a threat to internal security in the analysis of experts. Offences against property 
(Eigentumsdelikte) were mentioned primarily in the reports and here especially the theft of 
cars (which had received considerable attention in the public over the years).561 The 
inhabitants near the eastern borders felt intimidated through a heightened number of 
break-ins and petty theft. Drug delinquency was mentioned as a problem, with steadily 
rising numbers of confiscated material. However, in this case, the eastern border was hardly 
mentioned. Instead, the German-Dutch and the German-Danish border were shown to be 
the main problem.562
Crime and immigration were often not presented as separate categories, but as intricately 
linked. Walter for example says that movements of migration are a security problem sui 
generis, although they have to be seen also in connection with transborder crime.563 A link 
between crime and immigration is also derived from the national crime statistic. Here it is 
emphasised how immigration can lead to a heightened threat to internal security. Reinhard 
Rupprecht, head of the department of Internal Security at the BMI: ‘An der Polizeilichen
Limes.". It has to be pointed out that economic refugees neither have a legal right to stay in Germany 
nor does the majority of Germany recognise economic refugees as ‘real’ refugees.
559 See appropriate table in the appendix.
560 Hellenthal, "Die aktuelle Entwicklung der illegalen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland insbesondere 
mit Blick auf die Schleuserkriminalitat und andere Felder der grenzbezogenen Organisierten 
Kriminalitat und die GegenmaBnahmen des Bundesgrenzschutz in seiner neuen 
Organisationsstruktur," 4. Translation: The still problematic situation at the German eastern borders 
poses great challenges to all forces employed for border surveillance and for controls of transborder 
traffic, and therefore demands the deployment of all available forces.
561 Cf. Ibid.
562 Ibid.: 3f. It is mentioned that in 1992, 540 cases of arrests, out of a total of 911, were made at the 
Dutch-German border.
563 Walter, "Interpretationen und Tatsachen. Staatsgrenze - Kontur oder Limes," 48.
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Kriminalstatistik (PKS) laftt sich ablesen, daft Immigration zu einer verstarkten 
Kriminalitatsbelastung fuhrt.’564 He finds that even when all the necessary differentiations 
for a higher percentage of foreigners in the crime statistic are made565, the foreign 
population in Germany and especially the asylum applicants have a significantly higher 
crime rate than Germans (about 3 times as high as their percentage in the population).
Hellenthal makes reference to the link between illegal immigration, asylum and the import
of crime to Germany:
[Dabei] spielt die illegale Einreise und die Schleuserkriminalitat eine besondere Rolle. 
Zum einen stellen beide an sich bereits strafbares Handeln dar, zum anderen sichern 
sie die Verbreitung illegaler Aktivitaten in ganz Europa und damit den Aufbau 
krimineller Strukturen auch in den westeuropaischen Staaten. Der uberaus 
signifikante Anstieg des Anteils auslandischer Tatverdachtiger insgesamt -  bereinigt 
um alle auslandertypischen Straftaten im Zusammenhang mit dem Auslandergesetz 
oder Asylverfahrensgesetz -  und noch mal deutlicher, der von Asylbewerbern, gibt 
einen klaren Hinweis auf diese Entwicklung.566
To sum up, the prevalent argument with regard to border policies was that the border had 
an important security and filter function. The loss of border controls internally would also 
lead to an increase of insecurity. In some speeches, no differentiation was made between 
the fact that only internal border controls were to be abolished -  thus creating the 
impression that the abolition of border controls would lead to an easy entry for criminals 
and immigrants.
The threats which were primarily of relevance were immigration and international crime. 
Although the threat of these phenomena had already been discovered in the mid 1980s, it 
was only after the changes of 1989 that they became prevalent. The East appeared as an
564 Reinhard Rupprecht, "Zuwanderung und Innere Sicherheit," in Migration undFlucht, ed. Steffen 
Angenendt (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997). Translation: The police criminal statistic shows 
that immigration leads to a stronger burden of crime.
565 These differentiations are for him: crime which can only be committed by foreigners such as offences 
against the foreigners’ law (Auslandergesetz AuslG) and the asylum law (Asylverfahrensgesetz 
AsylVfG), age groups (foreigners have an unproportionately high percentage of minor offenders), 
citizenship (Turks and Yugoslavs have the highest percentage -  due to their larger section in the 
population) and crime categories (drug dealing, gambling and pick pocketing have over 2/3 foreign 
offenders).
566 Hellenthal, "Die aktuelle Entwicklung der illegalen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland insbesondere 
mit Blick auf die Schleuserkriminalitat und andere Felder der grenzbezogenen Organisierten 
Kriminalitat und die Gegenmafinahmen des Bundesgrenzschutz in seiner neuen 
Organisationsstruktur." Translation: The illegal entry and smuggling crimes play a special role. On the 
one hand, they both represent punishable action by themselves, on the other hand, they ensure the 
spreading of illegal activities in all of Europe and thus the building up of criminal structures also in 
West European states. The significant rise of the percentage of foreign suspects as a whole -  cleared 
up by all foreigner-typical crimes in connection with foreigner law or asylum process law -  and even 
more clearly the percentage of asylum applicants give a clear indication of this development.
-239-
The German debate regarding border controls
unpredictable area of uncertainty and insecurity at the beginning of the 1990s. Fears of 
being unable to contain such developments were (mostly unintendedly) nurtured by the 
discourse of political and law enforcement elites. In this perspective, stricter controls at the 
borders were presented as a means to stem against possible ‘floods’ of immigrants.
Another reason for the necessity of strictly enforcing the external border controls can be
inferred from a statement of Horst Eisel, part of the negotiating team of the Ministry of
Interior: while prior to 1989, the hesitations with regard to Schengen were mainly directly
towards the South, the fall of the Iron Curtain made the eastern border also problematic or
‘neuralgic’. Germany had the perception -  justly as can be inferred from statements of
French politicians for example -  that the Western partners were following with great
attention German measures to guard the eastern border.567
Zum Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses des ersten Schengener Ubereinkommens im Jahre 
1985 verhinderte noch die nahezu undurchdringliche innerdeutsche Grenze 
weitgehend das Eindringen von Gefahren aus ostlicher Richtung, womit nicht zum 
Ausdruck kommen soil, daft die deutsche Politik dem „Eisernen Vorhang“ aus 
solchen Erwagungen einen positiven Aspekt beimafi. Demgegeniiber hatten Lander 
wie Frankreich, Italien und Spanien unter anderem schwierige Seegrenzen zu 
schiitzen, so daft die zustandigen deutschen Behorden eher mit Sorge dorthin 
blickten, wenn sie an die Absicherung ihrer Westgrenzen dachten.
Nach der Wiedervereinigung anderte sich die Konstellation insofern, als Deutschland 
nunmehr Verantwortung fur die neuralgischen Grenzen zu Polen und Tschechien 
trug und die anderen Partner jetzt mit besonderer Aufmerksamkeit darauf achteten, 
daft die deutsche Seite die Schengener Ostflanke zuverlassig abschirmt.568
Given the importance of the security function of the border, compensatory measures were 
suggested. Advocates of the crucial importance of the centrality of the filter function of the 
border emphasised, however, that these measures could never really compensate for the 
security deficits created by the abolition of border controls. ’Mit dem Schengener
567 Bigo mentions Pierre Mazeaud from the RPR as saying that immigrants might profit from the 
admitted lack in strictness of control at the Bavarian-Austrian border: “Profitant, dit-il, des 
derogations admises au controle des frontiers externs de Schengen dans le cas de l’accord germano- 
autrichien, les emigres est-europeens auront toutes facilites our passer en Allemagne et de la 
n’importe ou.” Similarly, his party colleague, Paul Masson points to the Oder-Neisse border still badly 
controlled by the new authorities. Bigo, ed., L 'Europe des Polices et de la Securite Interieure, 83.
568 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: At the time of the conclusion of the first Schengen 
Agreement in
1985, the nearly impenetrable inner German border prevented the intrusion of dangers from the 
eastern direction -  which is not to say that German politics regarded the Iron Curtain’ under a 
positive aspect due to such deliberations. In contrast to this, countries such as France, Italy and Spain 
had to protect difficult sea borders so that the responsible German authorities tended to look there 
with concern if they thought of the security of their western border.
After unification, the constellation changed insofar as Germany now had the responsibility for the 
‘neuralgic’ borders to Poland and Czech and the other partners now took special care that the 
German side secured the Schengen eastern flank reliably.
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Durchfiihrungsubereinkommen ... wurde eine Vielzahl von Ausgleichsmaftnahmen 
konzipiert, die in dieser Art wohl einmalig auf der Welt sind, gleichwohl aber entstehende 
Sicherheitsdefizite nicht kompensieren konnen.’569
569 Ziegenaus, "Sicherheitsdefizite der Grenzoffnung - Kompensationsmoglichkeiten," 39. Translation: 
With the Schengen Implementing Convention, a multiplicity of compensatory measures was 
conceived which are probably singular in the world, but yet can not compensate the security deficits 
produced.
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3.2. The border as barrier
A parallel argument to the one on the security function of borders was that the border 
constituted a barrier in a number of ways which was an obstacle to the interests of 
European states, more particularly to the European market and to state authorities 
pursuing criminals. While the argument regarding the internal market necessitated an 
abolition of border controls, the argument regarding police authority demanded as a 
consequence that efficient compensatory measures be installed and strict external controls 
be conducted.
The deepening European integration and the internal market as a rationale for common 
policies on border controls has already been outlined in chapter three. This was also an 
important argument for German politicians. For chancellor Kohl, deepened European 
integration was central for a peaceful and free Germany in Europe. Freedom of movement 
across borders and cultural exchange were central for him to realize this goal: 
‘Europapolitik war und ist immer zuerst eine Politik fur den Frieden in Freiheit. Das 
miissen wir wieder mehr als bisher ins Bewufksein unserer Burger bringen durch ganz 
konkrete Schritte, durch mehr Abbau der Grenzkontrollen, durch eine Intensivierung der 
Kulturbeziehungen und durch eine Verbesserung und Verstarkung des 
Jugendaustausches’.570
In a similar vein, the answer of the government to a written question of the SPD 
parliamentary fraction states: ’Die Abschaffung der Binnengrenzkontrollen ist nach 
Auffassung der Bundesregierung ein wichtiges Ziel der europaischen Integration.’571
Chancellor Helmut Kohl was especially concerned that numerous barriers impeded the
completion of the internal market and a deepening of European integration.
Die Vollendung eines Binnenmarkte in der EG steht immer noch aus.... Wir miissen 
sie (die Wachstumsreserven) mobilisieren und die vielfaltigen wirtschaftlichen 
Grenzbarrieren, die sichtbaren und die versteckten, abbauen. Nur dann behalten wir 
auf Dauer die Chance, gestiitzt auf die GroBe des eigenen Marktes im Wettbewerb 
mit den anderen groBen Industrienationen erfolgreich bestehen zu konnen. Wenn ich
570 Deutscher Bundestag, "121. Sitzung, Regierungserklarung Dr. Helmut Kohl." Translation: 
Europapolitics has been and is always first and foremost politics for peace in freedom. We have to 
make citizens aware of this again more than up to now through very concrete steps, through more 
abolition of border controls, through an intensification of cultural relations and through an 
improvement and reinforcement of youth exchange.
571 Bundesregierung, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine kleine Anfrage der SPD Fraktion."
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vom Abbau von Barrieren spreche, denke ich natiirlich nicht nur an die 
wirtschaftlichen Barrieren, sondern auch an die tatsachlichen Grenzbarrieren.572
At the same time, law enforcement agencies were particularly concerned about the border 
acting as a barrier to state authority and the ability to pursue criminals while Europe was 
already one criminal geographic area.573 Edmund Stoiber exposed drastically the paradox he 
observed if border controls at internal borders were to be lifted while police still need to 
stop at the border: ’Kein iiberzeugter Europaer kann schliefilich eine Freifahrt fur 
Rauschgifthandler, Waffenschieber und andere Schwerverbrecher wollen, wahrend es fur 
die Polizei heifit: Stopp an den Grenzen.’574 He was supported in this by Ziegenaus, the 
President of the Bavarian ‘Landeskriminalamt’. He said that the police must not be stopped 
at the borders while criminals could pass without obstacles and controls.575 He is echoed by 
a high-level police officer: ’Nun fallen die Schlagbaume, wettert der Kriminaldirektor 
Mellenthin, aber nur fur die Spitzbuben; fur uns, da bleiben sie.’576
The President of the BKA also joined in this argument by saying that the emerging free 
movement in Western Europe and the growing together of Europe had also benefited the 
offenders: ’Von der wachsenden Freiziigigkeit in Westeuropa, der Grenzoffnung im Osten 
und den immer starkeren wirtschaftlichen und politische Verflechtungen, vom 
Zusammenwachsen Europas also, haben auch die Straftater profitiert.’577
It was emphasised that organised crime already worked in networks across Europe and that 
the opening of borders facilitated international activities of criminals.578 The prediction was 
therefore, that with the fall of internal border controls, the ability of police to investigate 
would be diminished even more if no measures were agreed to enhance police cooperation.
572 Deutscher Bundestag, "73. Sitzung am 6. Juni 1984." Translation: The completion of the internal 
market is still to come. (...) We have to mobilise (the growth reserves) and have to remove the 
manifold economic barriers at the borders, the visible and the hidden. Only then do we have a chance 
in the long-term to hold our own in the competition with other leading industrial nations by relying 
on the size of our domestic market. If I speak of the removal of barriers then I am thinking not only 
of economic barriers, but also of real borders.
573 Cf. Zachert, "Der neue kriminalgeographische Raum in Folge der Offnung des Binnenmarktes."
574 Stoiber, "Bekampfung der Organisierten Kriminalitat," 19. Translation: No convinced European can 
want a free passing for drug dealers, arms traffickers and other criminals, while the police is 
confronted with a stop sign at the borders.
575 Ziegenaus, "Sicherheitsdefizite der Grenzoffnung - Kompensationsmoglichkeiten."
576 Dieter Wenz, "Schengen und die Grenzen in Europa," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 December 
1990. Translation: N ow  the border barriers go away, rails criminal director Mellenthin, but only for 
the villains; for us, they remain.’
577 Zachert, "Der neue kriminalgeographische Raum in Folge der Offnung des Binnenmarktes," 26. 
Translation: Also the criminals have profited from the growing freedom of movement in western 
Europe, the opening of borders in the East and the ever stronger economic and political ties.
578 Cf. Stoiber, "Bekampfung der Organisierten Kriminalitat."
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Compensatory measures were the means advocated to make up for the fact that national 
police would have to stop at the borders while persons could leave the territory. These 
included the possibility of physical presence of police in a neighbouring country (cross- 
border observation and hot pursuit), a facilitation of exchange of information between 
local police offices of two countries, the Schengen Information System on criminals and 
their goods (in order to apprehend them at the borders) and a simplification of extradition 
procedures. The principle advanced was that if the border was regularly an obstacle for 
police, measures had to be taken which allowed the means of police investigation to cross 
borders (information on criminals, assistance in legal procedures) and allow policemen to 
cross the border in specific cases in person. At the same time, these kinds of measures 
would not be an obstacle to internal trade.
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3.3. The border as an inefficient instrument
A third line of argument pointed to the fact that border controls were not efficient in 
deterring criminals and that their abolition did therefore not necessarily represent a security 
threat in itself. This argument was often mixed with the previous one, which pointed to the 
fact that borders were obstacles to law enforcement services while networks of criminals 
operated across European borders.
For example the President of the BKA affirmed in 1991 that state borders had long been 
no considerable obstacle for criminal organisations: ’Insbesondere fur kriminelle 
Organisationen stellen die Staatsgrenzen schon lange kein nennenswertes Hindernis mehr 
dar.’579
Wolfgang Schauble inferred that the border barrier was not a very intelligent means of 
investigation of police. T)er Schlagbaum ist kein besonders intelligentes 
Fahndungsinstrument’.580 To some extent, Schauble therefore contradicted in this 
statement the argument of the filter function of the border.
If borders were no real obstacle to criminals or often not efficient, then cooperation with 
neighbouring national police forces promised more efficient results. Rudolf Seiters 
summed up this argument when he said that border controls could not provide everything 
and that reinforced cooperation was in the long run more effective than the filter function 
of the border alone. ‘Grenzkontrollen sind nicht alles; verstarkte Zusammenarbeit ist auf 
die Dauer effektiver als allein die Filterfunktionen der Grenzen.’581
To some extent, this argument supported the idea of compensatory measures most fully, 
since only they would be able to encounter the European structures of criminals. The 
argument remains open to challenges if contrasted with the arguments of security 
advocates of the border. Also the politics of the Schengen Agreement lifting internal 
border controls and reinforcing them externally is not quite congruent with the argument. 
If borders had themselves shown to be inefficient, why would border controls be retained 
at the external borders. A logical extension of this argument is therefore that where
579 Zachert, "Der neue kriminalgeographische Raum in Folge der Offnung des Binnenmarktes."
580 Schauble, "Europa ohne Grenzen - eine sichere Gemeinschaft."
581 Seiters, "Das Schengener Abkommen und die Innenpolitik im Zeichen von 
Binnengrenzkontrollabbau und Europaischer Einigung," 11.
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compensatory measures are not possible, border controls are still important for control of 
criminals and immigration. Furthermore, efficient compensatory measures are only possible 
with countries with whom close cooperation in a number of fields can be established and 
to whom a degree of trust is extended.
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3.4. The positions of the various institutions
The debate regarding the Schengen border control regime was on the whole congruent 
with the solutions found. The actors whose arguments were presented above were also 
influential during the phase of negotiations. Furthermore, the key arguments had been 
presented repeatedly in articles and the media so that they had become commonly 
accepted.
Nevertheless, a differentiation between the position of various actors -  no doubt 
influenced by their institutional interests -  can be observed. Each social group tended to 
emphasise a different part of the final compromise found.
As outlined above, representatives of the Bundesgrenzschutz tended to advocate stricter 
border controls and closer cooperation with their European colleagues in the interest of 
more efficiency at the borders in deterring criminals and immigrants. At the same time, the 
Bundesgrenzschutz also stressed the fact that efficient fulfilment of its task would 
necessitate a higher budget and personnel. All of these factors can also be found in the 
Schengen arrangements.
The representatives of the national police forces tended to stress compensatory measures 
rather than the security function of the border. Individual statements often demanded 
more extensive measures than agreed in the Schengen treaties (e.g. extensive harmonisation 
of legal arrangements). Further national security measures in Germany took up these 
concerns.
The Federal Ministry of the Interior tended to hold positions which united the various lines 
of argument, albeit with different emphasis. Wolfgang Schauble was of the opinion that 
although the border was not a very efficient means for police investigations (and thus could 
be abolished internally), the border ought to be strictly supervised externally, accompanied 
by compensatory measures. Rudolf Seiters, instead, tended to emphasise the European 
dimension of the problematic and thus also of its solution. He repeatedly appealed to 
European solidarity in dealing with immigration. Minister Seiters stated that the problems 
did not stop at the border and that politics had to answer with strategies which were not 
founded on national ‘solo efforts’. T)ie Uberlegung, daft man nationalistisch abgekapselt 
die heutigen Probleme losen kann, ist eine Vorstellung vergangener Zeiten.’582 Wolfgang
582 Ibid.. The thought that today’s problems could be solved nationally is an idea of the past.
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Schauble also said in 1991 that none of the European states could deal with the problem of 
‘poverty movement’ by itself.583 Although Minister Kanther was little optimistic with regard 
to a common European refugee policy, his project of a European zone of security also was 
a result of the idea of necessary collaboration.584 He added that the Schengen states were 
aware that in the face of illegal immigration they could defend themselves only together.585
The Chancellery made hardly any statement with regard to the issue of border controls. 
Chancellor Kohl’s statements wishing to advance European integration and the internal 
market also by lifting of border barriers have been cited above. Not many other statements 
of members of the chancellery could be found. From the way the Chancellery led the 
German delegation and negotiated for the German position (see chapter seven), it can be 
inferred however, that the principle lines of argument were shared with the other actors.
Summing up the various lines of argument employed for the Schengen measures of 
abolition of internal border controls, reinforcing of external border controls and 
establishment of a catalogue of compensatory measures, it can be shown that they were 
sometimes contradictory. While one discourse highlighted the role of borders for security 
purposes, another diminished the importance of borders and emphasised the role of 
cooperation between national polices instead. The solutions proposed were compatible, 
however, if considered under the interests of security of state and society. The Schengen 
arrangements can therefore be called the smallest common denominator of the parties 
involved.
The Schengen arrangements therefore accommodated all cited positions which dominated 
the debate in Germany. This is an indication as to why Germany was a key supporter of the 
final compensatory measures reached. Individual German groups would have preferred 
stronger measures in the interests of security which were eventually realised through 
national measures.
583 "Schauble will Asylrecht harmonisieren," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 January 1991.
584 Martina Fietz, "Kanther will europaische Sicherheitszone," Die Welt, 2 July 1998.
585 Martina Fietz, "Starkere Kontrolle der Grenzen," Die Welt, 17 September 1998.
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4. Conclusions
Policies in Germany in the late 1980s and early 1990s were faced with the challenge to 
strike a balance between necessary adjustments to new threats, new patterns of migration, 
and fears about ‘floods’ of immigrants coming to Germany.
Several parallel arguments were used in order to justify the reinforcement of external 
border controls and compensatory measures in exchange for the abolition of internal 
border controls: one was the loss of border controls as national security filters of criminals 
and immigrants, which necessitated stricter external border controls; another was the 
necessary abolition of barriers to the European market and to state authority and 
prosecution of criminals. A third line of argument was the existing inefficiency of border 
controls.
In conclusion, the argument emphasising the security and filter aspect of the border 
advocated compensatory measures as a ‘second-best’ option if border controls had to be 
lifted. Cooperation between law enforcement services could not fully replace the function 
of the border. This argument saw the border as the most efficient means in the fight 
against both international crime as well as illegal migration. The arguments with regard to 
the border as a barrier or the inefficiency of border controls presented compensatory 
measures as superior.
Security experts in the Federal Ministry for the Interior, in the BGS and police, supported 
through statements of politicians, mostly the federal Minister of Interior or his Lander 
colleagues, were central in the debate regarding border control policies. These groups were 
also the ones who were most influential for defining the German position in the Schengen 
negotiations.
The discourse of security experts did not admit any contradiction between the arguments. 
While in one sense, the border was considered so vital for the fight against crime that any 
removal of internal border controls had to be counteracted by strengthening of external 
border controls, in another sense, the border was seen as a not very useful means for police 
work in the current crime situation.
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All arguments for the strengthening of the border regime went together with the 
construction of a threat against societal security. This threat lay in the rise of international 
crime which was a potential direct threat to internal security and order; in the potential rise 
of immigration which could constitute a threat to the cultural and social cohesion of 
Germany through an influx of a number of foreigners which could not be assimilated; in 
the association of immigration with crime which could lead to the import of international 
criminal organisations and threats to internal security; in the direct neighbourhood of 
Germany to an instable and unpredictable East.
The discourse also emphasised Germany’s special geographic situation. The SPD Minister 
of the Interior in Brandenburg, Alwin Ziel, called the eastern German border the German 
‘Wohlstandsgrenze’.(the border of affluence)586 The proximity to the East was presented as 
a disadvantage in that it was the source and transit area of crime and immigration. There 
was no direct reference to old fears of the East in the official public discourse. However, 
allusions to past events like the ‘migration of the peoples’ of the 4th century or the use of 
metaphors which remind of the ‘hordes’ who lived in the East and threatened Europe do 
hold strong connotations without having to be spelt out.
By emphasising the security aspect of border-related issues, the proponents of strict 
external border controls and the most efficient compensatory measures played something 
of a ‘trump card’. By emphasising that their objective was to retain societal security, they 
surpassed any alternative voices pointing out the limitation of civil rights or parliamentary 
control of the process.587 The inability of alternative voices to influence the argument had a 
number of reasons: there really was a marked rise in numbers, the security experts were the 
people commanding the highest authority for identifying threats to internal security; they 
were supported in this through a similar discourse of security experts in other European 
countries;588 the inner logic of security which came to bear gave priority to security experts 
to define the solutions to the threat identified.
This trump card effect of securitisation led to a politically powerful and successful 
argument, but also to an argument which has gaps and silences. The trust the other states’ 
police forces needed to make this system work was hardly ever mentioned in the national 
German discourse. The border as inevitably connecting the Schengen area to its
586 Alvin Ziel, "Polizeiliche Zusammenarbeit mit Osteuropa," DiePolizei 84, no. 6 (1993): 129.
587 Such as the German Greens.
588 Cf. den Boer, "The Quest for European Policing: Rhetoric and Justification in a Disorderly Debate."
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environment was also largely ignored. Migration and crime as a consequence of the 
integratedness of a system were not recognised, but treated as a phenomenon which could 
be fought at the border if it so wished.
The debate made it impossible to address the deeper structures of immigration and crime. 
The sources of immigration were mentioned as economic and political instability. The 
problem was framed in a way, however, where the solution lay in the reinforcing of 
controls at the borders. The illegality of immigration, the connection with crime and the 
abuse of the asylum system were emphasised with the effect of an impression that these 
‘undeserving’ immigrants simply needed to be pushed back behind the borders.
Thus, the ultimate perspective of the discourse presented was national, emphasising largely 
national fears regarding immigration and crime, while European-level solutions were 
advocated in order to reach national societal security objectives.
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The last chapter outlined the German debate on border controls and how the security issue 
came to dominate the debate regarding borders in Germany. The increasing general 
awareness of potential threats from Eastern Europe entailed an increasing need of the 
security forces to demonstrate their ability to encounter such threats. At the same time, the 
developments on the European level put pressure on Germany to fulfil its promise to 
secure the Eastern borders. It is against this background that this chapter shows the 
changes which took place within Germany with the intention to provide additional security 
and adapt to European internal security demands.
National substitutes for border controls after the Schengen Agreements carry a special 
problem. The Schengen Agreements themselves do not allow such substitutes for border 
controls because the intention is that internal borders can be crossed without any checks on 
persons being carried out (Art.2 (1) SIC). Allowed are, however, measures for the enforcement 
of national law on the entirety of the sovereign territory (Art. 2 (3) SIC).
On the national level, substitutes for border controls directly behind the border were 
neither politically nor legally acceptable. The staff council of civil servants of the 
Bundesgrenzschutz, for example, voiced grave reserves with regard to controls at the 
interior of the country: ‘Bei einer Offnung der Grenzen stehen vermehrte Kontrollen im 
Landesinneren der Bundesrepublik Deutschland -  primar aus rechtsstaatlichen 
Erwagungen -  nicht zur Debatte’.589 Thus, the measures taken nationally had to be shaped 
so that they did not constitute a replacement of actual border controls: this meant that 
national measures should not constitute systematic controls in the border region 
independently of suspicion.590
589 Bundesgrenzschutz-Hauptpersonalrat, "Ergebnisprotokoll der Sitzung des AK GSE vom 
14.02.1989," (Bonn: 1989). Translation: After an opening of the borders, increased controls at the 
interior of the Federal Republic of Germany are not up for debate -  mainly for reasons of the rule of 
law. (Rechtsstaatlichkeit refers to the legality of a measure with a view to constitutional rights)
590 The difference between border checks and substitute measures is not always clear. A distinction 
becomes possible through the definition of border checks in the SIC: TBorder check shall mean a 
check carried out at a border in response exclusively to an intention to cross that border, regardless of 
any other consideration.’ (Art. 1). In this definition, border checks are those checks which are 
conducted independently of other reasons due to the displayed intention of crossing the border. This 
means that checks of vehicles or persons which are conducted due to a concrete suspicion of officers, 
in a border area in which usually no systematic checks are carried out, do not qualify as border 
controls. An impression of a border control may nonetheless remain with citizens if patrols are 
reinforced in border areas or on main roads leading to the border.
The issue of checks and controls also shows a semantic problem: While the English differentiates 
between systematic controls and intermittent (random or selective) checks, French and German only 
uses the word ‘controle’ or ‘Kontrolle’. Cf. Select Committee on European Communities Committee, 
"Schengen and the United Kingdom's Border Controls."
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The following will show which changes took place in Germany in the context of the 
European-level Schengen arrangements. Most of these measures have not clearly been 
identified as reactions to Schengen. Some responded to concrete demands of Schengen 
provisions or Schengen partners. Others may be interpreted to result rather from an 
intention to assure partners of German ability to control, yet others were an attempt to 
reassure the German public of the ability of the government to retain a high level of 
internal security in the face of open internal borders (see here for example Bavaria’s efforts 
before the joining of Austria) and uncertainty following the ‘asylum crisis’ of 1992/93.
This chapter thus also presents the German reaction to European agreements which it had 
negotiated. As the next chapter will outline, German officials had been very active in 
assuring the security of the new border arrangements in Europe. Even before 1989, 
national compensatory measures were advocated. However, after 1989, the activities were 
intensified and a number of changes in the Bundesgrenzschutz and the working methods 
of law enforcement services can be found.
The following will first present changes within the BGS, showing how reorganisations, a 
rise of budget and personnel, and increased technological means were to increase the 
efficiency of BGS work. The chapter continues with the changes within other law 
enforcement services and legal/administrative changes in the country, followed by 
agreements made with other states to increase border control efficiency.
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1. Changes within the Bundesgrenzschutz
The following will give an account of the changes which occurred in the 
Bundesgrenzschutz at the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s. A history of the border 
guards was given in chapter five to provide a context for the presentation of relevant 
national actors of internal security. Changes with regard to border controls happened in the 
Bundesgrenzschutz, its organisation, tasks and equipment as well as the cooperation with 
other services. These changes were an outcome of the debate about borders as it has been 
retraced in the preceding chapter. As has been pointed out, the BGS was itself an active 
player in this debate, advocating the need for heightened security measures. At the same 
time, the changes also provided further input into the debate, either as justifications for the 
supporters of stricter controls or as an object of criticism for opponents.
1.1. Reorganisation of the BGS in 1992 and 1998
During the 1980s, the emphasis of BGS work was on the tasks of policing, supporting 
Lander police in special situations such as major demonstrations. The year report of 1989 
illustrates that the BGS was organised in such as way as to provide the national logistical 
and personnel support to such missions: the units supporting Lander police were divided 
between 5 Grenzschutzkommandos (South, Centre, West, North and Coast) so that they 
could be deployed in the various Bundeslander. The rest of personnel was organised in 
units for the border controls in the ‘Einzeldienst’ -  which comprised actual border checks 
and mobile control teams.591
In 1992, the emphasis of BGS work changed due to the reorganisation of the service in 
reaction to the envisaged Schengen implementation, to German unification and changes in 
states east of Germany. On 1 April 1992, the tasks of rail police and air security were 
transferred by law to the BGS. The duty of rail police consists in averting dangers to public 
security, to rail equipment or to the running of the trains in the area of the rails of the 
federal government. The task to ensure air security is aimed at averting dangers for the 
safety of civil aviation (except those resulting from aviation itself), especially dangers of 
high-jacking and sabotage. This includes the control of passengers and their luggage for 
weapons, bombs and other dangerous objects; protection of the passenger control posts
591 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1989."
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with weapons to ensure that no unauthorised persons enter the areas beyond; protection of 
planes and aviation equipment and buildings; averting situations of concrete danger by 
special groups on alert.
With the 1992 reorganisation, a process was begun which shifted the focus of BGS work to 
the work at the borders, to rail and air security and away from the police as reinforcement 
from Lander police. This included mainly shifting personnel towards the east of Germany, 
but also putting an emphasis on new locations, concentrating on the main railway stations 
and airports.
In 1994, the law of the BGS was changed so that the guards were allowed to conduct 
police controls of identity up to 30 km from the border, enter houses of suspects of 
smuggling or illegal entry and use methods of ‘undercover’ investigation.
In 1998, a further re-organisation continued reform efforts in order to ‘take into account 
the new framework conditions and the changed crime situation’592, enabling the BGS to 
change its organisational structure in order to shift its focus even more to the 
Einzeldienst.593 This change has to be seen in conjuncture with the implementation of 
Schengen and the intensified fight against organised crime and illegal immigration. The year 
report of the BGS also shows that the measures now enacted had partly been envisaged 
since 1994. The focal points of the re-organisation as mentioned in the year report 1998 
were the following:
• Shifting of the focus of the work of the BGS to the external borders and to the rail 
police while reinforcing the number of personnel. The result of this shift was that 
while in April 1992 only 10% of the BGS officers worked in the ‘Einzeldienst’, in 
1999 80 % of its work was done there.
• Creation of 98 Inspektionen which integrate all work of ‘Einzeldienst’ (border 
control, air and rail security)
• Reduction and reorganisation of the those units which have tasks in special 
situations requiring police intervention.
592 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1998." Vorbemerkung. This 
formulation makes reference to the implementation of the Schengen Agreement and migration and 
organised crime in Eastern Europe.
593 Gesetz iiber den Bundesgrenzschutz zur Starkung der inneren Sicherheit vor dem Hintergrund der 
neuen Rahmenbedingungen und der veranderten Kriminalitatslage vom 1.11.1994; Erstes 
Anderungsgesetz vom 25. August 1998
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• Possibility of controls independently of suspicion (but according to the situation) in 
airports and railway infrastructure
The shifting of personnel towards the Eastern border after 1989/90 with the two major 
reforms was not met with pure welcome. It involved the moving of families not only to 
another part of the country, but to an area where quality of living was -  at least initially -  
markedly lower. General prejudices of Westerners against the East might also have played a 
role. The BGS itself said in its year report of 1998 that agreements had been made between 
the BMI and the main personnel representation of the BGS (Hauptpersonalrat) for the 
changes initiated in 1998 (around 9.500 employees were concerned).594 As far as possible all 
personnel shifts were to happen on the basis of voluntarism and in a socially acceptable 
way. Flanking measures such as easier promotion were introduced to encourage mobility. 
The report speaks of the successful conclusion of the personnel reorganisation in the first 
quarter of 1999.
Reports of the reorganisation of 1992 give a slightly different picture from official 
statements and point to difficulties. The police trade union (Gewerkschaft der Polizei), 
which is the strongest representation of BGS personnel, spoke of a lot of work in 
connection with the reorganisation following 1992, to try and make the structural changes 
more acceptable to employees. The plans of the BMI had included a principle of 
voluntarism as far as possible: offers of free posts primarily to the locations where 
personnel had to be reduced, chances of speedy promotion etc.595 In practice, however, 
Diederichs reports of the prevalence of the old ^ Prussian spirit’, meaning that higher ranks 
had much more chances of having their wishes fulfilled than the ordinary officers.596
The numbers involved were played down. Schauble indicated that of ‘originally’ 960 BGS 
officers at the border, 296 were to be retained at the internal borders. He claimed that only 
361 employees were concerned by the abolition of internal border controls, because normal 
fluctuation and placements in other units had already decreased the number of personnel at 
those borders.
The reorganisations of 1992 were met by concern not only in the service but also amongst 
party politicians. A letter to the Minister Wolfgang Schauble by the Member of Parliament
594 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1998."
595 Deutsche Polizei 3/92 cited after Diederichs, "In welcher Verfassung ist der BGS?."
sw Cf. Ibid.
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Willfried Penner of 17 July 1990, envisaging problems in the planned reorganisation, shows 
this.597 The answer by the Minister is indicative of the deliberations behind the changes: the 
BGS was to be retained and the continuing importance of the BGS was emphasised 
specifically. Schauble stated that the BGS would continue to conduct controls at EC- 
external borders with an emphasis on international airports, to protect constitutional and 
federal institutions and to protect German representations abroad. Furthermore, the BGS 
was seen as indispensable for support of Lander police in difficult situations and for the 
protection of the freedom in Germany. A ‘broader perspective for the future’ was to be 
given to the BGS by rail and airport security.’
Summing up the reorganisations of 1992 and 1998, a major shift occurred from federal 
‘police tasks’ to control at the border, railways and airports. At the same time, personnel 
was shifted from western stations to the eastern border. The military organisational 
structures were replaced with regional offices uniting all control tasks of the BGS in one 
region.
597 Wolfgang Schauble, "Brief an MdB Willfried Penner," ed. Bundesministerium des Innern (Bonn: 
1990).
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1.2. Rise of budget and personnel of the BGS
Despite the fact that the Schengen Agreements led to an abolition of border controls at the 
internal borders, the personnel and budget of the BGS continued to rise. This was due to 
the fact that the service managed to portray credibly the list of ‘indispensible security 
tasks’598 it fulfilled, not least at the new eastern border. At the same time, the loss of such 
an institution was often portrayed as a loss in itself. The newspapers reported uncertainty 
as to the future tasks of the BGS, but combined this with the emphasis of the necessity and 
efficiency of the BGS at the eastern border.599
In 1989, the year before unification, the total personnel of the BGS amounted to 24,982 
(this includes police officers, officers-in-training, administration personnel and others).600 
After merging with the BGS East (which had around 2,300 officers) and an increase in 
personnel, the total number had augmented to 34,733 (of which 24,463 were officers) by 
1992. This rise of personnel was employed to guard the eastern border.
An employment offensive was conducted between 1991-1996. By the end of 1997,40,346 
people worked for the BGS, 30,008 of these were fully trained officers. ‘Amateur officers’ 
called ‘Grenzpolizeilichen Unterstutzungskrafte’, which were introduced in 1993 to support 
the work of the officers, amounted to 1,205 in 1997.601 There were further 2,232 officers in 
training, adding to the number of personnel. (In 1998, the first reduction in personnel for 
over a decade can be noticed when the number fell to 39,631. Indeed, the BGS year report 
1998 states that new personnel would only be taken on to maintain the amount of 30,000 
officers planned.) A steady fall of administrative personnel can be constated due to budget-
598 "Grenzschiitzer lassen sich umschulen," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 2 November 1990.
599 Cf. for example "BGS-Beamte bereits an Ost-Grenzen im Einsatz - Schauble: Seitdem funktioniert es 
besser," Die Welt, 29 September 1990, "Bundesgrenzschutz soil verstarkt werden," Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 November 1990, "Grenzschutzer lassen sich umschulen.", Johannes Leithauser, 
"Die Fahnder aus dem Westen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 August 1990, Walter Reischl, 
"Bundesgrenzschutz heute: 30 000 Mann und kein Befehl?," Passauer Neue Presse, 2 November 1990, 
Hans Schiemann, "Handeschiitteln auf der Letzten Streife," RheinischerMerkury 6 July 1990, "Wenn 
immer mehr Grenzen wegfallen - Bundesgrenzschutz und Zoll vor neuen Aufgaben," Franfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 February 1990.
6°° por statistics see appendix.
601 These members of the BGS are recruited from local inhabitants, in a mixture between support for 
the officers and employment measure for the local communities. They are supposed to support the 
BGS officers to control the border against illegal immigrants and in the fight against human 
smuggling, car smuggling and transborder petty crime. They are also supposed to have an effect of 
deterrence on refugees and smugglers. These groups have been subject to sharp criticism, questioning 
their motives and legal status. Cf. for example Marina Mai, "Die Hilfssheriffs," Die Woche, 3 April 
1998.
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prescribed reductions of administrative personnel since 1993 and the total stop of 
employment in administration since 1995.602
In terms of budget, the BGS’ financial means saw a steady rise.603 In 1989, the total budget 
amounted to 1,294 million DM. In 1992, it grew to 1,899 million DM. In 1993, the amount 
jumped over 2 billion DM and by 1998,2.9 billion DM were paid to the BGS (two and a 
half times the amount of nine years earlier). In 2000, the budget was over 3.2 billion DM.604 
Given that 75% of the budget of the BGS are personnel costs (in 1998 year report), the rise 
coincides with the aforementioned rise of personnel.
One result of the Schengen Agreements and the assessment of the internal security 
situation after 1989 by German security experts was therefore a rise in personnel and 
budget. Despite the fact that the controls at the internal borders were suppressed, and a 
majority of personnel was shifted from other tasks to border controls, the necessity of 
more personnel had been advocated.
602 Figures from Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1998.", 
Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1999," ed. Bundesgrenzschutz 
(Berlin: 2000), Petra Pau and Katina Schubert, "Bundesgrenzschutz. Eine Omniprasente und 
Omnipotente Bundespolizei?," Biirgerrechte & Polizei 62, no. 1 (1999), Winter, "Kleine Geschichte des 
Bundesgrenzschutz."
603 See table on BGS personnel and budget in the appendix.
604 Figures from Pau and Schubert, "Bundesgrenzschutz. Eine Omniprasente und Omnipotente 
Bundespolizei?.", Winter, "Kleine Geschichte des Bundesgrenzschutz."
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1.3. Reinforcement of technological equipment
The BGS and the Lander police have also reinforced their technological equipment for 
control in the first half of the 1990s. Heiner Busch speaks of a shift from border control to 
border surveillance at the German eastern border which went hand in hand with new 
technology, meaning that the means of control changed from systematic checks at defined 
points to a technological surveillance of as many areas as possible.605
Generally speaking, the BGS aims at adapting its equipment to the ‘latest technical 
developments’.606 Since the 1992 reorganisation of the BGS following the changes of 
German unification and the signing of the Schengen Convention, the year reports of the 
BGS speak regularly of new vehicles purchased in order to fulfil the new tasks of the BGS. 
In 1992, the equipment of the BGS with automobiles and with arms was readjusted to ‘new 
requirements’ and the reorganised BGS.607 The year report of 1992 states that the amount 
spent for equipment of offices and for reneweing of technological equipment was around 
100 million DM.608 Similarly, special transport vehicles such as helicopters, speedboats and 
four-wheel drives were purchased.609 For example it was mentioned for the year 1997 that 
220 million DM were to be spent on the modernisation of the helicopter fleet and the 
purchase of 400 vehicles.610
The technology used for surveillance was originally developed for military purposes. One 
device reinforces the remaining light for use at night (light amplifiers and night vision 
scopes) and another translates the warmth of human bodies into images on a screen (heat 
sensors). Both these technologies are useful for the detection of persons seeking illegal 
entry over the border. While the first can detect groups or individuals wandering in the 
border region at night, the latter are able to detect people in complete darkness or hidden 
in cars. The BGS personnel was trained by the Bundeswehr to use these technologies. The 
first vehicles with heat sensors were developed at the beginning of the 1990s and 
introduced in 1994, in time before the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in
605 Heiner Busch, "Hart an der Grenze," Burgerrechte & Polizei 60, no. 2 (1998).
606 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1996/97," ed. 
Bundesgrenzschutz (Bonn: 1998).
607 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1992."
608 Ibid.
609 Pau and Schubert, "Bundesgrenzschutz. Eine Omniprasente und Omnipotente Bundespolizei?."
610 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1996/97."
-261-
National changes of border-related policies
1 9 9 5  6u Thgjg appliances cost around 300.000 DM per piece.612 By 1998,104 heat sensors 
were in use at the BGS, in VW-busses or in helicopters. Light amplifiers and night vision 
scopes were also in use by 1993 at the latest, with new models bought in subsequent years. 
A mobile video surveillance equipment was purchased in 1997.
The transport of goods is checked, in order to control smuggling, but also to make sure 
that no human beings are being transported in the lorries. C 0 2 measuring appliances are 
used for this purpose -  they are first mentioned in the 1996/97 year report of the BGS.
The control of passports and other documents is achieved with the help of appliances 
which magnify the documents as well as by the use of different light sources, like UV light. 
From the year reports of the BGS, it can not be inferred when this technology was 
introduced, but the state of technology makes it likely that this was in the early 1990s at the 
earliest: the regional centres for checking documents use videospectral analysis. The 
introduction of digital photo and video technology is mentioned for 1998.613 The central 
office for checking documents is the document laboratory (Urkundenlabor) in the 
Grenzschutzdirektion. It provides the units with information on real and false documents 
and also plans to set up a database on forged documents together with the BKA.
Also the use of information technology was begun in 1992. In subsequent years, the 
equipment with INPOL system terminals, IT work stations, wireless data terminals, vans, 
helicopters and boats was improved and constantly modernised. In 1995, the equipment of 
the border control posts with information technology was completed. Centrally stored 
information can be retrieved by terminals at the border posts.
By 1994, technology enabled border control guards to retrieve information from all central 
police databases:614 the databases which can be consulted are the INPOL (the police 
information system which contains data on persons and cases which are sought), the 
Auslanderzentralregister (the central database on foreigners held at the BKA), the Zentrale 
Verkehrsinformationssystem (the central traffic information system ZEVIS) and the
611 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1994," ed. Bundesgrenzschutz 
(Bonn: 1995).
612 for details on technologies used, refer to Busch, "Hart an der Grenze.", Pau and Schubert, 
"Bundesgrenzschutz. Eine Omniprasente und Omnipotente Bundespolizei?."; they also report that 
the technology only works well in good weather; in rain or fog, the visibility is greatly reduced. The 
year reports of the Bundesgrenzschutz contain information on the type and number of equipment 
purchased, but do not comment their use or purpose.
613 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1998."
614 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1994."
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Schengen Information System (SIS).615 Mobile terminals which can check data independent 
of a fixed terminal have been in use in trains since the 1980s. The Bavarian police doing 
controls inland has used mobile data transfer technology for checks in traffic since 1994.
Systems of digital recording of finger prints have become common. In Germany, all asylum 
seekers are fingerprinted and photographed since 1992 and the AFIS616 has been set up. In 
this system, the data of asylum seekers, of suspects, convicted and imprisoned people are 
all in the same database.
These new technologies allow the BGS to conduct checks on persons entering or leaving 
the Schengen territory to an extent hitherto unknown. They can be checked for existing 
warrants, whether they are registered as asylum seekers somewhere in Germany. Their car 
licence can be checked for any offences, and any van can be subjected to C 02  
measurements in order to check for hidden immigrants. The possibility to access different 
databases together has been criticised for endangering civil rights of citizens. The 
problematic of the SIS has also been presented by civil rights advocates. It has often been 
criticised that the reason for entering persons was not clear and that the data not 
suppressed in time.617
Modern technology introduced new possibilities and methods of border controls, and thus 
changed the practice at the border itself. It is difficult to assess whether the new technology 
has facilitated the work at the border. While machines allow the checking of forged 
passports or the surveilling of a border area, much important work still has to be done ‘in 
person’ such as patrols of the border area or detecting new forging techniques. 
Nevertheless, technological equipment was given great emphasis and is constantly being 
updated, since the BGS saw their work as an ongoing race between smugglers and police.618
615 Busch states that nearly 60% of the data in INPOL and 85% of the data in SIS concern non-EU 
nationals who are to be deported or denied entry.
616 Automatisiertes Fingerabdruckidentifizierungssystem, automated fingerprint information system.
617 For criticism of the SIS refer for example to publications of Statewatch and Biirgerrechte & Polizei.
618 See e.g. Jurgen Wahl, "Menschenschmuggel im Zittauer Sack. Die Kontrolle an den Aufiengrenzen 
der EU," Rheinischer Merkur, 30 June 1995.
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1.4. Cooperation between services
Since 1973, the BGS has a legal obligation to serve as a reinforcement of the Lander police 
if so requested. The BGS also supports the Lander in delegating the special services (anti­
terrorist unit GSG 9, flying services, central office for communication etc.), its helicopters, 
water-cannons and special automobiles. A substantial amount of its time was spent on such 
work in the past: for example in 1989, around 13,400 BGS officers worked at 16 different 
occasions for Lander police.619 By 1995, the number of officers in support of Lander police 
was markedly reduced, although the BGS supported the Lander police in 29 cases: 5,800 
officers were in action and 165,000 hours of work were invested.620 Most of these 
interventions were at the occasions of major demonstrations.
A number of cooperations between services on the federal level and between federal and 
Lander level have been initiated in order to improve the fight against border-related crime 
and offences. Especially after the unification and the signing of the SIC and before 
implementation, the security rationale became prevalent also for measures raising national 
law enforcement capacity. On 1 April 1992, a regulation went into force which unified the 
various existing regulations for the cooperation between customs and BGS and applied 
these also to the German-Polish and German Czech border.621 The intention was to create 
a unitary framework for the cooperation of the services which are subordinate to different 
ministries (customs: Ministry of Finance and BGS: Ministry of the Interior). The regulation 
provided for a unification of personnel at the border points and for coordinated work 
along the border. The reason given for this cooperation was the rise of illegal immigration 
and smuggling of goods.622 The BGS and the customs service also collaborated in order to 
evaluate the various sections of the border according to categories of danger in the 
framework of a criminal-geographic regional analysis. The goal was to optimise the control 
and surveillance.623
619 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1989."
620 Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1998."
621 Dienstanweisung fur die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesgrenzschutz und Bundeszollverwaltung bei der 
Uberwachung der Grenzen zu Polen und der CSFR, cited after Hellenthal, "Die aktuelle Entwicklung 
der illegalen Zuwanderung nach Deutschland insbesondere mit Blick auf die Schleuserkriminalitat 
und andere Felder der grenzbezogenen Organisierten Kriminalitat und die Gegenmaflnahmen des 
Bundesgrenzschutz in seiner neuen Organisationsstruktur," 5.
*22 Ibid.
623 Ibid, Fredi Hitz, "Grenzlagebild - Lageentwicklung und Zusammenarbeit der Sicherheitsbehorden," 
Die Polizei 84, no. 6 (1993), Eduard Lintner, "Grenziiberschreitende Kooperation der 
Sicherheitsbehorden," Die Polizei 84, no. 6 (1993).
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After shifting the emphasis of its own service gradually to border controls, the BGS started 
a number of cooperations with Lander police. These cooperations allowed the two services 
to gain insights for each other’s work and to provide mutual support during operations. A 
first regional security partnership between the police of Sachsen and the BGS of that area 
was enacted in 1992. The police was to support the BGS in the border region in measures 
of fighting crime (mainly observation) and to reinforce investigations in the area where 
three states meet (Dreilandereck). The objective of these partnerships was described as 
follows in the 1998 year report of the BGS: the aim was to promote the cooperation 
between the security authorities, to reinforce the visible presence of police, to fight 
transborder crime, especially smuggling and illegal immigration, and to include citizens 
more in the fight against crime.
The cooperation between Lander police and BGS was intensified through the so-called 
‘Sicherheitskooperationsvereinbarungen’ (security cooperation agreements) with Baden- 
Wiirttemberg (18 July 1997), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1 July 1998), Sachsen (3 
Marchl999), Niedersachsen (26 Aprill999), Schleswig-Holstein (20 May 1999), 
Brandenburg (7 June 1999), Berlin (30 June 1999) and Hamburg (5 May 1999). 
Furthermore, security partnerships were agreed for the cities of Berlin (22 April 1998), 
Stuttgart (3 March 1998) and Bremen (5 May 1998) as well as Frankfurt a.M., Offenbach, 
Hanau and the Rhein-Neckar region (early 1999). For the cities of Munich (4 June 1998) 
and Hanover (18 August 1998), regional cooperation for interventions was agreed.
The cooperation with Lander police meant that the BGS retained visibility in the Lander 
also after its shifting primarily to border controls. The BGS was also present at the interior 
of the territory due to the tasks of rail police at railway stations and in trains. Such a 
presence could give citizens the impression that security issues originally associated with 
the border had moved away from the border and were relevant for internal security 
everywhere in the country.
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2. Reinforced controls within the German territory
Having outlined the changes which occurred specifically within the BGS in order to adapt 
it to the new tasks at the eastern border and the consequences of the abolition of internal 
border controls, the next section surveys the means and principles of law enforcement 
agencies in general. The BGS is a central institution for law enforcement at the borders, but 
the Lander police have also been given an increasing role in ensuring internal security after 
the end of internal border controls.
The reinforced checks have introduced new principles of control, most notably the 
possibility of control independent of suspicion. Bavaria was the first Land which allowed 
its police so-called ‘anlafi- und verdachtsunabhangige Kontrollen’ (controls independent of 
concrete occasion and suspicion) (Bayerisches PAG, §13 Abs.l Nr.5) outside the 
immediate border zone in 1994.624 The origins of the so-called ‘Schleierfahndung’625 can be 
traced back to a working group of police practicioners in the Bavarian 
Landeskriminalamt626 which had already suggested in 1988 means of counteracting the 
reduction of border controls in Bavaria by compensatory measures.627 The following 
measures were suggested:628
investigations independent of concrete occasion, conducted by mobile patrols
- constant control of ‘criminographic areas’
- undercover control of moving traffic on motorways and through-roads with 
international traffic
use of mobile control troops for the fight against certain types of crime (illegal 
entry, car theft, drugs control)
Art. 31 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 of the changed police law in Bavaria of 1 January 1995 took most of 
these possibilities into account. This was justified with the impending accession of Austria 
to the EU and Schengen. Controls independent of suspicion were allowed on through- 
roads (Autobahn, European roads and other roads with significance for transborder traffic) 
and within 30 km of the border. Similar provisions were made by Baden-Wiirttemberg,
624 Eberhard Roese, "Interview with Eberhard Roese," (2001).
625 The term ‘Schleierfahndung’ describes the particular method of control and is difficult to translate 
and will therefore be used in German. The closest English translation is dragnet controls.
626 Land Office of Criminal Investigation.
627 Roese, "Interview with Eberhard Roese."
628 Eberhard Roese, ""Schleierfahndung" in Miinchen. Art. 13 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 Bayer. 
Polizeiaufgabengesetz," ed. Polizeiprasidium Miinchen and Abteilung Einsatz (Miinchen: 2000).
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Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersachsen, Sachsen and Thiiringen (which has neither an 
internal nor external Schengen border!).
From 1998 onwards, the BGS, too, was to conduct controls independent of suspicion, but 
depending on the general situation (lageabhangig). This was to be allowed in the 30-km 
area, but also in airports and railway stations. This meant that every person could be 
stopped and searched in all trains and railway stations independently of suspicion.
Connected to this new principle of control of was a general zonal approach to control. 
Markus Hellenthal, Referatsleiter of the BGS, wrote in 1997, that the strategy of the BGS 
left the actual border line and directs its attention to the border area.629 Minister Kanther 
also emphasised the need to control the region near the border rather than the border line: 
’Durch den Wegfall der Personenkontrollen an den Schengener Binnengrenzen kommt der 
verstarkten polizeilichen Uberwachung der grenznahen Region und der 
Verkehrsknotenpunkte maflgebliche Bedeutung zu. Nur durch einen gemeinsamen 
„Sicherheitsschleier“ von Bundesgrenzschutz und Landespolizeien konne verhindert 
werden, dass Kriminelle ungestort von einem Staat in den anderen reisen konnen.’630 
Through the security cooperations between Lander and BGS, the BGS could profit from 
the larger competences of the Lander police as well as surveilling its own 30 km zone. This 
also fit the picture of a spatial approach to control.
The basis of such a zonal approach to border control was traffic control. Bavaria equipped 
all the police units responsible for motorways with teams for control and investigation. 
Their task was to search for individuals, to fight smuggling and support other divisions in 
the fight against organised crime and drug-related crime.631 They disposed of laptops where 
they have access to all important data via police radio.
These special units were reinforced after the inclusion of the Bavarian border police into 
the Land police due to the abolition of border controls with Austria: two thirds of the 
former officers of the border police were used in the border region, in the 
‘allgemeinpolizeilichen Betreuung’ (general police services) of the Land police, in the LKA
629 Albrecht Maurer, "Schleierfahndung im Hinterland," Btirgerrecbte & Polizei 59, no. 1 (1998).
630 Press release of the BMI, 17.7.1996. Translation: Due to the lifting of controls on persons at the 
Schengen internal borders, the increased police surveillance of the border region and the traffic 
centers has gained crucial importance. Only a common ‘security veil/network’ by federal border 
police and Lander police could prevent that criminals travel unimpeded from one state to another.
631 Maurer, "Schleierfahndung im Hinterland."
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and the control of dangerous and heavy traffic. A significant part of the officers was 
employed in ‘Schleierfahndung’ and was attributed to 5 new police inspections.632
This kind of control has been the subject of intense debate. Critics have observed that it 
was not the original objective to multiply the points of controls and to ‘transform the old 
borders into the network maps of the European railways’ as one journalist put it.633 The 
former president of the police in Diisseldorf, Prof. Hans Lisken, said in an interview that 
such controls of everyone were against constitutional rights. 634 A head of the Baden- 
Wiirttemberg police academy, Thomas Feltes, has also argued that ‘Schleierfahndung’ was 
‘at least against the spirit of the Schengen Convention,’635 which stipulated that crossing of 
borders between Member States be possible without regular controls. This was 
contradicted by Munich’s police vice president Roese who said that the legal preconditions 
for the application of the law (on controls independent of suspicion) were concrete enough 
(prevention of illegal crossing of the border, prevention of illegal stay in Germany, fight 
against organised crime); he added that these preconditions were subjectable to legal 
control. He also said that imprecise terminology in the law was necessary in order to take 
into account the mobility and changeability of international crime.636 The Ministry of 
Interior argued thus: a differentiation had to be made between control of transborder 
circulation (which the SIC forbids at the internal borders) and the police surveillance of the 
border (which has to be understood as a general task of danger prevention not directed at a 
particular person).637
The controls of the BGS in the border area are de jure only observing units. The police of 
the Land, however, can exercise its control possibilities up to the border which seems 
within the legal ambit of the Schengen Convention. However, in cases where the division 
between the BGS and Lander police is attenuated, as for example in cooperation 
agreements, the argumentation becomes legally problematic.
632 Ludwig Fisch, "Polizei auf dem Land bekommt Verstarkung," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 10 March 1998.
633 Heribert Prantl, "Das Land der tausend Grenzen," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 15 June 1998.
634 Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 31.1.1998
635 cited after Maurer, "Schleierfahndung im Hinterland," 2.
636 Roese, "Interview with Eberhard Roese."
™ Ibid.
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3. Cooperation agreements with other countries
3.1. Cooperation with law enforcement services
Already in the 1950s, Germany entered into cooperation agreements with neighbours in 
order to be able to ensure the enforcement of controls at its borders. As concerns its 
Schengen neighbours, Germany already had cooperation agreements before the Schengen 
Agreement were concluded:638 with France639, with Belgium640 and with the Netherlands641. 
These agreements aimed mainly at regulating the relationships between border control 
units working in immediate proximity and provided for rudimentary cooperation. In the 
framework of the Schengen agreements, other cooperation seemed necessary. Police 
cooperation with France was agreed in October 1992 with common commissariats, a 
coordination centre, coordinated interventions, exchange officers and a rise in financial 
means for communication devices.642 Luxembourg and Germany concluded a similar 
agreement in October 1995, which contained also provisions and details for modalities of 
cross-border observation and pursuit.643 Additionally, agreements were made with the other 
Schengen neighbours according to Art. 39 (4) of the SIC (cooperation in border areas) with 
similar provisions.
Germany also concluded cooperation agreements with its eastern neighbours. In the years 
1991 and 1992, bilateral agreements in the area of the fight against organised crime, drug- 
related crime and illegal immigration were made between Germany and Poland, Hungary, 
the then Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. These states were to receive 31 million DM up to 
1994 with the purpose of purchasing of equipment and improving police education.644
With Poland, additional police cooperation was agreed. A state treaty between Germany 
and Poland for the cooperation of police authorities and border authorities was signed in
638 All figures taken from the report of the Schengen working group on police and security 
SCH/I (95) 46 rev.2.
639 Agreement of 18 April 1958 on the neighbouring border control stations and Agreement of 3 
February 1977 on police cooperation in the border area.
640 Agreement of 30 September 1959 on the relations between the police autorities at the common 
border.
641 The document of the working group does not indicate a date, but refers to several agreements 
predating the Schengen Implementing Convention.
642 Agreement of 12 October 1992 on police cooperation between the Lander and Departments at the 
border.
643 Agreement of 24 October 1995 on bilateral police cooperation.
644 Ziel, "Polizeiliche Zusammenarbeit mit Osteuropa."
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1995. Further agreements on the formation of common groups of investigation, and 
common units were planned.645
Despite these formal agreements, it was the informal contacts which proved most 
successful. Dietrich cites two BKA officers that the informal cooperation is satisfactory 
and even closer than the one with most Western European states.646
Furthermore, the conferences of Berlin (1991), Budapest (1993) and Prague (1997) brought 
together the authorities responsible for internal security of EC states, Switzerland, Austria 
as well as states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The conferences, at the initiative of 
the German Minster of Interior in 1991, Dr. Wolfgang Schauble, aimed at a common 
strategy for all European states, given that all states were concerned by the phenomena of 
migration and trans-border crime. Part of this strategy was future cooperation of law 
enforcement services and regular meetings of heads of police.
3.2. Readmission agreements
Readmission agreements provide for co-operation on the return of illegal immigrants to 
their country of origin, thus allowing a ‘refoulement* of refugees and asylum seekers. 
Individual states are usually partners in such treaties. The Schengen Agreements made 
possible the conclusion of Schengen Readmission Agreements between all Schengen 
partners and individual countries.
Germany had a number of readmission agreements with West European partners before 
Schengen: with the Benelux countries (1966), Denmark (1954), France (1960), Sweden 
(1954) and Norway (1955). These were all states with whom such deportation agreements 
were relatively unproblematic since fairly similar economic conditions and no large 
numbers of migrants were involved. In the face of a sharp rise of asylum seekers and 
immigration of ethnic Germans towards the end of the 1980s, Germany concluded a 
number of agreements with the aim of fixing the duty of neighbouring countries to take 
back people with provenance from the East who had no legal right to enter Germany.647
645 Cf. Helmut Dietrich, "Deutsch-PolnischePolizeikooperation," Biirgerrechte & Polizei/CILIP 59, no. 1 
(1998).
646 Ibid.
647 All following dates are taken from Council of the European Union, "Inventory of Readmission 
Agreements," ed. General Secretariat (Brussels: 1994).
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The first of such agreements was concluded between Poland and all of the Schengen states 
in March 1991; visa obligations were lifted after this agreement.648 An additional bilateral 
agreement between Germany and Poland for taking back refugees was signed in May 1993 
and enacted in June of the same year. In exchange, Germany agreed to pay 120 million DM 
to Poland for the accommodation of refugees and for the reinforcement of controls at the 
Polish eastern border. Similar bilateral agreements were made with the Czech Republic 
(1994), Romania (1992) and Bulgaria (1994 and 1996). Agreements with Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Turkey were also negotiated.
The countries east of Germany have started to imitate this policy and made readmission 
agreements amongst themselves. Poland for example has concluded readmission 
agreements with the Schengen members as well as Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
648 Since 1997, the European Commission has been authorised to negotiate further readmission 
agreements with other states of origin of refugees such as Russia, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Hong Kong and Macao. Also readmission clauses have been included in agreements with Algeria, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, FYROM and Uzbekistan.
- 271 -
National changes of border-related policies
4. Safe third countries and the change of the law of asylum
The first change for asylum seekers hoping to come to Germany was the introduction of 
visas for all countries of provenance of asylum seekers in the 1980s. Since this did not have 
much effect on the number of asylum seekers, the law of asylum was changed in 1993 after 
much debate. In a looser sense, this may also be considered as part of Germany’s national 
compensatory measures for the elimination of border controls. The change of the Basic 
Law required an alliance across parties which was achieved in the end with a coalition of 
the conservative parties CDU/CSU, the Social Democrats and the Liberals. The new 
provisions allowed for illegal immigrants to be pushed back - if found in the border area - 
to the country they came from. This was made possible by designating the country of 
provenance as a safe third country.
The geographic position in the midst of Europe was traditionally considered a 
disadvantage. Chapter five showed that Germany’s position in the centre of Europe was 
presented as problematic with regard to migration and international crime. Prantl writes 
that the conservative parties attempted to turn this position into an advantage in asylum 
policies:
Deutschland habe lange genug unter seiner geographischen Lage im Herzen Europas 
gelitten, meinte man in der CDU/CSU. Jetzt solle man sich in der Fliichtlingsfrage 
diese Lage doch einmal zunutze machen -  und die Staaten, die Deutschland wie ein 
Ring umgeben, zur Auffangzone fur Fliichtlinge machen. Diese Idee ist der Kern des 
Asylkompromisses vom Dezember 1992.649
According to this analysis, Germany tried to turn ’finally’ an old disadvantage on its head. 
The geographical position in the middle of the continent was to serve as a strategic 
advantage.
Germany had been trying to create a list of safe third countries since 1991 in the 
framework of the EC/EU (Ad hoc Group of Immigration).650 The reasoning was the 
following: if the objective of a person was to seek protection from political prosecution,
649 Prantl, Deutschland - Leicht Entflammbar, 96. Translation: The CDU/CSU were of the opinion that 
Germany had suffered long enough from its geographical position in the heart of Europe. Now this 
position could be used to one’s own advantage - and turn the countries which surround Germany 
like a ring into a gathering place for refugees. This idea is the centre of the asylum compromise of 
1992.
650 Heiner Busch, "Vom Einheitlichen Binnenmarkt zum Gemeinsamen Abschieberaum," Burgerrechte & 
Polizei /CILIP 45, no. 2 (1993): 19.
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then he or she would apply for asylum in the first safe state he arrived in. If, instead, a 
person continued towards another state, he or she was ‘obviously’ trying to abuse the right 
of asylum and their application of asylum may be rejected on the grounds that it was 
‘manifestly unfounded’651. Thus, people coming from a safe third country could be pushed 
back without the police having to wait for the outcome of a legal process.
The existence of safe third countries, comprising all countries around Germany, facilitated 
reducing the number of asylum seekers and immigration in Germany. At the same time, 
however, it put pressure on the borders since increasing numbers of people tried to enter 
and stay in the country illegally, knowing that there were no other options to enter: since 
Germany did not have a legal way to immigrate, they would be pushed back at the borders 
or have their asylum application rejected.
The change also augmented the task of the BGS. According to the readmission agreements, 
illegal immigrants caught in the border zone could only be pushed back if their entry via an 
external border could be proven or was apparent. Thus, the BGS had an important task in 
ensuring the asylum compromise: ’Seit dem 1. Juli 1993 hat der BGS eine zusatzliche 
fundamentale Funktion in der praktischen Umsetzung der Neuregelung des Asylrechts: Die 
Anwendung der Drittstaatenregelung als einem Eckpfeiler des Asylrechts und die daraus 
folgende Ruckfiihrung von unberechtigten Asylbewerbern setzen voraus, daft die 
Zuwanderung aus einem bestimmten Drittstaat nachgewiesen werden kann. Dies kann in 
der Regel nur bei Aufgriffen im Grenzgebiet gelingen.’652 The important role of the BGS in 
the new legal arrangements and its new tasks as deportation agents were also noted in the 
newspapers.653
All of the aforementioned measures were taken to make the control at the borders 
themselves tighter or to reinforce controls in a spatial view of borders. The widening of 
controls to the whole border zone, or as in the case of Bavaria, to practically the whole 
territory was a witness to this practice. High-tech control equipment and an increased 
budget and personnel allowed the services to do this job. Agreements with neighbouring
651 ‘offensichtlich unbegriindet’ is one of the legal categories for rejection of an asylum application.
652 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1994," 8. Translation: Since 1 
July 1993, the BGS has an additional fundamental function in the practical transposition of the new 
asylum regulation: The application of the third state rule as a pillarstone of the new law of asylum and 
the resulting returning of unfounded asylum applicants presuppose that immigration from a particular 
third state can be proven. As a rule, this can only succeed if migrants are apprehended in the border 
region.
653 Cf for example "Neue Dienststellen Beim Grenzschutz," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 April 1993, 
Wolfgang Sardison, "Grenzschiitzer als Abschieber," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 15 April 1993.
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countries were made so that border controls could be more effective. Readmission 
agreements -  and the new law of asylum -  served the purpose to deport speedily the 
unwanted migrants.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has retraced the changes in national border policies in Germany in the 
timeframe that was also relevant for the Schengen Agreements. It has been shown that the 
BGS adapted its structure, equipment and personnel to the new geopolitical situation with 
a reorganisation in 1992 and 1998 and a new law in 1994. New principles of control were 
introduced, using technology and a spatial approach to controls. Cooperation agreements 
with Lander police and the customs service were initiated to step up a coordinated fight 
against international crime and illegal immigration. The new law of asylum and the 
regulation regarding safe third countries as well as the re-admission agreements with 
neighbouring states gave the BGS a crucial role in apprehending illegal immigrants close to 
the border.
These developments show that reinforcement of controls did not only take place as a direct 
consequence of legal Schengen provisions, but that Germany reinforced controls on the 
national level without legal obligations to do so. Thus, the Schengen rationale of a common 
safe internal space was reinscribed on the national level.
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Chapters five and six presented the changes relating to border controls on the national 
German level, showing how national security agencies both contributed and reacted to a 
changing discourse regarding the use and necessity of border controls. The aim of this 
chapter is to analyse the involvement of German representatives at the European level. It 
will explain that Germany’s concerns were central in shaping the final nature of the 
Agreement. Germany’s contribution in the negotiations themselves consisted above all in 
providing technical and practical knowledge and experience. A ‘division of work’ between 
the two leaders France and Germany can be identified, in which France took more of the 
political leadership and authority while Germany provided the technical competence and 
experience. However, there was also disagreement between the two largest Schengen states 
with regard to SIS and cross-border hot pursuit. While Germany pushed these issues 
ahead, France was rather hesitant. These disagreements can be best understood in light of 
the different concepts of sovereignty in the two countries which has been outlined in 
chaper two.
Germany’s participation in European policies aiming at dismantling of border controls is 
set on a number of foundations. Germany’s historical experience, as outlined in chapter 
four, led its leaders to view the abolition of border controls in a European context as much 
desirable. Indeed, the Western and European identification of Germany was strong enough 
for it to be ready to give up sovereign rights in exchange for a deepening of the integration. 
Germany’s political and economic weight within the European Community led it to believe 
that also its influence in the area of internal affairs would be large enough to shape the 
results to a degree of security that was deemed indispensable by German officials. 
Conversely, the German experts for internal security were convinced that security could 
only be reached through Europe-wide measures.
The heritage of the historical role also was a reason for a certain reticence during the 
negotiations on the German side. Germany’s European partners would have regarded 
demands giving far-reaching rights to German police in other states or allowing strongly 
repressive measures as inappropriate or even threatening.
Germany’s central role in the process of European integration placed it in a position where 
lack of participation in such a major enterprise would have meant a crucial setback. The 
events of 1989 retained and even emphasised this constitutive role for Germany in the 
European Community, but changed its negotiating position. The interests of Germany’s 
partners after the end of bipolarity were to ensure Germany’s anchoring in the European
-276-
The German role on the European level
process even more and not to have Germany ‘drift’ eastwards. The government had to 
respect this in its policy choices and representations so as not to raise any further fears of 
its partners. Before unification, Germany did not have highly problematic borders in the 
Schengen perspective, since the ‘Iron curtain border’ was fiercely guarded. After 1990, 
Germany possessed a long eastern frontier which it had to control, bordering on an area 
which was feared to be politically instable.
The following will first outline which German institutions were involved in the 
negotiations. It will be shown that the lead of the negotiations in the Chancellery was 
advantageous to maintain a coherent position. The Ministry of the Interior and its BGS 
department were also centrally involved. A further section will show that the higher 
officials from the Chancellery and the Ministries attended the Central Negotiation Group 
while the professionals and experts were present in the working groups. This finding 
confirms the general description of other researchers of the structure of the Schengen 
negotiations (cf. Chapter three). The next section outlines Germany’s longstanding concern 
with compensatory measures and its influence on the Schengen negotiations in this respect. 
It will be shown that it provided a lot of technical expertise and thus pushed for a number 
of individual measures such as hot pursuit, the Schengen Information System or the actual 
conduct of controls at the borders. The last part of the chapter outlines the French- 
German relationship in these negotiations.
-277-
The German role on the European level
1. Institutional involvement of Germany
1.1. Tederfuhrung* in the Chancellery
Germany’s involvement in European circles began early on. It was a member of all circles 
on the EC level which dealt with questions of police cooperation, terrorism and drug 
controls. Germany sent representatives to meetings of all levels of TREVI. This meant that 
the Minister himself was involved in the regular meetings with European colleagues. At the 
same time, his senior civil servants were participating in conferences where information on 
policies were exchanged. Lastly, national experts (lower level bureaucrats and practitioners) 
met regularly for the exchange of information in working parties. It is known that in 
Germany, Hans Neusel as state secretary from the BMI was closely involved with TREVI. 
It is much more difficult to find out who from the lower level civil servants were present.654 
Also not much information was available about personal links between engagement in 
Schengen and that in other circles. Given that cooperation in the area of immigration and 
crime limited the circle of participants to members of the appropriate ministries (Ministry 
of Justice and Interior and of Foreign and European Affairs) and given the limited number 
of personnel, it is to be assumed that some overlay in terms of personnel must have 
existed. And furthermore, that at least people from the same departments were involved in 
circles as diverse as TREVI, Vienna Club and Schengen.
Although the Schengen Agreements were primarily about the abolition of border controls, 
the German Ministry of the Interior was initially not the prime actor involved in the 
negotiations. The initiative for the abolition of border controls came from the 
Bundeskanzleramt, the Federal Chancellery. The Schengen negotiations were ‘Chefsache’ 
as one interlocutor put it.655 It is well known, that Chancellor Kohl had a special personal 
interest in realising the abolition of border controls. Reportedly, he himself tried to destroy 
a border barrier as a young man.656 His common initiative with President Mitterrand in May 
1984 for the abolition of border controls between France and Germany became the 
immediate starting point for a long European development. As has been noted above, 
however, the politicians had not envisaged such lengthy negotiations. The abolition of 
border controls was to be a matter of weeks.
654 Interview partners were hesitant to name participants or had entered the Ministry later.
655 A matter for the leader.
656 At the beginning of the 1950s, a number of young people tore down border barriers which were 
regarded as symbols of divisions between countries.
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The Chancellery was in overall charge of negotiations for the abolition of border controls, 
‘federfiihrend’ until 1995. The concept of Tederfiihrung’ means that one federal institution 
has the initiative in a certain subject matter. It coordinates all actions, calls together 
meetings, receives and distributes information and therefore sets the agenda and the pace 
of proceedings in the subject matter. In international negotiations it also heads the national 
delegation. The Tederfiihrung5 in the Chancellery shows the importance accorded to the 
process by the top level of government. The positioning of the topic at the Chancellery 
also ensured that negotiations were integrated with other policy goals such as policies 
towards its neighbours, German policy of European integration and also relations between 
East and West Germany. Placing the negotiations in the hands of the BMI would have 
meant a primary emphasis on questions of security and border controls and their technical 
feasibility. One objective of putting the lead in the Chancellery was that no one of the other 
involved institutions could advocate its own interests one-sidedly. As Horst Eisel, the 
Schengen representative at the BMI at the time, puts it: T)ie Federfiihrung (fur Schengen) 
lag im Kanzleramt. Und dies aus gutem Grunde. Bei einem so komplexen Thema, bei dem 
Materien aus verschiedenen Ressorts involviert sind, ging es darum, Einseitigkeiten durch 
Ressortbegehrlichkeiten zu vermeiden.’657
The Tederfiihrung’ in the Chancellery was also necessary due to the federal structure of 
Germany and the Lander’s insistence in making their voices heard in the process. The lead 
with the central institution of government made coordination of diverging interests easier. 
Despite the fact that some differing interests may have remained, the overall long-term 
strategy of Germany was perceived as consistent by observers.658 This was certainly also 
due to the stability of the German government (1982-1998). While most other Schengen 
members experienced one or several turns of interior policy, Germany was able to present 
an overall consistent picture -  given the dramatic change of external political circumstances 
after 1989.659
Placing the lead of the negotiations with the BMI would also have been a great innovation 
since it had hitherto been rather nationally oriented. Internal security was not a central
657 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: The Tederfiihrung’ for Schengen lay in the 
Chancellery. And this for a good reason. It was important to avoid biases due to covetousness of 
departments in such a complex matter which involved issues of various departments.
658 Cf. Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, 121.
659 Although unification and large numbers of asylum seekers led to fundamental changes of the 
constitution, the general line of policy of the CDU-FDP government did not change. Stability of 
government also meant a stability of the composition of high-level civil servants which were central 
in these negotiations.
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European topic in the mid-1980s. It may have been dealt with amongst European circles of 
security officials, but the numbers of officials involved were small. EC structures before 
1985 had not included any topics relating to internal security. Therefore, employees of 
Ministries of the Interior had relatively little experience with the negotiation structures on 
the European level.
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1.2. The German delegation
The German delegation to the Schengen negotiations united members from a number of 
Federal Ministries, including the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Technology, the Ministry of Traffic, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Chancellery. The negotiations were headed by the so-called ‘Schengen 
Koordinator’ in the Federal Chancellery who represented Germany in the Executive 
Committee from 1985 -  1995, the highest level of decision-making in the Schengen 
negotiation process. After 1995, the lead passed to the Ministry of the Interior.
From 1985 up to the present, these were:
• Prof. Dr. Waldemar Schreckenberger (1985 -  1988), Permanent Secretary, head of the 
Federal Chancellery (Leiter des Kanzleramtes)
• Dr. Lutz Stavenhagen (1989-1991), Minister of State in the Chancellery
• Bernd Schmidbauer (1992 -  1995), Minister of State in the Chancellery
• Prof. Dr. Kurt Schelter (1995 -  1998), Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of the 
Interior
• Claus Henning Schapper (since 1998), Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of the 
Interior660
1.2.1. Departments involved
The team from the Chancellery was mainly recruited from the Department of Internal 
Affairs, Social Policy and Environment. The protocols available show that Horst Glatzel 
represented Germany in the Central negotiation group from 1989 to 1994.661 Witnesses of 
the negotiations estimate that he was centrally important to the progress of negotiations. It 
was voiced that without him, Schengen would not be what it was today. He was assisted by 
a team from the same department.662 As far as can be inferred from the protocols, 
chancellery members were present mainly in the Central Negotiation Group.
660 Together with the Minister, Permanent Secretaries and Ministers of State belong to the political 
leadership of the Ministry. They are hierarchically directly subordinate to the Minister. The German 
ministerial bureaucracy knows two types of Permanent Secretaries, one being civil servant, the other 
being a member of the German Parliament. The parliamentary Permanent Secretary is called 
Staatsminister in the Federal Chancellery.
661 His predecessor was Dr.Dr. Konig from the Chancellery. However, no protocols could be obtained 
on the earliest part of negotiations.
662 The following results from an analyses of protocols available. Unfortunately, reliable protocols could 
only be obtained for the time from 1989 onwards. There may also have been additional members. 
Only the more senior members of the delegation could be identified by their function. Given the 
limited availability of protocols and closure of Schengen documents in the German federal archive,
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A team from the Federal Ministry of the Interior was also involved from the beginning. Its 
involvement secured technical experience and knowledge for the negotiation team. The 
exact size of the team during various stages of the negotiations cannot be determined. 
Documents allow, however, to identify central figures and the length of their presence at 
the negotiations.
The most senior people involved were the state secretaries of the Ministry. For the time of 
enquiry, they were Hans Neusel (1985 -  1992) and Kurt Schelter (1993 -  1998).663 From 
the Ministry’s departments and units, the police unit was centrally involved from the 
beginning. During the 1980s, this unit comprised both ordinary police matters as well as 
the Bundesgrenzschutz. It thus contributed to the negotiations knowledge about border 
control practices and options as well as knowledge about police investigation practices and 
about information technologies such as the INPOL. One of the members of the 
department, Reinhard Rupprecht, was present at the negotiations already for the first 
Schengen Agreement. As head of special police matters at the BMI, he attended the 
negotiations until 1991, when he took over the Berlin representation of the Ministry.664 
Horst Eisel from the department concerned with border control665 was a long-term 
member of the negotiation team (until 1997). He was also mentioned to be one of the 
‘fathers of Schengen’ by an interlocutor of the BMI.666 Other departments present at the 
negotiations were for example the unit of police information systems and the unit of the 
Bundeskriminalamt at the BMI. Another BMI department involved was the one for matters 
of foreigners and asylum.667 Similarly, the department for constitutional matters, state law 
and administration was involved. For example, Klaus-Peter Nanz, one of the interviewees 
for this thesis, participated in the negotiations from the early stages until 1994. He was
there is no means to countercheck the data. Efforts were made, however, to have interviewees 
confirm the validity of data where possible.
663 Evidence they gave to the Committee of Internal Affairs at the Bundestag is an indication of their 
involvement. E.g. Neusel, "Bericht des Bundesministeriums des Innern iiber AusgleichsmaBnahmen 
zum Schengener Abkommen.", Neusel, "Unterrichtung des BT-Innenausschusses iiber den Stand der 
Beratungen der Einwanderungs- und Trevi-Minister der EG."
664 In 1992, he became head of the department Internal Security* at the Ministry. Since 1991, his name 
no longer appears in protocols, but his continuing interest in matters concerning European-level 
solutions for internal security is demonstrated by his book of 1992 and also later work: Rupprecht, 
"Zuwanderung und Innere Sicherheit.", Rupprecht and Hellenthal, Innere Sicberheit im Europdischen 
Binnenmarkt.
665 Abt. P 1 4, after reorganisation in 1993 P HI 1 (General police intervention, border police; a unit for 
international and Schengen police matters). In 1996, the Schengen coordination was transferred to 
this area which became an subunit within the police unit. Eisel also held the post of border 
representative of the government.
666 Interview with Dr. Mizia.
667 Abt. VII, from 1992 onwards Abt. A
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seconded to the General Secretariat in 1992 with the task to represent the interests of the 
BMI. Other departments of the BMI present at the negotiations included visa matters, 
border control, police and security matters.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sent regular members of the delegation. Here, 
primarily the department for legal matters was concerned. They came from the unit of state 
and administrative law, and the unit of foreigners’ and asylum law. The Ministry of 
Finances was present through representatives from the unit III for customs, consumer 
taxes and movement of goods. The Ministry of Justice was equally involved through 
members of the unit of public law and of the unit for international penal law. Occasionally, 
also members from the Ministry of Traffic were present.
Additionally to representatives from federal Ministries, members from a number of other 
institutions completed the German team of negotiators. The Bundeskriminalamt sent 
members into various working groups; so did the Bundesgrenzschutz. The representatives 
of the Bundeskriminalamt were present mainly in the SIS steering group and the SIRENE > 
group, the sub-groups on visas and on drugs. The BGS employees worked mainly in the 
sub-group on borders. Also representatives from Lander Ministries of the Interior were 
present in working group negotiations.
1.2.2. Attendance in Schengen groups
During the Schengen negotiations, officials from a variety of hierarchical levels were 
needed to discuss the multiplicity of issues. The German members of the Executive 
Committee came from the Bundeskanzleramt from 1985 -  1995, and from the Federal 
Ministry of Interior after the national coordination was handed over.
The leadership of the German delegation in the Central Negotiation Group remained fairly 
permanent with the Chancellery. Dr. Dr. Konig headed the delegation in the beginning, 
replaced by Dr. Glatzel in the late 1980s, who remained in office until 1994. Occasionally, 
the German leader of the delegation replaced the state secretary at meetings of the 
Executive Committee.
The size of the national delegations in the Central Group varied between around 4 and 10 
members, increasing to 8 to 14 members when one delegation held the presidency. The
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German delegates in the Central Group came from all of the aforementioned Ministries, 
varying with the matters under discussion.
A survey of the protocols shows that some German negotiators worked exclusively in the 
Central Negotiation Group. Many attended additionally meetings of working groups668, 
while yet others were present only in the working groups or their sub-groups. The 
representatives of the various Ministries attended working groups according to their 
specialisation.
For example, German members of working group I (police and security) originated 
primarily from the Ministry of the Interior, but later also members of the BGS and the 
BKA were present. Also other working groups illustrate the presence of specialists: for 
example, the BMI member from the unit of police information systems participated in the 
SIS working group. Similarly, the working group which occupied itself with judicial 
cooperation (WGIH) had as German members mainly representatives of the Ministry of 
Justice, and the German delegates of working group IV - responsible for customs matters -  
were principally from the Ministry of Finance, division of customs. As has already been 
indicated above, members of the BKA contributed to the working groups on the SIS, 
drugs and visas, thus their areas of expertise.
In summary, the German representatives in the Schengen negotiations originated mainly 
from federal Ministries, primarily the Chancellery, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. ‘Federfiihrung’ for the German delegation 
came from the Chancellery until 1995 when it changed over to the BMI. The heading of 
the German delegation in the Central Negotiation group paralleled this development. On 
the whole, the leadership of the German delegation proved relatively stable, with little 
change of personnel. 669 The working group participants changed more frequently 
according to the topics under discussion.
668 por ^  overview of the organisation of negotiations into working groups, see chapter three.
669 This was different in some other delegations: The head of the French delegation in the Central 
Group changed from Ambassador Cazimajou to B. Hagelsteen to J. Y. Audoin and P.H. Maccioni 
between 1989 and 1997.
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2. Germany’s position in the negotiations: technical expertise and 
promotion of compensatory measures
The positions and interests of German bureaucrats and politicians in European circles are 
somewhat difficult to trace. One reason is that documents on the German preparations of 
negotiations themselves are hard to obtain. In Germany, many are classified as secret or are 
simply not in the public domain. Protocols of the Central Negotiation Group or the 
Working Groups were available for this thesis, but can only give limited information about 
German interests. To some extent, this is a reflection of the structure of policy-making on 
the European level. TREVI and Schengen were both intergovernmental processes whose 
work was difficult to control.670 Although national parliaments were regularly informed, 
they were dependent on the information and perspectives provided by the participants.671 
Transparency to the public in general, including the availability of documents, was not a 
characteristic of the negotiations regarding border controls.
The information had to be pieced together from the sources available and observations of 
witnesses of the process. This chapter was able to refer to a number of protocols of the 
meetings of the various negotiation groups, to reports made by the German government to 
the Committee of Internal Affairs in the Bundestag and to reports made by the Committee 
itself. Published speeches and reports by the relevant ministries and politicians have also 
been used. Furthermore, a series of interviews has been conducted with officials from the 
Ministry of Interior, Members of Parliament involved in the Schengen process and non- 
German observers of the process from the Schengen Secretariat.672 Additionally, the 
existing work of other scholars could be referred to for particular aspects.673 The variety of
670 The secretive nature of Schengen has repeatedly been denounced by researchers and civil rights 
associations. Cf. e.g. Bigo, Polices en Reseaux, Bunyan, ed., Statewatching the New Europe, den Boer, 
"Justice and Home Affairs: Cooperation without Integration."
The Schengen Secretariat, now moved into the General Secretariat, maintains an archive with all relevant 
documents to which researchers can get access upon request. This facilitates access to a number of 
documents regarding the negotiations themselves.
671 The Dutch parliament criticised its government in 1989 for planning to sign an agreement whose text 
was not known to the parliament. "Gefahrdetes Abkommen iiber den Abbau innereuropaischer 
Grenzkontrollen," Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, 14 December 1989.
672 Not many persons who were involved in the initial negotiations are still in office. Often, they have 
gone into retirement or left Parliament. The people from the Chancellery and the Ministry of Interior 
who were decision-makers at the negotiations were mostly senior level bureaucrats who have left 
office by now.
673 Cyrille Fijnaut, for example, has retraced the German positions nationally and on the European level 
with regard to police cooperation up to 1993. Fijnaut, "The 'Communitization' of Police Cooperation 
in Western Europe."
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sources ensured that organisational interest representations of one particular actor did not 
overly skew results.
This chapter will show that Germany was a central player during the negotiations for the 
Schengen Agreement. Not only through its weight within the European Community, but 
also by virtue of its experiences and expertise of its experts and bureaucrats and by the 
relatively coherent strategy within negotiations was Germany able to influence the process 
and outcome of negotiations. Horst Eisel from the German Ministry of Interior, who was 
present at the negotiations from the start, emphasises the centrality of Germany in the 
Schengen process and the motivation of realising free movement for its engagement: 
T)eutschland vertritt die Schengener Binnen-Politik aus Uberzeugung und war seit Anfang 
an einer der Schrittmacher. Die Bundesregierung hat Freiziigigkeit nicht nur vertraglich 
zugesagt, sondern maftgeblich dazu beigetragen, daft sie praktisch zur Geltung kam.’674
A central issue in the German position throughout the entire negotiations was the inclusion 
and actual content of compensatory measures. This was an attitude mainly advanced by 
bureaucrats and security professionals, and was due to the perspective that border controls 
were intimately linked with internal security. As has been shown in the chapter on the 
German debate regarding border controls, compensatory measures became the means of 
choice to make up for the loss of internal controls. An abolition of border controls 
therefore necessitated other measures to ensure security from dangers in the transnational 
sphere.675
674 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: Germany represents the Schengen internal policy 
out of conviction and was a pacemaker right from the beginning. The federal government has not 
only agreed freedom of movement in a treaty, but has decisively contributed to the fact that it was 
transposed into practice.
675 This argumentation is explored further in the Chapter on the debate about changes in border 
policies.
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2.1. The early ‘history* of compensatory measures
The importance of measures compensating for the abolition of border controls in 
European agreements can be traced back to the European Council in Fontainebleau in 
1984 when the intention to abolish border controls before mid-1985 in Europe was 
published.676 Says Fijnaut: ‘Notably for the Germans such a decision could not be 
implemented unless simultaneous measures were taken to counteract what they considered 
to be the more or less negative effects of such a policy, including the negative effect on 
internal safety and crime-fighting in the countries concerned.’677 Indeed, by mid-1985, none 
of the envisaged ‘all police and customs formalities’ had fallen in the EC. The measures 
needed in order to enact such an abolition proved to be much more important, complex 
and controversial than foreseen by the heads of state.
The Franco-German Agreement of 1984 itself only mentioned compensatory in a general 
way, stipulating more cooperation between national police and customs authorities, 
envisaging shifting all controls to external borders as well as approximating of national law 
(the whole document comprises only 2 pages).678 Political discourses concentrated on the 
freedom of movement for goods and persons that was being created. That the issue of 
compensatory measures was regarded as relatively unproblematic by politicians is shown by 
the fact that Kohl and Mitterand intended to have results within a few weeks. The 
Frankfurter Rundschau reported at the time that according to President Mitterand the two 
states ought to pass the implementation laws within a very short period of time. As a 
timeframe, he envisaged ‘the next few weeks’. Chancellor Kohl said that abolitions of 
border controls were to happen soon.679 However, the abolition of border controls was far 
away and compensatory measures played a large role in making abolition acceptable. The 
implementation of the Saarbriicken Agreement of 13 July 1984 only reduced border checks
676 ”The European Council welcomes the basic agreement which has been reached regarding the 
introduction of the European passport and asks the Council to take the necessary decisions so that 
this passport is available to the citizens of the Member States on 1 January 1985 at the latest. It asks 
the Council and the Member States to examine very quickly the measures which allow to abolish 
within the shortest period of time, at any rate before the end of the first half of 1985,... all police and 
customs formalities at the inner community borders.” (emphasis added) Presidency of the European 
Council, "Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council on the 28th Meeting of the 
European Council in Fontainebleau on 25 and 26 June 1984," Europa-Arcbiv, no. 15 (1984): 442.
677 Fijnaut, "The 'Communitization' of Police Cooperation in Western Europe," 87.
678 "Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Franzosischen 
Republik iiber den Schrittweisen Abbau der Kontrollen an den Grenzen Frankreichs und der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Bulletin der Europaischen Gemeinschaften 17, no. 7/8 (1984).
679 "Bald ohne Grenzkontrollen. Paris und Bonn iiber Abschaffung einig/Feier in Verdun," Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 30 May 1984., cited after Busch, Grenzenlose Polizei? Neue Grenzen undpolizeiliche 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa.
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to occasional spot checks and introduced common check points. An abolition of border 
controls was envisaged for later. Events were taken up by the Schengen negotiations and it 
took until 1995 that border checks were completely abolished.
An early use of the concept of compensatory measures can be found in 1984 when a 
German newspaper report already referred to the idea of compensatory measures: after a 
visit to France, Belgium and the Netherlands, members of parliament of the CDU/CSU  
reported that they had been in agreement with their interlocutors in these countries that the 
abolition of controls had to be accompanied by corresponding security measures.680
Reports of security experts in the Franco-German working group and the Bavarian police 
(regarding the Austrian-German Agreement along similar lines) in the mid-1980s displayed 
a concentration on security aspects: the practice of the control procedure without creating 
too many obstacles to traffic, the development of apprehensions at the border and the 
implementation of agreed compensatory measures.681 Thus, with regard to a Franco- 
German Agreement, German police and law enforcement experts focused much more on 
security than politicians had done.
Similarly, the Conference of German Lander Ministers of Interior (IMK) created a working 
group already on 13 June 1984 (thus before the Saarbriicken Agreement) to consider 
compensatory measures for the removal of checks on persons at the internal borders of the 
EC.682 The first report of this group -  noted by the Conference of Ministers on 19 October 
1984 -  emphasised the importance of border controls for internal security in Germany. As 
a first step, spot checks were accepted immediately without a loss of security. However, a 
second step of abandoning border controls completely would necessitate the prior 
‘complete implementation of the measures suggested for the fight against crime’.683 
Compensatory measures were presented without which the abolition of border controls 
ought not to take place. The list included684:
680 "Grenzkontrollen werden weiter abgebaut," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 29 November 1984.
681 Cf. Busch, Grenzenlose Polizei? Neue Grenzen undpolizeiliche Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 24.
682 Arbeitsgruppe ‘zur Priifung von Ausgleichsmafinahmen fur den Abbau von Personenkontrollen an 
den Binnengrenzen der EG’. Decision of the IMK of 13.6.1984, quoted after Ibid, 25.
683 Arbeitsgruppe der Standigen Konferenz der Innenminister und -senatoren der Lander, "Erster 
Bericht der IMK-Arbeitsgruppe zur Priifung von AusgleichsmaBnahmen fur den Abbau von 
Personenkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen der EG, dem Innenausschuft des Bundestages iibermittelt 
vom BMI am 27.11.1984," ed. Innenministerkonferenz (Bonn: 1984)., quoted after Busch, Grenzenlose 
Polizei? Neue Grenzen und polizeiliche Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 25. Original text: “vollstandige 
Durchfiihrung der zur Kriminalitatsbekampfung vorgeschlagenen Maftnahmen.
684 Quoted after Busch, Grenzenlose Polizei? Neue Grenzen und polizeiliche Zusammenarbeit in Europa.
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- cooperation in electronic investigations
exchange of information between security agencies
simplification of cooperation between authorities and for purposes of extradition 
hot pursuit
approximation of laws regarding drugs, weapons and compulsory registration.
A statement of Permanent Secretary Spranger in 1987 referring to this concept shows that 
the link between compensatory measures and border controls was applied to the then 
ongoing European negotiations: ’Spranger erinnerte daran, daft der Bundesinnenminister 
eine klare Konzeption zum Abbau der Grenzkontrollen habe, die mit der 
Innenministerkonferenz abgestimmt sei. Danach sollen bei einem Abbau der 
Grenzkontrollen entsprechende Ausgleichsmaftnahmen in Kraft gesetzt werden.’685
Thus, the Conference of Ministers of Interior of the Lander and the Federal Ministry of 
Interior began to develop the rationale of security through compensatory measures from 
1984 onwards at the latest. This rationale also found entry not only into the bilateral 
Agreements (see delay in putting Saarbriicken Agreement fully into practice) but also into 
the multilateral European-level negotiations.
/
685 "Offnung der Grenzen erfordert neue Formen der Kriminalitatsbekampfung." Translation: Spranger 
recalled that the Federal Minister of the Interior had a clear concept for the abolition of border 
controls which was in coordination with the Conference of Interior Ministers. In accordance with 
this concept, compensatory measures were to be enacted if border controls were abolished.
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2.2. Introduction of German experiences into the Schengen Agreement I
The rationale of compensatory measures to ensure security was also introduced by German 
representatives in the Schengen Agreements. As outlined above, the Schengen I document 
is divided into long-term and short-term measures thus introducing the two steps suggested 
by the working group of the Lander. It is interesting to observe that these measures include 
all of the above-mentioned aspects listed in the report by the working group of the IMK. 
The Schengen Agreement states a date by which both the abolition of border controls and 
the compensatory measures ought to be in place (1 January 1990). An express temporal 
link between compensatory measures and abolition of border controls is made in Art. 17 
where it says ‘To that end they shall endeavour first to harmonise, where necessary, the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions concerning the prohibitions and restrictions 
on which the checks are based and to take complementary measures to safeguard internal 
security and prevent illegal immigration by nationals of States that are not members of the 
European Communities.’ Also this echoes the suggestion made by the German working 
group for compensatory measures.
Didier Bigo has found out that representatives of the German Ministry of Interior at the 
time, amongst them Reinhard Rupprecht, were very influential for including the idea that 
the end of border controls was a risk for security and that compensatory measures needed 
to be found.686 It may be supposed that other countries had similar concerns, but it is 
indicative of the ‘division of roles’ that it was a German representative who was deemed 
responsible for the inclusion of the issue. Busch states that Rupprecht was one of the most 
important representatives of the thesis of the ‘loss of security’, thus the thesis that an 
abolition of border controls endangered security severely.687 Rupprecht himself has pointed 
repeatedly to the importance of state borders for police investigations and defence against 
threats.688 He emphasised the filter function of borders and that border controls were to 
deflect damage from the community whose territory is circumscribed by the border to be 
controlled.689
686 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux.
687 Busch, Grenzenlose Polizei? Neue Grenzen und polizeiliche Zusammenarbeit in Europa  ^37.
688 Reinhard Rupprecht, "Wettlauf der Schnecken. Probleme und Konsequenzen des Abbaus von 
Grenzkontrollen," Kriminalistik, no. 5 (1989).; see also Rupprecht, "Zuwanderung und Innere 
Sicherheit.", Rupprecht and Hellenthal, Innere Sicherheit im Europaischen Binnenmarkt.
689 The relevant sections in Rupprecht’s and Hellenthal’s draft of a European Community of Internal 
Security (EGIS - Europaische Gemeinschaft der Inneren Sicherheit) are indicative in this respect: 
Rupprecht and Hellenthal, Innere Sicherheit im Europaischen Binnenmarkt, 129-37. See especially section 
IV: Die Bedeutung der Grenzkontrollen fur die Innere Sicherheit.
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By viewing the border as the spatial fixation of state sovereignty, Rupprecht follows a 
tradition of scientists and practitioners of the state.690 He interprets a legal-administrative 
tradition which asserted that effective governance is only possible in a bordered area. He 
equates the boundedness of territory with controls at its borders. Rupprecht therefore 
necessarily saw a danger in the abolition of border controls because such controls had 
hitherto been central for governance and public security. He narrowed the legal tradition of 
giving borders a central role for governance to one emphasising the internal security 
function of border controls. He was echoed in this by many German experts for internal 
security, but has spelt out this theory most precisely.
It is to be supposed that the German input was crucial in providing for compensatory 
measures already in Schengen I. Given that institutions within Germany had already got 
experience in planning such agreements (Saarbriicken) and had already elaborated the 
necessity and a list of compensatory agreements regarded as useful, it can be assumed that 
this experience and rationale led Germany to press for the inclusion of these measures into 
agreements on border controls: Schengen I lists in Articles 18-20 the compensatory 
measures on which talks were to be started soon:
police cooperation for preventive combating crime and for investigation 
improvement in international legal aid and extradition
measures for common combat against crime: hot pursuit by police, use of given 
communication possibilities and internal legal aid
approximation of laws in the areas of weapons, drugs and foreigner registration 
harmonisation of visa and immigration conditions
Talks regarding the details of border controls were taken up soon afterwards. The fact that 
the measures had not been agreed in detail had obviously sped up the negotiations for 
Schengen I. At the same time, however, it led to a situation where the necessary content of 
these measures also had to be defined afterwards. The ‘junctim’ between compensatory 
measures and abolition of border controls which had been included in the agreement made 
such a settlement necessary. Apparently the security officials were unhappy with the clear 
formulation of objectives regarding the lifting of border controls and the lack of clarified 
compensatory measures. A member of the German delegation states that this situation was 
suspicious:
690 Ibid.; here he makes reference to the German lawyer Ernst Sauer: Ernst Sauer, Grundlagen des 
Volkerrechts (1948).. See also chapter two on the role of the border for the state.
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Im Vergleich zu dieser klaren Zielbestimmung sind die Regelungen iiber 
Ausgleichmafinahmen im Sicherheitsbereich verschwommen. Da ist von der 
Einleitung von Gesprachen, von der Suche nach Mitteln zur gemeinsamen 
Verbrechensbekampfung u.a. durch Priifung der etwaigen Einfiihrung eines Rechtes 
der polizeilichen Nacheile. Solche ausweichende Sprache macht mifitrauisch und hat 
die Verantwortlichen fiir die Innere Sicherheit besonders dazu veranlafit, ihre 
Erwartungen und Forderungen eindeutig zu definieren und intensive Bemiihungen 
zu deren Durchsetzung zu unternehmen.691
691 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: In comparison with this clear definition of objective, 
the regulations about compensatory measures are vague. The beginning of talks is mentioned, the 
search for means of a common fight against crime amongst other by examining the possible 
introduction of a right to hot pursuit. Such evasive language makes suspicious and has caused the 
responsible people for internal security to define their expectations and demands clearly and to 
undertake intensive attempts to push them through.
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2.3. The elaboration of compensatory measures
The importance of compensatory measures within the national circles charged with 
negotiations remained high between 1985 and 1990/1995. Negotiations of Schengen II by 
the German government were conducted on the basis of two decisions which both 
emphasised the importance of compensatory measures.
One was a decision of the German Bundestag introduced by the Committee on Internal
Affairs in 1985 which emphasised compensatory measures:
Die Bundesregierung wird gebeten, mit ihren Partnerstaaten zum Ausgleich der 
verringerten Grenzkontrollen bilateral oder auf Gemeinschaftsebene geeignete 
Mafinahmen zu vereinbaren, damit der erleichterte Grenziibertritt nicht zu 
Sicherheitsdefiziten und der illegalen Einreise von Nicht-EG-Staatsangehorigen in 
die Mitgliedsstaaten fiihrt. Diese Ausgleichsmafinahmen werden fur unverzichtbar 
gehalten.692
The second one was a decision of the Innenministerkonferenz of 18 April 1986 which 
listed compensatory measures which it considered important before realising the abolition 
of border controls.693 The IMK represents the opinion of the Lander Ministers in the 
federal system of Germany in the area of internal policy. Its opinion has therefore to be 
taken very seriously by the government.
A concept of the Federal Minister of Interior for a policy on security and foreigners was 
based on this IMK-Decision; this document was also concerned with compensatory 
measures (in the context of policies on foreigners). A report of a session of the committee 
on internal affairs of the German Bundestag of 13 April 1988 states: ’Herr Pari. 
Staatssekretar Spranger hat Ihnen am 2. Dezember 1987 das Konzept des Bundesministers 
des Innern fur den Sicherheits- und Auslanderbereich vorgetragen, wie sich ein aus dem 
Abbau der Binnengrenzkontrollen ergebendes Sicherheitsdefizit vermindern und eine
692 Innenausschufi des Deutschen Bundestages, "Beschlufiempfehlung und Bericht des 
Innenausschusses," ed. Deutscher Bundestag (Bonn: 1985), 2. Translation: The government is asked 
to agree with its partner states, bilaterally or on the Community level, apt measures in compensation 
for the reduced border controls so that the eased crossing of the border does not lead to security 
deficits and to illegal entry of non-EU citizens into Member States. These compensatory measures are 
taken to be indispensable.
693 Standige Konferenz der Innenminister und -senatoren der Lander, "Beschlufiniederschrift iiber die 
Sitzung der Standigen Konferenz der Innenminister und -Senatoren der Lander am 18. April 1986 in 
Bonn," (Bonn: 1986). The compensatory measures mentioned are: international police cooperation 
(exchange of information, common information system, cross-border pursuit), facilitation of 
international legal aid including extradition, taking into account the interests of other EC states, 
approximation of material law (drugs, weapons and explosives, compulsory registration), foreigners’ 
law (uniform travel documents, uniform visa regime, exchange of information on unwanted third 
country nationals, carrier liability, harmonisation of asylum law).
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abgestimmte Auslanderpolitik verwirklichen lassen.5694 Thus, within Germany, there was a 
lot of activity in circles charged with or with influence on negotiation policies in order to 
define compensatory measures.
Reports to the Committee on Internal Affairs of the German Bundestag show that officials 
of the Ministry of Interior insisted consistently on the realisation of compensatory 
measures before any abolition of border controls.695 Similarly, this emphasis on 
compensatory measures can also be detected in the publications of the Ministry of Interior 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s.696 It has to be assumed, however, that the objective of 
these publications was less to influence the negotiations, but rather to communicate the 
existing security provisions and plans to the public and personnel.
While compensatory measures were foreseen already early in the Schengen process, no 
express temporal link as to their completeness was made initially. As time progressed, 
German authorities tended to emphasise that these measures all had to be enacted 
completely before border controls could be lifted. This development is reflected by two 
statements of the Innenministerkonferenz, a central group in internal policy making 
(consisting of all Lander Ministers of the Interior. In 1986, the Lander Ministers only 
encouraged their federal colleague that all negotiations with regard to abolition of border 
controls also include negotiations about compensatory measures.697 In 1989, they 
emphasised that compensatory measures must be enacted before abolition of border 
controls due to the danger of security deficits: T)ie Innenministerkonferenz ... ist 
insbesondere der Auffassung, daft ein Abbau der Grenzkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen 
der Schengener Vertragsstaaten ohne die erforderlichen Ausgleichsmaftnahmen zu
694 Innenausschufi des Deutschen Bundestages, "Kurzprotokoll, 23. Sitzung des Innenausschusses." 
Translation: The parliamentary state secretary Spranger has presented to you on 2 December 1987 
the concept of the Minister of the Interior for the area of security and foreigners, how to reduce a 
security deficit which might result from abolition of internal border controls and how to realise a 
concerted foreigners’ policy.
695 Innenausschuft des Deutschen Bundestages, "Kurzprotokoll, 45. Sitzung des Innenausschusses," ed. 
Deutscher Bundestag (Bonn: 1989).; Innenausschuft des Deutschen Bundestages, "Bericht iiber die 
Reise einer Delegation des Innenausschusses vom 4. Juli bis 8. Juli 1988 in die Lander Frankreich, 
Luxemburg, Belgien, Niederlande zum Thema: Ubereinkommen von Schengen."; Innenausschufi des 
Deutschen Bundestages, "Kurzprotokoll, 23. Sitzung des Innenausschusses."; Schreckenberger, "An 
den Vorsitzenden des Innenausschusses - Unterrichtung des Innenausschusses von der Umsetzung 
des Schengener Abkommens."; Standige Konferenz der Innenminister und -senatoren der Lander, 
"Beschlufiniederschrift iiber die Sitzung der Standigen Konferenz der Innenminister und -Senatoren 
der Lander am 14. April 1989 in Koln."
696 Cf. The journal Tnnenpolitik’ over the years.
697 Cf. Standige Konferenz der Innenminister und -senatoren der Lander, "Beschlufiniederschrift iiber 
die Sitzung der Standigen Konferenz der Innenminister und -Senatoren der Lander am 18. April 1986 
in Bonn."
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schwerwiegenden Sicherheitsdefiziten fiihren wiirde und daft deshalb moglichst vor, 
spatestens im umsetzungsmaftigen Zusammenhang mit dem Grenzkontrollabbau Einigkeit 
iiber die notwendigen Ausgleichsmaftnahmen erzielt und die Voraussetzungen fur ihre 
Umsetzung geschaffen werden miissen.’698
Thus, it can be assumed that the role of German officials was not only to insist on 
compensatory measures (most states have done that), but also to create a ‘junctim’ between 
compensatory measures and implementation, to suggest a concrete list of measures which 
was incorporated into the Agreements and to insist on a certain standard of measures 
before abolition of controls was to be introduced.
698 Standige Konferenz der Innenminister und -senatoren der Lander, "Beschlufiniederschrift iiber die 
Sitzung der Standigen Konferenz der Innenminister und -Senatoren der Lander am 14. April 1989 in 
Koln." Translation: The conference of ministers of the interior is of the opinion that an abolition of 
border controls at the internal borders of the Schengen treaty states without that the necessary 
compensatory measures would lead to grave security deficits, and that therefore there has to be 
unanimity regarding the necessary compensatory measures and the preconditions for their 
implementation have to be met before or at the latest contemporaneously with the abolition of 
border controls.
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2.4. W idening of the agenda
The fact that compensatory measures were demanded in the first Schengen Agreement, but 
not spelt out in detail left much open to later negotiations. It appears that Germany was 
active in including a number of new topics in the compensatory measures. Indeed, it seems 
that the openness with which this issue was settled in the first Schengen treaty was used by 
German officials to widen the agenda.
According to Permanent Secretary Neusel, it was decided only in 1987 that the transfer of 
border controls to the external borders and the creation of compensatory measures would 
be settled in a state treaty.699 Apparently, it had become clear by that time that the extent of 
the regulations would necessitate such a state treaty (in contrast to the ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement that was Schengen I). This widening of the agenda was not welcomed by all.
The inclusion of more and more issues was not favoured by all members, for example the 
Benelux countries. A protocol of a meeting of the Executive Committee cites a quotation 
of the French head of the Central Group saying that he feared that harmonisation had 
become an objective in itself:
Unter Beriicksichtigung der Tatigkeiten der Arbeitsgruppen und der Untergruppen 
hat die Zentrale Verhandlungsgruppe den Eindruck gewonnen, dass das Ziel des 
Schengener Ubereinkommens, namlich die Erleichterung der Grenzkontrollen, 
manchmal aus den Augen verloren wird. Wie es in dem Ubereinkommen 
ausdriicklich vorgesehen worden ist, setzt -  soweit erforderlich -  die Pflicht zur 
Erreichung dieses angestrebten Ziels die Harmonisierung bestimmter gesetzlicher 
und administrativer Bestimmungen voraus. Die Harmonisierung darf aber nicht als 
Ziel an sich betrachtet werden. Sie muss auf eine notwendige und ausreichende 
Harmonisierung beschrankt werden, um unter vertretbaren Bedingungen den Folgen 
der Erleichterung oder der Abschaffung der Grenzkontrollen begegnen zu konnen.700
Similar opinions were voiced by Permanent Secretary Robert Goebbels of the Foreign 
Ministry of Luxemburg who headed the negotiations for his country. In a report of a visit 
of a delegation of the German Bundestag, he is quoted as saying: ’Er habe den Eindruck
699 Innenausschufi des Deutschen Bundestages, "Kurzprotokoll, 23. Sitzung des Innenausschusses."
700 SCH/M (88) P V 1. Translation: Taking into account the activities of the working groups and the sub­
groups, the Central Negotiation Group has got the impression that the objective of the Schengen 
Agreement, i.e. the easing of border controls, is sometimes lost out of sight. As is explicitly provided 
for in the Agreement, the duty to reach this objective presupposes -  as far as necessary -  the 
harmonisation of certain legal and administrative regulations. The harmonisation must not be 
regarded as a goal in itself, however. It must be reduced to the necessary and sufficient harmonisation 
in order to be able to confront under justifiable conditions the consequences of the easing or 
abolition of border controls.
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gewonnen, daft in den einzelnen Arbeitsgruppen Perfektionismus betrieben werde. 
Dariiber werden eigentliche Ziel -  Wegfall der Grenzkontrollen -  vergessen.’701 He 
furthermore blamed the German delegation in the negotiations for the inclusion of 
unnecessary and unfeasible measures as well as measures beyond the framework of the 
Schengen Agreement: ’Seitens der Bundesrepublik z.B. wiirden Kontrollen an den 
Auftengrenzen verlangt, die nicht zu machen und nicht notig seien.... Er habe auch den 
Eindruck, daft man haufig bereits Dinge mitregeln wolle, die iiber das Ziel und den 
Rahmen des Schengener Abkommens hinausgingen.’702
A similar statement is noted from the General Secretary of the Benelux Union, E.D.I. 
Kruijtbosch who emphasised during the discussion that perfectionism should not be an 
objective of the negotiations and that the real objective of Schengen must not get out of 
focus: ’E.D.I. Kruijtbosch ... wies im Gesprach vor allem darauf hin, daft bei den 
Beratungen in den 4 Arbeitskreisen kein Perfektionismus angestrebt werden konne. Man 
wolle nur das machen, was auch zu machen sei, und nicht um jeden Preis harmonisieren. 
Ziel sei die Abschaffung der Grenzkontrollen.’703
It is therefore to be assumed that the widening of the agenda of compensatory measures 
was in some cases initiated by the German delegation and in others supported. The 
perception that perfectionism went hand in hand with an inclusion of more topics into the 
agenda fits with the philosophy advanced by German professionals that compensatory 
measures have to make up for the loss of security through the abolition of border controls.
701 Innenausschufi des Deutschen Bundestages, "Bericht iiber die Reise einer Delegation des 
Innenausschusses vom 4. Juli bis 8. Juli 1988 in die Lander Frankreich, Luxemburg, Belgien, 
Niederlande zum Thema: Ubereinkommen von Schengen," 5. Translation: He had got the impression 
that perfectionism was pursued in the individual working groups. The real objective -  the abolition of 
border controls -  was being forgotten by this.
702 Ibid. Translation: By the Federal Republic, for example, controls would be demanded at the external 
borders which could not be done and were unnecessary. (...) He had the impression that one 
attempted to already regulate things which went beyond the goal and framework of the Schengen 
Agreement.
703 Ibid, 20. Translation: E.D.I. Kuijtbosch mentioned during our talk that no perfectionism must be 
aimed at in the negotiations of the four working groups. One could only agree what was doable and 
not harmonise at any price. Goal was the abolition of border controls.
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2.5. German influence on a list of measures
With regard to individual measures, Germany has played a prominent role in a number of 
areas. Horst Eisel has identified the following points of influence:
Deutsche Handschrift tragen -  auBer SIS -  zum Beispiel die Vorschriften und 
Entscheidungen iiber
die Personenkontrollen an Ubergangen und die UberwachungsmaBnahmen an den 
griinen und blauen AuBengrenzen, niedergelegt vor allem in Art. 6 des 
Durchfuhrungsiibereinkommens und im Gemeinsamen Handbuch;
- die Inanspruchnahme der Beforderungsunternehmen zur Priifung der fiir den 
Bestimmungsstaat erforderlichen Dokumente bei Vermeidung von Sanktionen 
(Art. 26 SDU);
die Ponalisierung von Schleuserhandlungen (Art. 27 SDU); 
die Verkniipfung der einzelnen, nacheinander gestaffelten Sicherheitsstationen zu 
einem konsistenten Schutznetz gegen illegale Zuwanderung und 
grenziiberschreitende Kriminalitat, beginnend bei der Erhebungen anlaBlich der 
Visumerteilung iiber die Kontrollen der Beforderer, die AuBengrenzabsicherung bis 
hin zu den Aktivitaten im Landesinneren;
das Programm zum Riickbau der Abfertigungsanlagen und -einrichtungen an den 
Ubergangen entlang der Binnengrenzen;
Teilbereiche des Visum-Regimes;
- Das Reglement zur Festlegung der Zustandigkeit fiir die Behandlung von 
Asylbegehren, spater abgelost durch das Dubliner Ubereinkommen;
Die Einfiihrung des Inkraftsetzungsmechanismus (Art. 1 der Schlussakte zum 
SDU) in Erganzung zum Institut des Inkrafttretens mit dem Ziel, die tatsachlich 
Verwirklichung der von den Beitrittsstaaten iibernommenen vertraglichen 
Verpflichtungen zu gewahrleisten.704
704 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel."
Translation: Apart from SIS, for example the following rules and decisions bear German handwriting
- checks of persons at the crossing points and the surveillance measures at the green and blue external 
borders, as noted primarily in art. 6 of the Implementing Agreement and in the Common Handbook
- the charging of transport enterprises with examining the documents necessary for entering the 
country of destination, at the expense of avoiding sanctions
- penalising of smuggling (art. 27 SIC)
- the linking of individual, security measures to a consistent network of protection against illegal 
immigration and transborder crime, starting with the investigations with regard to issuing visas, over 
controls of the transport enterprises and the protection of external borders up to activities at the 
interior of the country
- the program for the de-construction of clearance installations and institutions 
parts of the visa-regime
- the system of rules to identify the responsibility for the examining of asylum applications, later 
supplanted by the Dublin Convention
- the introduction of the mechanism of putting into force (art. 1 of the final act of the SIC), 
complementary to the legal institute of coming into force, with the objective to guarantee the 
realisation of the commitments assumed by the accession states.
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Thus, Germany was active in nearly all areas of compensatory measures. As an illustration 
of the way Germany was able to input its experiences, the next few sections show German 
influence on border controls, the SIS and cross-border police investigations in particular.
2.5.1. Border checks and controls
It seems to be evident that Germany was very concerned with and influential in the area of 
checks on persons at the borders and the actual controls of the border. A direct 
consequence of the general concerns with compensatory measures was to insist on strict 
standards of controls at the external borders. Indeed, the regulations regarding principles of 
systematic and intensive checks and controls at the external borders were amongst the first 
to be accepted by the Executive Committee. The Dutch delegation presented a draft in 
1988. State Secretary Neusel mentioned in the same year that a treaty text covering these 
issues was nearly completely finished.705 The protocol of the meeting of State Secretaries 
and the Minister of June 1988 shows, however, that important reservations remained with 
regard to security of the external borders.706
The regulations for implementing the agreed controls (Durchfuhrungsbestimmungen) were 
crucially influenced by the German side. It was a German, Horst Eisel, who wrote the draft 
for the Common Handbook which serves as an instruction manual for officers at the 
border to guarantee a common high standard of controls.707 Obviously, many Schengen 
partners asked for changes and additions, but the original draft and the shape of the 
handbook were due to German initiative.
Germany was apparently also concerned with the standard of controls and sought to 
introduce this into the agreement. Luxemburg’s State Secretary Goebbels stated in 1988 
that Germany was especially eager in asking for high standards of controls (which he 
thought unnecessary and unfeasible). It seems that views regarding the usefulness of border 
controls varied. While Germany saw the external borders as ideal instruments for the fight
705 Cf. StS Neusel in Innenausschufl des Deutschen Bundestages, "Kurzprotokoll, 23. Sitzung des 
Innenausschusses."
706 SCH/M (88) PV 1.
707 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel."
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against crime due to their filter function, Luxemburg’s negotiator stated that terrorists and 
important drug dealers were seldom caught at the border.708
It has to be emphasised that this insistence on strict external border controls became 
virulent for Germany itself only after the political changes of 1989/90. Before that, 
Germany’s borders with Western partners were either internal borders (France, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands) or covered by special treaties (Denmark, Austria).709 
The inner German border was not problematic from the point of view of border controls. 
Transit between West Berlin and West Germany which was the main control task, only 
flowed through 4 crossing points: Hof, Bebra, Helstedt and Lauenburg. Asylum seekers 
were not a major problem at the border. In Berlin Schonefeld, which was the only 
important point of entry for asylum seekers, they often contacted the BGS themselves. The 
presence of the BGS at the inner German border was therefore not justified by the 
necessity of border security but by a combination of factors: West Germany wanted a 
presence at the internal border in order to be able to react to inexpected political events. At 
the same time, the BGS at the border was a remnant of the early BGS task to guard against 
possible (Communist) uprisings.
Before 1989/90, German concerns were therefore directed much more against the difficult
sea borders of southern states such as France, and Italy and Spain (when their joining
became clear). The standards which Germany had insisted on were to ensure the safety of
those borders. However, these suddenly also became relevant at the German eastern
border after 1990.
Horst Eisel: ‘Zum Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses des ersten Schengener 
Ubereinkommens im Jahre 1985 verhinderte noch die nahezu undurchdringliche 
innerdeutsche Grenze weitgehend das Eindringen von Gefahren aus ostlicher 
Richtung, womit nicht zum Ausdruck kommen soli, dafi die deutsche Politik dem 
‘Eisernen Vorhang’ aus solchen Erwagungen einen positiven Aspekt beimafl. 
Demgegeniiber hatten Lander wie Frankreich, Italien und Spanien unter anderem 
schwierige Seegrenzen zu schiitzen, so dafl die zustandigen deutschen Behorden eher 
mit Sorge dorthin blickten, wenn sie an die Absicherung ihrer Westgrenzen dachten. 
Nach der Wiedervereinigung anderte sich die Konstellation insofern, als Deutschland 
nunmehr Verantwortung fur die neuralgischen Grenzen zu Polen und Tschechien
708 Cf. Innenausschufl des Deutschen Bundestages, "Bericht liber die Reise einer Delegation des 
Innenausschusses vom 4. Juli bis 8. Juli 1988 in die Lander Frankreich, Luxemburg, Belgien, 
Niederlande zum Thema: Ubereinkommen von Schengen."
709 The situation with Austria was not unproblematic, however, since it opened the Southern German 
border (an external one) to crossing with spot checks only.
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trug und die anderen Partner jetzt mit besonderer Aufmerksamkeit darauf achteten, 
daft die deutsche Seite die Schengener Ostflanke zuverlassig abschirmt.’710
Indeed, the situation created through the changes of 1989 also had large implications for 
the negotiations of Schengen. The German government cancelled the signing of the 
Schengen Agreement on the day of 14 December 1989 due to a number of insecurities 
which had arisen from the October events.711 The legal position of East German citizens 
with regard to the western neighbours had not been completely resolved and the German 
government insisted that East Germans be treated like West Germans. This left open the 
question of efficient controls of third-country nationals entering via the eastern border of 
the GDR. Politicians asked for further negotiations so that East Germans would not 
become ‘Second Class Germans’ with respect to rights of free movement.712 This unclear 
situation for GDR citizens was especially bemoaned by the FDP partner of the German 
government coalition. Additionally, they also had reservations with regard to the data 
protection provisions.713
The insecurities, uncertainties and even fears the prospect of German unification raised 
with Germany’s neighbours have been mentioned in chapter four. Furthermore, the 
German government had to examine first if it was in a position to secure the new eastern 
border. Thus, the signing the Schengen Convention in December 1989 was judged to be 
inopportune by the German government. Additionally, there were a number of other issues 
which remained unresolved, such as disagreement about tax questions with Luxembourg. 
Dinan states that the calling off must have relieved the Schengen partners: It appeared that
710 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: At the time of the conclusion of the first Schengen 
Agreement in 1985, the nearly impenetrable inner-German border still prevented largely the 
penetration of dangers from the eastern direction, which is not meant to say that German politics 
judged positively the Iron Curtain’ due to such deliberations. In contrast, countries like France, Italy 
or Spain had to secure amongst other difficult sea borders, so that the responsible German 
authorities looked there with apprehension when thinking of the security of their western borders. 
After re-unification, the constellation changed so that Germany now bore the responsibility for the 
neuralgic borders with Poland and the Czech Republic and the partners now took special care that 
the German side would shield the eastern flank reliably.
711 Negotiations had gone on until late that night although the decision was taken in a German cabinet 
meeting in the evening. It is not clear when the negotiators knew of the decision to cancel. The 
protracted negotiations were due to disagreements between the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
regarding fiscal matters. C f." Abbau der Grenzkontrollen gefahrdet. Bonner EG-Partner befurchten 
ungehinderten Zustrom von Menschen aus dem Osten," Suddeutscloe Zeitung, 13 December 1989. 
One could assume that the German delegation hoped that the signing would be called off anyway due 
to these disagreements and therefore delayed announcing the cancelling. Although there is no proof 
of this thesis, it is supported by the fact that on the day before the called-off signature, only the 
partner states had been held responsible for delays. Cf. "Kabinett verzichtet auf Paraphierung," 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 December 1989.
712 See for example the conservative Schlee: Harald Gunter," Vor Schengen zieht Schlee eine Maginot- 
Linie," Die Welt, 5 January 1990.
713 Cf. "Kabinett verzichtet auf Paraphierung."
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the German government stated in public only what the other four signatories had privately 
though; no country was quite ready to do away with border controls.’714
Within the German government, there was considerable unrest after the signing had to be 
called off. The Permanent Minister of the Interior Stavenhagen blamed the FDP and its 
sudden change of mind. He claimed that the FDP had repeatedly changed its reason for 
not giving in three times (from the lack of information for Parliament during the 
negotiations to the involvement of Parliament in international negotiations in general to the 
problem of GDR citizens).715 It seems therefore, that there was considerable disagreement 
in the government regarding the cancelling of the signing. Nevertheless, the hesitations of 
the FDP were important enough to set itself in opposition to the Chancellor and the 
Minister of the Interior. In the final result, the government accepted that too many 
questions remained unresolved and called off the signing.
Thus, while the security of border controls themselves was called into question after the 
changes of 1989, it was not this single issue which led to the cancellation. Additionally, the 
lack of information for parliaments, the uncertain legal situation of GDR citizens and 
disagreement between the Netherlands and Luxembourg on fiscal matters played a role.
714 Desmond Dinan, ed., Encyclopedia of the European Union (Boulder, Col: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
715 ""Schengener Abkommen ohne Not aufs Spiel gesetzt"," Badische Neueste Nacbrickten, 18 December
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2.5.2. Schengen Information System
Another compensatory measure which was crucially influenced by Germany was the SIS. 
The Schengen Information System represents a completely new instrument in international 
police cooperation. It is a common system by a number of states into which all partners 
can feed information regarding items and persons sought, and from which all states can call 
up information.
Germany had had electronic systems for investigation since the 1970s. This became a 
useful source of experience. Not only the suggestion of such a system, but also its 
conception and technique were heavily influenced by German ideas and experiences. Horst 
Eisel:
Das Schengener Informationssystem ist maftgeblich von deutschen Experten 
mitentwickelt worden. Sie waren bei der Ausarbeitung des konzeptionellen Geriistes, 
der Realisierung bis zur Betriebsbereitschaft und der standigen Perfektionierung und 
Erweiterung tonangebend. Dabei kamen ihnen die jahrelangen Erfahrungen mit 
elektronischen Personen- und Fahndungssystemen in Deutschland -  namentlich 
INPOL -  sehr zu gute.716
Already in 1972, the first electronic police information system was introduced - INPOL. 
The system is ‘star-shaped’, thus run commonly by Lander and federal level with the BKA 
as a central office. Data regarding persons who are to be arrested or whose whereabouts 
are to be found is included, as well as data regarding objects which have a connection to a 
crime.717
This principle was advocated also for the SIS. The experts from the Bundeskriminalamt, 
experienced in the use of INPOL, were also crucial in designing the SIS. Horst Eisel: T)as 
BKA hat sich grofle Verdienste um SIS erworben.’718 The SIS also is shaped like a star 
system with a central unit in Strasbourg (C.SIS) and national units (N.SIS). There is a 
difference between the functions of the central units, however. While the BKA also has an 
analytic and investigative function in INPOL, the C.SIS is only a ‘computing’ unit which 
provides all national system with the same set of data. Also the data categories in the SIS
716 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: The Schengen Information System has been 
developed decisively with the help of German experts. They set the tone at the elaboration of the 
conceptual framework, at the realisation until the system was operational and at the constant 
perfectioning and enlargement. The years of experience with electronic investigation systems for 
persons and goods -  notably INPOL -  was very useful in this respect.
717 Cf. Gernot Achsnich et al., Innere Sicherheit im vereinten Deutschland (Erfurt: Heron, 1997), 35f.
718 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: The BKA has earned great merits with regard to the 
SIS.
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are also similar to the ones of the national ENPOL system. They refer to objects (weapons, 
documents, registered money, vehicles -  also for the purpose of ‘hidden registration’) and 
persons (reason of inclusion into database, measure requested and additional information). 
Flowtext is not permitted, all data to be entered has to fit the given category. This parallels 
the German INPOL system, where objects are entered only alphanumerically, and data 
regarding persons has to be fitted into fixed categories.
An official of the Schengen General Secretariat has remarked on the importance of the SIS: 
‘The importance of SIRENE is not so much the technology but the organization and its 
underlying rationale, that is to relay information necessary to safevouch public order and 
security.’719 (SIRENE is an complementary system to the SIS, the Supplementary 
Information Request at the National Entry. It is part and parcel of the SIS and provides 
additional information if requested).
SIS was considered the ‘heart’ of compensatory measures, but was also one of the items 
which took longest to become ready for operation. Indeed, implementation of Schengen 
was delayed due to the fact that the SIS could not run due to ‘technical problems’. 
Oberservers credited the French, on whose territory the central unit was placed, with this 
delay. The German Member of the European Parliament Detlev Samland thought it was 
‘obstructionist policies’ which had prevented computer progress. He accused Charles 
Pasqua, who was very critical of the cooperation, of delaying progress.720
Also after implementation, Germany remained one of the most active partners in the SIS. 
It provided most data (in the beginning this was a logical result of existing experiences and 
data in INPOL) both in the category of persons and of objects. By November 2000, the 
SIS contained 9.6 million data sets Europe-wide. 1.2 million of these were for investigation 
of persons and 8.4 million for objects. Germany provided the largest national section with 
2.6 million entries (that is 40.1% of data regarding persons and 23.4% of data regarding 
objects). For comparison: Benelux provided around 2% of all data, Spain 2.5 % and
719 Verraes, "Schengen, an Agreement to Cooperate".
720 „Der SPD-Politiker Samland meint, dafi es wohl „franzosische Obstruktionspolitik“ gewesen sei, die 
Computerfortschritte beim SIS verhindert habe. Bis Dezember hatte Paris den Vorsitz in der 
Schengen Kommission inne, und da habe Pasqua offenbar dafiir gesorgt, dafi man es beim SIS etwas 
langsam angehen lasse.“ Karl-Otto Sattler, "Die Grenzen feiern klammheimlich Auferstehung," 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 May 1994.
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Portugal only 0.6 %. Italy, however, was also a major contributor with 30.3 % of data 
regarding persons and 24.5 % of all data regarding objects.721
2.5.3. Hot pursuit and cross-border observation
Another measure which German officials put a lot of emphasis on was the introduction of 
the possibility of cross-border observation and hot pursuit, that is the possibility for police 
officers to follow a suspect across the border into the neighbouring country. The German 
position in this case was to create the possibility of unlimited (temporal and spatial) pursuit 
in the neighbouring countries. The objective of German officials was an agreement which 
would have made cross-border observation and pursuit subject to similar conditions 
everywhere. This was not acceptable to some Schengen partners, such as Denmark and 
France. According to observers, Germany was supported by others, however, such as 
Spain and Italy. Hesitations with regard to national sovereignty led Germany’s partner 
states to reject such a regulation. The negative experiences of Germany’s neighbours in the 
past may also have had a part in this.
In the Schengen convention, hot pursuit was allowed in principle without limit to time and 
space, but subject to additional bilateral agreements or declarations.722 The result is that the 
rights of police differ between all countries. France allows hot pursuit unlimitedly, but does 
not give permission to foreign officers to apprehend a suspect until French police arrive. 
Denmark has limited the area for hot pursuit and added regulations regarding the use of 
weapons. Belgium has introduced a time limit. The Netherlands allow pursuit in an area of 
15 km, but only in public space. Germany is the only country in which no limit was 
introduced. This is often given by security experts as an example to what extent Germany 
was ready to give up sovereignty rights in exchange for security measures. At the same 
time, Dr. Mizia from the BMI has also mentioned the factor that smaller states always 
worry not to be dominated by the bigger ones. Given Germany’s history with its 
neighbouring countries, he says, it is understandable that they were more hesitant.723
721 Bayern mit 280.000 Fahndungsausschreibungen im Schengener Informationssystem vertreten, 
Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern.
722 Roese, "Interview with Eberhard Roese.". According to Roese, a general limitation of pursuit to 15 
km was discussed at a certain point in the negotiations. The German delegation was able to prevent 
this.
723 personal opinion of the interviewee.
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Similar divergence can be observed on the topic of cross-border observation. While 
Germany aimed at a regulation which would have allowed both observation of the 
environment of the suspect and ‘preventive’ observations, the result of the SIC was 
different: cross-border observation is only possible after an application for administrative 
help (Rechtshilfeersuchen) (Art. 40 (2)), only directed at the suspect himself and only if one 
of the crimes of a given catalogue is concerned. (Art. 40 (7))
These limitations were not satisfying for German officials. Additionally, the refusal of 
Schengen partners to create extensive provisions for the cooperation on the level of police 
practice led to dissatisfaction. Other states often insisted on keeping involved the judicial 
bureaucracy which was seen as time-consuming by Germany.
Nicht durchsetzen konnte sich die deutsche Seite etwa mit ihrer Forderung zur 
Reform der Rechtshilfe, insbesondere in Gestalt der sogenannten polizeilichen 
Rechtshilfe. Sie betrifft die direkte Zusammenarbeit der Polizeibehorden ohne die 
oft zeitraubende Beteiligung der Justiz bei der Erledigung eiliger Ersuchen um 
Durchfiihrung von Aufklarungsmaftnahmen im Rahmen der Strafverfolgung. 
Mehrere Schengen-Staaten konnten sich den Uberlegungen Deutschlands nicht 
anschliefien, weil sie von den ehernen justiziellen Befugnissen nicht abriicken 
wollen.724
Given the dissatisfaction with results of Schengen II in this respect, Germany has tried to 
introduce changes to the Agreement also afterwards. One example is the German-Swiss 
Agreement of 1999 which included a number of measures that were not possible in 
Schengen II.725 It is hoped in circles of German security experts that this agreement can 
serve as a model for further changes to the Schengen acquis.
Nicht selten muft man Umwege gehen, um zum Ziel zu gelangen. Im April 1999 hat 
die Bundesrepublik mit dem Nicht-EU-Staat Schweiz einen Polizeivertrag 
abgeschlossen, der zukunftsweisend ist und vieles enthalt, was im Schengener 
Rahmen noch nicht durchsetzbar war. Osterreich hat gegeniiber der 
Eidgenossenschaft nachgezogen und will mit Deutschland eine Ubereinkunft 
ahnlichen Inhalts treffen. Unsere Rechnung scheint aufzugehen. Wenn das deutsch-
724 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: The German side was not successful with its claims 
for a reform of judicial aid, especially in the for of so-called police judicial aid. It concerns the direct 
cooperation of police authorities without the often time-consuming participation of the judiciary in 
the execution of urgent calls for investigations in the framework of criminal prosecution. Several 
Schengen states could not join the German deliberations because they did not want to dissociate 
themselves from iron judicial rights.
725 Bundesregierung, "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu den Vertragen vom 27. April 1999 und 8. Juli 1999 
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft iiber 
grenziiberschreitende polizeiliche Zusammenarbeit, Auslieferung, Rechtshilfe sowie zu dem 
Abkommen vom 8. Juli 1999 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Schweizerischen 
Eidgenossenschaft iiber Durchgangsrechte," ed. Deutscher Bundestag (Berlin: 2001).
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schweizerische Vorbild erst einmal im EU-Raum Fufi gefafit hat, konnte es auch 
innerhalb der Union zum Selbstlaufer werden.726
726 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: Not rarely, one has to take detours in order to reach 
a goal. In April 1999, the Federal Republic has concluded a police treaty with the non-EU-state 
Switzerland which is forward-looking and contains much which has not yet been successful in the 
Schengen framework. Austria has followed with regard to confederation and wants to conclude with 
Germany an agreement of a similar nature. Our calculation seems to work out. Once the German- 
Swiss example has taken root in the EU area, it could perpetuate itself within the Union.
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2.6. Germany as a ‘neutral* negotiator for security and freedom
German self-perceptions insisted that Germany acted much less on the motive of national 
interests than others. This is mostly based on the argument that Germany was willing to 
give up more sovereignty rights with regard to hot pursuit than other states. Germany’s 
role as an honest broker is therefore based on the perception that it had no particularistic 
interests to defend: Deutschland hatte nach meinen Beobachtungen keine 
Sonderinteressen zu ‘retten’ und war dadurch in der giinstigen Situation, seine ganze 
Aufmerksamkeit auf die bestmogliche Umsetzung des Schengener Anliegens zu 
konzentrieren, das Europa der Burger zu schaffen.’727
It is certainly true that Germany had less concerns on giving up sovereignty than France 
and other partners did. However, Germany, too, had special interests which it brought into 
the process. Like all negotiators it brought the lessons from its historical experiences to the 
table as well as a legal and administrative tradition of interpreting the role of the state. 
Interestingly, Germany’s interests concentrated on areas which were of concern to all 
participating countries to a greater or lesser degree: the possible loss of security. The 
rationale it brought to the negotiations was not in opposition to the objectives of other 
states, although the practical measures suggested might sometimes have gone too far and 
been difficult to reconcile with the sovereignty interests of other states. France and 
Germany shared the general political objectives and also security concerns, but took 
different views on the place of national sovereignty in the solutions.
It also has to be mentioned that the situation changed with German unification and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Germany now had the task and the vital interest in 
protecting its eastern frontier, contrary to the situation before 1989 where the guarding of 
the border was in practice done through the arrangements of the Communist regimes. 
Especially after 1992, the security concerns can be seen to rise. While compensatory 
measures had been advocated from the start by German security experts, now the wider 
political landscape became aware of possible dangers. Thus, after 1989/92, the German 
insistence on compensatory measures also concerned its own external borders.
727 Ibid. Translation: According to my observations, Germany had no special interests to ‘safeguard’ and 
was thus in the favourable position to be able to concentrate on the best possible translation of the 
Schengen matters of concerns in order to create the Europe of citizens.
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In summary to the German position on compensatory measures, it can be observed that
German bureaucrats, thus experts in the provision of security, advocated strict and
comprehensive compensatory measures, while politicians were initially for a quick abolition
of border controls. But the ‘necessity’ and feasibility of compensation and the security logic
of bureaucrats were gradually accepted by politicians as well, especially after 1992. In an
interview, Horst Eisel cautiously admits the central role of Ministries of Interior on the
federal and Lander level for advocating security standards:
Sicherheitspolitische Forderungen wurden sehr wohl von politischer Seite erhoben, 
wenn auch nicht gerade gebieterisch aus Kreisen, die sich primar dem Ziel der 
Freiziigigkeit verpflichtet sahen. Der Bundesminister des Innern hat aber stets im 
Benehmen mit den Innenministern der Lander darauf gedrungen, daft der Schutz der 
Burger gleichen Rang besitzt wie ihre ungehinderte Reisemoglichkeit im Schengener 
Raum.728
In the Schengen rationale, compensatory measures were the only efficient means of 
arriving at a similar standard of security despite the abolition of border controls which had 
hitherto been considered essential to the provision of internal security. It was agreed that 
no national measures would be necessary once a high standard of controls at external 
borders was reached.
After the implementation, an argument was made that national measures were needed
nonetheless in order to ensure internal security in the face of international crime and
migration which were crossing internal borders. Implicitly, it was therefore argued that
external border control measures and compensatory measures did not provide the standard
of internal security expected by German officials.
Grenzpolizeiliche Prasenz an den Binnengrenzen und in deren riickwartigen Raumen 
war wohl im Schengener Szenario nicht vorgesehen, weil man davon ausging, daft vor 
allem durch den griindlichen Auftengrenzschutz der Wegfall der Kontrollen an den 
gemeinsamen Grenzen ausreichend kompensiert wiirde. Diese Annahme hat sich 
nicht bestatigt. Die weiterhin iiber die inneren Grenzen stattfindenden Wanderungs-
728 Ibid. Translation: Security demands were made from teh political side, even if not very peremptorily 
from circles whose first responsibility was the goal of freedom of movement. The Federal Minister of 
the Interior in agreement with the Ministers of the Lander has always asked that the protection of 
citizens has the same importance as their unhindered travel opportunity in the Schengen area.
It is important to note here that organisational interests and loyalty would make it impossible for an 
official to admit any specific roles assumed by the institutions in this regard. At the same time, 
however, it is to be supposed that attitudes were mixed and security interests also voiced from within 
the Bundeskanzleramt (and vice versa). Given the above rationales, however, it seems correct to 
attribute more concern for freedom of movement in the BK than in the BMI. At the same time, it is 
the institutional task of the Ministry of Interior to work for what it perceives to be an optimum of 
possible internal security for citizens.
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und Kriminalitatsbewegungen haben die verantwortlichen Behorden veranlafk, 
Gegenmafinahmen in nationaler Zustandigkeit zu ergreifen.729
Thus, the Schengen rationale was paralleled by measures on the national level which were 
spelt out in chapter six. These illustrate the idea that internal security is compromised 
through the abolition of controls at the internal borders and that additional measures have 
to be taken. It can be deducted therefore that despite a multiplicity of voices and opinions 
within Germany, a general line of policy was coherently followed on both the European 
and national level. A security-led perspective dominated, but a discourse with regard to the 
realisation of freedom of movement was retained. This was possible due to a ‘division of 
work’ between politicians and bureaucrats. The former accepted the security necessities 
advocated by security experts, but continued to emphasise a rhetoric and objective of 
freedom.
Germany therefore also had its agenda at the negotiations which it aimed to defend. It 
managed to have a number of its proposals passed, not least due to the fact that the other 
Schengen partners were also concerned with security (albeit in different degrees).
729 Ibid. Translation: The presence of border police at the internal borders and the rear areas was not 
envisaged in the Schengen scenario, because it was assumed that the abolition of controls would be 
sufficiently compensated by thorough external border security. This assumption has not been 
confirmed. The continuing migration and movements of criminals across the internal borders have 
prompted the responsible authorities to take counter measures in national competency.
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3. French-German relations in the negotiations
France and Germany were the two most important players in the Schengen negotiations. 
Not only did they have the most economic and political weight of the Schengen founding 
states, but also the French-German agreement proved the immediate precurser of 
Schengen.730 A common basic interest in terms of trade and European integration pushed 
the two partners to persevere in putting together a comprehensive agreement on border 
controls. Regular exchange and informal meetings between the countries’ representatives 
ensured that solutions could be found which safeguarded national interests. Furthermore, 
the close relationship between President Mitterand and Chancellor Kohl, and their 
commitment to the Schengen process meant that political solutions could be sought to 
problematic issues.
The two countries had differences in the starting positions, however. As has been shown 
above, the French Republic was most openly pushed to seek open borders due to the lorry 
strike of 1984. While Germany had similar concerns (also proved in the agreement with 
Austria), its politicians emphasised the ultimate political goal of European integration much 
more.
Furthermore, the legal and state traditions of the two countries were very different which 
was to remain apparent throughout the negotiations. One French concern was that the 
Schengen agreements would entail too much loss of sovereignty. Cross-border observation 
and pursuit therefore proved difficult elements of the Schengen agreement. Most notably 
the right of foreign officers to arrest someone in France, thus exercising foreign law on 
French territory, remained unacceptable. A number of restrictions were imposed so that 
France and other states would find the new regulation acceptable. Furthermore, the various 
national services allowed to exercise hot pursuit were listed in the treaty text. Bilateral 
agreements between the Schengen partners regulate details of the hot pursuit and can allow 
further measures. This issue remained difficult until relatively shortly before the proposed 
signatures in December 1989.731
730 Nevertheless, the role of the Benelux must not be underestimated. Their inclusion into the Schengen 
founding group meant that one could draw the the Benelux experiences with a travel union. 
Furthermore, the Benelux were important in helping France and Germany to come to compromises 
on difficult issues.
731 Cf. the solution spelt out in the protol SCH/M (89) PV 2.
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Germany was much less concerned with sovereignty issues, which is shown by the fact that 
its declaration in the SIC allows the widest-possible right for hot pursuit and observation 
by other states. It may be speculated, why this is the case. Interlocutors have mentioned 
that the necessity of compensatory measures and interests of security weighed more in this 
respect than considerations of national sovereignty. It has also been voiced that Germany -  
due to its historical development -  was used to a division of sovereignty between various 
levels. Thus, conceding limited rights to other Member States was considered less of a 
break with tradition. Since national competency for the actual controls was retained, the 
agreement was also acceptable to German police. Additionally, the German debate on 
border-related issues highlighted the urgency of efficient measures against illegal 
immigration and organised crime so that far-reaching agreements would have been 
accepted. Lastly, Germany was ready to take into account national sensitivities of its 
neighbours and therefore to accept a solution which was considered sub-optimal.
It has been mentioned by several of the observers that a division of work took place 
between France and Germany to the extent that Germany provided expertise while France 
took over the role of political leadership. This is difficult to trace through the protocols of 
the meetings of workings groups and State Secretaries and Ministers. It becomes clear from 
remarks of observers, however, that there was disagreement between France and Germany 
as to the extent of security versus liberties. As mentioned, the demands by the German 
delegation to have foreign officers arrest in France and use their weapons were rejected in 
France. Furthermore, the French negotiators were astonished about the role of 
representatives of the Bundeskriminalamt who acted as equal to their colleagues from the 
BMI and often were much more restrictive.732 The French government used this situation 
to present the final text, which gave less rights to foreign police than anticipated, to the 
public as a concession from the ‘Germany of police’.733
The roles reversed somewhat with the revolutions in Eastern Europe and German 
unification. As the quotation of Eisel above shows, it was now Germany’s partners who 
started to watch carefully if Germany was able to ensure the security of the eastern border. 
All the more so, since Germany had before been perceived to demand ever stricter control 
and compensatory measures. The new situation not only gave Germany a new eastern 
border, but there was also insecurity as to the ability to control the border. It is a land
732 Cf. Jean Quatremer, "Frankreich: Sieg iiber das 'Deutschland der Polizei'?," in Europol - DieBullen 
Greifen nach den Stemen (Hamburg: Forderverein Umweltschutz Unterelbe, 1990).
733 Ibid.
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border, for a lengthy part along a river. The West German Bundesgrenzschutz was largely 
unfamiliar with the topography and the Eastern Bundesgrenzschutz was only being built 
up. At the same time, an interlocutor mentioned that there were some hesitations of East 
German officials to cut long-established connections with the former ‘Communist 
brothers’. Economically and politically, this was unwelcome to some GDR or ‘new Lander’ 
citizens.
As has been spelt out in chapter five, the German debate regarding border controls itself 
also demanded stricter measures. The topics of immigration and international crime as 
objects of fears were present in both Germany’s debate as well as the one in France and 
other European partners. The concern in France was most pronounced, however, 
especially with regard to migration. The element of mutual trust between the Schengen 
partners necessary for the system to work and which had been established through the 
Schengen mechanism was put to a first test. A report in the name of the Committee of 
Control of the French Senate by Paul Masson and Xavier de Villepin of 1991 is indicative 
in this respect: the situation in Germany in 1991 was defined as ‘particularly 
preoccupying,’734 most importantly the situation with regard to asylum seekers and 
immigration. The authors recall the numbers of asylum seekers of 1991 and mention the 
Russian Minister of Interior saying that around 3 million Russians might move to Western 
Europe during the next year.
The report asserts that a European space without controls means to trust the key to one’s 
national territory to one’s other partners. It insists therefore that every participating state 
must scrupulously respect all its obligations under the treaty.735 This has to be interpreted as 
a call to Germany, but also to Southern members of Schengen (with whom the system had 
not been ‘activated’ yet at the time) to ensure the security of France by securing their 
external border.
Thus, German unification and changes in Eastern Europe made realise the Schengen 
member states that they were dependent on each other for ensuring mutual security. To 
what extent the changes of 1989/90 were considered threatening depended on national 
positions and fears with regard to immigration and crime. France considered Germany’s
734 Masson and Villepin, "Rapport de la Commission de controle du Senat sur la mise en place et le 
fonctionnement de la convention d'application de l'accord de Schengen du 14 Juin 1985," 37.
735 Ibid. “Realiser un espace en Europe sans controles aux frontieres, c’est confier en quelque sorte la cle 
de notre territoire national a nos partenaires. C’est pourquoi chaque Etat partie, y compris la France, 
doit respecter pleinement ses obligation dans le cadre de l’Accord de Schengen.”
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eastern borders its own new border. At the same time, it showed itself particularly 
concerned with migration from Eastern Europe and asked for re-assurance that this border 
was secure.
Migration from Southern Europe had of course been a concern from the start and also 
rendered problematic the negotiations with Italy, Spain and Portugal, later also Greece, 
aiming to ensure the best possible control of sea borders. However, the fast changes in 
Eastern Europe which required adaptation by one of the central Schengen players had the 
impact of novelty and insecurity as to future numbers. It raised remaining fears and 
hesitations with regard to the Schengen system and trust of other Schengen partners.
The German role on the European level
4. Conclusions
This chapter has aimed to present Germany’s role in the negotiations on the European 
level. Its national interests were influenced by its historical relationship with borders (cf. 
chapter four) and the national debate regarding border controls (cf. chapter five). Borders 
and their control were seen as a protection against unwanted immigration.
In the Schengen negotiations, Germany aimed at finding a European solution to nationally 
perceived insecurities. At the same time, the political goal of the completion of the internal 
market played an important role. Together with France, Germany played the role of leaders 
and both were crucial for the progress of the negotiations.
Germany’s advocacy for compensatory measures was echoed by the other Schengen states, 
but made particularly salient through the participation of German experts from the BMI 
and BKA which contributed relevant experiences, i.e. with regard to control or data 
analysis systems. With its emphasis on a comprehensive SIS and on cross-border pursuit 
possibilities, Germany attempted to project national internal security arrangements of its 
federal system to the European level. This was met with reticencies by other countries, 
such as France, whose domestic internal security systems were structured differently.
Germany showed itself much less concerned about issues of sovereignty than its partner 
states, most markedly France. It pressed for far-reaching solutions in the area of cross- 
border observation and crime, but had to give in to the reservations of the Schengen 
partners.
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1. Introduction
This thesis has aimed to explore the role of borders for a modern West European state 
with the example of Germany. Such an investigation seemed especially interesting in the 
context of the evolution of a European policy on border controls which gave an 
intergovernmental institution the possibility to prescribe common standards for border 
controls at the external borders and to found a new principle of a common safe internal 
area of free movement. The changes touch the very heart of governance, traditional 
concepts of state sovereignty and security provision. Border controls -  and therefore the 
control over entry and exit of persons and goods -  were part of the attributes of the 
modern territorial state. The thesis has therefore answered the question which processes 
and perceptions within one of the Member States of the European Union have led the 
country to push for a common regulation of these issues. It has furthermore been explored 
which solutions were favoured and for what reasons.
The leading question of whether borders are losing their importance in such an 
arrangement has to be denied. While border controls at the internal borders are abolished, 
borders as such retain vital importance for the state in legal and administrative terms as 
well as for the enforcement of security measures. The research has also shown, however, 
that a differentiation in the role of borders has taken place which challenges the 
absoluteness of state borders as symbols of state authority and means of representing and 
enforcing security.
The findings of this thesis will be summarised in the following sections. The first section 
will cover Germany’s position on border controls, the national discourse and policy 
intentions. A second section looks at the German role in the Schengen negotiations and 
shows the interplay between national and European level. A further part presents 
conclusions on the functions of the border after Schengen. A last section will explore 
consequences of the particular way the Schengen negotiations were framed and the 
changed role of borders.
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2. The German position on border controls
This thesis has presented Germany’s position in the Schengen negotiations. The country’s 
position was decisively influenced by high-level bureaucrats, professionals of the provision 
of internal security and the Bundesgrenzschutz, as well as politicians in the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior and the Chancellery. Influenced by current interpretations of historical 
experiences, these elites developed a discourse emphasising the security function of borders 
which paralleled the one on the European level. This discourse represented a common 
ground between the institutional interests of internal security, border professionals and 
politicians aiming to retain the governance ability of the modern state. In negotiations, 
Germany adopted a role in which it mainly provided the technical competence to reach the 
objective of internal security. The result was a special emphasis on compensatory measures 
which also found entry into the final Schengen Agreements.
In the case of Germany, the historical heritage of lack of territorial identity and the self­
definition against eastern neighbours has contributed to an underlying feeling of dangers 
emanating from the East. While true social learning and a common perspective have 
arguably accompanied post-war changes in Western Europe, the transformations in the 
East were met with much less political and structural changes in their Western partners. 
The perspective of a ‘common fate’ was much less expressed on the Western side.
Chapter four outlined Germany’s historical relationship with its borders and emphasised an 
uneasiness of historic national and territorial identity. A survey of Germany’s history 
showed a lack of continuity with regard to national identity and territorial state formation. 
Contrary to the evolution of other European states, the German ethnic principle of 
nationhood was not connected to territorial consolidation and concentration. Universalism 
and political plurality combined to a political entity which was much more a federation of 
territorial rulers than a territorial state. Germany became ‘the late nation’, founding a state 
only in the late 19th century and a territorial democracy only in 1919. N o geographical 
barriers served to circumscribe a German territory. This meant that no territorial image was 
fixed to the image of Germany. German-ness was an abstract idea, manifested in language 
and culture, but not projected onto a limited area. Indeed, German culture was spread 
much further east than the states inhabited by German speakers. From the Middle Ages 
onwards, the influence of German language and culture extended eastward into Central and
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Eastern Europe. Despite the close involvement in the region, the definition of German­
ness happened in opposition to the Slav and the Western neighbours.
This territorial instability was also shown to be mirrored in the history of current German 
borders. Especially the eastern borders changed location dramatically over the centuries, 
while the Western borders with France were often objects of conflicts, but actually 
consolidated over time. The current Eastern borders of Germany were all set after World 
WarH.
Although the German question can be considered as ended with German unification, a 
heritage of uncertainty with regard to the East has remained. The East was shown as the 
region against which Germany defined itself, culturally and politically. Eastern Europe was 
not only associated with a lack of civilisation at times, but also with a lack of political 
culture and stability. A threat emanating from the East became a deeply-engrained 
possibility for Germans. Negative associations with the East from Mongols to Russians 
were present in German language until late in the 20th century -  living alongside a 
fascination with Central and Eastern European history and culture. This ambiguous 
relationship to the East received new life in the discussions regarding the need of border 
controls. By pointing to the possible dangers emanating from the East, politicians and 
security experts could refer to an existing framework of interpretation. Even the term 
‘ Volkerwanderung (migration of the peoples)736 used in the debates was a reference historical 
migrations between the 3rd and 6th centuries. The residue and current interpretation of 
German relationships with Western and Eastern neighbours therefore was important for 
the German position in discussions on border policies.
Current interpretations of past experiences and perspectives were influential for a position 
in Germany which justified the need for stricter border controls with the danger of 
uncontrollable waves of immigration. While a very real possibility of further immigration 
existed, exaggerated numbers played on existing fears. The projected immensity of 
numbers turned immigration into a security issue, instead of a challenge to social policy. A 
similar interpretation could be applied to international crime. Here, however, it has to be 
acknowledged that projections on international crime did exist and were indeed used as a 
justification for increasing border controls and compensatory measures, but projections in 
fact underestimated the actual developments. Nevertheless, the debate regarding cross­
736 Migration of the peoples
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border crime associated the East with an area of instability and turned the issue into a 
security issue.
Chapter four also showed that Germany never saw itself as a country of immigration. 
Contrary to that image, Germany was crucially influenced by migration both in and out of 
the country. Already in the latter third of the 16th century, immigration into Germany began 
with religious refugees. Huguenots, Dutch, Waldensians and Salzburg people were greeted 
with economic privileges and cultural autonomy in the 17th century. Industrialisation at the 
end of the 19th century led to immigration of Eastern workers. This continued also in the 
first decade of the 20th century. Germany was obviously also a country of emigration -  
from the Eastern settlements from the 12th century onwards to the mass emigration to 
America in the 19th century. While the latter has stayed in public consciousness, the fact 
that Germany also was a country of immigration in the past was ignored.
It has been demonstrated that a traditional division between Germans and ‘Fremde’ 
(foreigners) in German identity can partly explain this phenomenon. A fear of foreigners 
existed due to projections and images of danger connected with ‘others’. Klaus Bade 
analysed that not only the clear distancing (‘Abgrenzung’!) of the own from the suspicious 
foreign was the aim, but also the security of the own identity against a foreign identity 
whose only function was at times to be the opposite of the own: ’Oft ging und geht es 
dabei nicht nur um die Abgrenzung des vertrauten Eigenen vom beargwohnten Fremden, 
sondern auch um die Sicherung der eigenen durch Abgrenzung von einer fremden 
Identitat, die sich zuweilen in der Funktion erschopft, das Gegenbild zur eigenen zu 
sein.’737 This division between home and others has therefore led to a denial of the reality 
of immigration into Germany in the past, such as the migration of refugees and 
‘Gastarbeiter’ from the 1970s onwards. This denial led to a discrepancy of public 
perception and reality. It was argued that a fear of immigration from the East and the 
necessity of protection from the East was at least partly influenced by the uncertainty 
which resulted from this discrepancy.
At the same time, the steadily rising numbers of incoming foreigners into Germany in the 
1980s and 1990s were a reminder of the fact that Germany had to deal with immigrants but 
had no immigration policy. All the more so since a substantial part of the immigrants were 
so-called ethnic Germans (Aussiedler), whose claim to a German passport was rooted in the
737 Klaus J. Bade, Homo Migrans. Wanderungen (Essen: Klartext, 1994).
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German law of descent. Their lack of knowledge of current German culture and language 
made them appear to many as foreigners. Thus, the old distinction between foreigner and 
‘German* engendered problems also in the present. The lack of clarity and of a capable 
policy dealing with immigration led to an uncertainty in society and a vague feeling of 
uncontrollability.
It has also been demonstrated that the changes after 1989 and the opening of Eastern 
Europe for the West reposed the open questions regarding the German relationship with 
the East. While there was an economic and political interest in Central and Eastern 
European states (and also a fascination with Eastern European cultures), the insecurity 
regarding political stability combined with an uncertainty regarding German identity in 
differentiation from Central Europe remained. Debates on border controls brought this 
ambiguity to the forefront, highlighting a division between a growing connection to 
Eastern Europe and a necessary protection from instability.
The changes of 1989 engendered concerns of Germany’s neighbours about the country’s 
future orientation. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, feared that Germany 
would use its larger population and economy to dominate the Western European partners 
and even to lay claims to earlier possessions in Eastern Europe. France, too, was concerned 
about Germany turning East. At the same time, there were serious concerns whether 
Germany would be able to control its eastern external border sufficiently well to shield 
France and the other Schengen partners from dangers.
The German post-war experience, the integration into Western structures and the 
development of a democratic and European Germany also influenced the way Germany 
dealt with security problems. The Western orientation begun by Konrad Adenauer has 
become a fixed component of German policies. It views itself as a country of the Western 
world, participating in democratic values, freedom rights and a partner in ensuring security 
collectively. Furthermore, Germany has come to see itself as a Europeanised Germany, 
thus a country whose identity is linked to its membership in European institutions and to 
their common norms. This value orientation also played its part in German perspectives on 
border policies. Security problems -  which linked external and internal security by 
transgressing the border -  were perceived as possible threats to European partners with 
similar social values as much as to Germany. Solutions were to be found on a common 
level. This was to some extent reciprocated by the European partners who were willing to 
use the established mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation in a new subject area.
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Germany’s strong European identity also led it to be less weary of sovereignty 
infringements than other partners. This might partly be explained by the assurance of being 
a big and central European player as opposed to smaller European states. However, 
France, too, displayed much more hesitations in this regard. Historical experience certainly 
played a role in this, since all neighbours of Germany had suffered from German 
occupation and been oppressed by German authorities in recent memory. Furthermore, the 
German national debate had come to concentrate on the necessity of efficient 
compensatory measures. As a result, Germany was willing to agree to the presence of 
foreign police officers in hot pursuit or cross-border observation without a territorial or 
temporal limitation. In an imbalanced solution, all other states restricted these rights much 
more.
During the Schengen negotiations, Germany adopted a security-led perspective, 
emphasising the need for the highest standard of external border control practices and 
compensatory measures. Chapter five presented the main actors in the German debate 
regarding border policies and retraced their concerns. The German government of the time 
emphasised the need to abolish internal border controls in the interests of European 
integration. Chancellor Kohl regarded the borders as barriers both to political and to 
economic integration. This was supplemented by arguments referring to immigration and 
crime as reasons for reinforced border controls. The latter arguments were put forward 
mainly by national security professionals and the bureaucracy of the Ministry of the 
Interior.
The solutions of compensatory measures and external border controls united the interests 
both of security specialists as well as politicians in general. The need to retain the 
governance function provided hitherto by the border meant that solutions had to be found 
that still enabled an enforceable distinction between citizen and foreigner. Most centrally, 
the security function was crucial in this respect. The enforcement of national law depends 
on a limited territory and the real probability of consequences in case of deviance. At the 
same time, security professionals emphasised that borders were useful for law enforcement 
in a pragmatic sense by serving as a filter. While researchers have doubted the usefulness of 
the border for this purpose to the extent that police emphasises it, the awareness of 
population and government of such a role of the border is more central than its actual 
efficiency. Compensatory measures therefore served to replace this function of the border
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for efficiency of law enforcement -  although experts remain divided over the question 
whether such measures can ever replace the identified filter function of the border.
The reasons for the inability of alternative discourses to influence the final shape of the 
Agreements were considered. The problems treated in the Schengen Agreements were 
presented as mainly of a technical nature, their political impact being sidelined during the 
negotiations. The required expert knowledge therefore limited the circle of contributors to 
those well versed in questions of security provision. At the same time, the structure of the 
negotiations between the European level of cooperation and national representatives left 
little room of influence for non-governmental actors. Given that such an 
intergovernmental agreement on a whole complex of issues of internal security was a 
novelty, there was no established procedure for input of dissenters such as NGOs, 
churches, lawyers’ associations etc. to the negotiations.
Even the influence of the German Bundestag and the German Lander was only gradually 
established with the progress of negotiations. The relevant committee of the Bundestag 
was only informed of the progress of negotiations, but became more closely involved only 
in 1990 when Parliament had to vote on the second Schengen Convention. Regular 
hearings with experts from the Ministry of Interior took place, but Parliamentary influence 
was low. The lack of importance of Parliament is also shown by the fact that a special 
working group on Schengen was only formed in January 1990.738
Another reason for the dominance of a security-led discourse lies in the nature of security 
itself. Security actors within the state have the professional and institutional task of 
identifying such threats and offering solutions. This means that some actors have more 
authority to identify a political or social occurrence as a danger and interpret it as a threat. 
With regard to border controls in Germany, these security actors include the Ministry of 
the Interior and the Chancellery, as well as security officials and professionals. These were 
not only closely involved in the Schengen negotiations, but were also present in the 
national public debate, explaining the need of compensatory measures. From the 
institutional perspective of government and security professionals, it was logical to press 
for compensation for the loss of governance and security functions of the internal borders.
738 In principle, the Lander were represented through the Conference of Ministers of the Interior on 
whose decision the federal government negotiated. In practice, the Lander did not have much 
influence on the negotiations themselves. They were influential, however, in spelling out the necessity 
of compensatory measures upon which the mandate to negotiate was based. Only in 1996 were they 
able to send a representative to the negotiations.
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The security debate acted as an argument which ‘beat’ others such as voices for openness 
of the European polity and concerns of building a fortress Europe or limiting civil rights. 
All the more so since the negotiators in Schengen took care to emphasise that the 
‘freedom’ perspective was not neglected. The inclusion of provisions for data protection -  
one of the main worries of opponents -  served as a proof of that during the debate. 
German representatives were especially active in this regard. One reason was the 
established institution of data protection officers and laws in Germany, another the existing 
awareness in the German public for such a problematique.
The structure of the public discourse and the relative influence of the players remained 
similar. Once established, the dual rationale of security and freedom remained largely 
unchallenged. Security experts used a convincing argument of threat and offered a solution 
which was difficult to counter.
The lack of an informed media and public debate can be seen as a weakness of the national 
political process regarding Schengen. While the media did report on impending changes in 
1985, interest remained fairly low during the time of negotiation of the Convention. When 
the SIC was signed, media interest returned to the issue. Relatively few journalists followed 
the ongoing discussions, although there were regular comments asking when the Schengen 
Agreements were finally to be implemented and the borders opened. This development 
was aided by traditionally secluded policy-making in the area of security. Access to 
documents and information on the process was scarce. At the same time, it has to be 
admitted that interest in the ‘mechanics’ of the debate was low.
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3. Germany’s role in the negotiations and the interplay between 
national and European level
Chapter three showed that the origins of the Schengen Agreements were due to a Franco- 
German initiative: the deepening of European integration in which Germany was crucially 
involved implied the lifting of all controls to persons as well as goods, services and capital. 
The French President and German chancellor were both convinced of both the political 
and economic necessity of the step. Chancellor Kohl emphasised the importance of such a 
step for European integration expressly; he also consistently mentioned the importance of 
a European reference for German identity, if future conflicts were to be avoided. It was the 
participation of the two central states in European integration, France and Germany, which 
gave momentum to the development. This opened up a new level of policy-making which 
also would touch upon issues of sovereignty, so that Schengen can rightly be termed a sui 
generis treaty.
Germany’s involvement in the Schengen negotiations was outlined in chapter seven. 
Institutionally, Germany was involved in all important negotiation groups and was able to 
display consistency over time. The consistency in the German approach was due to the a 
number of factors: the administrative lead for the project was located centrally in the 
Chancellery and later in the Ministry of Interior. The location in the administration directly 
subordinated to the Chancellor during the time when the basic foundations of the treaty 
were laid, allowed the coordination of the interests of a number of ministries from 1985 to 
1995 and ensure the congruity of larger European policy goals with those of the Schengen 
negotiations. These political intentions centred around measures which would make 
Europe visible for citizens -  freedom of movement was an important option for this 
policy.
Consistency was also given through the long-standing influence of the Ministry of Interior. 
While officially only one of the ministries represented in the Schengen negotiations, the 
rationale of security was advocated from the start and found entry into the central German 
position. The compensatory measures included in the final agreement already were 
developed from the mid-1980s onwards in German circles of interior policy. Although the 
political and economic perspective was prevalent in the beginning and promoted by the 
Chancellery, the view of possible threats to internal security existed from the start of the 
negotiations and gained prevalence gradually. After 1989, and especially after 1992, a shift
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can be observed in the central objectives from primarily political and economic concerns to 
security issues in which the Ministry of Interior had the expertise. In 1996, the Ministry also 
took over the coordination of the German position for further negotiations.
Within the German delegation, consistency was assured by a relative stability of personnel. 
The government sent high-level bureaucrats and Permanent Secretaries to head the 
negotiations in the Executive Committee and Central Group, as well as the working 
groups. The representatives in the Executive Committee only changed if the office holder 
had been replaced, thus in 1989,1992 and 1998. The stability of the German government 
itself proved advantageous for a consistent policy line. From 1982 to 1998, the 
conservative parties of CDU and CSU were in government in a coalition with the Liberals, 
the FDP. France, for example, had a different development where the governments and 
also the interior policy objectives changed several times during the negotiations.
Chapter seven showed the interplay between the dynamics of European integration and the 
supranational intergovernmental level. European integration had foreseen a right of free 
movement for persons, goods and services from the Treaties of Rome onwards. Germany 
was a convinced subscriber to this policy. While the realisation of such freedoms had been 
politically unfeasible until the beginning of the 1980s, new momentum in European politics 
embraced the economic as well as political necessity for a common European Market. The 
German Chancellor was one of the most prominent and active promoters of this policy.
The intergovernmental Schengen negotiations outside the treaties pre-empted events on 
the EC level. It was the bilateral Franco-German Accord of 1984 which became -  together 
with the Benelux Union -  the founding stone of the first Schengen Agreement. Speeches 
by the German Chancellor show that this step was clearly perceived in reference to 
European objectives -  but taken outside the EC framework. It was later repeatedly 
emphasised that Schengen, which effectively ran parallel and in temporal rivalry to EC-level 
negotiations, was to serve as a model for European enterprises.
The interplay between the national and European level was identified also in the security 
rationale. Firstly, national security was perceived as impossible to be attained by one 
country on its own due to the international nature of security threats. What was seen as 
threatened, however, was the security of states and national societies, not European society. 
While common values of European states were sometimes invoked, the clear emphasis was 
on a threat to national security interests. Protection from this was only to be attained
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through a European security strategy. Thus, any development of a common security 
strategy happened in the name of Members States and for the sake of these states.
Chapters five, six and seven dealt with the national German and European discourse and 
practice regarding border policies. The emphasis of security functions of the border can be 
traced back to common European-level circles as well as to the national level. Germany’s 
involvement in questions of border-related issues reached back before the Schengen 
negotiations. The country was a member of a number of European and international circles 
which dealt with the danger to security of transnational crime and terrorism. Earlier circles 
of security experts (whether Interpol or TREVI, the Pompidou Group or the Vienna 
Group) emphasised the exchange of information and led to the gradual emergence of a 
common definition of dangers and their threats, leaving untouched all questions relating to 
internal security. Chapter five showed that the German debate regarding border controls 
used arguments similar to the European circles for changes in border policies (which were 
outlined in chapter three). This discourse emphasised publicly the political goal of 
European integration and free movement in a framework of security. The dangers 
identified and thus the protection offered through compensatory measures and external 
border controls were largely similar on the German and European level. This may first of 
all be explained simply by the fact that national security experts all over Europe concurred 
in their views of the role of borders by nature of their tasks. Being charged with ensuring 
protection of the state and used to the role of borders in this protection, they referred to 
the same logic of ‘security through borders’ by transferring it to the European level -  
regardless of political implications. Second of all, both on the European and the national 
level, the room for alternative voices was small and did not form a part of the central 
political discourse.
When political necessities pushed for the deepening of European integration by removing 
border controls, the common knowledge of European internal security circles came to 
bear. Although the circles of people meeting in the Schengen negotiations differed from 
those who had met in TREVI, they partly originated in the same institutions and it can be 
assumed that they also shared the concerns of their colleagues who had participated in 
earlier meetings.
The connectedness of the European and the national level can also be seen in the actual 
changes in border controls. European-level measures were negotiated between all Schengen 
Members in unanimity and therefore as a compromise. The emphasis of the participating
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governments varied between them and over time: from a primary concern about freedom 
to one about security. The Schengen Agreements can be regarded as the smallest common 
denominator with regard to security. Some observers have interpreted this to mean that a 
maximum of security measures were taken. However, chapter seven showed that some 
states including Germany had originally hoped to include more far-reaching compensatory 
measures, such as more rights in police cooperation, cross-border observation and pursuit.
It has been shown that at times, national sovereignty concerns were set against European 
security concerns. Cross-border observation and hot pursuit are a good example. As was 
mentioned above with reference to the heritage of past experiences, most governments 
were very hesitant to give up sovereignty rights in this respect.739 The result was that while 
the general right to such measures was written into the Schengen Convention, bilateral 
agreements between member states were to regulate the actual proceedings. This has not 
only led to a diversity of arrangements but also to restrictive handling of the matter in some 
states.
Compromises about these matters on the European level led to additional national 
compensatory measures if states were not assured of the security provided through 
Schengen. In the case of Germany, national measures included the introduction of new 
methods of control (Schleierfahndung), cooperation between services, cooperation with 
eastern neighbours and a new asylum policy (cf. chapter six).
An interesting contradiction emerged: on the one hand, German officials advocated strict 
compensatory measures and the widening of the agenda of measures in order to ensure 
maximum security even in the face of an abolition of external border controls. They also 
presented themselves officially as content with the result reached. Yet many professionals 
doubted the feasibility of the compromise and interpreted subsequent rises of crime at the 
borders as an indication that security could not be maintained. The solution was not to 
plead for additional measures on the European level, but to introduce measures on the 
national level.740 One reason was certainly that the nature of the treaties as a compromise 
made a re-opening of the negotiations on such a basic level impossible.
739 Others had more hesitations in fixing these rights in writing. Benelux countries emphasised that 
according to their experience the practical relevance of these measures was low and that not all had to 
be fixed in writing.
740 Obviously, the Schengen acquis was widened even after 1995, with additional measures strengthening 
security provisions. Cf. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, The Schengen Acquis 
Integrated into the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
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On the other hand, experience showed that national control over national measures to 
provide security was effective. At the same time, the enforcement of such measures at the 
national borders served to underline state authority in a core area of governance.
Influence also occurred from the national German to the European level: German 
influence on the development of a common rationale and compensatory measures can be 
discerned all through the process; it was a central member of a security community before 
1985; it provided expertise and practical solutions in the negotiation process; it pushed for 
the inclusion of many subject areas and strict enforcement of agreed measures.
Practical border controls provide an example of German influence on European 
agreements. Chapter seven has presented the close involvement of Germany in the 
development of compensatory measures. Germany’s role of providing technical 
competence while France provided the political authority in the process can be seen there. 
German experiences in the development of a common data system found entry in the 
development of the SIS; members of the Bundeskriminalamt were crucial in this 
development. Also experiences in actual patrols and controls of the borders were taken up, 
for example in the common handbook on border controls whose original version was 
provided by a German delegate from the Ministry of Interior. Similarly, Germany was 
influential in introducing the system of mutual control. Generally speaking, Germany 
aimed at widening the agenda of compensatory measures to include more and more issues. 
This was opposed by some states such as Luxembourg, but the final large agenda of 
Schengen (which includes for example exchanges on speeding tickets and hooliganism) 
shows that Germany was fairly influential.
The European context for the development of future policies on borders in Germany was 
crucially important. First of all, Germany and the security of its borders were seen in the 
context of other West European countries which faced the same security problems. A 
community of European security experts was responsible for such a view. Secondly, the 
European rationale of integration led to a perceived political necessity to abolish border 
controls. This in turn exacted reactions from security experts who saw additional security 
problems if no compensatory measures were taken. Thirdly, national and European
Communities, 2001).. The basic logic of complementing European measures with national ones 
remained, however. This way, individual states retained national control over important measures to 
ensure public security although the borders were subject to a European regime.
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measures changing the practice of border controls were complementary, and national 
measures can be interpreted as additions to European-level measures.
4. Border functions after Schengen
Schengen created a new distinction between two categories of borders. The internal 
borders became those borders between EC/EU member states who were willing to 
cooperate in the Schengen framework. This included land borders, but also those airports 
and ports which were exclusively used for direct transport to another Schengen state. By 
definition, external borders were consequently all other borders. This definition 
represented a break from the past where only one legal concept of a state border existed -  
with the same implications for citizenship, entry of other states’ nationals etc. Schengen, 
instead, created a common safe space in terms of security, but retained the legal and 
administrative function of the border. It has created a more complicated situation in this 
respect. The whole of the Schengen territory is considered as one unit with regard to 
security. Controls at the external borders enclosing this space have to ensure protection 
against external threats. Also short-term visas are given out according to common 
principles aiming at a uniform standard of security. However, decisive competences remain 
with the national state. The national territory is still the basis for defining citizenship and 
thus the basis for defining legal obligations and rights. The national authorities are also 
responsible for decisions on longer stays of third-country nationals. Equally, the actual 
border controls remain the responsibility for national border services. Also the national 
police is limited to the national borders (except for specifically defined exceptions under 
Schengen).741
The role of borders changed from a situation where a border was in principle expected to 
serve military, legal, control, economic, identity and security purposes. Through the 
Schengen Agreements, a differentiated view of borders has emerged: one kind of borders, 
internal borders of the Schengen area, no longer have a defensive function and also have 
lost much of their economic and identity functions. They remain intact in legal and 
administrative terms, but have a less prominent role for control and security. Before the 
Schengen Agreements, all borders were seen as a potential net through which criminals and 
terrorists could be caught and which represented state power visibly for all people crossing. 
The changes reduced the law enforcement and representative functions of internal borders,
741 Furthermore, Schengen has created ambiguous spaces where it is unclear when third-country 
nationals are regarded as being in the Schengen area (e.g. the airport spaces).
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but necessitated compensatory measures which were conducted in reference to the border. 
These compensatory measures included police cooperation, a common visa policy, the 
Schengen Information System and, most prominently, hot pursuit and cross-border 
observation. Thus, one step removed, the security function of the border remained central.
While the internal borders themselves were no longer to exercise the border functions of 
security and national identity, the eastern borders attained new security meaning because 
they were also ‘external’ borders of the Schengen Area. External borders of Schengen are a 
pre-condition for the system of internal borders to exist. They maintain strict controls, thus 
fulfilling the main security function of borders, replacing the one of internal borders to a 
large extent.
The fact that the national debate in Germany concentrated on security aspects or the 
border as a barrier meant that other aspects were neglected. While the function of the 
(external) border outwards (in terms of deterrence) was considered, signals given to direct 
neighbours were largely ignored. Also, the effects of the border inwards were not part of 
the deliberations. The ability of the border to enable structured relationships and the 
exercise of state power received little attention. Thus, there were not many deliberations 
what a splitting up of the security functions of the border and the representation of the 
state would have on citizens. Horst Eisel’s statement shows that the attention of politicians 
was only on particularly negative effects of the border, the border as a barrier and a symbol 
for national narrowness: ’Man hatte auf diese Weise zweierlei gewonnen: Die Reisenden 
konnen freie Fahrt innerhalb der Gemeinschaft genieften und die Grenzen, zuvor als 
Symbol als nationalstaatlicher Enge empfunden, reduzieren sich visuell auf unsichtbare 
Linien.’742
The emphasis of the kind of security to be provided by borders has changed from an 
emphasis on military security before the end of the Cold War to a protection against threats 
posed to society in the form of illegal immigration and international crime. Another change 
resulting from the security-led debate in Schengen was a growing attention towards the 
‘practical’ security function of borders, providing protection from large-scale social 
phenomena. The actual act of providing security received much more attention both in
742 Eisel, "Interview with Horst Eisel." Translation: One had thus gained two things: Die travellers can 
enjoy free movement within the community and the borders -  formerly perceived as symbols of 
nation-state narrowness -  are visually reduced to invisible lines.
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public and in the tactics of the border guard service than the underlying rationale for 
border controls.
Whether these external borders also have a special role with regard to a European identity 
is open to speculation. The importance of borders for symbolical representation of the 
state is less clear. The differentiation of borders between internal and external borders and 
the different levels of controls and law enforcement at the borders may also lead to a 
differentiation of perceptions of borders in the public. No studies have been made, 
although it is conceivable that the division between safe ‘Schengenland’ and non-safe 
abroad at the borders will have consequences for the development of a European sense of 
identity.
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5. Consequences of Schengen
The continuing importance of borders for the state can be concluded both from the 
framing of the national debates and the result of the Schengen negotiations. The emphasis 
on the relevance of borders for national internal security was clear in the discourse of elites. 
External border controls were seen as vital for ensuring an acceptable level of security 
within the Schengen area, and also the importance of internal borders was emphasised: 
firstly, it was precisely the abolishing of controls at these borders which necessitated the 
whole range of compensatory measures. Secondly, the states retained the right to re­
introduce temporary controls at these borders in the interest of public order or national 
security. Thirdly, additional security measures in the zone around the internal borders were 
stepped up, partly due to the concern of the population regarding trans-border crime. 
Furthermore, the whole public discussion and the actual changes in border controls and 
national security measures have recalled the importance of borders for citizens. Although 
no survey institute seems to have conducted research on opinions regarding the 
importance of borders, the presence of the topic ‘borders and national security’ brought 
the centrality of borders into focus.
At the same time, states, not any European-level arrangement, presented themselves as the 
central actors providing security. This follows the traditional pattern and points to the fact 
that states are presenting themselves as willing and able to fulfil the classic security function 
of the state -  albeit in a manner of coordinated sovereignty. Internal security -  traditionally 
at the heart of national government -  has been presented as feasible only through 
European cooperation.
Borders and the state thus remain of central importance to security also or even especially 
after Schengen. This is not least due to the fact that the self-perception of governments 
includes security as fundamental to governance. As has been shown in chapter two, 
borders have become central to the provision of such security and the authority to restrict 
movement is constitutive for the territorial state. The findings show that the territorial state 
continues to exist as a lock-in, but that governments view the means of achieving security 
in a perspective beyond the state. These changes can not only be understood as an 
adaptation to European integration dynamics but also the beginning of a more 
fundamental change to this historically contingent constellation of state, borders and 
security.
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Nevertheless, the Schengen Agreements did represent a new departure. They provided for 
a comprehensive, binding intergovernmental Agreement which regulated many issues 
which were close to the core of governance. The modalities for the provision of security at 
the borders could no longer be decided upon independently. At the same time, states had 
to rely on their partners to ensure a high standard of control.
The representation of the ‘own’ state as the major actor in terms of internal security 
neglected the fact that the actual decisions with Schengen taken allow considerable 
influence of partner states on decisions regarding national security. It seems that the 
structuring of the national debate avoided the clear admittance that sovereignty had been 
given up.
It is obvious that the actors themselves did not have in mind a major shift of sovereignty 
when negotiating the new arrangement of border controls. In this respect, one has to 
distinguish between the intentions of actors and consequences of these actions. A member 
of the BMI emphasises that the elimination of the border as an integral part of the state 
was not intended, but only the removal of state control functions which were linked to the 
border for strategic and tactical reasons.743
The effect of new arrangements regarding border controls and compensatory measures on 
national governance can only be assessed over time. Changes in perceptions and 
subsequent effects on citizenship and national sovereignty happen but gradually. The 
inclusion of the Schengen Agreements into the European Treaties and the transfer of 
issues of migration and asylum to the first pillar suggest a further shift. It might be that 
citizens will only become aware of this once they feel directly impacted by decisions 
attributable to the European Community level.
Changes in this respect are occurring slowly, but some indications may be perceived already 
now. The public appeals for closing the border due to foot-and-mouth disease in the UK 
and France showed that the public still retained a consciousness of the protecting function 
of the national border. At the same time, this episode also showed that any such protection 
was ineffective in the face of true transnational threats such as highly infectious diseases or 
environmental threats. In the case of violent protesters, the temporary re-installation of
743 Ibid.: „Ihre Zielrichtung war nicht die Aufhebung der Grenzen als eines integralen Bestandteiles des 
Staatsgebildes, sondern die Abschaffung staatlicher Kontrollfunktionen, die aus strategischen oder 
taktischen Griinden mit der Grenze verkniipft waren.“
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controls at the German-Austrian border during the economic summit was perceived by the 
public as a useful measure. Thus, it may be that a differentiation in the perception of the 
role of borders will occur, in which the border can offer protection (even if only temporal) 
against threats emanating directly from identifiable persons, while it is useless against other 
threats.
It remains to be seen whether this difference of perceptions between elites and public of 
the role of borders, but also the ability of the state to protect, is an indication of a further 
rift between policy-makers in European and national politics and the expectations of the 
public. The future of the state and of the European Union depends, however, on a 
concurring view of the role of the state and its ability to fulfil this role.
An interesting specificity of the Schengen process is the fact that the administration acted 
pre-emptively here. While usually re-active, it was the impending abolition of internal 
border controls and the possible threat of large-scale illegal immigration to Western 
Europe which prompted a process of negotiations of counteracting measures. European 
circles had identified a threat of international crime, illegal immigration and terrorism at a 
time at which borders still existed. Yet the lifting of internal border controls was 
immediately interpreted as augmenting the threat to Western Europe. The link between 
border controls and international crime and migration had not been conclusively proven 
yet. It was an established self-reinforcing agreement that border controls had a filter and 
funnel effect. This discourse neglected any discussion as to the efficiency of such a filter 
(whether the heads of crime and the root of the problem could be touched).
The debate regarding border controls centred around security-led arguments so that the 
issue of societal security from crime and immigration became prominent. The national 
German and European debate show important parallels. This may first of all be due to the 
force of the argument of security itself which leaves little possibility for alternative voices. 
Second of all, this congruence of debates may also be ascribed to the influence of security 
experts both on the European and on the national level. Thirdly, the similar emphasis on 
compensatory measures can also be accounted for by the influence which the security­
conscious Germany had on the course of the negotiations of Schengen.
The conclusion of the Schengen Agreements also had significant impacts on the definition 
of security in Europe. An explicit link between freedom and security was made that later 
also found entry in the European concept of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
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Freedom firstly referred to freedom of movement as envisaged in the Treaty of Rome. This 
became one of the rationales for starting negotiations. Gradually, the term freedom was 
also used to designate the idea of freedom from threat. This is a concept from the national 
tradition in which freedom is postulated only to exist under circumstances allowing the 
exercise of freedom rights. Thus, freedom became conditional upon the existence of 
freedom in the European space. The linked concepts of freedom and security employed 
here refer primarily to European nationals, thus ensuring security for those inside the 
European space to enable them to exercise their rights as European and national citizens. 
The pitching of a safe internal area versus an unsafe external area against which one had to 
protect created problems, however.
First of all, it was not clear what the ‘inside’ was. As pointed out, the competencies for 
security provision remained on the state level and for the state level, i.e. German politicians 
emphasised that Germany was still safe. At the same time, this security was only to be 
achieved through coordinated European standards and the definition of a common 
European space of security. At the same time, it was not clear, what the ‘outside’ was. The 
Schengen arrangement seemed to view everyone coming from outside as potentially a 
threat and therefore subject to intensive controls. This alerted all those member states of 
the EC/EU who were not (yet) part of Schengen. Arrangements had to be found which 
satisfied these states that their nationals would not be disadvantaged.
Also in the context of enlargement, the effects of this differentiation were strong. The 
partners in the EU or/and in the Schengen Agreements were portrayed as states with 
similar interests and values, both culturally and in terms of security. They were thus all part 
of the safe inside. This was reinforced by that view that not only did they face the same 
threats as Germany but they also envisaged the same solutions through Schengen (and 
earlier European groups). In principle, they had to be trusted to enforce the measures 
necessary for security. The states east of Germany faced very different challenges and were 
portrayed as resting area for criminals, victims of large-scale corruption as well as origin of 
possible migration and crime. The close control of borders was therefore necessary. While 
this was the general discourse during the Schengen negotiations in the early 1990s, the 
prospects of enlargement have changed the language here. The future members of the 
Union have been increasingly portrayed as making good progress, also in the area of Justice 
and Home Affairs, and as able to apply the Schengen acquis in the future. A period of 
transition for the implementation of free movement is ascribed to economic rather than 
security reasons. The logic of security has therefore been extended to include the accession
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candidates, and the divisive line of the external borders has been pushed further east. The 
problems which such a new border will pose for the accessing states, especially Poland, 
were long not much thematised. For example, the Eastern Polish economy depends also on 
the trade from Byelorussia and Ukraine. Furthermore, not only the signals sent to the 
accession states were ambiguous, but also the signals to states further east. Conditionality 
has been imposed with regard to cooperation of Eastern European states in crime and 
immigration control.
A conclusion is that the interests and concerns of the participating states have shaped the 
agreements, with a lack of attention to the signals sent to ‘outsiders’. East European 
countries are regarded as the origin of threats to Europe with little prospect of change. The 
necessary opposition with which the security logic operates has identified them as lasting 
problems. The negative image of the ‘East’ is therefore repeated, much in the same way as 
the ‘Southern threat’ has emerged. While the structural deficits of such countries in 
comparison to Western and also Central Europe cannot be denied, it remains an important 
question whether these exclusionary signals are a useful basis for future relationships with 
the EU.
What also has been reinforced in the Schengen negotiations is the perception that security 
is to be attained through controls. While security may also be regarded as the absence of 
threat, security has been presented in the negotiations as the successful protection against a 
threat. This implies that a threat had been identified by security experts and a solution 
offered. This thinking remained, however, within the state-centred logic, only shifting the 
solution to the European level. The presentation of possible migration as an anonymous 
phenomenon made regular and thorough controls appear as the best solution. A policy of 
promoting democratic and economic structures in the countries of origin was also pursued, 
but it remained unconnected to the Schengen security rationale.
Security through control at the border and internally is a means of governing which does 
not deal with the sources of the problem. While this may be a temporary solution, it does 
not seem feasible as a structural element of policy. This, however, is the nature of the 
content of the Schengen Agreements. The external borders are to represent the ‘protecting’ 
limits of Europe safeguarding against permanent external threats. Therefore, the 
conclusions of the special European Council in Tampere in 1999 are to be welcomed 
which envisaged a more balanced approach addressing also the roots of migration in 
countries or origin.
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If borders are ‘time inscribed into space or, more appropriately, time written in 
territories’744, then the role assigned to the Schengen borders point to a time which does 
not take into account the reality of citizens’ perceptions and signals sent to the outside. The 
present border is a witness to a time in which the state presents answers to challenges by 
transnational phenomena. This answer consists in an uneasy compromise between re­
assertion of current interpretations of past experiences, national security tasks and 
consequences of European integration. This answer also consists in a new phase in the 
relationship between the national and the European, where a European space of freedom 
of movement coincides with reinforced spatial controls.
Each European state has found its own interpretation of this compromise. For Germany, 
this has meant that its concerns and fears but also its experiences in the provision of 
security have found entry into the European border arrangements. Where its concerns 
could not be entirely lifted by the Schengen arrangement, additional national security 
measures were put in place. It has also meant that Germany was willing to give up 
sovereignty, and also to endanger civil rights, for the sake of ensuring freedom in a context 
of security.
744 Cf. Michel Foucher, "The Geopolitics of European Frontiers," in The Frontiers of Europe, ed. Malcolm 
Anderson and Eberhard Bort (London and Washington: Pinter, 1998), Foucher, "Les frontieres dans 
la Nouvelle Europe."; this saying is sometimes wrongly attributed to Rupnik, see Knud Erik 
Jorgensen, "Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe [Review]," 
Regional & Federal Studies 7, no. 1 (1997).
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Table 1: Federal Ministers of the Interior and their Permanent Secretaries (1983 -  
present)
Election
period
Bundesminister Parliamentary Permanent 
Secretaries
Permanent Secretaries
1983-1987 Friedrich
Zimmermann
(CSU)
Cari-Dieter Spranger
(CSU)
Horst Waffenschmidt
(CDU)
Siegfried Frohlich (until 30.6.1985) 
Hans Neusel (from 1.8.1985)
Gunter Hartkopf (until 19.4.1983) 
Franz Kroppenstedt (from 16.5.1983)
1987-1990 Friedrich
Zimmermann
(CDU) (until 
21.4.1989)
Wolfgang 
Schauble (CDU) 
(from 21.4.1989)
Horst Waffenschmidt
(CDU)
Cari-Dieter Spranger
(CSU)
Hans Neusel 
Franz Kroppenstedt
1990-1994 Wolfgang 
Schauble (CDU) 
(until 26. 11. 1991)
Rudolf Seiters
(CDU)
(from 26.11.1991 to 
7.7.1993)
Manfred Kanther 
(CDU)
(from 7.7.1993)
Horst Waffenschmidt
(CDU)
Eduard Lintner (CSU)
Hans Neusel (until 30.9.1992)
Johannes Vocking (from 1.10.1992 to 
22.6.1993)
Kurt Schelter (from 15.9.1993)
Franz Kroppenstedt 
Walter Priesnitz
1994-1998 Manfred Kanther
(CDU)
Horst Waffenschmidt
(CDU) (until 15.5.1997)
Manfred Carstens (CDU) 
(from 15.5.1997)
Eduard Lintner (CSU)
Franz Kroppenstedt (until 30.4.1995) 
Eckart Werthebach (from 1.6.1995) 
Kurt Schelter
Walter Priesnitz (until 31.3.1996)
1998-2002 Otto Schily (SPD) Fritz Rudolf Korper (SPD)
Dr. Cornelie Sonntag- 
Wolgast (SPD)
Brigitte Zypries 
Claus Henning Schapper
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Figure 2: Federal Ministry of the Interior in 1989745
This overview shows in an exemplary fashion the organisation of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. 
Organisation changed over time (see chapter five), but the overall structure remained the same.
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745 Bund Transparent. Parlament, Regierung, Behdrden, 6 ed. (Bad Honnef: Verlag Karl Heinrich Bock, 1989).
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Figure 3: Schengen negotiation structure746
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746 Bigo, Polices en Reseaux. Bigo has reconstructed the structure of negotiations from a large number of 
interviews and document research. The chart represents only an approximation. The section on 
working groups in chapter 3 outlines the changeable character of the organisation of working groups.
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Table 2: German Representatives in the Executive Committee
Prof. Dr. Waldemar 
Schreckenberger
1985-1988 Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes (Head of the 
Federal Chancellery)
Dr. Lutz Stavenhagen 1988-1991 Staatsminister beim Bundeskanzler (Minister 
of State at the Chancellery)
Bemd Schmidbauer 1992-1995 Staatsminister beim Bundeskanzler (Minister 
of State at the Chancellery)
Prof. Dr. Kurt Schelter 1995-1998 StaatssekretSr im Bundesministerium des 
Innem (Permanent Secretary, BMI)
Claus Henning Schapper since 1998 StaatssekretSr im Bundesministerium des 
Innem (Permanent Secretary, BMI)
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Table 3: Asylum applicants to Germany (1971 -  2001)747
Numbers of asylum applicants in Germany had a peak in 1992 before the ‘asylum 
compromise’ changed the law of asylum. At the same time, the percentages of recognition 
went steadily down.748 It has to be noted, however, that even if refugees did not receive 
individual asylum, a much larger percentage received protection from deportation due to 
political circumstances in their home country.
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Applicants 5,388 5,289 5,595 9,424 9,627 11,123 16,410
Recognition in % 57.0 39.8 33.0 32.4 22.2 18.4 10.0
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Applicants 33,136 51,493 107,818 49,391 37,423 19,737 35,278
Recognition in % 10.3 16.5 12.0 7.7 6.8 13.7 26.6
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Applicants 73,832 99,650 57,379 103,076 121,318 193,063 256,11:
Recognition in % 29.2 15.9 9.4 8.6 5.0 4.4 6.9
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Applicants 438,191 322,599 127,210 127,973 116,367 104,353 98,644
Recognition in % 4.3 3.2 7.3 9.0 7.4 4.9 4.0
Year 1999 2000 2001
Applicants 95,113 78,654 88,287
Recognition in % 3.0 3.0 5.3
747 Source: Berliner Institut fiir Vergleichende Sozialforschung, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Asylbewerber 
und -berechtigte (1971 bis 1995) (1999 [cited September 2001]); available from http://userpage.fu- 
berlin.de/%7Emigratio/Statistik/brasy002.htm, Bundesamt fiir die Anerkennung auslandischer 
Fluchtlinge, Asyl im Blick (Niirnberg: BAFI, 2000), Bundesamt fiir die Anerkennung auslandischer 
Fliichtlinge, Entscheidungen undEntscheidungsquoten seit 1985 (2002 [cited May 2002]); available from 
www.bafl.de/bafl/template/index_statistiken.
748 The percentages of recognition refer to decisions taken that year, not to numbers of asylum seekers.
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Figure 4: Numbers of asylum applicants to Germany (1971 -  2001)
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Table 4: Numbers of asylum applicants to selected European countries (1985 -  
1995)749
These figures show the high number of asylum applicants in Germany in comparison to other 
European countries. The trend in Germany was reversed in 1993 after the change of policies, but 
numbers generally remain high in Europe.
(in thousand)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Germany 73.9 99.7 57.4 103.1 121.3
France 25.8 23.4 24.8 31.6 58.8
UK 5.5 4.8 5.2 5.1 10.0
Austria 6.7 8.7 11.4 15.8 21.9
Sweden 14.5 14.6 18.1 19.6 32.0
Netherlands 5.6 5.9 13.4 7.5 13.9
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Germany 193.0 256.1 438.1 322.6 127.2 127.9
France 56.0 44.8 28.9 26.6 26.0 20.4
UK 30 57.7 32.3 28.0 41.0 55.0
Austria 22.8 27.3 16.2 4.7 5.1 5.9
Sweden 29.4 26.5 84.0 37.6 18.6 9.0
Netherlands 21.2 21.6 20.3 35.4 52.6 29.3
749 Source: SOPEMI 1998 cited after Berliner Institut fiir Vergleichende Sozialforschung, Asylum 
Applicants in OECD-Countries (1999 [cited January 2001]); available from http://userpage.fu- 
berlin.de/%7Emigratio/Statistik/euall008.htm, Bundesamt fiir die Anerkennung auslandischer 
Fliichtlinge, AsylbewerberzugdngeimEuropaiscben Vergleich (2001 [cited September 2001]); available from 
www.bafl.de/bafl/template/index_statistiken.
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Figure 5: Numbers of asylum applicants to selected European countries (1985 -  1995)
■  Germany
■  France
■Austria
□  Sweden
■  Netherlands
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Year
- 3 4 7 -
Appendix
Table 5: Inflow of asylum seekers and ‘Aussiedler’ (1985-1995)750
This table shows that although numbers of asylum seekers in Germany were high, they were topped 
by the influx of ‘Aussiedler’ or ethnic Germans in all years since 1987, except 1991 -  1993.
Year All Asylum seekers ‘Aussiedler’
1985 112,800 73,832 38,968
1986 142,438 99,650 42,788
1987 135,902 57,379 78,523
1988 305,749 103,076 202,673
1989 498,373 121,318 377,055
1990 590,136 193,063 397,075
1991 478,107 256,112 221,995
1992 668,756 438,191 230,565
1993 541,487 322,599 218,888
1994 349,801 127,210 222,591
1995 345,835 127,937 217,898
750 Source: Berliner Institut fiir Vergleichende Sozialforschung, BundesrepublikDeutschlandyAsylbewerber 
und -berechtigte(1971 bis 1995) ([cited), Bundesministerium des Innern, "Das Bundesministerium des 
Innem. Informationen zu Aufgaben und Bilanz, Organisation und Geschichte.", Bundesministerium 
des Innern, "Info-Dienst Deutsche Aussiedler. Zahlen Daten Fakten," ed. Beauftragter der 
Bundesregierung fiir Aussiedlerfragen (Berlin: 2001).
Please note: Since numbers of ‘Aussiedler’ had to be taken from different sources, variations in statistical 
precision had to be accepted.
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Figure 6: Inflow of asylum seekers and ‘Aussiedler’ to Germany (1985 -  1995)
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
cm a ii
— Asylum
Aussiedler’
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Year
- 349-
Appendix
Table 6: Net Migration in selected OECD countries (1987-1995)751
The following shows that Germany had a relatively high number of positive net migration, even 
compared to other European states with a large population. The most striking case in Europe is 
Italy with a change from emigration to substantial immigration within a short period of time.
(including EU/EEA nationals and third-country nationals)
Year France Germany Italy Netherlands UK
1987 44,000 152,486 - 3,880 35355 21,986
1988 57,000 497,867 9,554 27,808 36,072
1989 71,000 746,048 16,324 27,260 81,770
1990 80,000 656,166 24,212 48,730 68,384
1991 90,000 602,563 4,163 49,998 76,416
1992 90,000 776,397 181,913 43,185 44,887
1993 70,000 462,284 181,070 44,418 90,184
1994 50,000 315,568 153,364 20,429 84,249
1995 40,000 398,263 94,012 14,929 116,868
751 Source: Center for International and European Law on Immigration and Asylum, Net Migration 
Including EU/EEA Nationals and Third-Country Nationals to andjromEUMember States (1987to 1997) 
(1999 [cited January 2001]); available from http://migration.uni-konstanz.de/pdf/Net-Migration- 
including-EU.htm. The different rounding of numbers (France versus the other countries) has to be 
taken into account. The original source does not give any explanation.
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Figure 7: Net migration in selected OECD countries (1987 -  1995)
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Table 7: Stolen cars retrieved at the German border (1991 -  1995)
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Retrieved cars 353 725 1176 1947 1334
Table 8: Attacks against foreigners in Germany (1991 -  1996)752
The following shows that attacks on foreigners were a permanent feature in Germany 
during the 1990s. An especially high number of attacks occurred at the beginning of the 
1990s, the reversal of the trend coinciding with the new law of asylum and gradually lower 
numbers of asylum seekers.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Murder
- concluded 3 4 2
- attempted 28 18 8 8 11
Physical
injury
236 576 727 494 372 307
Explosives
offence
12 3 1
Arson 335 596 284 80 37 27
Other 1852 5120 5687 2908 2051 1887
Sum 2426 6336 6721 3491 2468 2232
752 Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Auslanderfragen, Daten und Fakten zur Auslandersituation.
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Table 9: Budget and personnel of BGS (1985-2000)753
This table shows the marked rise of both personnel and budget of the BGS. Number of 
personnel rose steadily during the 1980s and showed a marked rise at the beginning of the 
1990s. The budget rose in parallel (although inflation has to be taken into account).
Year
Policemen all personnel754
All personnel with 
policemen in training
Budget
1985 Ca. 20,000 24,551 1.15 billion
1986 Ca. 20,000 24,446 1.16 billion
1987 24,575 1.23 billion
1988 24,869 1.29 billion
1989 20,538 24,982 1.29 billion
1990 20,700 25,187 1.30 billion
1991 21,800 27,320 31,360 1.66 billion
1992 24,463 29,981 34,733 1.93 billion
1993 26,382 32,062 35,392 2.17 billion
1994 27,514 34,066 39,921 2.43 billion
1995 26,919 34,912 40,440 2.74 billion
1996 28,597 36,924 41,018 2.95 billion
1997 30,008 38,114 40,346 2.86 billion
1998 30,800 38,389 39,631 2.98 billion
1999 30,491 38,128 38,829 3.02 billion
2000
(projected)
39,240 3.29 billion
753 Source: Year reports of the BGS (1989 -  2000) and "Der Bundesgrenzschutz erfiillt als Polizei des Bundes 
verlafilich seine Aufgaben.", "Eine Schneise in der Landschaft.", "Mehr Einsatze als je zuvor."
754 With administration personnel, employees and workers
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Table 10: Border crossings (1986 -  1995)755
This table shows the rise in border crossings since the end of the 1980s according to the 
numbers given by the BGS. It also shows that crossings over the external borders were 
about 63% of all crossings in 1991.
Year Border crossings (in million)
1986 913
1988 998
1989 1076
1990 1137
1991 1157
1991 740 (1991 following without EC-internal border)
1992 864
1993 910
1994 920
1995 907
755 Bundesministerium des Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz-Jahresbericht 1994.", Bundesministerium des 
Innern, "Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1996/97.", Bundesministerium des Innern, 
"Bundesgrenzschutz - Jahresbericht 1998.", Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des 
Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1989.", Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des 
Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1991.", Bundesministerium des Innern, "Tatigkeitsbericht des 
Bundesgrenzschutzes (BGS) 1992."
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Table 11: Cross-border Traffic (1985 -  1995)756
This table shows the number of vehicles crossing the borders.
Year Vehicle crossings
1985 133,393
1986 144,118
1987 151,991
1988 159,294
1989 168,315
1990 181,319
1991 201,138
1992 219,103
1993 217,147
1994 231,079
1995 234,259
756 Bundesverkehrsministerium, ed., Verkehrin Zahlen (Hamburg: Deutscher Verkehrs-Verlag, 1997).
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Table 12: Spending in international travel757
Country Rank in 1993 Spending in 
million $ in 1993
Spending in 
million $ in 
1980
Rank in 1980
United States 1 40,564 10,385 2
Germany 2 37,514 20,599 1
Japan 3 26,860 4,593 6
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland
4 17,431 6,893 3
Italy 5 13,053 1,907 12
France 6 12,805 6,027 4
Canada 7 10,629 3,122 9
Netherlands 8 8,974 4,664 5
Austria 9 8,180 2,847 10
Taiwan 10 7,585 818 23
Belgium 11 6,363 3,272 8
Switzerland 12 5,803 2,357 11
Mexico 13 5,562 4,174 7
Spain 14 4,706 1,229 21
Sweden 15 4,464 1,235 20
Republic of Korea 16 4,105 350 34
Australia 17 4,100 1,749 15
Norway 18 3,565 1,310 19
Denmark 19 3,214 1,560 17
Singapor 20 3,022 322 35
757 Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Tourismus in Zahlen 1995.
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Table 13: German Gross Domestic Product (1983 - 2001)758
The table shows the development of the German economy in the timeframe of the thesis. 
Important is the recession in the German economy in 1992/93 with negative growth.
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Change in % 1.8 2.8 2.0 2.3 1.5 3.7 3.6 5.7 5.0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
2.2 -1.1 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 1.8 3.0 0.6
Figure 8: German Gross Domestic Product (1983 -  2001)
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758 Statistisches Bundesamt, Volkswirtschafiliche Gesamtrecbnungen (Wiesbaden: 2002). The changes are 
given in constant prices: 1984 -  1991 in prices of 1991, from 1991 onwards in prices of 1995. Before 
1992: former West Germany, after 1992: unified Germany.
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